If a Mississippi county finds out it has been underpaying its justice court judges for years, how far back can it go to make them whole?
Apply this to your situation
This page answers the general question as of 2023. Ezel answers yours: what it means for your facts, under current Mississippi law, with citations.
Plain-English summary
After receiving the May 2023 AG opinion to Judge Brandon Ladner, the Harrison County Board of Supervisors clerk recalculated justice court judges' salaries and discovered they had been underpaid for over three years. The Board asked whether it could correct the salaries going further back than three years, given that the underpayment was only discovered when the recent Ladner opinion came out.
The AG said claims against a county for unpaid compensation are subject to a three-year statute of limitations under § 15-1-49. The clock starts when the plaintiff "first had the right to demand payment of the officer or board authorized to allow or disallow the claim" (§ 15-1-51). Discovery doesn't restart the clock for purposes of these statutes. The factual questions (when a particular claim accrued, what salary was owed, whether the limitations period actually bars the claim) are for the Board, subject to judicial review.
The AG noted that the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense that must be raised when claims are made against a county and cannot be waived (citing the 2011 Neyman opinion). § 25-1-47 lets counties settle bona fide and just claims, but the county must make a factual finding that it is legally obligated for the claim. The county can't manufacture an obligation to pay outside the statute of limitations by characterizing it as a settlement.
The opinion suggests the Board may also wish to contact the State Auditor's Technical Assistance Division for guidance on the public-funds aspect.
What this means for you
County attorneys and boards of supervisors
The opinion holds that "[c]laims against the county for unpaid compensation are subject to a three-year statute of limitations" under §§ 15-1-49 and 15-1-51, which begins to run "when the plaintiff first had the right to demand payment of the officer or board authorized to allow or disallow the claim sued upon." It does not tie the start of the clock to when the underpayment was discovered. The opinion stresses that "[t]he point at which a specific cause of action accrues for individual claims of unpaid compensation is a factual determination that must be made by the local governing authorities, subject to judicial review, and is outside the scope of an official opinion."
On settlement authority
The opinion notes that § 25-1-47 allows counties to settle claims (citing Sanders for the point that "municipalities" in § 25-1-47 includes counties), that the authority "does not require the filing of a lawsuit," but that "the claim must be bona fide and just" and the county "must make a factual finding that it is legally obligated for the claim and such claim is not exempt from liability" (citing Dailey). The opinion repeats that it "cannot make factual determinations."
Justice court judges and other county officers
The opinion describes the limitation as running from when the officer "first had the right to demand payment," and treats whether any specific claim is time-barred as a fact question for the Board or a court, not something the AG resolves.
State Auditor
Because the question deals with the expenditure of public funds, the opinion suggests contacting the Technical Assistance Division of the Office of the State Auditor for further guidance.
Common questions
Q: How far back can a county go to fix underpaid salaries?
A: The opinion holds unpaid-compensation claims against a county are subject to a three-year statute of limitations under §§ 15-1-49 and 15-1-51. It leaves the accrual date for any specific claim, and whether it is barred, to the Board (subject to judicial review).
Q: When does the clock start?
A: The opinion quotes § 15-1-51: the limitation runs "beginning at the time when the plaintiff first had the right to demand payment of the officer or board authorized to allow or disallow the claim sued upon."
Q: Does discovering the error later restart the clock?
A: The opinion frames the start of the limitation as "when the plaintiff first had the right to demand payment," not as the date of discovery, and declines to resolve the accrual date itself, calling it a factual determination for the Board.
Q: Can the Board just waive the limitations defense?
A: No. The opinion states the statute of limitations "is an affirmative defense that must be raised when claims are made against a county and cannot be waived," citing the Neyman opinion.
Q: Can the Board settle anyway under § 25-1-47?
A: The opinion says § 25-1-47 lets counties settle bona fide and just claims, but the county "must make a factual finding that it is legally obligated for the claim and such claim is not exempt from liability." It does not say a settlement can be used to pay a claim the Board determines is time-barred.
Background and statutory framework
The opinion builds on a three-year statute of limitations. Section 15-1-49 provides a three-year limitation, after the cause of action accrued, "for actions for which no other period of limitation is prescribed," and the opinion (citing Barbour) applies it to "claims for additional compensation allegedly owed by the county." Forrest County v. Thompson, 37 So. 2d 787, 792 (1948), held that statutes of limitations run in favor of the county against claims of unpaid compensation.
Section 15-1-51 fixes the start of the clock: "The statutes of limitation shall run in favor of the state, the counties, and municipal corporations beginning at the time when the plaintiff first had the right to demand payment of the officer or board authorized to allow or disallow the claim sued upon." The opinion also quotes Ferguson v. Mississippi Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 147 So. 3d 374, 378 (Miss. Ct. App. 2014), that "a cause of action accrues when it comes into existence as an enforceable claim."
On settlement, the opinion cites § 25-1-47 and three prior opinions: Sanders (counties are included in § 25-1-47's reference to municipalities), Dailey (settlement does not require a filed lawsuit, but the claim must be bona fide and just and the county must find it is legally obligated), and Neyman (the limitations defense must be raised and cannot be waived; whether a claim is barred is for the Board or a court, not the AG).
Citations and references
Statutes:
- Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49 (three-year statute of limitations for actions where no specific period is prescribed)
- Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-51 (limitations run in favor of state, counties, and municipalities from the time plaintiff first had the right to demand payment)
- Miss. Code Ann. § 25-1-47 (county and municipal authority to settle claims; bona fide and just)
Cases:
- Forrest County v. Thompson, 37 So. 2d 787, 792 (1948) (Mississippi Supreme Court, statutes of limitations run in favor of counties against unpaid compensation claims)
- Ferguson v. Mississippi Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 147 So. 3d 374, 378 (Miss. Ct. App. 2014) (cause of action accrues when it becomes an enforceable claim)
Prior AG opinions referenced:
- MS AG Op., Barbour (Nov. 18, 2016): three-year statute of limitations applies to claims for additional compensation owed by the county.
- MS AG Op., Sanders (Mar. 28, 2023): municipalities in § 25-1-47 includes counties.
- MS AG Op., Dailey (Feb. 24, 2022): settlement requires bona fide and just claim plus factual finding of legal obligation.
- MS AG Op., Neyman (July 29, 2011): statute of limitations is an affirmative defense that must be raised and cannot be waived.
Source
- Landing page: https://attorneygenerallynnfitch.com/divisions/opinions-and-policy/recent-opinions/
- Original PDF: https://attorneygenerallynnfitch.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/T.Holleman-November-3-2023-Justice-Court-Judges-Salaries.pdf
Original opinion text
November 3, 2023
Tim C. Holleman, Esq.
Attorney, Harrison County Board of Supervisors
1720 23rd Avenue
Gulfport, Mississippi 39501
Re: Justice Court Judge's Salaries
Dear Mr. Holleman:
The Office of the Attorney General has received your request for an official opinion.
Background
According to your request, upon receiving a copy of the opinion that our office issued to Judge Brandon Ladner on May 18, 2023, the clerk of the board of supervisors ("Board") recalculated the salaries of justice court judges and determined that they had not been paid the correct salaries for over three years.
Question Presented
Can the Board correct and pay justice court judges' salaries for periods more than three years before the error was discovered, or are such claims barred by the statute of limitations even though such errors were not discovered until the recently issued opinion to Judge Ladner?
Brief Response
Claims against the county for unpaid compensation are subject to a three-year statute of limitations, which begins to run "when the plaintiff first had the right to demand payment of the officer or board authorized to allow or disallow the claim sued upon." Miss. Code Ann. §§ 15-1-49 and 15-1-51. The point at which the statute of limitations begins to run for a particular claim and the salary owed are factual determinations to be made by the Board and cannot be made by this office.
Applicable Law and Discussion
The Mississippi Supreme Court has held that statutes of limitations run in favor of the county against claims of unpaid compensation. Forrest County v. Thompson, 37 So. 2d 787, 792 (1948). Section 15-1-49 provides a three-year statute of limitations after the cause of action accrued for actions for which no other period of limitation is prescribed. This three-year statute of limitations in Section 15-1-49 applies to claims for additional compensation allegedly owed by the county. MS AG Op., Barbour at 4 (Nov. 18, 2016). Pursuant to Section 15-1-51, "[t]he statutes of limitation shall run in favor of the state, the counties, and municipal corporations beginning at the time when the plaintiff first had the right to demand payment of the officer or board authorized to allow or disallow the claim sued upon." The Mississippi Court of Appeals has recognized "that a cause of action accrues when it comes into existence as an enforceable claim, that is, when the right to sue becomes vested. . . . In other words, the statute of limitations begins to run when all the elements of a tort, or cause of action, are present." Ferguson v. Mississippi Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 147 So. 3d 374, 378 (Miss. Ct. App. 2014) (internal citations omitted). Further, the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense that must be raised when claims are made against a county and cannot be waived. MS AG Op., Neyman at 1 (July 29, 2011).
The point at which a specific cause of action accrues for individual claims of unpaid compensation is a factual determination that must be made by the local governing authorities, subject to judicial review, and is outside the scope of an official opinion. See Neyman at *1 ("The determination of whether the claim at issue is barred by the statute of limitations is one that cannot be made by this office by way of official opinion. Such a determination must be made by the board of supervisors, consistent with law and fact, or by a court of competent jurisdiction.").
We note that Section 25-1-47 allows counties to settle claims. See MS AG Op., Sanders at 2 (Mar. 28, 2023) (opining that municipalities in Section 25-1-47 includes counties). This office has consistently opined that the authority to settle a claim does not require the filing of a lawsuit, but the claim must be bona fide and just. MS AG Op., Dailey at 1 (Feb. 24, 2022). The county also "must make a factual finding that it is legally obligated for the claim and such claim is not exempt from liability." Id. This office cannot make factual determinations.
Because your question deals with the expenditure of public funds, you may wish to also contact the Technical Assistance Division of the Office of the State Auditor for further guidance.
If this office may be of any further assistance to you, please do not hesitate to contact us.
Sincerely,
LYNN FITCH, ATTORNEY GENERAL
By: /s/ Beebe Garrard
Beebe Garrard
Special Assistant Attorney General
Get today's answer for your situation
You just read a 2023 opinion on this question. Ezel checks the current Mississippi statutes and case law and answers your specific situation, with citations.
Opens in Ezel Pro. Every answer cites the law it relies on.