Does the 2023 ban on prone restraint and compressive restraint in Minnesota schools restrict school resource officers and other peace officers when they're carrying out arrests, enforcing court orders, or otherwise doing their police job at a school?

Plain-English summary

The August 22, 2023 AG opinion answered the Education Commissioner's question about whether the Legislature's new prohibition on prone restraint and compressive restraint techniques (Minn. Stat. § 121A.58) yielded to the school staff's continuing authority to use reasonable force under § 121A.582. It did, the AG said.

What that opinion did not address was how the new restraint statutes applied to peace officers, including school resource officers and other contracted peace officers working in schools. The August opinion explicitly left that question to the Legislature.

Between August 22 and September 20, the AG met with the Minnesota Chiefs of Police Association, the Minnesota Sheriffs' Association, the Minnesota Police and Peace Officers Association, individual police chiefs, legislators, city officials, and county attorneys. Those conversations surfaced "valid questions about the application of the new law" to peace officers. Rather than wait for the Legislature, the AG issued the September 20 supplement.

The supplement reaches the same core conclusion as the August opinion for the school-staff question. The Amendment does not limit the reasonable force that school staff and agents can use to prevent bodily harm or death. It then adds the peace-officer conclusion: the Amendment also does not limit the reasonable force that peace officers can use to carry out their lawful duties as set forth in Minn. Stat. § 609.06, subd. 1(1). The test for reasonable force, in both contexts, is still fact-specific.

The legal architecture supporting the peace-officer conclusion runs as follows. Chapter 609 (Minnesota's general criminal code) governs reasonable force generally. Section 609.06, subd. 1(1) authorizes a public officer or one assisting a public officer to use force "as reasonably necessary in effecting a lawful arrest, executing legal process, enforcing an order of the court, or executing any other duty imposed upon the public officer by law." That's a free-standing authorization, not dependent on school statutes.

The school restraint statutes cross-reference chapter 609 in two relevant places. Section 121A.58, subd. 3 (the prohibited-restraints section) references chapter 609. Section 121A.582, subdivisions 3 and 4 (the reasonable-force-by-school-staff sections) do the same. The AG read those cross-references as legislative signals that chapter 609's authority survives the schools-only restraint ban. The restrictions on prone restraint and compressive restraint "do not apply under the circumstances enumerated in section 609.06, subdivision 1(1)."

The result is a clean line: a peace officer in a school does not lose authority to use force as reasonably necessary in arrests, court-order enforcement, or other lawful duties because the school passed an anti-restraint policy or because the Legislature passed § 121A.58. The officer is still bound by Fourth Amendment reasonableness and the criminal liability standard in chapter 609, but not by § 121A.58 as a school-specific restriction.

The supplement also adds a footnote affirming the binding nature of school-matter AG opinions. Minn. Stat. § 8.07 says AG opinions "on all school matters" are "decisive until the question involved shall be decided otherwise by a court." The Minnesota Supreme Court has confirmed this in Eelkema v. Bd. of Ed. of Duluth (Minn. 1943), with later applications in Village of Blaine v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 12 (1965), Mattson v. Flynn (1944), and Lindquist v. Abbott (1936). "School matters" is construed broadly to include the application of general statutes to education contexts.

What this means for you

For school resource officers: the school restraint statutes do not restrict your authority to use reasonable force in your official capacity. If you are making an arrest, executing a search warrant, or enforcing a court order on school grounds, your force authority comes from § 609.06, not from § 121A.582. The same Fourth Amendment and criminal-liability standards apply that apply anywhere else.

For school administrators contracting with police for SRO services: the September supplement gives you clarity to put in your SRO MOUs. SRO use of force in official duties is governed by chapter 609 and the officer's training; the school restraint policy does not bind the SRO acting as an officer. Your school's own restraint policy still governs school staff (including SROs acting as school staff for non-law-enforcement functions, if applicable in your district).

For police chiefs and sheriffs assigning officers to schools: the AG explicitly invited "coordinated training and guidance from trusted law enforcement leaders" on this area. Develop department training that maps the line between (1) the officer acting as a peace officer under chapter 609 (force authority preserved) and (2) the officer in a more general supervisory or supportive role (which may bring school-specific restraint rules into play).

For school district attorneys: review your SRO contracts and your restraint policies. The contracts should reflect that the SRO operates under chapter 609 authority when carrying out law-enforcement functions and is not bound by § 121A.58 for those functions. The restraint policies should be written for school staff and clearly note the SRO carve-out.

For parents of students with disabilities and special-education advocates: the supplement does not weaken the schools-only restraint ban for school staff. It addresses peace officers specifically. The substantive concern, that physically aggressive restraint may be misused, remains active for school-staff incidents. For SRO involvement, the question shifts to whether the SRO was acting as a peace officer under § 609.06 and whether the force used was "reasonably necessary." Those are evaluated under the standard Fourth Amendment and chapter 609 frameworks, not under the school-specific ban.

For the Minnesota Legislature, if it considers further changes: the AG noted that "there may be room for additional clarification from the Legislature" on the SRO question. Specifically, the textual asymmetry between teachers/principals (who need "imminent" threat) and other school staff and bus drivers (who do not) under § 121A.582 was flagged in the August opinion but not resolved in the supplement.

Common questions

Q: How is this opinion different from the August 22 one?
A: The August opinion answered the question about school staff and agents. This supplement adds the peace-officer answer the August opinion explicitly left open. The school-staff conclusion is the same in both opinions.

Q: Does this mean an SRO can use prone restraint on a student?
A: When the SRO is acting as a peace officer in an official duty (arrest, executing process, court-order enforcement, etc.), § 609.06's "reasonably necessary" standard governs, not § 121A.58's categorical ban. Whether prone restraint is reasonably necessary in a particular arrest is a fact question evaluated under Fourth Amendment and chapter 609 standards.

Q: What if an SRO is just supervising a hallway or watching a basketball game?
A: That's the harder case. The opinion focuses on "official duties" under § 609.06, subd. 1(1), which lists arrests, legal process, court orders, and other duties imposed by law. Routine supervision or building presence may not be an "official duty" in that sense. The AG's invitation for "coordinated training" reflects that this line is not bright. Conservative practice: when the SRO is engaged in non-arrest school-supervision work, follow school restraint policies.

Q: Does this opinion bind school resource officers personally?
A: The footnote affirms that AG opinions on school matters bind school officers until a court rules otherwise. SROs operate under both school and law-enforcement chains of command. To the extent the SRO is performing school functions, the opinion binds. As a peace officer, the officer is bound by their department's training and policies plus statute and constitutional law.

Q: What about CSOs (community service officers) or unarmed school safety personnel?
A: They are not "peace officers" under Minnesota law and are not covered by § 609.06's peace-officer authority. They fall under the school-staff framework in § 121A.582 and the restrictions in § 121A.58, plus the August 22 opinion's reasonable-force analysis.

Q: Are these opinions still in effect if the Legislature amends the statutes again?
A: AG opinions interpret statutes as they exist. A subsequent amendment that materially changes § 121A.58 or § 121A.582 would require a new opinion. The supplement is the operative AG opinion until that happens or until a court rules otherwise.

Q: Why didn't the AG wait for the Legislature?
A: The supplement says coordinated training and Legislative clarification "could be very beneficial." But because § 8.07 lets the AG issue decisive opinions on school matters and because schools and officers needed guidance before the next legislative session, the AG issued the supplement.

Background and statutory framework

Minn. Stat. § 8.07 authorizes the Attorney General to render written opinions on school matters that are "decisive" until a court rules otherwise. Eelkema v. Bd. of Ed. of Duluth (Minn. 1943) is the foundational case interpreting § 8.07 this way. Village of Blaine v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 12 (Minn. 1965) confirmed that AG opinions properly construing general statutes in education contexts are binding under § 8.07. Mattson v. Flynn (Minn. 1944) and Lindquist v. Abbott (Minn. 1936) are earlier applications. "School matters" is construed broadly.

The substantive framework comes from the 2023 Amendment. Minn. Stat. § 121A.58, subd. 3 (the prohibited-restraints provision) now contains the savings clause: "Nothing in this section or section 125A.0941 precludes the use of reasonable force under section 121A.582." It also cross-references chapter 609, which carries the peace-officer authority into the analysis.

Minn. Stat. § 121A.582 has the school-staff reasonable-force authority. Subdivision 3 incorporates chapter 609 by reference. Subdivision 4 contains the supplementary-rights provision the August opinion relied on.

Minn. Stat. § 609.06 is the general reasonable-force statute in Minnesota's criminal code. Subdivision 1(1) authorizes a public officer (or one assisting one) to use force as reasonably necessary in:
- effecting a lawful arrest
- executing legal process
- enforcing an order of the court
- executing any other duty imposed upon the public officer by law

The September supplement reads this independent authorization, combined with the chapter 609 cross-references in §§ 121A.58 and 121A.582, as placing peace officers outside the school-specific restraint ban.

The interpretive canons are the same as the August opinion: Houck v. Houck (Minn. Ct. App. 2022) for the "nothing in this section" reading; Christensen v. State Dep't of Conservation (Minn. 1970) for supplementary-provisions construction; Minn. Stat. § 645.26, subd. 1 and Connexus Energy (Minn. 2015) for specific-over-general; In re E.M.B. (Minn. Ct. App. 2023) for no-additions. And the reasonable-force standard remains Moses v. Minneapolis Public Schools (1998) and Bond v. Indep. Sch. Dist. #191 (2022).

The Amendment was Laws of Minnesota 2023 ch. 55, art. 2, § 36 (the § 121A.58 changes) and art. 12, § 4 (the § 121A.582 changes), enacted May 24, 2023.

Citations and references

Statutes:
- Minn. Stat. § 8.07
- Minn. Stat. § 121A.58 (prohibited restraints)
- Minn. Stat. § 121A.582 (school-staff reasonable force)
- Minn. Stat. § 121A.582, subdivisions 3 and 4 (chapter 609 incorporation; supplementary rights)
- Minn. Stat. § 125A.0941, .0942 (students with disabilities)
- Minn. Stat. § 609.06 (use of reasonable force)
- Minn. Stat. § 609.06, subd. 1(1) (peace officer official-duty force)
- Minn. Stat. § 645.26, subd. 1 (specific/general canon)
- Laws of Minnesota 2023 ch. 55, art. 2, § 36; art. 12, § 4

Cases:
- Eelkema v. Bd. of Ed. of Duluth, 11 N.W.2d 76 (Minn. 1943)
- Village of Blaine v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 12, 138 N.W.2d 32 (Minn. 1965)
- Mattson v. Flynn, 13 N.W.2d 11 (Minn. 1944)
- Lindquist v. Abbott, 265 N.W. 54 (Minn. 1936)
- Hogan v. Brass, 957 N.W.2d 106 (Minn. Ct. App. 2021)
- Houck v. Houck, 979 N.W.2d 907 (Minn. Ct. App. 2022)
- Christensen v. State Dep't of Conservation, Game and Fish, 175 N.W.2d 433 (Minn. 1970)
- Connexus Energy v. Commissioner of Revenue, 868 N.W.2d 234 (Minn. 2015)
- In re E.M.B., 987 N.W.2d 597 (Minn. Ct. App. 2023)
- Moses v. Minneapolis Pub. Schs., No. C4-98-1073, 1998 WL 846546 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 8, 1998)
- Bond v. Indep. Sch. Dist. #191, No. A21-0688, 2022 WL 92661 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 10, 2022)

Source

• Landing page: https://www.ag.state.mn.us/Office/Opinions/
• Original PDF: https://www.ag.state.mn.us/Office/Opinions/169f-20230920.pdf

Original opinion text

SCHOOL PUPILS: DISCIPLINE: Laws of Minnesota 2023 ch. 55, art. 2, § 36 and art. 12, § 4 do not limit the types of reasonable force that may be used by school staff and agents to prevent bodily harm or death or to carry out lawful duties as set forth in Minnesota Statutes section 609.06, subd. 1(1). Minn. Stat. §§ 121A.58; 121A.582. Op. Atty. Gen. 169f (August 22, 2023) supplemented.

169f
September 20, 2023

Willie L. Jett, II
Commissioner
Minnesota Department of Education

Dear Commissioner Jett:

Thank you for your letter of August 18, 2023, which seeks clarity regarding recent amendments to student discipline laws. Pursuant to Minnesota Statutes section 8.07, I issued an opinion on August 22, 2023, with binding guidance on the issue you raised. Since that date I have met with many stakeholders, including the Minnesota Chiefs of Police Association, Minnesota Sheriffs' Association, Minnesota Police and Peace Officers Association, individual police chiefs, legislators, city elected officials, and county attorneys, who brought forward valid questions about the application of the new law. As a result, I supplement that opinion today. By operation of section 8.07, this opinion is "decisive until the question involved shall be decided otherwise by a court," and therefore it may be relied upon.

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

The Amendment does not limit the types of reasonable force that may be used by school staff and agents to prevent bodily harm or death. It also does not limit the types of reasonable force that may be used by public officers to carry out their lawful duties, as described in Minnesota Statutes section 609.06, subdivision 1(1). The test for reasonable force remains unchanged, and is highly fact-specific.

ANALYSIS

Three things support these conclusions. First, the Amendment adds a new sentence to Minnesota Statutes section 121A.58, subdivision 3: "Nothing in this section or section 125A.0941 precludes the use of reasonable force under section 121A.582." By this language, the Legislature expressed its clear intent to not limit the use of reasonable force when faced with the threat of bodily harm or death.

Second, Minnesota Statutes section 121A.582 states that: "Any right or defense under this section is supplementary to those specified in section 121A.58[.]" This further evinces the Legislature's view that the use of reasonable force authorized in Minnesota Statutes section 121A.582 is separate and distinct from the conduct prohibited by Minnesota Statutes section 121A.58.

Similarly, because chapter 609 is referenced in section 121A.58, subdivision 3, as well as in section 121A.582, subdivisions 3 and 4, the restrictions on prone and compressive restraints do not apply under the circumstances enumerated in section 609.06, subdivision 1(1). Therefore, all peace officers, including those who are "school resource officers" or otherwise agents of a school district, may use force as reasonably necessary to carry out official duties, including, but not limited to, making arrests and enforcing orders of the court. See Minn. Stat. § 609.06.

Third, and relatedly, even without those clear indications of intent from the Legislature, the usual canons of statutory construction support the same result. Section 121A.582 specifically governs responses to threats of violence, and therefore controls over the more general statute about acceptable punishments.

Accordingly, the Legislature did not change the types of reasonable force that school staff and agents are authorized to use in responding to a situation involving a threat of bodily harm or death. Of course, what force is "reasonable" is not defined in law and is determined on a case-by-case basis. In addition, the level of threat posed by a particular student or situation can change rapidly, and any assessment of what use of force is reasonable must take that into account.

In recent meetings with representatives of your staff, the Minnesota Chiefs of Police Association, the League of Minnesota Cities, the Minnesota Sheriffs' Association, and the Minnesota Police and Peace Officers Association, participants raised other important questions. Those questions demonstrate that coordinated training and guidance from trusted law enforcement leaders could be very beneficial in this area and there may be room for additional clarification from the Legislature.

Sincerely,

KEITH ELLISON
Attorney General