Can North Carolina use its uniform reciprocal enforcement of support law to enforce child support obligations between NC residents and residents of West Germany, the same way it enforces support orders across state lines within the U.S.?

Plain-English summary

The Director of the Social Services Division of the Department of Human Resources asked the AG a practical international-family-law question. North Carolina's Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (URESA), codified at N.C. Gen. Stat. 52A-1 to 52A-32, allows NC courts to enforce support orders against obligors in other reciprocating jurisdictions and to receive enforcement of NC orders by those jurisdictions. The question: does West Germany count as a reciprocating jurisdiction under the NC URESA?

The AG said yes.

The analysis traces the statutory evolution.

The original URESA. When NC first adopted URESA in the 1950s, "State" was defined narrowly. The pre-1975 version of N.C. Gen. Stat. 52A-3(8) covered only "any state, territory, or possession of the United States, and District of Columbia, in which this or a substantially similar reciprocal law has been enacted." Foreign nations were not included.

The 1968 RURESA revision. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws revised URESA in 1968 (the revised version is sometimes called RURESA). The revised definition of "State" was expanded to include "any foreign jurisdiction in which this or a substantially similar reciprocal law is an effect." The expansion reflected a deliberate choice at the September 1967 conference: rather than seeking federal involvement in international support enforcement (which had practical difficulties about which federal agency would carry the function), the conference decided to let each state expand its URESA definition to include foreign nations.

NC's 1975 amendment. By 1971, nineteen states had amended their URESA definitions to permit reciprocity with foreign nations. North Carolina had not. In 1975, NC caught up. N.C. Gen. Stat. 52A-3(13) (the renumbered "State" definition) now reads: "any state, territory, or possession of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the provinces of Canada in which reciprocity can be effected by administrative action, and any foreign jurisdiction in which this or a substantially similar reciprocal law is in effect." The "any foreign jurisdiction" clause is the operative international provision.

Application to West Germany. The AG reviewed West German support law and found it substantially similar to North Carolina's. Both jurisdictions cover legitimate and illegitimate children up to age 18; neither has a statute of limitations for paternity; both determine support by need and ability to pay; both recognize foreign support orders or enforce via standard URESA petitions; both use contempt-like proceedings for enforcement. The AG noted that California and Oklahoma (which used the same URESA definition language) had already determined West Germany qualified as a reciprocating jurisdiction. West German child support authorities had also indicated through correspondence their willingness to reciprocate.

The constitutional objection. Article I, Section 10 of the U.S. Constitution prohibits states from entering into treaties with foreign nations. A predictable objection was that URESA enforcement with a foreign nation amounts to a state-foreign treaty. Blouin v. Dembitz, 367 F. Supp. 415 (D.N.Y.), aff'd 489 F.2d 488 (2d Cir. 1973), considered and rejected that objection. The court held that URESA grants the foreign jurisdiction the same procedural remedies in NY courts that the foreign jurisdiction grants to U.S. citizens, which is not a compact with a foreign government and does not disrupt foreign relations.

The practical conclusion. With the 1975 amendment in place, with West German law substantially similar, with West German authorities willing, and with the constitutional objection rejected, NC could begin processing URESA petitions to and from West Germany. The opinion notes that NC had already begun similar enforcement with Ontario, Canada under the same statutory authority. West Germany was the next logical step.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1979. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

URESA has been largely replaced in NC and across the U.S. by the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA), which provides a more modern framework for interstate and international support enforcement. The 1996 federal welfare reform legislation (PRWORA) required all states to adopt UIFSA as a condition of federal child support funding. International support enforcement is now also governed by the 2007 Hague Convention on the International Recovery of Child Support and Other Forms of Family Maintenance (which the U.S. ratified and which entered into force in 2017). Germany (reunited since 1990) is a party to the Hague Convention. Anyone with a current international support enforcement question should consult UIFSA, the Hague Convention, federal IV-D program regulations, and current state-level procedures rather than relying on this 1979 URESA framing.

Historical context: what the AG concluded

The opinion is a careful piece of statutory and policy analysis on the international scope of a uniform act.

URESA's purpose and history. URESA was originally adopted in the early 1950s as a uniform mechanism for enforcing support obligations across state lines. The problem it addressed was structural: the obligor was typically outside the dependent's home state, the dependent could not afford to litigate in the obligor's jurisdiction, and federal courts were closed to domestic relations matters. URESA created a two-state procedure: the dependent files in her home state (the "initiating" state), which transfers the petition to the obligor's state (the "responding" state) for enforcement. Each state used its own procedural law to handle its side of the petition.

Kline v. Kline, 542 S.W.2d 499 (1976), Thompson v. Kite, 522 P.2d 327 (1974), and Rainey v. Rainey, 536 S.W.2d 617 (1976), are out-of-state cases supporting the proposition that URESA is liberally construed to effect its purpose of enforcing parental support duties.

The international expansion. The 1968 RURESA revision expanded the definition of "State" to include any foreign jurisdiction with a substantially similar reciprocal law. The expansion was deliberate: international support cases had been arising for decades, and the existing federal-court route was effectively closed by the domestic-relations exception. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws judged that state-level reciprocity, rather than federal action, was the most practical path forward.

NC's 1975 amendment. NC adopted the international-jurisdiction expansion in 1975, joining the nineteen states that had already done so by 1971. The 1975 amendment also added the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and "the provinces of Canada in which reciprocity can be effected by administrative action." The Canada language reflects a recognition that some Canadian provinces handle child support administratively rather than through court orders, and that NC reciprocity could effectively reach those provinces through administrative coordination.

The substantially-similar test. The statute's "substantially similar reciprocal law" standard requires a substantive comparison of the foreign jurisdiction's support framework with NC's. The opinion's review of West German law identifies five points of similarity:

(1) Children covered. Both jurisdictions cover legitimate and illegitimate children up to age 18.

(2) Paternity limitations. Neither has a statute of limitations for paternity actions.

(3) Support amount. Both use a need-and-ability-to-pay framework.

(4) Recognition of foreign orders. West German courts recognize and enforce foreign support orders; where no foreign order exists, a standard URESA petition can be sent to German authorities for issuance of a German order.

(5) Enforcement mechanism. Contempt-like proceedings similar to those used in NC.

The AG concluded that the West German framework was, if anything, broader than NC's. That breadth supported the conclusion that the West German law was substantially similar to NC's for URESA purposes.

The Blouin constitutional analysis. Blouin v. Dembitz, 367 F. Supp. 415 (D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd 489 F.2d 488 (2d Cir. 1973), is the key constitutional authority. The argument considered and rejected: Article I, Section 10 of the U.S. Constitution prohibits states from entering treaties with foreign nations, and URESA enforcement against a foreign-nation obligor amounts to such a treaty. The court rejected the argument on two grounds. First, URESA does not create a compact; it provides reciprocal procedural remedies that operate through each jurisdiction's own courts. Second, URESA enforcement does not disrupt or embarrass U.S. foreign relations; it operates entirely through domestic procedural channels with no diplomatic involvement.

The doctrinal point is that reciprocity through statutory recognition is different from a treaty in two important ways. A treaty creates binding international-law obligations; a statutory recognition does not. A treaty is negotiated between sovereigns; a statutory recognition is a unilateral state act that the foreign jurisdiction is free to honor or not.

The other-states corroboration. The AG noted that California and Oklahoma (using the same statutory language) had already determined West Germany was a reciprocating jurisdiction. The other-states pattern provided some assurance that NC's conclusion was within the mainstream of URESA interpretation.

The willingness signal. West German child support authorities had indicated through correspondence willingness to reciprocate. The "substantially similar" test is a statutory question, but practical reciprocity also requires the foreign authorities' actual willingness to handle U.S. petitions. The correspondence confirmation removed any doubt on that front.

For the NC Social Services Division in 1979, the operational takeaway was: process URESA petitions to and from West Germany the same way you process them to and from Ontario or any other reciprocating jurisdiction. The legal framework supports the procedure. Coordinate with West German child support authorities through the existing correspondence channels.

Common questions

What is URESA?

The Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, a uniform statute first adopted in the early 1950s and now codified across all U.S. states. URESA provides a two-state procedure for enforcing support orders across jurisdictional lines without requiring the dependent to travel to the obligor's jurisdiction. URESA has now been largely superseded by UIFSA (the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act) and by international treaties like the 2007 Hague Convention.

What does "substantially similar reciprocal law" mean?

A statutory standard requiring the foreign jurisdiction's support framework to be substantively comparable to NC's. The AG identified five points of comparison: who is covered (legitimate and illegitimate children), paternity limitations, support amount determination, recognition of foreign orders, and enforcement mechanism. West Germany's law was at least as broad as NC's on each of these dimensions.

Why doesn't URESA international enforcement violate the federal treaty clause?

Because URESA does not create a treaty. It is a unilateral state statute providing reciprocal procedural remedies through each jurisdiction's own courts. The foreign jurisdiction is free to honor or not honor NC petitions; there is no binding international-law commitment. Blouin v. Dembitz (1973) is the constitutional authority rejecting the treaty-clause objection.

Did West Germany have to also recognize NC orders?

Yes, in practical terms. The "reciprocal" in URESA means both directions: NC enforces orders coming from the foreign jurisdiction, and the foreign jurisdiction enforces orders coming from NC. The substantially-similar test focuses on the foreign framework's compatibility with NC's, but the practical operation requires the foreign jurisdiction to actually accept and process NC petitions.

What about other countries beyond West Germany?

The 1975 NC amendment's "any foreign jurisdiction" language is general; the substantially-similar test has to be applied jurisdiction by jurisdiction. The opinion treats West Germany specifically because that was the question presented. Other foreign jurisdictions would require their own analysis. The opinion's analytical framework (review of substantive support law, willingness to reciprocate, constitutional analysis) would apply.

What was special about Ontario, Canada?

The 1975 NC amendment specifically referenced "the provinces of Canada in which reciprocity can be effected by administrative action." Ontario had been the first Canadian province to develop URESA-compatible administrative procedures. NC had already begun reciprocity with Ontario by 1979. The Ontario experience demonstrated that the new international-jurisdiction provision was operating in practice.

Is West Germany still a reciprocating jurisdiction with NC?

The 1979 framework has been superseded. Germany (reunified since 1990) is a party to the 2007 Hague Convention on the International Recovery of Child Support, which the U.S. ratified and which entered into force in 2017. NC also follows UIFSA. Current international support enforcement with Germany operates through that more modern framework, not through URESA. The 1979 opinion's basic conclusion (that international support enforcement is permissible and that German law is substantially similar) generally holds, but the operative legal framework has changed.

What kinds of support obligations does URESA cover?

Child support primarily; some applications to spousal support depending on the jurisdiction. URESA is designed for enforcement of existing support obligations rather than establishment of new ones. Where the dependent has no existing order, a standard URESA petition asks the responding jurisdiction to issue a new order.

Background and statutory framework

The URESA statutory framework. N.C. Gen. Stat. 52A-1 to 52A-32 (Chapter 52A) is NC's URESA. N.C. Gen. Stat. 52A-2 states the purposes: "to improve and extend by reciprocal legislation the enforcement of duties of support and to make uniform the law with respect thereto." N.C. Gen. Stat. 52A-3 contains the definitions.

The definition of "State." Pre-1975, N.C. Gen. Stat. 52A-3(8) defined "State" to include "any state, territory, or possession of the United States, and District of Columbia, in which this or a substantially similar reciprocal law has been enacted." The 1975 amendment renumbered the definition as 52A-3(13) and expanded it to include "the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the provinces of Canada in which reciprocity can be effected by administrative action, and any foreign jurisdiction in which this or a substantially similar reciprocal law is in effect."

The 1968 RURESA national revision. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws revised URESA in 1968, expanding the "State" definition to include foreign jurisdictions. The revision reflected a 1967 conference decision to handle international support enforcement through state-level reciprocity rather than federal action.

The case law. Kline v. Kline, 542 S.W.2d 499 (1976), Thompson v. Kite, 522 P.2d 327 (1974), and Rainey v. Rainey, 536 S.W.2d 617 (1976), are out-of-state authorities supporting liberal construction of URESA. Blouin v. Dembitz, 367 F. Supp. 415 (D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd 489 F.2d 488 (2d Cir. 1973), is the constitutional authority rejecting the treaty-clause objection to international URESA enforcement.

The West German law comparison. West German support law covers legitimate and illegitimate children up to age 18, has no statute of limitations for paternity, determines support by need and ability to pay, recognizes foreign orders or issues new orders on URESA petitions, and enforces through contempt-like proceedings. The AG concluded the framework was substantially similar to NC's (and in some respects broader).

The other-states pattern. California and Oklahoma had previously determined West Germany was a reciprocating jurisdiction under their analogous URESA provisions. NC was joining an existing pattern, not breaking new ground.

Citations

• N.C. Gen. Stat. 52A-1 to 52A-32 (NC URESA, Chapter 52A)
• N.C. Gen. Stat. 52A-2 (URESA purposes)
• N.C. Gen. Stat. 52A-3(8) (pre-1975 definition of "State"; limited to U.S. jurisdictions)
• N.C. Gen. Stat. 52A-3(13) (1975 amendment; expanded definition of "State" to include Puerto Rico, Canadian provinces with administrative reciprocity, and foreign jurisdictions with substantially similar reciprocal laws)
• Kline v. Kline, 542 S.W.2d 499 (1976) (URESA liberally construed to effect parental support duty)
• Thompson v. Kite, 522 P.2d 327 (1974) (URESA's purpose of prompt expeditious enforcement)
• Rainey v. Rainey, 536 S.W.2d 617 (1976) (URESA as commercial and expedient means of enforcing support orders for parties in different jurisdictions)
• Blouin v. Dembitz, 367 F. Supp. 415 (D.N.Y.), aff'd 489 F.2d 488 (2d Cir. 1973) (URESA international enforcement does not violate constitutional prohibition on state-foreign treaties)
• 4 Family Law Reporter 4017 (May 2, 1978) (background on URESA's international application)

Source

• Landing page: https://ncdoj.gov/opinions/social-services-child-support-international-reciprocal-enforcement-of-support-obligations/

Original opinion text

Requested By: Robert H. Ward, Director, Social Services Division, Department of Human Resources

Question: Is the Nation of West Germany a foreign jurisdiction which has a substantially similar support law such that reciprocal enforcement may be effectuated under the North Carolina uniform reciprocal enforcement of support act (N.C. Gen. Stat. 52A-1 to 52A-32)?

Conclusion: Yes.

The Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (hereinafter referred to as URESA) is codified in the North Carolina General Statutes under Chapter 52A. As stated in 52A-2, the purposes of the Chapter "are" to improve and extend by reciprocal legislation the enforcement of duties of support and to make uniform the law with respect thereto."

It is clear that URESA is a uniform law, reciprocal in nature and purpose and should be liberally construed to effectuate its purpose to accomplish and enforce the duty of a parent to support his children. Kline v. Kline, 542 S.W.2d 499 (1976).

The purpose of URESA is to provide a prompt expeditious way of enforcing the duty to support minor children without getting the parties involved in complex collateral issues. Thompson v. Kite, 522 P.2d 327 (1974).

URESA was designed to provide commercial and expedient means of enforcing support orders for parties who are located in different states or jurisdictions. Rainey v. Rainey, 536 S.W.2d 617 (1976).

From the very onset of its first adoption in the early fifties, it has been clear that URESA has been a success and the various states have adopted it, as well as its amendments, quite readily. The act seeks to apply an equitable and expeditious method of dealing with the complex problems involved. As stated in the Family Law Reporter, 4 FLR 4017, May 2, 1978:

"URESA was a recognition by the states that problems of child and spousal support were no longer a purely local concern. Conventional judicial proceedings were simply unsuitable for effective enforcement of support orders because the absent spouse was normally outside the jurisdiction of the dependent's state courts, because the stay-at-home spouse could rarely afford to track down and sue the absent spouse in another jurisdiction, and because the federal courts have traditionally been closed to domestic relations actions. . . . URESA is an attempt to provide a consistent statutory mechanism for the interstate, and occasionally international, enforcement of support decrees without forcing the person seeking support to bring the action in the absent spouse's jurisdiction. . . . Even though the typical URESA proceeding involves an obligee in one state and an obligor in another state, the act's mechanism may also be used within a state on a county-to-county basis, and is occasionally used in support enforcement cases which cross national boundaries." (P. 4017)

In conference at the September, 1967, meeting of the National Conference on the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, the central committee decided that it would be far more desirable to have state action on reciprocity with foreign jurisdictions than to seek federal involvement. Basically, this was due to the belief that the federal government would be reluctant to delve into matters relating to family law coupled with the additional problem as to which federal agency could properly and effectively represent the various states. Thus it was left to the individual states to broaden the definition in their statutes to include foreign nationals. This was accomplished by a re-examination of the statutory definitions of URESA.

As a result, in 1968 URESA was rewritten such that the definition of "State" in the revised resion of URESA (called RURESA) was expanded to include "any foreign jurisdiction in which this or a substantially similar reciprocal law is an effect."

In 1971, the Council of State Governments on completion of a study of URESA found that nineteen states had provisions in their acts which permitted reciprocity with other nations. North Carolina was not among those enumerated. In this regard, it is noted that North Carolina General Statute 52A-3(8) in 1971 provided that a "State" included "any state, territory, or possession of the United States, and District of Columbia, in which this or a substantially similar reciprocal law has been enacted." Therefore, it is clear that prior to 1975, the North Carolina definition of "State" excluded anything other than a state, territory, or possession of the United States in which a reciprocal law was in effect.

In order to correct the limited scope of the statute and to broaden the definition of "State", in 1975 the statute was amended so that the definition of "State" now includes any "state, territory, or possession of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the provinces of Canada in which reciprocity can be effected by administrative action, and any foreign jurisdiction in which this or a substantially similar reciprocal law is in effect." See N.C. Gen. Stat. 52A-3(13).

Obviously, the North Carolina Legislature intended that the statute as amended should include foreign nations which have a substantially similar reciprocal law within the scope of URESA. Proceeding under the new amendments, North Carolina has recently begun to enforce support laws with Ontario, Canada and thus support duties are now being enforced on behalf of North Carolina residents against residents of Ontario, and vice versa. The amendment made in 1975 clearly evidences legislative intent that the same procedure is permissible with other foreign nations.

It should be noted that the objection to reciprocity with a foreign nation on the grounds that international enforcement violates the constitutional prohibition against individual states entering into treaties with foreign governments has been considered and rejected in at least one case. See Blouin v. Dembitz, 367 F. Supp. 415, D.N.Y.; aff'd 489 F.2d 488 (2d Cir. 1973). In Blouin, supra, the Court held that the statute has reciprocal effect and grants to the foreign jurisdiction the same procedural remedies in New York Courts as the foreign state grants to our citizens. The Court further held that it was not a compact with a foreign government, nor did the statute disrupt or embarrass our relations with other countries. Pp. 417-418.

A review of the law of West Germany reveals that the support laws there are substantially similar to those which exist in North Carolina and, in fact, often are broader than our own. For example, the obligation to support includes legitimate and illegitimate children up until age eighteen. There is no statute of limitations for the establishment of paternity. The amount of support is determined by financial needs of the child and the ability of the parent to pay. Foreign orders establishing paternity and/or support are recognized and can be enforced in German courts or, if no judgment exists, a standard URESA petition may be sent to the German authorities who will seek to have a suitable order entered in Germany. Enforcement is through contempt proceedings similar to those followed in North Carolina. Thus, it is clear that the law of West Germany is "substantially similar" to our own.

In other states which have considered this problem, notably California and Oklahoma, we find that the term "State" is defined in the same manner as it is in North Carolina. Both Oklahoma and California have determined that West Germany is a reciprocating nation within the ambit of URESA and have granted reciprocity. Further, the West German Child Support authorities have indicated through correspondence that they are willing to reciprocate in the handling of support matters.

In summary, based on the history of URESA, the legislative intent as evidenced by recent amendments and actions by the various states which have considered this problem, it is apparent that our Chapter 52A intends that any foreign nation which has a substantially similar support law should be granted reciprocity and that West Germany falls within the statutory definition.

Rufus L. Edmisten
Attorney General

Henry H. Burgwyn
Associate Attorney