Can a Minnesota sheriff sign a 287(g) immigration enforcement agreement with ICE on their own, and does a 287(g) agreement let local officers hold someone in jail solely on an ICE detainer?

Plain-English summary

In late 2025, Ramsey County Attorney John Choi asked the Minnesota AG two pointed questions. First, can a Minnesota sheriff, acting on their own, sign a 287(g) agreement with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement? A 287(g) agreement is the contract through which the federal government deputizes state and local officers to perform certain immigration-enforcement functions under 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g). Second, if a 287(g) agreement is in place, does it let local officers hold someone in custody past their release date based only on an ICE civil immigration detainer?

Attorney General Keith Ellison said no to both.

On the first question, sheriff authority in Minnesota is created by statute. The legislature listed the kinds of contracts sheriffs may enter, like contracts to provide police service to cities and towns (Minn. Stat. § 436.05) or to process firearm permits (§ 624.714). None of those listed contract authorities cover agreements with federal agencies to perform federal enforcement work. Because the legislature was specific about what it did authorize, the AG read the omission as intentional under the canon "the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another," citing the Minnesota Supreme Court's 2023 decision in Chrz v. Mower County.

The Joint Exercise of Powers Act, Minn. Stat. § 471.59, then closes the door even further on a unilateral sheriff signature. The Joint Powers Act governs cooperative agreements between governmental units and contains a "commonality" requirement: contracting parties may only jointly exercise powers common to both. Sheriffs do not have immigration-enforcement powers absent a 287(g) agreement, so a sheriff and ICE do not share common powers and cannot satisfy the commonality requirement on their own. The Act does have an exception in subdivision 8 that lets a county board of commissioners enter agreements without commonality, but only by board resolution. So a county can sign a 287(g) agreement; a sheriff acting alone cannot.

On the second question, the AG built on his February 2025 opinion (also Op. Atty. Gen. 3a) that held Minnesota law prohibits state and local agencies from holding a person based only on an immigration detainer once that person would otherwise be released. The new question was whether a 287(g) agreement changes that result. The answer was no.

The AG considered subdivision 12 of the Joint Powers Act, which can give officers acting under a peace-officer-related joint-powers agreement "full and complete authority" of peace officers in another jurisdiction. The AG concluded subdivision 12 does not apply to 287(g) agreements for two independent reasons: ICE officers are not "peace officers" under any Minnesota statutory definition (those definitions are limited to officers licensed by the Minnesota POST Board or, in a few cases, officers licensed by other states, never federal officers); and ICE does not exercise "police power" because police power is a state power, not a federal one. Even if subdivision 12 did somehow apply, its text limits an officer's authority to that of a Minnesota peace officer, and the Minnesota legislature cannot grant authority to exercise federal powers.

The AG then turned to federal preemption. Section 287(g) itself authorizes agreements only "to the extent consistent with State and local law." That language makes field, express, and conflict preemption all unavailable: Congress did not occupy the field, did not expressly preempt state regulation of how officers behave, and the 287(g) program is optional (no command, no conflict). The AG followed Nash v. Mikesell, a 2024 Colorado Court of Appeals decision reaching the same conclusion on a parallel Colorado statute, plus federal cases including the Ninth Circuit's United States v. California.

Result: a 287(g) agreement signed by a county board does not buy local officers any new state-law authority to hold a person on a civil immigration detainer.

What this means for you

For Minnesota sheriffs: do not sign a 287(g) agreement on your own. If the county board has not passed a resolution authorizing the agreement under Minn. Stat. § 471.59, subd. 8, the agreement is not valid under Minnesota law. The AG specifically called out that some Minnesota sheriffs have already signed such agreements, and the opinion's reasoning suggests those signatures are not legally effective. Talk to your county attorney before continuing to operate under one.

For county boards of commissioners considering a 287(g) agreement: the path the AG identifies is a county-board resolution under subdivision 8. The board, not the sheriff, is the contracting authority. Bring it to a public meeting and adopt a resolution. Counsel should also document that the agreement complies with the rest of the Joint Powers Act.

For county attorneys advising sheriffs and jail administrators: this opinion combines with the February 2025 AG opinion to mean that holding someone on an ICE detainer, even under a 287(g) agreement, exposes the agency to false-imprisonment liability under Lundeen v. Renteria and the Esparza litigation. The AG cites Nobles County's $200,000 Esparza settlement and the $30,000-plus damages plus $248,000-plus attorney-fee award in Parada v. Anoka County as concrete examples of the financial risk.

For jail and corrections administrators: the practical instruction is the same as in the February 2025 opinion. When an inmate's state release date arrives, release them. An ICE detainer (form I-247A) and accompanying administrative warrant (I-200 or I-205) are not judicial warrants and do not satisfy Minnesota's arrest-authority statutes. The 287(g) wrinkle does not change that operational rule.

For immigration and civil rights attorneys: the opinion is useful authority in challenges to detainer holds in Minnesota. The AG specifically invokes the Esparza v. Nobles County line of cases and treats the federal preemption defense as foreclosed by the "consistent with State and local law" text of 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g).

For city attorneys whose police departments may be approached about 287(g) participation: the same Joint Powers Act analysis applies. A police department is a city department, not a county department, so the subdivision 8 exception does not transfer; cities should look hard at commonality of powers before any agreement.

Common questions

Q: Is a 287(g) agreement entered by a county board enough to authorize local officers to act on ICE detainers?
A: No. The AG draws a clean line: the agreement itself can be validly executed by county-board resolution, but it does not change Minnesota's underlying arrest-authority rules. Holding a person past their state release date based only on an ICE detainer is still a new arrest, and Minnesota statutes do not authorize that arrest.

Q: What about the federal Supremacy Clause? Does federal law preempt Minnesota's restriction on detainer compliance?
A: The AG walks through field, express, and conflict preemption and finds none of them. The decisive piece of text is 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(1)'s requirement that 287(g) agreements operate "to the extent consistent with State and local law." Congress chose to defer to state law on this question. And the program is voluntary under § 1357(g)(9), so there is no federal mandate that state law can conflict with.

Q: If a sheriff already signed a 287(g) agreement before this opinion, what happens?
A: The opinion does not directly say, but the analysis treats those sheriff-only signatures as not validly executed under Minnesota law. Counties in that position should consider having the county board ratify or replace the agreement by resolution if the county wants to participate. Practically, the AG's reasoning casts doubt on the legality of any pre-existing sheriff-only signature.

Q: Are there state laws that would let Minnesota officers arrest someone for civil immigration violations?
A: The AG's February 6, 2025 opinion (Op. Atty. Gen. 3a) addresses this in detail and finds none. Minnesota's civil arrest statutes cover mental-illness commitment, contempt of court, juvenile delinquency, and sex-offender commitment, but not immigration. The criminal arrest statutes require either an arrest in the officer's presence, probable cause of a felony, or a judicially signed warrant; an ICE administrative warrant does not qualify.

Q: Does this opinion apply to Customs and Border Protection (CBP) agreements too, not just ICE?
A: The February 2025 opinion's footnote 2 notes that other federal immigration officers, including CBP agents, can issue detainers and the analysis applies to those as well. The December 2025 opinion focuses on ICE, but the Joint Powers Act analysis would treat CBP the same way: federal officers are not "peace officers" or exercisers of "police power" under Minnesota law.

Q: How is this different from the Texas and Virginia approach?
A: Texas (Tex. Code Crim. P. 2.251) requires its law enforcement agencies to comply with ICE detainer requests, and Virginia (Va. Code § 19.2-81.6) gives its officers the authority to enforce immigration law. Minnesota has no such statute. The February 2025 opinion specifically cites the contrast to underline that Minnesota's legislature has not created the authority.

Background and statutory framework

The Joint Exercise of Powers Act, Minn. Stat. § 471.59, is the centerpiece of the analysis. The Act lets governmental units pool authority through written agreements. Subdivision 1 sets the commonality requirement: any joint exercise must be of powers "common to the contracting parties or any similar powers." Where two parties do not share the relevant power, they cannot enter a Joint Powers agreement on that subject.

Subdivision 8 carves out an exception for counties. A county board of commissioners may, by resolution, enter an agreement with another governmental unit "to perform on behalf of that unit any service or function which that unit would be authorized to provide for itself." That subdivision is the door through which a Minnesota county can validly enter a 287(g) agreement: ICE is authorized to enforce federal immigration law, and the county is performing that function on behalf of ICE under the agreement. But the door opens only by board resolution, not by sheriff signature.

Subdivision 12 of the same statute lets peace officers from one jurisdiction exercise full peace-officer authority in another jurisdiction when a joint-powers agreement authorizes "the exercise of peace officer or police powers." The AG concludes that ICE does not exercise either, because ICE officers are not Minnesota peace officers and federal agencies do not exercise the state's police power.

For the detainer-arrest question, the AG carries forward the analytical frame from Op. Atty. Gen. 3a (Feb. 6, 2025). That earlier opinion held that prolonging custody past a state release date is a new arrest that must be authorized by Minnesota's arrest statutes (Minn. Stat. §§ 629.30, 629.34), and that none of those statutes covers civil immigration detainers. The earlier opinion left open whether 287(g) agreements change this; the December 2025 opinion is the answer.

Federal section 287(g) authorizes the Secretary of Homeland Security to enter agreements that let state and local officers perform immigration-enforcement functions under federal supervision. Crucially, 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(1) limits these agreements to actions "consistent with State and local law." Cases including the Ninth Circuit's United States v. California, the Colorado Court of Appeals' Nash v. Mikesell, and the Fifth Circuit's City of El Cenizo v. Texas have read that text to leave room for state regulation of officer behavior even where a 287(g) agreement is in place. The AG adopted that reading.

Citations and references

Statutes:
- Minn. Stat. § 8.07 (county attorney's authority to request AG opinion)
- Minn. Stat. § 387.03 (sheriff's statutory powers)
- Minn. Stat. § 436.05, subds. 1 and 2 (sheriff police-service contracts)
- Minn. Stat. § 471.59 (Joint Exercise of Powers Act)
- Minn. Stat. § 471.59, subds. 1, 8, and 12 (commonality, county-board exception, peace-officer authority)
- Minn. Stat. § 624.714, subd. 2(c) (sheriff firearm-permit contract)
- 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (287(g) agreements; the "consistent with State and local law" clause)
- 8 C.F.R. § 287.7 (immigration detainers)

Cases:
- Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387 (2012)
- Chrz v. Mower County, 986 N.W.2d 481 (Minn. 2023)
- United States v. California, 921 F.3d 865 (9th Cir. 2019)
- Galarza v. Szalczyk, 745 F.3d 634 (3d Cir. 2014)
- Santos v. Frederick County Bd. of Commissioners, 725 F.3d 451 (4th Cir. 2013)
- Orellana v. Nobles County, 230 F. Supp. 3d 934 (D. Minn. 2017)
- Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960)
- Nash v. Mikesell, 557 P.3d 369 (Colo. Ct. App. 2024)
- City of El Cenizo v. Texas, 890 F.3d 164 (5th Cir. 2018)
- Lundeen v. Renteria, 224 N.W.2d 132 (Minn. 1974)

Prior AG opinions referenced:
- Op. Atty. Gen. 3a (Feb. 6, 2025) (detainer compliance prohibited absent 287(g))
- Op. Atty Gen. 390a-6 (Oct. 31, 1994) (sheriff's powers defined by state law)
- Op. Atty Gen. 225i (Jan. 25, 1968) (commonality requirement)
- Op. Atty. Gen. 1001-A (July 20, 1955)
- Op. Atty. Gen. 1007 (June 11, 1975)

Source

• Landing page: https://www.ag.state.mn.us/Office/Opinions/
• Original PDF: https://www.ag.state.mn.us/Office/Opinions/3a-390a6_20251212.pdf

Original opinion text

SHERIFFS; DUTIES AND AUTHORITY; Minnesota law does not authorize sheriffs to enter agreements under section 287(g) of the federal Immigration and Nationality Act. Instead, a county may execute a 287(g) agreement if the agreement is approved by a resolution of the county board of commissioners; Minnesota law prohibits local law enforcement officers from detaining or holding persons based solely on ICE civil immigration detainers regardless of whether the law enforcement agency is operating under a valid 287(g) agreement.

3-a; 390a6
December 12, 2025

John J. Choi
Ramsey County Attorney
360 Wabasha Street North, Suite 100
St. Paul, MN 55102-1418

Re: Request for Advisory Opinion Pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 8.07

Dear County Attorney Choi:

Thank you for your letter of November 25, 2025, which requests an opinion from this Office on whether Minnesota sheriffs may enter 287(g) agreements with U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement (ICE) and whether such an agreement permits local law enforcement officers to detain people solely on the basis of civil immigration detainer requests from ICE.

BACKGROUND

Section 287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act permits ICE to enter agreements with state and local governments to authorize state or local officers to perform certain immigration duties ("287(g) agreements"). See 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g). Some Minnesota sheriffs have signed 287(g) agreements with ICE. Your Office requested a written opinion from our Office on the validity of these agreements under Minnesota law.

ICE sometimes issues civil immigration detainers to state and local law enforcement agencies requesting that they hold an individual who is in their custody beyond the time that they would otherwise be released so that ICE can take the individual into custody for deportation purposes. In response to a question from you, this Office previously opined that, at least in the absence of a 287(g) agreement, Minnesota law prohibits holding a person who would otherwise be released from custody based solely on an immigration detainer. See Op. Atty. Gen. 3a (Feb. 6, 2025). You have now asked whether a 287(g) agreement permits state and local authorities to hold a person solely on an immigration detainer.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

(1) May Minnesota sheriffs unilaterally enter 287(g) agreements with ICE?

(2) Do 287(g) agreements permit local law enforcement officers to detain persons who would otherwise be released from custody pursuant to civil immigration detainers from ICE?

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

Minnesota law does not authorize sheriffs to enter 287(g) agreements. Instead, a county may execute a 287(g) agreement if the agreement is approved by a resolution of the county board of commissioners.

Minnesota law prohibits local law enforcement officers from detaining or holding persons based solely on ICE civil immigration detainers regardless of whether the law enforcement agency is operating under a valid 287(g) agreement.

ANALYSIS

I. Sheriffs may not unilaterally enter 287(g) agreements.

A. Sheriffs' powers are defined by state law and do not include the ability to enter cooperative agreements with the federal government.

"The office of County Sheriff is established by state statute" and "[s]pecific powers and duties of county sheriffs are defined[.]" Op. Atty Gen. 390a-6 (Oct. 31, 1994) (citing Minn. Stat. § 387.03). State law specifically authorizes sheriffs to enter certain types of contracts. See, e.g., Minn. Stat. § 436.05, subd. 1 (authorizing sheriffs to contract for furnishing of police service to cities and towns); Minn. Stat. § 624.714, subd. 2(c) (authorizing sheriff to contract with a police chief to process firearm permit applications). But no statute authorizes sheriffs to enter contracts with agencies of the federal government or to perform services on behalf of the federal government.

The fact that the legislature took care to enumerate certain types of contracts that sheriffs are authorized to enter into but did not authorize sheriffs to enter contracts to perform enforcement activities on behalf of the federal government implies this was an intentional omission. See Chrz v. Mower Cnty., 986 N.W.2d 481, 486 (Minn. 2023) (in interpreting statutes, "the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another"). This is particularly so because in Minnesota Statutes section 436.05, the legislature enacted a detailed statute regarding contracts by sheriffs for providing law enforcement services to cities and towns but did not provide for similar contracts with the federal government.

B. The Minnesota Joint Exercise of Powers Act prohibits 287(g) agreements between sheriffs and ICE.

Further, in Minnesota, agreements among governmental bodies for the joint or cooperative exercise of powers are governed by the Joint Exercise of Powers Act (the "Joint Powers Act"). See Minn. Stat. § 471.59; see also Minn. Stat. § 436.05, subd. 2 (contract by sheriff to provide police services must comply with § 471.59). A 287(g) agreement concerns the joint and cooperative exercise of powers between an agency of the United States and a Minnesota political subdivision and is therefore subject to the Joint Powers Act. See Minn. Stat. § 471.59, subd. 1.

The Joint Powers Act's "commonality" requirement provides that, subject to certain exceptions, the contracting parties may only jointly exercise powers "common to the contracting parties or any similar powers." Minn. Stat. § 471.59, subd. 1(a). Sheriffs lack authority to enforce immigration law in the absence of a 287(g) agreement. See Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 408 (2012). A 287(g) agreement that a sheriff alone enters into therefore does not comply with the Joint Powers Act's commonality requirement.

C. The Joint Powers Act permits counties to enter 287(g) agreements only if authorized by the county board of commissioners.

Subdivision 8 of the Joint Powers Act creates a limited exception to the commonality requirement for counties. It provides:

[n]otwithstanding the provisions of subdivision 1 requiring commonality of powers between parties to any agreement the board of county commissioners of any county may by resolution enter into agreements with any other governmental unit as defined in subdivision 1 to perform on behalf of that unit any service or function which that unit would be authorized to provide for itself.

Minn. Stat. § 471.59, subd. 8.

Under this exception, counties can enter 287(g) agreements but must do so by resolutions of their county boards of commissioners. But state law does not permit sheriffs unilaterally to enter a 287(g) agreement on behalf of the county.

II. A 287(g) agreement does not authorize Minnesota law enforcement officers to detain individuals on immigration detainers.

ICE may issue immigration detainers to federal, state, or local law enforcement agencies. See 8 C.F.R. § 287.7. An immigration detainer "serves to advise another law enforcement agency that [DHS] seeks custody of an alien presently in the custody of that agency, for the purpose of arresting and removing the alien." 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(a). The detainer "is a request" that the receiving agency advise ICE before releasing the person and that it "maintain custody of the alien for a period not to exceed 48 hours…to permit assumption of custody by [DHS]." 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(a), (d). Several courts have confirmed that detainers are merely requests and are not mandatory.

"As a general rule, it is not a crime for a removable alien to remain present in the United States." Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 407 (2012). An immigration detainer indicates ICE's belief that a person may be removable and does not by itself indicate suspicion of criminal activity. Further, immigration detainers are issued by ICE officers and are not reviewed by neutral magistrates like judicial warrants.

This Office has previously opined that "Minnesota law prohibits state and local law enforcement agencies from holding someone based on an immigration detainer if the person would otherwise be released from custody." Op. Atty. Gen. 3a at 2 (Feb. 6, 2025). As that opinion explains, holding an individual beyond when they would otherwise be released constitutes a new arrest, no Minnesota statute authorizes arrest based solely on immigration status or immigration detainers, and an arrest unauthorized by statute is illegal.

That opinion left open, however, "whether detainer arrests by Minnesota officials operating under a valid Section 287(g) agreement would comply with Minnesota law," which this opinion now answers. For the reasons below, 287(g) agreements do not alter Minnesota law enforcement officers' obligations to comply with Minnesota law and do not authorize them to hold persons pursuant to immigration detainers who would otherwise be released.

A. Minnesota law does not provide broader arrest authority to law enforcement officers acting pursuant to 287(g) agreements.

A potential source of expanded authority for officers with 287(g) agreements is subdivision 12 of the Joint Powers Act, which authorizes peace officers from one jurisdiction to exercise "the full and complete authority" of peace officers from another jurisdiction where the agreement at issue "authorize[s] the exercise of peace officer or police powers."

Subdivision 12 does not define "peace officer," but no definition of "peace officer" in Minnesota law includes federal officers. ICE officers are therefore not "peace officers" as defined in Minnesota law and jurisprudence and 287(g) agreements do not authorize the exercise of peace officer powers by local law enforcement.

"Police power" is also not defined in subdivision 12, but that term describes the power of the states, not the federal government. ICE, a federal agency whose authority is limited to immigration enforcement, not general criminal law enforcement, therefore does not exercise "police powers." Because a 287(g) agreement is not an agreement for "the exercise of peace officer or police powers," subdivision 12 is inapplicable and does not expand the authority of officers acting under 287(g) agreements.

Even where subdivision 12 applies, it can only authorize officers to exercise the authority of Minnesota peace officers. The Minnesota legislature clearly lacks authority to authorize persons to exercise powers of law enforcement officers from non-Minnesota jurisdictions. In particular, the Minnesota legislature cannot authorize officers to exercise the powers of ICE officers, which are granted by the federal government.

For these reasons, Minnesota law enforcement officers acting under 287(g) agreements have no greater authority under state law than they otherwise have. In particular, the state law prohibition on holding a person based solely on an immigration detainer applies to officers acting under 287(g) agreements.

B. Federal law does not authorize local law enforcement officers acting under 287(g) agreements to make arrests prohibited by state law.

The second question is whether federal law authorizes local officers acting under 287(g) agreements to detain persons pursuant to immigration detainers even if doing so is prohibited by state law. For the reasons below, federal law does not displace state law obligations for officers acting under 287(g) agreements.

Under the U.S. Constitution's Supremacy Clause, federal law can sometimes preempt state law. "Federal law can preempt state law in three ways: through (1) field preemption, (2) express preemption, and (3) conflict preemption[.]"

There is no field preemption here because Congress did not (and likely could not) prevent states from regulating the conduct of their own officers. In fact, section 287(g) authorizes agreements only "to the extent consistent with State and local law." 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g). By commanding that officers adhere to state and local law while operating under a 287(g) agreement, Congress clearly did not forbid states from taking action in this field.

Nothing in section 287(g) expressly preempts state law. In fact, section 287(g) denies preempting state law by authorizing agreements permitting state and local officials to take actions only "to the extent consistent with State and local law." 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(1).

And conflict preemption exists where "compliance with both state and federal law is impossible," or where "the state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." Section 287(g) does not require anything at all because 287(g) agreements are optional. See 8 U.S.C. § 287(g)(9). Because section 287(g) does not mandate anything, it is possible to comply with both section 287(g) and Minnesota law, so there is no conflict preemption.

The analysis above is bolstered by the fact that the Colorado Court of Appeals recently decided that a Colorado law prohibiting holding a person on an immigration detainer applied to officers operating under a 287(g) agreement. See Nash, 557 P.3d at 377-79.

CONCLUSION

Minnesota law permits counties to enter 287(g) agreements, but such agreements must comply with the requirements of the Joint Powers Act. That requires, among other things, that the agreement be entered into by a resolution of the county board of commissioners.

Even a valid 287(g) agreement does not permit officers to detain persons based solely on ICE immigration detainers or take any other actions violating Minnesota law. Officers or agencies who do so may expose themselves to liability. See Lundeen v. Renteria, 224 N.W.2d 132, 146 (Minn. 1974).

Sincerely,

KEITH ELLISON
Attorney General
State of Minnesota