Can the North Carolina Attorney General's Office act on behalf of counties under the Set-off Debt Collection Act to collect judgments against social services recipients?
Plain-English summary
A Fraud Investigator with the Sampson County Department of Social Services asked the AG whether the Attorney General's Office could act on behalf of counties under the Set-off Debt Collection Act (Chapter 105A) after counties obtained judgments against social services recipients.
The AG said no. The Set-off Debt Collection Act lets a "claimant agency" submit a debt to the Department of Revenue, which then intercepts tax refunds and applies them to the debt. The statute defines who counts as a claimant agency and under what circumstances.
N.C.G.S. § 105A-2(1)h authorized the Attorney General's Office to act as a claimant agency "on behalf of any State agency when the claim has been reduced to a judgment." The AG read that text strictly. The AG could represent only State agencies; the statute did not extend the authority to counties. Counties had their own claimant-agency status under § 105A-2(1)c and (d) for Medicaid and Title IV-D (child support) collections, but those subdivisions defined counties as claimant agencies in their own right, not as State agencies.
Because counties were not "State agencies" for purposes of § 105A-2(1)h, the AG's Office could not represent them under that subdivision. Counties wanting to use Chapter 105A for non-Medicaid, non-IV-D collections (such as judgments against social services recipients for other obligations) would have to act through their own representation, not through the AG's Office.
The AG also addressed a separate procedural question: had Chapter 105A been amended by the 1982 Session of the General Assembly? The AG checked with the Legislative Services Office and confirmed Chapter 105A had not been amended in the 1982 Session.
Currency note
This opinion was issued in 1982. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.
Chapter 105A has been amended substantially since 1982, including changes to the categories of claimant agencies, the types of debts eligible for set-off, and the procedural rules. The basic principle (AG representation runs to State agencies, not counties) is durable, but anyone with a current Set-off Debt Collection question should pull the current statutes and current Department of Revenue program rules.
Common questions
Q: Can counties use the Set-off Debt Collection Act at all?
A: Yes, in their own right. § 105A-2(1)c and (d) made counties claimant agencies for Medicaid and Title IV-D (child support) collections. They could submit those debts directly to the Department of Revenue.
Q: What if a county wanted the AG to help with a non-Medicaid, non-IV-D judgment?
A: The AG's Office could not act under § 105A-2(1)h. The county would need to either rely on its own county attorney, retain outside counsel, or look for a different statutory hook.
Q: Could the legislature have given the AG authority over county collections?
A: Yes, by amending Chapter 105A's definitions. The AG's analysis pointed out that the existing definitional structure carefully distinguished counties from State agencies, and that distinction controlled.
Q: Did the AG explain why the statute drew the distinction this way?
A: The opinion did not explore the policy. It applied the statute as written.
Background and statutory framework
Chapter 105A (the Set-off Debt Collection Act) used a definition-driven system. The category "claimant agency" identified the entities entitled to submit debts for set-off:
- § 105A-2(1)c and (d). Counties as claimant agencies for Medicaid and Title IV-D collections.
- § 105A-2(1)h. The Attorney General's Office as a claimant agency for State agencies whose claims had been reduced to judgment.
The interpretive move was textual. The statute distinguished counties from State agencies. The AG could act for State agencies under (h); the AG could not stretch (h) to cover counties because the statute had separately addressed counties in (c) and (d) for specific narrower purposes. The "expressio unius" implication was that counties' rights ran through (c) and (d) only.
The opinion was issued by Rufus L. Edmisten, then-Attorney General, with Henry T. Rosser as Assistant Attorney General.
Citations
- N.C.G.S. § 105A-2 (claimant agency definitions)
- N.C.G.S. § 105A-2(1)c (counties for Medicaid collections)
- N.C.G.S. § 105A-2(1)d (counties for Title IV-D collections)
- N.C.G.S. § 105A-2(1)h (Attorney General's Office for State agencies with judgments)
Source
Original opinion text
Requested By: Lew Gary Darden
Fraud Investigator
Sampson County Department of Social Services
Question: May the Attorney General's Office act on behalf of counties under the Set-off Debt Collection Act?
Conclusion: No.
You have asked whether the Attorney General's Office can act under N.C.G.S. § 105A-2(1)h on behalf of counties that have obtained judgments against social services recipients. We do not construe the applicable statutes to authorize the Attorney General's Office to so act.
N.C.G.S. § 105A-2(1)h provides that the Attorney General's Office is a "claimant agency" for the purpose of "acting on behalf of any State agency when the claim has been reduced to a judgment." (Emphasis added) Under subdivisions c and d of § 105A-2, a county is defined as a "claimant agency" for the purpose of Medicaid and Title IV-D collections. The statute does not, however, define a county as a "State agency" for such purpose.
It is our opinion, therefore, that the Attorney General's Office may represent only State agencies, as that term is generally understood, for collections under Chapter 105A and that it is not authorized to represent counties for such purposes.
You have also inquired whether Chapter 105A was amended by the 1982 Session of the General Assembly. We have been informed by the Legislative Services Office of the General Assembly that Chapter 105A was not amended by the 1982 Session.
Rufus L. Edmisten
Attorney General
Henry T. Rosser
Assistant Attorney General