If a county or the State has appropriated less money for Aid to the Needy Blind than is needed to pay every fully qualified applicant, can DHR or the county turn applicants away because the money ran out?
Plain-English summary
L. Earl Jennings, Jr., Director of the Division of Services for the Blind, asked the AG whether the program for Aid to the Needy Blind under G.S. 111-13 through G.S. 111-20 could turn away qualified applicants if the appropriated funds ran short.
The 1980 AG concluded that the program cannot turn away qualified applicants because of insufficient appropriations. The obligation to accept all duly qualified and otherwise eligible applicants is fixed by the statutes; the appropriation level does not modify the obligation.
The reasoning runs in two parts.
Constitutional underpinning. Once a state elects to establish a public assistance program, it must meet constitutional standards and may not arbitrarily deny benefits to a portion of its eligible citizens. The AG cited Sherbert v. Verner, 274 U.S. 398 (the famous Free Exercise Clause case about denial of unemployment benefits). The point is that arbitrary denial of an established benefit on the ground of insufficient funds, when other applicants are receiving the benefit, would violate equal protection. A blind applicant who is fully qualified cannot be denied while another blind applicant who is identically qualified is paid.
Statutory structure. G.S. 111-17 requires that a county's share of Aid to the Needy Blind awards be transmitted to the State Treasurer in equal monthly installments. The statute allows counties to borrow (within constitutional debt limits) to make up any deficiency caused by an insufficient appropriation. Eligibility for the award does not depend on whether the county has timely paid its share. The award is paid; the county's share remains a debt the county must satisfy.
The AG acknowledged the practical limit: public officials cannot do impossible acts. If the absolute unavailability of funds would make payment impossible, the program's promise becomes a budget-constrained promise. But the opinion explicitly bracketed that hypothetical and addressed only the realistic scenario where appropriations are insufficient but funds can be raised.
If a county fails to pay its share, the deficiency carries forward into the next fiscal year as part of the county's appropriation and tax levy. G.S. 111-17 also authorizes the Department to withhold allocation of funds to a county that fails to provide for its share. The structure makes the county legally responsible for the shortfall and gives DHR enforcement tools.
The interest-rate constraint at the time on county borrowing might have made G.S. 111-17's authorization to borrow ineffective in practice. The opinion flagged this as a practical concern but did not change the legal conclusion.
Currency note
This opinion was issued in 1980. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here. Aid to the Needy Blind was part of the categorical assistance programs that were partially federalized under the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program in 1974. The state-administered structure described in this opinion has been substantially superseded for most blind individuals. The state still administers Special Assistance for the Blind and related services, but the funding and eligibility structures have changed significantly. Modern questions should be addressed under current Chapter 111 and Chapter 108A law.
Historical context: what the AG concluded
The opinion's constitutional move is the more analytically interesting piece. The AG framed insufficient-appropriations denial as an equal protection problem. If the state has decided to operate an assistance program for the blind, it cannot arbitrarily decide that some qualified applicants will be paid and others will not based on when they applied or whether the budget held out.
The Sherbert v. Verner citation is an unusual one for a state public assistance question. Sherbert is best known as a Free Exercise Clause case about a Seventh-Day Adventist denied unemployment benefits because she would not work on Saturday. But Sherbert also stands for the broader principle that benefits, once granted as a category, cannot be denied to qualified individuals on grounds that violate fundamental rights. The AG used this proposition to bridge from the federal Free Exercise context into the equal protection framework: the State has set up the program, eligibility is statutory, and turning eligible applicants away because of arbitrary fiscal cutoffs raises constitutional concerns.
The statutory analysis is more straightforward. G.S. 111-17 is the funding split provision. The program is funded from county, State, and federal sources. The county's share is to be paid monthly to the State Treasurer. The statute provides for the county to borrow within constitutional debt limits to make up any deficiency. The structural assumption is that the program is paid first, and then funding follows; the county is obligated to fund its share retroactively if necessary.
The opinion also flagged the enforcement angle. G.S. 111-17 includes mandatory withholding of allocations to a county that fails to fund. DHR can use the withholding mechanism as a stick to ensure county compliance. The county's failure to fund does not become a license to deny eligibility to qualified individuals.
The "impossible acts" caveat is the AG's acknowledgment that abstract legal obligations have practical limits. If a county genuinely could not raise the money, the obligation might run aground on impossibility. But the opinion makes clear that this is a narrow exception, not the general rule, and that the realistic case is an appropriations shortfall that can be filled by borrowing or by subsequent-year levies.
Background and statutory framework
Aid to the Needy Blind was one of North Carolina's categorical public assistance programs in the pre-SSI era. The federal Social Security Act of 1935 established the framework for state-administered categorical assistance programs (Aid to the Aged, Aid to the Blind, Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled, Aid to Families with Dependent Children). States that participated received federal matching funds and administered the program through state agencies.
In North Carolina, the Aid to the Needy Blind program was housed within DHR's Division of Services for the Blind. G.S. 111-13 created the program and assigned supervision to DHR. G.S. 111-18 directed DHR to make payments to qualifying recipients. G.S. 111-17 set up the funding structure, dividing the cost among county, State, and federal sources and requiring monthly county remittance to the State Treasurer.
The Supplemental Security Income program, enacted in 1972 and effective in 1974, federalized most categorical assistance for the aged, blind, and disabled. After 1974, SSI took over the bulk of cash assistance for blind individuals, with state supplementation programs filling specific gaps. The state-administered Aid to the Needy Blind structure described in this opinion was already on the decline by 1980 but had not been entirely subsumed.
The county's role in funding stems from North Carolina's tradition of local administration of social services. County DSS offices administer eligibility determinations and make payments, with funding pooled from county, state, and federal sources. The counties were responsible for a portion of the cost of categorical assistance programs, and the General Assembly's funding split assumed each county would appropriate its share.
The constitutional debt limit referenced in G.S. 111-17 is the constitutional limit on county borrowing without voter approval. The interest-rate cap that the opinion flagged as making borrowing ineffective in practice was a then-current statutory ceiling on the rate counties could pay; in 1980's high-interest-rate environment, the cap might have been below market, making it hard for counties to actually borrow.
Common questions
What was a "duly qualified and otherwise eligible" applicant?
A person who met the program's statutory eligibility criteria: legal blindness as defined by the program, residency in the relevant county, income and resource limits, and any other categorical requirements. The opinion did not work through the eligibility criteria; it took eligibility as given and addressed only the consequence of running out of money.
Could DHR refuse to certify a county's deficiency?
DHR's role under G.S. 111-17 includes the withholding-of-allocations enforcement mechanism. If a county failed to pay its share, DHR could withhold State funds to the county, which presumably would force the county to address the deficiency. The withholding is an enforcement tool, not a permission to deny applicants.
What if the State's own appropriation was insufficient?
The opinion focused on the county-share scenario but extended the same principle to State funds. The State's failure to appropriate enough money does not authorize denying eligible applicants. The State would have to find the money or amend the statute.
Did anyone actually borrow under G.S. 111-17 to fund Aid to the Needy Blind?
The opinion does not say. The flagged practical concern about interest-rate caps suggests that borrowing was difficult in 1980. In practice, deficiencies might have been carried forward into the next year's appropriation as the AG described.
Does this principle apply to all public assistance programs?
The opinion's analysis is rooted in the structure of Aid to the Needy Blind specifically, but the constitutional principle (a state cannot arbitrarily deny eligible applicants once a program is established) is general. Similar reasoning would apply to other categorical assistance programs with similar funding structures. The federalized programs (AFDC, SSI, Medicaid) have additional federal entitlement protections that further strengthen the conclusion.
Source
- Landing page: https://ncdoj.gov/opinions/counties-department-of-human-resources-aid-to-the-needy-blind/
Citations
- G.S. 111-13
- G.S. 111-17
- G.S. 111-18
- G.S. 111-20
- Sherbert v. Verner, 274 U.S. 398, 10 L.Ed. 2d 965
Original opinion text
Requested By: L. Earl Jennings, Jr. Director Division of Services for the Blind Department of Human Resources
Question: Under the provisions of G.S. 111-13 through G.S. 111-20, what is the requirement upon the Department of Human Resources and the individual counties with respect to accepting all cases involving applicants for special assistance to the blind, in which the applicants fully satisfy the eligibility requirements, regardless of the amount of funds appropriated for that purpose?
Conclusion: The requirement upon the Department of Human Resources and the Boards of County Commissioners of the individual counties to accept all duly qualified and otherwise eligible applicants for special assistance to the blind remains the same and is not reduced or limited by the amount of funds appropriated by a county or by the General Assembly for the specific purpose.
The program for Aid to the Needy Blind mandated by G.S. 111-13 through G.S. 111-20 is a State program. The Department of Human Resources is charged with the supervision of its administration (G.S. 111-13) and with making the payments to persons qualifying for awards thereunder (G.S. 111-18). Once a state elects to establish a program for public assistance, it must meet constitutional standards and may not arbitrarily deny to a portion of its citizens the benefits of such program. Sherbert v. Verner, 274 U.S. 398, 10 L.Ed. 2d 965. An applicant who is fully qualified and eligible must be granted suitable relief under the applicable laws and regulations. For a board of county commissioners or the Department of Human Resources to deny that relief because of the inadequacy of current county and/or State appropriations would constitute a violation of that applicant's constitutional right to equal protection of law.
We realize, of course, that public officials may not be required to do impossible acts such as the payment of awards where the absolute unavailability of funds would make payment of the total of such awards an impossibility. However, the pertinent statutes do not make the payment of these awards contingent upon whether the county of residence of the recipient has made timely payment of the full amount of its share of such relief granted in that county as required by G.S. 111-17. That section provides that such award shall be paid from county, State and federal funds available. (This Opinion does not attempt to deal with the hypothetical situation where adequate funds for the full payment of all awards cannot be made available to the Department of Human Resources.)
Nothing theretofore said implies an opinion by this Office that the several counties are excused from payment of their share of the total amount of relief granted to blind applicants. G.S. 111-17 requires that a county's share of such be transmitted to the State Treasurer in equal monthly installments. It permits counties to borrow within constitutional limitations, to make up any deficiency in its share caused by insufficiency of its appropriation. We believe that G.S. 111-17 imposes an obligation of the highest priority upon the several counties to use all lawful means to pay their share of the total relief granted in a timely manner. In the event it becomes absolutely impossible for a county to pay its full share of such assistance during a given fiscal year, the resulting deficiency remains a portion of the county's share to be provided for in its next appropriation and tax levy, pursuant to G.S. 111-17. Failure of a county to so provide would subject it to the sanction of that Section including the mandatory withholding of allocation of funds by the Department of Human Resources.
It is recognized that the provisions of G.S. 111-17 permitting a county to borrow to meet its part of the amount required for such aid may currently be rendered ineffective by the statutory limitation upon interest which may be paid.
Rufus L. Edmisten
Attorney General
William F. Briley
Assistant Attorney General