Did the 2023 amendment that banned prone restraint and chest/throat-pressure holds in Minnesota schools also ban those holds when a school staffer has to physically prevent a student from hurting someone or themselves?

Plain-English summary

In May 2023, the Minnesota Legislature changed two school discipline statutes. The Amendment to Minn. Stat. § 121A.58 defined "prone restraint" and prohibited school employees and agents from using prone restraint or any "compressive restraint techniques" that limit a pupil's ability to breathe or communicate distress, put pressure on the chest, throat, neck, head, lungs, sternum, diaphragm, back, or abdomen, or straddle a pupil's torso. At the same time, the Amendment to Minn. Stat. § 121A.582 said teachers and principals may use reasonable force "to correct or restrain a student to prevent imminent bodily harm or death," and other school employees, agents, and bus drivers may use reasonable force "to restrain a student to prevent bodily harm or death."

Education Commissioner Willie Jett asked the AG to resolve the obvious tension: are the prone-restraint and compressive-restraint bans absolute, or do they yield when a staffer must act to prevent imminent harm?

The AG concluded the bans do not limit reasonable force used to prevent bodily harm or death. The reasoning rests on three points.

First, the Amendment itself added a new sentence to Minn. Stat. § 121A.58, subd. 3: "Nothing in this section or section 125A.0941 precludes the use of reasonable force under section 121A.582." The AG read this "nothing in this section" phrase the same way the Minnesota Court of Appeals read a similar phrase in Houck v. Houck (Minn. Ct. App. 2022): unambiguous and susceptible to only one reasonable interpretation.

Second, Minn. Stat. § 121A.582, subd. 4 states that "any right or defense under this section is supplementary to those specified in section 121A.58." The AG read "supplementary" in its ordinary dictionary sense (additional), consistent with Christensen v. State Dep't of Conservation (Minn. 1970), which interprets supplementary provisions of an act together rather than as defeating each other. So the right to use reasonable force under § 121A.582 stands on its own; it does not yield to the prohibitions in § 121A.58.

Third, even without those textual signals, the canon that specific statutes control over general ones (Minn. Stat. § 645.26, subd. 1; Connexus Energy v. Commissioner of Revenue (Minn. 2015)) reaches the same result. Section 121A.582 specifically governs responses to threats of violence; § 121A.58 generally governs acceptable forms of discipline. The specific provision controls. And under the general no-additions canon (In re E.M.B. (Minn. Ct. App. 2023)), if the legislature had wanted to exclude prone and compressive restraint from the reasonable force allowed by § 121A.582, it would have said so.

The AG closed by emphasizing that "reasonable force" is not defined in statute and is determined case-by-case by a jury. Moses v. Minneapolis Public Schools (Minn. Ct. App. 1998) holds that the reasonableness of force is a fact issue. Bond v. Indep. Sch. Dist. #191 (Minn. Ct. App. 2022) shows the limits: official immunity may not protect a school dean who uses force explicitly defined as prohibited in school restraint training. Threat levels can change rapidly, and the assessment must account for that.

A footnote flagged a wrinkle: subdivision 1(a) (for teachers and principals) uses the word "imminent" to describe the threshold threat, but subdivision 1(b) (for other school employees, agents, and bus drivers) does not. The AG noted but did not resolve this textual difference.

The opinion ended by noting that other questions raised by police chiefs, the League of Minnesota Cities, and the Minnesota Police and Peace Officers Association about school resource officers and contracted peace officers were beyond the scope of the August request and better directed at the Legislature. The AG's September 20, 2023 supplement (Op. Atty. Gen. 169f, supplemented) addressed those points.

What this means for you

For teachers and principals: the Amendment did not strip you of authority to use reasonable force in a real emergency. If a student is about to seriously hurt themselves or another person, you can intervene with reasonable force, even using techniques that would otherwise be prohibited if they are reasonable under the circumstances. The categorical ban applies to ordinary discipline, restraint as punishment, or restraint for compliance, not to defense-of-self or defense-of-others.

For other school staff and bus drivers: the same authority applies to you under subdivision 1(b), with the textual difference that the statute does not include the word "imminent." You can use reasonable force to "restrain a student to prevent bodily harm or death." Whether the threat must be imminent for you the way it must be for teachers and principals is unresolved.

For school district attorneys advising on policy: update your restraint policies and training materials to reflect both the categorical ban and the reasonable-force carve-out. Make clear that prone restraint and compressive restraint are prohibited as discipline, supervision, or compliance tools, but reasonable force to prevent bodily harm or death remains lawful. Train staff on threat assessment so the line between the two is visible in the moment.

For parents of students with disabilities: § 121A.58 and § 125A.0941-.0942 specifically restrict actions toward students with disabilities, but they explicitly allow reasonable force under § 121A.582 (the AG cites § 125A.0942, subd. 6(b)). So the same balance applies. If your child was restrained in a way that did not respond to an imminent or actual threat of bodily harm, the categorical ban may have been violated; if the restraint was in response to a genuine threat, it falls under the reasonable-force exception. Documentation and witness accounts matter.

For special education advocates and ombudspersons: the opinion does not weaken the categorical ban on prone and compressive restraint as discipline. It only confirms that genuine emergencies are not categorically governed by that ban. Push districts to document each restraint incident with detail about the threat that prompted it; without that documentation, the "reasonable force" defense is harder to sustain.

For school resource officers and peace officers in schools: the August opinion left this question explicitly open. The September 20, 2023 supplement (companion AG opinion) confirms that peace officers, including SROs, can use reasonable force to carry out their official duties under Minn. Stat. § 609.06, subd. 1(1). Read both opinions together.

Common questions

Q: Does the ban on prone restraint apply when a student is fighting another student and a staffer pulls them apart?
A: The pulling-apart action would be evaluated under the reasonable-force standard of § 121A.582. The prone-restraint ban is about deliberately placing a student face-down on the ground in a restraint position. A staffer who incidentally needs to use a prone hold momentarily to stop an active assault is acting under § 121A.582's reasonable-force authority, not in violation of § 121A.58.

Q: Can a staffer use a prone restraint to stop a student from running out of the building?
A: Generally no, unless the running-out conduct creates an imminent threat of bodily harm or death (for example, running into traffic). The ban on prone restraint applies to discipline and supervision. Running out of class is a discipline issue. Running into traffic is a safety emergency.

Q: What is "imminent" bodily harm or death?
A: The statute doesn't define it. Case law generally treats "imminent" as meaning about to occur, not merely possible. The AG's footnote notes that subdivision 1(b) (for non-teacher staff and bus drivers) omits "imminent" entirely, so the threshold may be lower for them, though this is unsettled.

Q: Does the AG's "reasonable force" carve-out include techniques described in school restraint training as prohibited?
A: The opinion cites Bond v. Indep. Sch. Dist. #191 (Minn. Ct. App. 2022) for the point that official immunity may not apply to a staffer who uses force explicitly defined as prohibited in restraint training. So even if reasonable force is generally authorized, using a technique your district has trained you not to use puts you at greater liability risk. Follow your training.

Q: Who decides if a particular use of force was "reasonable"?
A: A jury, on the facts. Moses v. Minneapolis Public Schools is the cited authority. The Commissioner's role is implementing the statutory framework, and individual cases get resolved through litigation if challenged.

Q: How does this opinion interact with the special-education rules under § 125A.0941-.0942?
A: Footnote 3 confirms that § 125A.0941-.0942, which restricts actions toward students with disabilities, "explicitly allows the use of reasonable force under section 121A.582" via § 125A.0942, subd. 6(b). So the reasonable-force carve-out applies across the board, including for students with IEPs.

Q: What about school resource officers?
A: The August opinion left this open. The September 20, 2023 supplement (companion opinion) addressed it: peace officers, including school resource officers, can use force as reasonably necessary to carry out their official duties under Minn. Stat. § 609.06, subd. 1(1). The school-specific restraint ban does not displace peace-officer authority.

Background and statutory framework

Minn. Stat. § 121A.58 sets the general rule against using prone restraint and compressive restraint techniques on pupils. The 2023 Amendment added the prone-restraint definition and the compressive-restraint enumeration. Subdivision 3 of § 121A.58 now contains the savings clause: "Nothing in this section or section 125A.0941 precludes the use of reasonable force under section 121A.582."

Minn. Stat. § 121A.582 authorizes reasonable force in two tiers. Subdivision 1(a) covers teachers and principals: reasonable force "to correct or restrain a student to prevent imminent bodily harm or death to the student or another." Subdivision 1(b) covers other school employees, agents, and bus drivers: reasonable force "to restrain a student to prevent bodily harm or death." Subdivision 4 confirms that any right or defense under § 121A.582 is "supplementary to those specified in section 121A.58." That word "supplementary" is the textual hook for the AG's reading.

Minn. Stat. § 125A.0941-.0942 imposes additional restrictions for students with disabilities, but § 125A.0942, subd. 6(b) explicitly preserves the § 121A.582 reasonable-force authority.

The interpretive framework draws on three Minnesota canons:
- Houck v. Houck (Minn. Ct. App. 2022): "nothing in this section" provisions are unambiguous.
- Christensen v. State Dep't of Conservation (Minn. 1970): supplementary provisions are construed together.
- Minn. Stat. § 645.26, subd. 1 and Connexus Energy v. Commissioner of Revenue (Minn. 2015): specific statutes control over general ones.
- In re E.M.B. (Minn. Ct. App. 2023): courts cannot add words to a statute.

The Amendment was Laws of Minnesota 2023 ch. 55, art. 2, § 36 (the § 121A.58 changes) and art. 12, § 4 (the § 121A.582 changes). Both were enacted by the Act of May 24, 2023.

For the "reasonable force" standard, Moses v. Minneapolis Public Schools (Minn. Ct. App. 1998) is the operative case: the reasonableness of force used by school employees is a fact issue for a jury. Bond v. Indep. Sch. Dist. #191 (Minn. Ct. App. 2022) added the wrinkle that official immunity may not protect a staffer who uses force explicitly defined as prohibited in restraint training.

The footnote on "agents" uses Hogan v. Brass (Minn. Ct. App. 2021) to define agent as "one who has the authority to act on another's behalf," with the factual question whether a particular individual has that authority decided case by case.

The September 20, 2023 supplement extended this analysis to add that the same reasonable-force authority applies to peace officers (including school resource officers) carrying out their official duties under Minn. Stat. § 609.06.

Citations and references

Statutes:
- Minn. Stat. § 8.07 (AG opinion authority on school matters)
- Minn. Stat. § 121A.58 (prohibited restraints)
- Minn. Stat. § 121A.582 (reasonable force authority)
- Minn. Stat. § 125A.0941, .0942 (students with disabilities restrictions)
- Minn. Stat. § 645.26, subd. 1 (specific/general canon)
- Laws of Minnesota 2023 ch. 55, art. 2, § 36; art. 12, § 4

Cases:
- Hogan v. Brass, 957 N.W.2d 106 (Minn. Ct. App. 2021)
- Houck v. Houck, 979 N.W.2d 907 (Minn. Ct. App. 2022)
- Christensen v. State Dep't of Conservation, Game and Fish, 175 N.W.2d 433 (Minn. 1970)
- Connexus Energy v. Commissioner of Revenue, 868 N.W.2d 234 (Minn. 2015)
- In re E.M.B., 987 N.W.2d 597 (Minn. Ct. App. 2023)
- Moses v. Minneapolis Pub. Schs., No. C4-98-1073, 1998 WL 846546 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 8, 1998)
- Bond v. Indep. Sch. Dist. #191, No. A21-0688, 2022 WL 92661 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 10, 2022)

Source

• Landing page: https://www.ag.state.mn.us/Office/Opinions/
• Original PDF: https://www.ag.state.mn.us/Office/Opinions/169f-20230822.pdf

Original opinion text

SCHOOL PUPILS: DISCIPLINE: Laws of Minnesota 2023 ch. 55, art. 2, § 36 and art. 12, § 4 do not limit the types of reasonable force that may be used by school staff and agents to prevent bodily harm or death. Minn. Stat. §§ 121A.58; 121A.582.

169f
August 22, 2023

Willie L. Jett, II
Commissioner
Minnesota Department of Education
400 NE Stinson Boulevard
Minneapolis, Minnesota 55413

Re: Recent Amendments to Student Discipline Laws

Dear Commissioner Jett:

Thank you for your letter of August 18, 2023, which seeks clarity regarding recent amendments to student discipline laws, Minnesota Statutes sections 121A.58 and 121A.582. See Act of May 24, 2023, ch. 55, Art. 2, § 36; Art. 12, § 4 (hereinafter, the Amendment). Pursuant to Minnesota Statutes section 8.07, I issue this opinion to offer binding guidance on the issue you have raised.

BACKGROUND

Relevant to your inquiry, the Amendment revises Minnesota Statutes section 121A.58 to include a definition of "prone restraint" and to specify that school employees and agents generally: (1) "shall not use prone restraint" on pupils; and (2) "shall not inflict any form of physical holding that restricts or impairs a pupil's ability to breathe; restricts or impairs a pupil's ability to communicate distress; places pressure or weight on a pupil's head, throat, neck, chest, lungs, sternum, diaphragm, back or abdomen; or results in straddling a pupil's torso" (i.e., compressive restraint techniques). Id. at Art. 2, § 36.

The Amendment also revises Minnesota Statutes section 121A.582 to provide that: (1) teachers and principals may use reasonable force "to correct or restrain a student to prevent imminent bodily harm or death to the student or another"; and (2) other school employees, agents, and bus drivers may use reasonable force "to restrain a student to prevent bodily harm or death to the student or another." Id. at Art. 12, § 4.

QUESTION PRESENTED

You have expressed uncertainty regarding whether the Amendment categorically prohibits prone restraint and compressive restraint techniques in all scenarios. In particular, you ask: "whether the new language in Minnesota Statutes, section 121A.58, subdivision 3 and its reference to Minnesota Statutes, section 121A.582, acts as an exception to the general prohibition on prone restraints and other types of physical holds, thereby allowing the use of these practices when doing so would 'prevent imminent bodily harm or death to the student or to another.'"

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSION

The Amendment does not limit the types of reasonable force that may be used by school staff and agents to prevent bodily harm or death. The test for reasonable force remains unchanged, and is highly fact-specific.

ANALYSIS

Three things support this conclusion. First, the Amendment adds a new sentence to Minnesota Statutes section 121A.58, subdivision 3: "Nothing in this section or section 125A.0941 precludes the use of reasonable force under section 125A.582." By this language, the Legislature expressed its clear intent to not limit the use of reasonable force when faced with the threat of bodily harm or death. See, e.g., Houck v. Houck, 979 N.W.2d 907, 911 (Minn. Ct. App. 2022).

Second, Minnesota Statutes section 121A.582 states that: "Any right or defense under this section is supplementary to those specified in section 121A.58[.]" Minn. Stat. § 121A.582, subd. 4. This further evinces the Legislature's view that the use of reasonable force authorized in Minnesota Statutes section 121A.582 is separate and distinct from the conduct prohibited by Minnesota Statutes section 121A.58.

Third, and relatedly, even without those clear indications of intent from the Legislature, the usual canons of statutory construction support the same result. Section 121A.582 specifically governs responses to threats of violence, and therefore controls over the more general statute about acceptable punishments. See Minn. Stat. § 645.26, subd. 1; accord Connexus Energy v. Commissioner of Revenue, 868 N.W.2d 234, 242 (Minn. 2015). Furthermore, had the Legislature intended to exclude prone restraint and compressive restraint techniques from the reasonable force permitted under Minnesota Statutes section 121A.582, it would have clearly said so. See In re E.M.B., 987 N.W.2d 597, 601 (Minn. Ct. App. 2023).

Accordingly, the Legislature did not change the types of reasonable force that school staff and agents are authorized to use in responding to a situation involving a threat of bodily harm or death. Of course, what force is "reasonable" is not defined in law and is determined on a case-by-case basis. See Moses v. Minneapolis Pub. Schs., No. C4-98-1073, 1998 WL 846546, at 3 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 8, 1998); cf. Bond by and through Bond v. Indep. Sch. Dist. #191, No. A21-0688, 2022 WL 92661, at 5 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 10, 2022). In addition, the level of threat posed by a particular student or situation can change rapidly, and any assessment of what use of force was reasonable must take that into account.

In a recent meeting with representatives of your staff, the Minnesota Chiefs of Police Association, the League of Minnesota Cities, and the Minnesota Police and Peace Officers Association, participants raised other important questions about the standards applicable to school resource officers or other contracted peace officers at school events. Those questions are beyond the scope of your August 18 request and more appropriately directed at the Legislature.

Sincerely,

KEITH ELLISON
Attorney General