Can North Carolina use its uniform reciprocal enforcement of support law to enforce child support obligations between NC residents and residents of West Germany, the same way it enforces support orders across state lines within the U.S.?

Plain-English summary

In 1979, North Carolina's Attorney General concluded that West Germany qualified as a foreign jurisdiction for reciprocal support enforcement under North Carolina's Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (URESA). The 1975 amendment to N.C. Gen. Stat. 52A-3(13) had expanded the statute's definition of "State" to include a foreign jurisdiction where the same or a substantially similar reciprocal law was in effect.

The AG reviewed West German law and found it substantially similar to North Carolina's, and "in fact, often ... broader than our own." The opinion says West German support obligations covered legitimate and illegitimate children until age eighteen, no limitations period barred establishing paternity, support amounts reflected a child's needs and the parent's ability to pay, and German courts could recognize foreign support orders or obtain orders on URESA petitions. Those details describe West German law in the opinion. The AG did not say North Carolina had identical age limits or paternity limitation rules.

The opinion also notes that California and Oklahoma had granted reciprocity to West Germany under similarly worded statutes, and that West German child support authorities had indicated willingness to reciprocate. It cites Blouin v. Dembitz for rejection of the objection that international URESA reciprocity was a prohibited state treaty with a foreign government.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1979, when West Germany existed and North Carolina used the URESA framework described here. Check current law and procedures for any present international support matter.

What this means for you

Support enforcement staff. The 1979 opinion supports handling reciprocal support matters with West Germany under Chapter 52A. Its conclusion rests on the amended statutory definition, its review of German law, other states' treatment, and German authorities' stated willingness to reciprocate.

Families and counsel. The opinion describes how the AG assessed a foreign jurisdiction's support law; it does not decide the amount due in an individual case or establish North Carolina's age and paternity limitation rules.

Common questions

Why did the 1975 amendment matter?

Before it, the opinion says North Carolina's definition of "State" reached only U.S. states, territories, possessions and the District of Columbia with a reciprocal law. The amendment added foreign jurisdictions with the same or a substantially similar reciprocal law.

Did the AG find West German law identical to North Carolina law?

No. It found West German support law substantially similar and sometimes broader. Its examples of age coverage and the absence of a paternity limitations period concern West Germany alone.

Could reciprocal enforcement with a foreign jurisdiction be an unconstitutional treaty?

The opinion cites Blouin v. Dembitz as rejecting that objection. As recounted there, reciprocal procedures did not create a compact with a foreign government or disrupt foreign relations.

Did West German authorities agree to handle these matters?

The AG says West German child support authorities had indicated through correspondence that they were willing to reciprocate.

Background and statutory framework

North Carolina's URESA was codified at N.C. Gen. Stat. 52A-1 to 52A-32. The opinion quotes § 52A-2's purpose as improving and extending enforcement of support duties through reciprocal legislation. It traces the broader foreign-jurisdiction definition from the 1968 revision of the uniform act to North Carolina's 1975 amendment in § 52A-3(13).

The AG applied the "substantially similar reciprocal law" language to West German law and found the test met. It also pointed to North Carolina's recent reciprocal enforcement with Ontario and to California and Oklahoma's treatment of West Germany. These observations support the 1979 conclusion; the opinion does not supply a general ruling on every foreign jurisdiction.

Citations

• N.C. Gen. Stat. 52A-1 to 52A-32
• N.C. Gen. Stat. 52A-2
• North Carolina General Statute 52A-3(8)
• N.C. Gen. Stat. 52A-3(13)
• Kline v. Kline, 542 S.W.2d 499 (1976)
• Thompson v. Kite, 522 P.2d 327 (1974)
• Rainey v. Rainey, 536 S.W.2d 617 (1976)
• Blouin v. Dembitz, 367 F. Supp. 415, D.N.Y.; aff'd 489 F.2d 488 (2d Cir. 1973)

Source

• Landing page: https://ncdoj.gov/opinions/social-services-child-support-international-reciprocal-enforcement-of-support-obligations/

Original opinion text

Requested By: Robert H. Ward, Director, Social Services Division, Department of Human Resources

Question: Is the Nation of West Germany a foreign jurisdiction which has a substantially similar support law such that reciprocal enforcement may be effectuated under the North Carolina uniform reciprocal enforcement of support act (N.C. Gen. Stat. 52A-1 to 52A-32)?

Conclusion: Yes.

The Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (hereinafter referred to as URESA) is codified in the North Carolina General Statutes under Chapter 52A. As stated in 52A-2, the purposes of the Chapter "are" to improve and extend by reciprocal legislation the enforcement of duties of support and to make uniform the law with respect thereto."

It is clear that URESA is a uniform law, reciprocal in nature and purpose and should be liberally construed to effectuate its purpose to accomplish and enforce the duty of a parent to support his children. Kline v. Kline, 542 S.W.2d 499 (1976).

The purpose of URESA is to provide a prompt expeditious way of enforcing the duty to support minor children without getting the parties involved in complex collateral issues. Thompson v. Kite, 522 P.2d 327 (1974).

URESA was designed to provide commercial and expedient means of enforcing support orders for parties who are located in different states or jurisdictions. Rainey v. Rainey, 536 S.W.2d 617 (1976).

From the very onset of its first adoption in the early fifties, it has been clear that URESA has been a success and the various states have adopted it, as well as its amendments, quite readily. The act seeks to apply an equitable and expeditious method of dealing with the complex problems involved. As stated in the Family Law Reporter, 4 FLR 4017, May 2, 1978:

"URESA was a recognition by the states that problems of child and spousal support were no longer a purely local concern. Conventional judicial proceedings were simply unsuitable for effective enforcement of support orders because the absent spouse was normally outside the jurisdiction of the dependent's state courts, because the stay-at-home spouse could rarely afford to track down and sue the absent spouse in another jurisdiction, and because the federal courts have traditionally been closed to domestic relations actions. . . . URESA is an attempt to provide a consistent statutory mechanism for the interstate, and occasionally international, enforcement of support decrees without forcing the person seeking support to bring the action in the absent spouse's jurisdiction. . . . Even though the typical URESA proceeding involves an obligee in one state and an obligor in another state, the act's mechanism may also be used within a state on a county-to-county basis, and is occasionally used in support enforcement cases which cross national boundaries." (P. 4017)

In conference at the September, 1967, meeting of the National Conference on the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, the central committee decided that it would be far more desirable to have state action on reciprocity with foreign jurisdictions than to seek federal involvement. Basically, this was due to the belief that the federal government would be reluctant to delve into matters relating to family law coupled with the additional problem as to which federal agency could properly and effectively represent the various states. Thus it was left to the individual states to broaden the definition in their statutes to include foreign nationals. This was accomplished by a re-examination of the statutory definitions of URESA.

As a result, in 1968 URESA was rewritten such that the definition of "State" in the revised resion of URESA (called RURESA) was expanded to include "any foreign jurisdiction in which this or a substantially similar reciprocal law is an effect."

In 1971, the Council of State Governments on completion of a study of URESA found that nineteen states had provisions in their acts which permitted reciprocity with other nations. North Carolina was not among those enumerated. In this regard, it is noted that North Carolina General Statute 52A-3(8) in 1971 provided that a "State" included "any state, territory, or possession of the United States, and District of Columbia, in which this or a substantially similar reciprocal law has been enacted." Therefore, it is clear that prior to 1975, the North Carolina definition of "State" excluded anything other than a state, territory, or possession of the United States in which a reciprocal law was in effect.

In order to correct the limited scope of the statute and to broaden the definition of "State", in 1975 the statute was amended so that the definition of "State" now includes any "state, territory, or possession of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the provinces of Canada in which reciprocity can be effected by administrative action, and any foreign jurisdiction in which this or a substantially similar reciprocal law is in effect." See N.C. Gen. Stat. 52A-3(13).

Obviously, the North Carolina Legislature intended that the statute as amended should include foreign nations which have a substantially similar reciprocal law within the scope of URESA. Proceeding under the new amendments, North Carolina has recently begun to enforce support laws with Ontario, Canada and thus support duties are now being enforced on behalf of North Carolina residents against residents of Ontario, and vice versa. The amendment made in 1975 clearly evidences legislative intent that the same procedure is permissible with other foreign nations.

It should be noted that the objection to reciprocity with a foreign nation on the grounds that international enforcement violates the constitutional prohibition against individual states entering into treaties with foreign governments has been considered and rejected in at least one case. See Blouin v. Dembitz, 367 F. Supp. 415, D.N.Y.; aff'd 489 F.2d 488 (2d Cir. 1973). In Blouin, supra, the Court held that the statute has reciprocal effect and grants to the foreign jurisdiction the same procedural remedies in New York Courts as the foreign state grants to our citizens. The Court further held that it was not a compact with a foreign government, nor did the statute disrupt or embarrass our relations with other countries. Pp. 417-418.

A review of the law of West Germany reveals that the support laws there are substantially similar to those which exist in North Carolina and, in fact, often are broader than our own. For example, the obligation to support includes legitimate and illegitimate children up until age eighteen. There is no statute of limitations for the establishment of paternity. The amount of support is determined by financial needs of the child and the ability of the parent to pay. Foreign orders establishing paternity and/or support are recognized and can be enforced in German courts or, if no judgment exists, a standard URESA petition may be sent to the German authorities who will seek to have a suitable order entered in Germany. Enforcement is through contempt proceedings similar to those followed in North Carolina. Thus, it is clear that the law of West Germany is "substantially similar" to our own.

In other states which have considered this problem, notably California and Oklahoma, we find that the term "State" is defined in the same manner as it is in North Carolina. Both Oklahoma and California have determined that West Germany is a reciprocating nation within the ambit of URESA and have granted reciprocity. Further, the West German Child Support authorities have indicated through correspondence that they are willing to reciprocate in the handling of support matters.

In summary, based on the history of URESA, the legislative intent as evidenced by recent amendments and actions by the various states which have considered this problem, it is apparent that our Chapter 52A intends that any foreign nation which has a substantially similar support law should be granted reciprocity and that West Germany falls within the statutory definition.

Rufus L. Edmisten
Attorney General

Henry H. Burgwyn
Associate Attorney