Can a Minnesota county jail or sheriff hold someone past their state release date because ICE has sent over an immigration detainer asking them to keep the person 48 more hours?

Plain-English summary

In January 2025, Ramsey County Attorney John Choi asked Attorney General Keith Ellison a question his predecessors at the Ramsey County Attorney's Office had wrestled with in 2014: can the county jail keep someone in custody past the time they would otherwise be released because U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement has sent over a detainer asking the jail to hold the person for up to 48 more hours?

The 2014 Ramsey County analysis said no. A 2019 Minnesota Court of Appeals decision in Esparza v. Nobles County affirmed an injunction against Nobles County and its sheriff on the same theory. But the Esparza decision was nonprecedential and arose from a preliminary injunction, not a final judgment, and ICE had changed its detainer forms since 2014. So Choi asked for a fresh opinion.

The AG concluded that Minnesota law does not authorize a hold based only on an immigration detainer.

The reasoning runs in three steps. First, prolonging custody past a person's state release date is a new arrest. The U.S. Supreme Court's Rodriguez v. United States (2015) holds that extending a seizure for a new purpose is a new seizure, and the Minnesota Supreme Court's State v. Askerooth line requires independent justification for each incremental expansion of a seizure under Article I, section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution. State courts from Montana to Massachusetts have reached the same conclusion specifically about detainer holds: see Ramon v. Short (Mont. 2020), Lunn v. Commonwealth (Mass. 2017), and the New York Appellate Division in People ex rel. Wells v. DeMarco. The Minnesota Court of Appeals' Esparza decision lines up with that consensus.

Second, no Minnesota statute authorizes an arrest based on civil immigration status. Minnesota peace officers do not have common-law authority to arrest; Hilla v. Jensen (Minn. 1921) makes arrest authority statute-bound, and State v. Varnado (Minn. 1998) says an arrest not authorized by statute is illegal. Minnesota's civil arrest statutes cover mental-illness commitment, contempt, juvenile delinquency, and sex-offender commitment, but not immigration. Minnesota's criminal arrest statutes require either an officer-witnessed crime, probable cause of a felony, or a judicial warrant. Section 631.50 requires correctional officials to inquire about noncitizen status of convicted felons and report it to ICE, which is express authorization to cooperate in a narrow way; the absence of analogous express authorization to detain on a civil detainer is, the AG says, "glaring."

Third, federal law does not supply the missing authority. ICE administrative warrants (forms I-200 and I-205) are signed by federal immigration officers, not by judicial officers, and so they fail Minnesota's requirement that an arrest warrant be signed by a judge (Minn. R. Crim. P. 3.02, subd. 1). The cooperation clause in 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(10) does not affirmatively grant arrest authority; it just lets state and local officers cooperate informally to the extent state law allows, per Ramon v. Short, Lunn, and DeMarco. And the Tenth Amendment's anticommandeering principle (Murphy v. NCAA) prevents Congress from ordering Minnesota officials to enforce federal regulatory programs anyway.

The opinion expressly leaves open whether a 287(g) agreement would change the answer; that question got its own AG opinion on December 12, 2025, which concluded that a 287(g) agreement does not change the answer either.

What this means for you

For county jails and corrections facilities: when an inmate's state release time arrives (sentence completed, bail posted, charges dismissed), release them. Do not extend the hold because ICE sent over a detainer form. Form I-247A, even when accompanied by an ICE administrative warrant (I-200 or I-205), is a request, not a command. Treating it as a command is a new arrest, and that arrest is not authorized by Minnesota statute.

For sheriffs and county commissioners: the opinion describes the civil-liability picture in concrete dollar amounts. Parada v. Anoka County, 54 F.4th 1016 (8th Cir. 2022), produced a $30,000 false-imprisonment award and over $248,000 in attorney fees. Nobles County paid a $200,000 settlement in the Esparza litigation. These are not hypothetical risks.

For county attorneys advising on jail policy: align written jail-release procedures with this opinion. Train booking and release staff that a detainer plus administrative warrant does not authorize a hold. Document the legal basis for releases in case of later challenge by federal officials or by the inmate.

For immigration attorneys and public defenders: the opinion provides citable authority to argue that a Minnesota client's continued detention past release time is an unlawful arrest. Pair the AG opinion with Esparza and the Ramon/Lunn/DeMarco line for state-court motions, and Galarza and the Tenth Amendment anticommandeering argument for any federal challenges.

For civil rights litigators: the AG specifically notes that any unauthorized arrest "potentially exposes the arresting agency to civil liability" under Lundeen v. Renteria. False-imprisonment claims under Minnesota law plus Section 1983 claims under federal law are both viable.

For state legislators considering changes: the opinion identifies the architecture of the problem. Minnesota's civil arrest statutes are itemized; the legislature has authorized arrests for mental illness, contempt, juveniles, and sex-offender commitment. Detainer compliance would require adding a parallel category. The AG's footnote 8 specifically contrasts Virginia's § 19.2-81.6 and Texas's Code Crim. P. 2.251, which expressly authorize state officers to enforce federal immigration law and to comply with ICE detainers. Minnesota has not enacted such a statute.

Common questions

Q: Can the jail hold someone for the 48 hours requested by the detainer if they have nothing else to do during that time?
A: No. The clock is the state release time. Once that time has passed, continued custody is a new seizure that must be independently authorized. The 48 hours in 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(d) is the maximum ICE asks for, not a Minnesota authorization to detain.

Q: Does it matter if the detainer is paired with an ICE administrative warrant (form I-200 or I-205)?
A: No. Both forms are signed by federal immigration officials, not by judges. The Minnesota Constitution requires a judicial signature for an arrest warrant. Abel v. United States (1960) confirmed that immigration warrants are not "judicial warrants within the scope of the Fourth Amendment."

Q: What about the cooperation clause in 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(10)?
A: The cooperation clause permits informal cooperation, but it does not affirmatively grant state officers arrest authority they did not otherwise have. The AG follows Ramon v. Short (Mont.), Lunn v. Commonwealth (Mass.), and People ex rel. Wells v. DeMarco (N.Y. App. Div.), all of which read § 1357(g)(10) the same way.

Q: Is the jail required to give ICE advance notice before releasing someone?
A: This opinion does not say the jail must, only that the jail may not extend the hold. Notice itself, separate from continued detention, is treated differently. The AG's December 2025 opinion on 287(g) agreements expands on this and does not displace the general rule.

Q: What about cooperation with criminal warrants, not detainers?
A: The opinion's footnote 1 expressly preserves this: nothing in the opinion limits arrests on judicial warrants or warrantless arrests of noncitizens for criminal violations under Minnesota statutes and the U.S. and Minnesota Constitutions. The opinion is only about detainer-only holds.

Q: Was the legislature aware of this issue when it enacted § 631.50?
A: The opinion treats the existence of § 631.50, which requires correctional officials to inquire about and report convicted-felon noncitizen status, as significant evidence that the legislature knew how to authorize cooperation when it wanted to. The fact that the legislature did not also authorize detainer compliance reads as a deliberate choice.

Q: Does this apply to U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) detainers too?
A: Yes. Footnote 2 of the opinion notes that other federal immigration officers, including CBP agents, are authorized to issue detainers under 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(b), and the same analysis applies to those detainers.

Q: What about a 287(g) agreement, does that change the answer?
A: The opinion left that question open in footnote 9. The AG's December 12, 2025 opinion (Op. Atty. Gen. 3-a; 390a6) closed the question and concluded the answer is still no.

Background and statutory framework

The Minnesota Constitution and the U.S. Constitution both protect against "unreasonable searches and seizures" (Minn. Const. art. I, § 10; U.S. Const. amend. IV). The Minnesota Supreme Court in State v. Askerooth read Article I, section 10 to provide greater protection than the federal Fourth Amendment. State v. Beckman (Minn. 1984) sets the test for whether a seizure has occurred: would a reasonable person in the same circumstances believe themselves under custodial arrest and unfree to leave? Once a person is past their state release time, that test is easily met.

Minnesota arrest authority is statutory, not common law. Hilla v. Jensen (Minn. 1921) is the foundational case; State v. Varnado (Minn. 1998) is the modern reaffirmation. An arrest not authorized by statute is illegal and creates false-imprisonment liability under Lundeen v. Renteria (Minn. 1974).

Minn. Stat. § 629.30 is the four-category arrest statute: arrest by peace officers with a warrant, arrest by peace officers without a warrant, arrest by federal immigration officers, and citizen arrests. The third category is significant: § 629.30 authorizes federal immigration officers themselves to make immigration arrests. It does not authorize Minnesota officers to make those arrests. Section 629.34 governs warrantless arrests. Minn. R. Crim. P. 3.02, subd. 1 requires arrest warrants to be signed by a judge.

For civil arrests, Minnesota's specific authorizations cover mental-illness commitment (§§ 253B.141, 253B.051, 253B.07), contempt of court (§ 588.04(a)), juvenile delinquency (§§ 260C.143, 260C.175), and sex-offender civil commitment (§ 253D.10). The list is finite. Immigration is not on it.

Federal section 287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act lets DHS contract with state and local agencies for them to perform federal immigration functions, but only "to the extent consistent with State and local law" (§ 1357(g)(1)). Subsection (g)(10) is the cooperation clause, which has been read by Ramon v. Short, Lunn v. Commonwealth, and People ex rel. Wells v. DeMarco to permit cooperation only to the extent state law authorizes.

Federal regulations at 8 C.F.R. § 287.7 establish the detainer system. ICE policy 10074.2 (2017) requires that detainers (form I-247A) be paired with administrative warrants (I-200 for someone not yet under a final removal order, or I-205 for someone subject to a final order). The administrative warrants are signed by ICE officials, not judges, so under Minnesota law they cannot serve as arrest warrants.

The Tenth Amendment, as construed in Murphy v. NCAA (U.S. 2018), prevents Congress from commandeering state and local officials to administer federal regulatory programs. The Third Circuit's Galarza v. Szalczyk (2014) applied that principle specifically to immigration detainers and held that they must be deemed requests, not commands. The Seventh Circuit's McHenry County v. Raoul (2022) and the Ninth Circuit's United States v. California (2019) line up the same way.

Citations and references

Statutes:
- Minn. Stat. § 8.07
- Minn. Stat. § 629.30
- Minn. Stat. § 629.34
- Minn. Stat. § 629.37
- Minn. Stat. § 631.50
- Minn. Stat. §§ 253B.07, subd. 2b; 253B.051; 253B.141, subd. 2
- Minn. Stat. § 253D.10
- Minn. Stat. §§ 260C.143, subd. 4; 260C.175, subd. 1
- Minn. Stat. § 588.04(a)
- Minn. R. Crim. P. 3.02, subd. 1; 6.01, subd. 1(a)
- Minn. Const. art. I, § 10
- 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(3)
- 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (including subsections (1), (2), (3), (9), (10))
- 8 C.F.R. § 287.7

Cases:
- Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387 (2012)
- Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980)
- Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001)
- Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348 (2015)
- Murphy v. NCAA, 584 U.S. 453 (2018)
- Galarza v. Szalczyk, 745 F.3d 634 (3d Cir. 2014)
- Morales v. Chadbourne, 793 F.3d 208 (1st Cir. 2015)
- Lunn v. Commonwealth, 78 N.E.3d 1143 (Mass. 2017)
- Ramon v. Short, 460 P.3d 867 (Mont. 2020)
- People ex rel. Wells v. DeMarco, 168 A.D.3d 31 (N.Y. App. Div. 2018)
- Esparza v. Nobles County, A18-2011, 2019 WL 4594512 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 23, 2019)
- McHenry County v. Raoul, 44 F.4th 581 (7th Cir. 2022)
- United States v. California, 921 F.3d 865 (9th Cir. 2019)
- Parada v. Anoka County, 54 F.4th 1016 (8th Cir. 2022)
- Moreno v. Napolitano, 213 F. Supp. 3d 999 (N.D. Ill. 2016)
- State v. Beckman, 354 N.W.2d 432 (Minn. 1984)
- State v. Thompson, 929 N.W.2d 21 (Minn. App. 2019)
- State v. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d 353 (Minn. 2004)
- Peterson v. Lutz, 3 N.W.2d 489 (Minn. 1942)
- Hilla v. Jensen, 182 N.W. 902 (Minn. 1921)
- State v. Varnado, 582 N.W.2d 886 (Minn. 1998)
- Lundeen v. Renteria, 224 N.W.2d 132 (Minn. 1974)
- City of St. Paul v. Tobler, 153 N.W.2d 440 (Minn. 1967)
- State ex rel. Duhn v. Tahash, 147 N.W.2d 382 (Minn. 1966)
- INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984)

Source

• Landing page: https://www.ag.state.mn.us/Office/Opinions/
• Original PDF: https://www.ag.state.mn.us/Office/Opinions/3a-20250206.pdf

Original opinion text

Minnesota law prohibits state and local law enforcement agencies from holding someone based on an immigration detainer if the person would otherwise be released from custody. Minn. Stat. §§ 629.30; .34

3-a
February 6, 2025

John J. Choi
Ramsey County Attorney
360 Wabasha Street North, Suite 100
St. Paul, MN 55102-1418

Re: Request for Advisory Opinion Pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 8.07

Dear Ramsey County Attorney Choi:

Thank you for your letter of January 13, 2025, which requests an opinion from this Office on whether Ramsey County can lawfully hold people in custody based on civil immigration detainer requests from U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement.

BACKGROUND

The facts as you present them are as follows. In 2014, the Ramsey County Attorney's Office reviewed the legality of holding people in custody at the Ramsey County Jail and the Ramsey County Correctional Facility in response to immigration detainers issued by U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement (ICE). As discussed below, an immigration detainer is a request from ICE to hold someone for up to 48 hours beyond the time they would otherwise be released so federal immigration officers may assume custody. See 8 C.F.R. § 287.7. Your Office concluded that holding people because of immigration detainers was unconstitutional and exposed Ramsey County to civil liability.

In 2019, the Minnesota Court of Appeals reached a similar conclusion. In Esparza v. Nobles County, the court of appeals affirmed an injunction prohibiting Nobles County and the Nobles County Sheriff from holding people because of immigration detainers. See A18-2011, 2019 WL 4594512 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 23, 2019).

QUESTION PRESENTED

Your letter asks the following question: "Can Ramsey County lawfully hold a detainee or inmate based solely on an ICE Form I-247 Detainer, or similar civil request, without a supporting warrant or probable cause?"

ICE, however, has discontinued use of form I-247. ICE now issues detainer requests through a consolidated detainer form, I-247A, accompanied by one of two types of administrative warrants: (1) form I-200 (Warrant for Arrest of Alien) or (2) form I-205 (Warrant of Removal/Deportation).

We therefore interpret your question as follows: Can Ramsey County lawfully hold people in custody based on immigration detainers?

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSION

Minnesota law prohibits state and local law enforcement agencies from holding someone based on an immigration detainer if the person would otherwise be released from custody.

ANALYSIS

I. OVERVIEW OF IMMIGRATION DETAINERS

Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, the Secretary of DHS has the authority to "establish such regulations . . . and perform such other acts as he deems necessary for carrying out his authority." 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(3). Based on that authority, the Secretary has promulgated regulations that authorize ICE to issue immigration "detainers." 8 C.F.R. § 287.7. A detainer advises another federal, state, or local law enforcement agency that ICE "seeks custody of a [noncitizen] presently in the custody of that agency, for the purpose of arresting and removing the [noncitizen]." Id. § 287.7(a). A detainer asks the receiving agency to do two things: (1) notify ICE before a specific detainee or inmate is released from custody; and (2) maintain custody of that person for up to 48 hours after he or she would otherwise be released so that ICE may assume their custody.

Federal regulations specify that detainers are requests, not commands. See 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(a). Federal courts across the country have recognized the same. E.g., Galarza v. Szalczyk, 745 F.3d 634, 642 (3d Cir. 2014). And to the extent there were any doubt, the Tenth Amendment "clearly establishes that [detainers] must be deemed requests." Id. at 643.

II. CONTINUED DETENTION AFTER A PERSON SHOULD BE RELEASED FROM CUSTODY IS AN ARREST.

Both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and Article I, section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution, protect people from "unreasonable searches and seizures." An arrest is a seizure. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980). The law deems a person to be under arrest if a reasonable person, under the same circumstances, would believe themselves to be under custodial arrest and unfree to leave.

Under this rule, prolonging the custodial detention of a person who should otherwise be released is an arrest and must comply with Minnesota's arrest statutes. Cf. Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 356-57 (2015); Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d at 365. The Minnesota Supreme Court has accordingly held: "A jailer or prison superintendent can be held liable for false imprisonment in an action by a prisoner detained beyond the expiration of his sentence." Peterson v. Lutz, 3 N.W.2d 489, 489 (Minn. 1942).

Applying these principles, prolonging the detention of someone who should otherwise be released, based solely on an immigration detainer, is an arrest. Several federal and state courts have considered this issue. And they have reached "broad consensus" that prolonging a person's detention solely because of an immigration detainer is a new arrest. Ramon v. Short, 460 P.3d 867, 875 (Mont. 2020); see also Morales v. Chadbourne, 793 F.3d 208, 217 (1st Cir. 2015); Lunn v. Commonwealth, 78 N.E.3d 1143, 1153-54 (Mass. 2017); People ex rel. Wells v. DeMarco, 168 A.D.3d 31, 39-40 (N.Y. App. Div. 2018); Esparza, 2019 WL 4594512, at *4-5.

III. NEITHER MINNESOTA LAW NOR FEDERAL LAW AUTHORIZES STATE AND LOCAL OFFICIALS TO ARREST AN INDIVIDUAL BASED ON AN IMMIGRATION DETAINER.

Because continued detention due to an immigration detainer is an arrest, the question becomes whether the detainer alone authorizes Minnesota officials to hold someone. The answer is no.

A. Minnesota law does not authorize state and local officials to hold someone based on an immigration detainer.

Minnesota peace officers do not have inherent or common law authority to arrest. Arrest authority is instead defined by statute. Hilla v. Jensen, 182 N.W. 902, 903 (Minn. 1921). An arrest that is unauthorized by statute is illegal. State v. Varnado, 582 N.W.2d 886, 892-93 (Minn. 1998). And any unauthorized arrest potentially exposes the arresting agency to civil liability.

Civil arrest statutes. As the Supreme Court has repeatedly stated, "it is not a crime for a removable [noncitizen] to remain present in the United States." Arizona, 567 U.S. at 407. Instead, "[r]emoval is a civil, not criminal, matter." Id. at 396. Thus, legal authority for detainer arrests must be found in Minnesota's civil statutes, not its criminal code.

Minnesota statutes authorize civil arrests, with or without a warrant, in limited circumstances. Civil arrest schemes govern mental illness, contempt of court, juvenile delinquency, and sex-offender commitment.

We are aware of no civil statute that vests Minnesota officials with the authority to arrest someone in response to an immigration detainer. The absence of such an arrest authority is glaring because the Minnesota legislature has authorized law enforcement to work with federal immigration officials in other ways. Minnesota law, for example, requires sheriffs and other correctional officials to inquire into the immigration status of convicted felons and those civilly committed for mental health reasons. Minn. Stat. § 631.50.

The Minnesota legislature thus knows how to authorize state officials to work with ICE. But it has not authorized Minnesota officials to carry out civil immigration arrests.

Criminal arrest statutes. Even if Minnesota's criminal arrest statutes applied, the analysis would not change. As for arrests with a warrant, Minnesota law requires a finding of probable cause by a judicial officer. The administrative warrants that accompany immigration detainers (i.e., ICE forms I-200 and I-205) are not valid arrest warrants under Minnesota law because they are issued by federal immigration officials, not judicial officers.

As for arrests without a warrant, officers' authority is narrow and circumscribed by statute. None of these rules authorizes warrantless detainer arrests.

B. Federal law does not authorize Minnesota law enforcement agencies to conduct immigration detainer arrests.

Section 1357(g) of the INA allows DHS to enter contracts with state or local law enforcement agencies to perform the functions of federal immigration officers. No state or local entity is required to enter into an agreement under Section 1357(g), and we are unaware of any Minnesota law enforcement agency that is currently party to one.

Section 1357(g)(10) contains a saving clause that allows state and local officials to "cooperate" with federal immigration officials in certain circumstances. But as courts from Montana to Massachusetts have explained, Section 1357(g)(10) does not affirmatively vest state and local officials with detainer arrest authority. See, e.g., Ramon, 460 P.3d at 879; Lunn, 78 N.E.3d at 1159; DeMarco, 168 A.D.3d at 50-52. Instead, Section 1357(g)(10) allows for informal cooperation between state and local authorities and federal immigration officials, but only to the extent that cooperation is "authorized by state law." Lunn, 78 N.E.3d at 1159. And because Minnesota law does not authorize detainer arrests, detainer arrests are not a permissible form of cooperation under Section 1357(g)(10).

Thank you again for your inquiry, and we hope this opinion is helpful to you.

Sincerely,

KEITH ELLISON
Attorney General