Can a Mississippi regional utility authority pay membership dues to join a local chamber of commerce?

Subject

Utility Authority Membership in Chamber of Commerce

Recipient

Wayne Spell, Executive Director, DeSoto County Regional Utility Authority

Plain-English summary

The DeSoto County Regional Utility Authority (DCRUA) is created by a 1999 local and private act. The authority's executive director asked whether the entity could pay membership dues and join local chambers of commerce. The AG said no, because authority for that kind of expenditure has to come from the entity's own enabling statute or from a general statute that applies to the entity, and neither source supports chamber dues here.

The opinion applies the implied-powers framework. Under Wilkerson v. Miss. Emp. Sec. Comm'n (1994), administrative agencies created by statute have only the powers expressly granted to them or necessarily implied in those grants. The DCRUA's local and private legislation does not authorize it to pay chamber dues. Section 17-3-1, which lets counties and municipalities contribute to chambers of commerce, does not apply to utility authorities. The AG cited its Hunt opinion (Aug. 17, 2018), which held a municipal utility authority could not rely on the authority granted to a municipality to contribute to a chamber, and reasoned the same way here. The general authority to contract, the opinion held, does not supply the authority either.

The AG noted at the outset that the request was about ordinary membership dues, not a contract for specific services beyond regular member benefits. It cited its Perry opinion (Sept. 30, 2021), where a county could let a chamber manage a county park under a lawful management agreement, and expressly limited this opinion to the membership-dues question.

What this means for you

Utility authority directors

The opinion holds that DCRUA's authorizing local and private legislation does not grant it power to pay chamber-of-commerce dues, and that neither Section 17-3-1 (which applies to counties and municipalities) nor a general authority to contract supplies that power. Under the implied-powers doctrine the opinion applies, an authority has only the powers expressly granted in its enabling act or necessarily implied in those grants.

Authority attorneys

The opinion rests the answer on whether the expenditure is authorized by the entity's own enabling act or a statute that applies to it. It expressly rejected the argument that the general authority to contract supplies authority for chamber dues; a general contracting power does not expand the underlying scope of authorized expenditures.

Chambers of commerce in DCRUA's service area

The opinion holds DCRUA cannot pay membership dues to join. It distinguishes a contract for specific services beyond ordinary member benefits (citing the Perry opinion, where a county engaged a chamber to manage a county park under a management agreement), but it did not decide any such contract here; the opinion is limited to the membership-dues question.

Other local authorities and special districts

The opinion's reasoning rests on the general implied-powers doctrine for statutorily created bodies (Wilkerson): such an entity has only the powers expressly granted or necessarily implied. The opinion itself addressed DCRUA's authority to pay chamber dues and did not rule on any other entity.

Common questions

What is a "regional utility authority"?
A public body created by local and private legislation to provide utility services to a defined area. DeSoto County Regional Utility Authority is the entity addressed in this opinion.

What is "local and private legislation"?
An act of the Mississippi Legislature that applies to a specific local entity rather than the state as a whole. The opinion notes DCRUA was established by Mississippi Local and Private Laws of 1999, Chapter 1039 (House Bill 1735).

Does Section 17-3-1 apply to the authority?
The AG said no. Section 17-3-1 is the chamber-of-commerce contribution authority for counties and municipalities. The opinion cited its Jordan opinion (Oct. 12, 1989) confirming that authority for those entities, and its Hunt opinion (Aug. 17, 2018) holding that a municipal utility authority may not rely on it.

What about the "general authority to contract"?
The opinion expressly held that the general authority to contract does not provide authority to pay chamber dues.

Can the authority hire the chamber to do work for it?
The opinion limited itself to membership dues and did not decide that. It cited the Perry opinion (Sept. 30, 2021), in which a county could let a chamber manage a county park under a lawful management agreement, and noted this opinion does not discuss contracts for specific services like those in Perry.

What would it take to authorize chamber dues for the authority?
The opinion holds the authority must come from the entity's enabling act or a statute that applies to it. It does not direct any particular legislative fix.

Background and statutory framework

Mississippi creates regional utility authorities through local and private legislation. The opinion states DCRUA was established and is governed by Mississippi Local and Private Laws of 1999, Chapter 1039 (House Bill 1735), which the request described as granting broad authority including the authority to contract.

Section 17-3-1 authorizes counties and municipalities to contribute to chambers of commerce upon a proper factual finding. The opinion holds it does not apply to utility authorities. Section 21-91-44 separately authorizes municipal donations to chambers of commerce; the opinion cited it (via its Barton opinion, Oct. 5, 2020) as a basis available to municipalities, contrasting it with DCRUA's lack of donation authority.

The implied-powers doctrine for Mississippi administrative bodies comes from Wilkerson v. Mississippi Emp. Sec. Comm'n, 630 So. 2d 1000, 1001 (Miss. 1994): an agency has only the powers "expressly granted to [it] or necessarily implied in [its] grant of authority." The opinion applies that rule to DCRUA and concludes the local and private legislation does not authorize chamber dues.

Citations

• Miss. Code Ann. § 17-3-1 (county and municipal authority to contribute to chambers of commerce)
• Miss. Code Ann. § 21-91-44 (municipal donation authority to chambers of commerce)
• Mississippi Local and Private Laws of 1999, Chapter 1039 (House Bill 1735) (creating DCRUA)
• Wilkerson v. Mississippi Emp. Sec. Comm'n, 630 So. 2d 1000, 1001 (Miss. 1994) (implied powers doctrine for administrative bodies)
• MS AG Op., Jordan (Oct. 12, 1989) (Section 17-3-1 supports county and municipal chamber contributions)
• MS AG Op., Hunt (Aug. 17, 2018) (municipal utility authority cannot rely on municipality's chamber authority)
• MS AG Op., Barton (Oct. 5, 2020) (Section 21-91-44 supports municipal donations to chambers)
• MS AG Op., Perry (Sept. 30, 2021) (county-chamber management agreements for specific services)

Source

• Landing page: https://attorneygenerallynnfitch.com/divisions/opinions-and-policy/recent-opinions/
• Original PDF: https://attorneygenerallynnfitch.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/W.Spell-June-29-2023-Utility-Authority-as-a-Member-of-the-Chamber-of-Commerce.pdf

Original opinion text

June 29, 2023
Wayne Spell, Executive Director
DeSoto County Regional Utility Authority
365 Losher Street, Suite 310
Hernando, Mississippi 38632
Re:

Utility Authority as a Member of the Chamber of Commerce

Dear Mr. Spell:
The Office of the Attorney General has received your request for an official opinion.

Background
The DeSoto County Regional Utility Authority ("DCRUA") was established and is governed by
Mississippi Local and Private Laws of 1999, Chapter 1039, House Bill 1735 ("Local and Private
Legislation"), which, according to your request, grants the DCRUA broad authority, including the
authority to contract.
Question Presented
Does the DCRUA have the authority to pay membership dues and join local chambers of
commerce?

Brief Response
The DCRUA's Local and Private Legislation does not provide authority for the DCRUA to pay
membership dues and join local chambers of commerce.
Applicable Law and Discussion
As we understand your request, the DCRUA is not looking to the local chambers to provide
specific services beyond those provided to other members of the chamber. See MS AG Op., Perry
(Sept. 30, 2021) (opining that a county can allow a chamber of commerce to manage a county park
pursuant to a lawful management agreement). Thus, this opinion is limited to whether the Local
and Private Legislation authorizes DCRUA to pay membership dues and join the local chambers
of commerce and does not discuss contracts for specific services such as those in the Perry opinion.
Administrative agencies, such as DCRUA, are created by statute and have "only such powers as
are expressly granted to [it] or necessarily implied in [its] grant of authority." Wilkerson v.
Mississippi Emp. Sec. Comm'n, 630 So. 2d 1000, 1001 (Miss. 1994) (internal citations omitted).
The Local and Private Legislation establishing and governing DCRUA does not authorize it to pay
membership dues and join local chambers of commerce.
The authority found in Mississippi Code Annotated Section 17-3-1 for municipalities and counties
to contribute to chambers of commerce does not apply to utility authorities. See MS AG Op.,
Jordan (Oct. 12, 1989) (opining that upon the proper factual finding, Section 17-13-1 allows
counties and municipalities to contribute to chambers of commerce); MS AG Op., Hunt (Aug. 17,
2018) (opining that a municipal utility authority may not rely upon the authority specifically
granted to a municipality to contribute to a chamber of commerce). Also, the Local and Private
Legislation does not provide the DCRUA with the authority to make donations to entities such as
chambers of commerce. Contra MS AG Op., Barton at *2 (Oct. 5, 2020) (opining that a
municipality can donate to a chamber of commerce pursuant to Section 21-91-44). Accordingly,
it is the opinion of this office that the DCRUA does not have the authority to pay membership dues
and join local chambers of commerce or donate funds to such organizations. Additionally, the
general authority to contract, as referenced in your request, fails to provide such authority.
If this office may be of any further assistance to you, please do not hesitate to contact us.
Sincerely,
LYNN FITCH, ATTORNEY GENERAL
By:

/s/ Beebe Garrard
Beebe Garrard
Special Assistant Attorney General