MN Op. Atty. Gen. 624c-4 (May 16, 2019) 2019-05-16

Can a Minnesota city turn off your electric or water service because you didn't pay your garbage bill or another unrelated municipal charge?

Short answer: Probably not, and the AG expressly overruled a 1938 opinion that had allowed it. Municipal utilities must use reasonable methods to compel payment, and disconnection requires good cause. Disconnecting an essential utility service for nonpayment of an unrelated municipal service is unduly harsh and likely unreasonable. The 1938 opinion that had allowed bundled-bill cutoffs is overruled.
Currency note: this opinion is from 2019
Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.
Disclaimer: This is an official Minnesota Attorney General opinion. AG opinions are advisory and inform local officials but are not binding precedent like a court ruling. This summary is for informational purposes only and is not legal advice. Consult a licensed Minnesota attorney for advice on your specific situation.
About this page: The plain-English summary, reader guidance, and Q&A below were written by Ezel based on the official AG opinion. The original opinion (linked at the bottom of this page, or PDF in the sidebar) is the authoritative source for any reliance.
View original AG opinion (PDF)

Plain-English summary

A Minnesota city used a single bill for several municipal services (water, electricity, garbage, and similar). The city was considering an ordinance that would let it disconnect any service when any of the bundled charges went unpaid. The question to the AG was whether a 1938 AG opinion still allowed that, given the development of utility-disconnection law since then.

The 2019 AG concluded: no, the 1938 opinion is overruled. Three points:

  1. The 1938 opinion is overruled. In 1938, AG William Ervin had advised that a village providing water, heat, and electricity on one bill could adopt a regulation discontinuing any or all services for delinquency in any one. The 2019 AG expressly overruled that opinion: "Given the substantial development of the law since 1938, regarding consumer protection, entitlements to provision of gas, electric, and water service, and the reasonableness of terminating services for nonpayment, this Office is not confident that the 1938 opinion remains an accurate legal analysis and expressly overrules it."

  2. The reasonableness rule today. Municipal utilities must use reasonable methods to compel payment for services. Utility service may not be disconnected other than for good cause. Whether a particular ordinance is reasonable turns on the specific local ordinance and the circumstances; the AG does not resolve factual questions or construe local ordinances.

  3. The AG's bottom line on the facts presented. On the facts the requester described, "we do not believe that the law allows a municipality to disconnect utility service for nonpayment of the varied and unrelated municipal services stated in your letter." That is not a flat rule against bundled billing; it is a conclusion that disconnecting an essential utility for an unrelated charge is too harsh on the facts presented.

The AG drew on a divided line of out-of-state authority:

  • South Dakota and Nebraska have refused to allow disconnection of electric or water service for nonpayment of garbage collection charges. Owens v. City of Beresford (S.D. 1972) treated garbage collection as a "collateral matter." Garner v. City of Aurora (Neb. 1948) said a city could not force collection of garbage fees by disconnecting water service.
  • California allowed bundled-service disconnection in narrower circumstances. Perez v. City of San Bruno (Cal. 1980) upheld a city's policy of terminating all municipal services for nonpayment of the garbage portion of a joint bill, but cautioned that an "unduly harsh" or "oppressive" method may violate due process.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2019. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here. Minnesota PUC rules and consumer-protection statutes have continued to evolve since 2019. The underlying principle (reasonableness governs municipal utility disconnections, and disconnecting one service for nonpayment of an unrelated service is questionable) is likely stable, but the specific facts and the application of any local ordinance should be evaluated against current law.

Historical context: what the AG concluded

The opinion has three pieces.

The reasonableness frame. The AG did not lay down a categorical rule. Whether a city's enforcement ordinance is reasonable depends on the specifics of the local ordinance, the nature of the bundled services, and the circumstances. The Attorney General "does not render opinions that require making such factual determinations or construing the meaning of terms in local ordinances or resolutions," citing Op. Atty. Gen. 629a (May 9, 1975), the standing rule on what AG opinions decline to do.

The break from the 1938 opinion. The 1938 opinion (issued by AG William Ervin, with Dwight S. Johnson signing as Special Assistant) had allowed bundled-bill cutoffs. It reasoned that if a municipal utility's rules and regulations on payment enforcement were "reasonable and not prohibitory," then the consumer takes service subject to those rules; on that basis, a village could disconnect water, heat, or electricity for delinquency in any one of the three. The 2019 AG overruled that conclusion as outdated. The development of consumer protection law, the recognition of entitlements to gas, electric, and water service, and the doctrine that disconnections must be reasonable have all overtaken the 1938 analysis. The 1938 opinion is no longer "an accurate legal analysis," in the 2019 AG's words.

The application to the requester's facts. The requester's letter did not include a specific ordinance, rule, or regulation. The AG accordingly did not assess any particular instrument's reasonableness. But the AG was willing to say, on the facts described, "the law allows a municipality to disconnect utility service" — by negative implication — was not satisfied for the "varied and unrelated municipal services" the requester described. Where bundled services are not closely related to the utility being disconnected, the disconnection cannot be supported as a reasonable enforcement mechanism.

The opinion concludes with citation, in passing, to Village of Blaine v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 12, Anoka Cty., 138 N.W.2d 32 (Minn. 1965), for the standing rule that AG opinions are given careful consideration but are not binding.

Common questions

Can a Minnesota city ever disconnect my utility service for an unpaid bill?

Yes, for good cause. The AG's frame is that disconnection requires reasonableness and good cause. Disconnecting service for nonpayment of that same service is generally reasonable. Disconnecting an essential utility for nonpayment of an unrelated municipal service is much harder to justify and, on the facts the AG saw in 2019, is not allowed.

What if my city sends me a single bill that combines water, garbage, and electricity?

A single bill is not by itself unlawful. The question is whether disconnection of one service for nonpayment of another is reasonable. Out-of-state authority on this is mixed. In Minnesota, the 2019 AG expressly overruled a 1938 opinion that had allowed bundled cutoffs and signaled that an unrelated cross-service disconnection probably exceeds reasonable enforcement.

What does the AG mean by "good cause"?

The 2019 opinion uses the phrase but does not define it. It refers to the body of consumer-protection law that has developed since 1938 around essential utility services. Courts have weighed factors like the relationship between the unpaid charge and the service being terminated, the necessity of the service to health and safety, the proportionality of the penalty, and the availability of less harsh enforcement methods.

Is this opinion binding on cities or courts?

No. AG opinions are not binding precedent. Village of Blaine v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 12, Anoka Cty. confirms that they are given careful consideration but not binding. A court will treat the 2019 opinion as persuasive guidance on Minnesota's position; a city's ordinance is still subject to judicial review.

What happened to the 1938 opinion?

It is expressly overruled. The 2019 opinion states: "this Office is not confident that the 1938 opinion remains an accurate legal analysis and expressly overrules it." The 2019 opinion reproduces the 1938 opinion at the back so the reader can see what is no longer the AG's position.

Background and statutory framework

The 2019 opinion does not turn on a single Minnesota statute. It reads the question through the general lens of municipal authority and reasonableness, and through the broader common-law framework that has developed since 1938.

The 1938 framework. In 1938, the AG's office relied on AG of Power v. City of Duluth and similar authority to conclude that a municipal utility could enforce payment through reasonable, non-prohibitory rules. On that frame, bundling water, heat, and electricity on one bill and conditioning continued service on payment of the whole bill was reasonable: the consumer took service subject to the rules; the obligation to pay arose by contract.

The post-1938 frame. By 2019, courts and AG offices in many states had developed a richer consumer-protection framework, including utility-specific procedural protections, recognition of essential utility access, and limits on cross-service disconnection. The AG canvassed the out-of-state authority (Owens, Garner, Perez) to show the range. South Dakota and Nebraska refused to allow water disconnection for garbage nonpayment. California allowed bundled disconnection in narrower circumstances, with a constitutional-due-process caveat against "unduly harsh" or "oppressive" enforcement.

Op. Atty. Gen. 629a (May 9, 1975) is appended to the 2019 opinion as a reminder of what AG opinions decline to do. Among other things, AG opinions do not (1) determine the constitutionality of state statutes, (2) make factual determinations, (3) interpret terms in contracts and local ordinances, (4) decide questions likely to arise in pending litigation, (5) decide hypothetical or moot questions, (6) review local ordinances for validity, (7) construe federal law, or (8) construe city charter terms. The 2019 opinion uses this frame to explain why it declines to evaluate any specific ordinance.

Citations

  • Op. Atty. Gen. 624c-4 (November 2, 1938) (expressly overruled by this opinion).
  • Op. Atty. Gen. 629a (May 9, 1975) (limits of AG opinion practice; attached as enclosure).
  • Owens v. City of Beresford, 201 N.W.2d 890 (S.D. 1972).
  • Garner v. City of Aurora, 30 N.W.2d 917 (Neb. 1948).
  • Perez v. City of San Bruno, 616 P.2d 1287 (Cal. 1980).
  • Village of Blaine v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 12, Anoka Cty., 138 N.W.2d 32 (Minn. 1965).
  • Cross-reference: Op. Atty. Gen. 624d-5.

Source

Original opinion text

The official PDF on the AG's website begins at internal page 2 of the opinion; the first page of the AG's analysis was not present in the retrieved file. The reasoning and disposition reproduced here are taken from the available pages.

PUBLIC UTILITIES: ELECTRICITY – LIGHT & POWER: DELINQUENT BILLS: Municipal utilities must use reasonable methods to compel payment for services and utility service may not be disconnected other than for good cause. Op. Atty. Gen. 624c-4 (Nov. 2, 1938) superseded.

624c-4 (cr.ref. 624d-5)

John T. Shockley
May 16, 2019
Page 2

Courts in other states have discussed the methods municipal utilities may or may not use to enforce the collection of fees or utility charges. As you noted in your letter, the South Dakota Supreme Court held that a city wrongfully disconnected electrical and telephone service for nonpayment of garbage collection fees because garbage collection was a collateral matter. See Owens v. City of Beresford, 201 N.W.2d 890, 893 (S.D. 1972). Similarly, the Nebraska Supreme Court held that a city could not attempt to force collection of garbage fees by disconnecting water service. See Garner v. City of Aurora, 30 N.W.2d 917, 921 (Neb. 1948). On the other hand, the California Supreme Court held that, where a city used a single bill for municipal services (water, sewer, and garbage collection), the city did not violate due process by terminating all municipal services for failure to pay the garbage collection portion of the joint bill. See Perez v. City of San Bruno, 616 P.2d 1287, 1296-97 (Cal. 1980). The court cautioned, however, that "when a statutory or legislative scheme utilizes a means to reach its end and which is unduly harsh or exacts a penalty which may be deemed oppressive in light of the legitimate objections sought to be achieved, it may be held to be violative of constitutional due process guarantees." Id. at 1297.

A Minnesota Attorney General opinion from 1938 opined that a village providing water, heat, and electricity, all billed on one statement, may adopt a regulation allowing for discontinuance of any and all services for delinquency of one service. Op. Atty. Gen. 624c-4 (Nov. 2, 1938). While Attorney General opinions are given careful consideration, they are not binding. Village of Blaine v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 12, Anoka Cty., 138 N.W.2d 32, 39 (Minn. 1965). Given the substantial development of the law since 1938, regarding consumer protection, entitlements to provision of gas, electric, and water service, and the reasonableness of terminating services for nonpayment, this Office is not confident that the 1938 opinion remains an accurate legal analysis and expressly overrules it.

Ultimately, whether enforcement of a city ordinance that allows for disconnection of a utility service based upon nonpayment of another service is unreasonable turns on specific questions of fact and the construction of any local ordinance or resolution implementing the enforcement method. The Attorney General does not render opinions that require making such factual determinations or construing the meaning of terms in local ordinances or resolutions. See Op. Atty. Gen. 629a (May 9, 1975).

John T. Shockley
May 16, 2019
Page 3

You did not supply a specific ordinance, rule, or regulation implementing the enforcement method you discussed in your request. Given the breadth of the municipal services established in your inquiry, however, we do not believe that the law allows a municipality to disconnect utility service for nonpayment of the varied and unrelated municipal services stated in your letter.

Sincerely,

KEITH ELLISON
Attorney General

KATHERINE HINDERLIE
Assistant Attorney General
(651) 757-1468 (Voice)
(651) 297-1235 (Fax)

Enclosure: Op. Atty. Gen. 629a (May 9, 1975)
Op. Atty. Gen. 624c-4 (Nov. 2, 1938)