Does a Maine county commissioner automatically vacate her seat by selling her home in her electoral district and moving to a different district within the same county?
Subject
Whether a vacancy is created on the Androscoggin County Board of County Commissioners when Commissioner Helen Poulin sells her home in her electoral district (Lewiston) and moves to another district (Auburn) within the same county, while claiming she intends to return.
Currency note
This opinion was issued in 2008. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.
Plain-English summary
Governor Baldacci asked AG Steven Rowe whether Androscoggin County Commissioner Helen Poulin had vacated her seat by selling her home in Lewiston (her District 3) and buying a home in Auburn (a different district in the same county). Poulin had filed an affidavit saying she intended to return to Lewiston once her Auburn home sold.
The AG concluded that a court would likely hold she had vacated the office. Two statutory threads drove the answer:
The qualification statute, 30-A M.R.S.A. § 61(1), required commissioners to be residents of the district they represent for the full term, not just at election. The general vacancy statute, 21-A M.R.S.A. § 361, declared a vacancy when an officeholder "changes his residence to an electoral division other than that from which he was elected." Section 333 reinforced this by requiring a county officer to "maintain a voting residence in that electoral division during his term of office."
A separate provision, § 63, talked about a vacancy occurring when a commissioner moves "from the county." Counsel for Poulin argued this implied that intra-county moves did not create vacancies. The AG rejected that reading: the "removal from the county" language predated the 1969-1975 division of counties into commissioner districts and could not override the residency rules in §§ 61, 333, and 361.
On the factual side, the AG applied the domicile test from § 1(40) and § 112 ("a fixed and principal home to which the person, whenever temporarily absent, intends to return"). Poulin had no remaining home in Lewiston after selling the Ferry Road property; her only residence was the Auburn home; her stated intent to return was contingent on the Auburn home selling, which (as her affidavit acknowledged) might take a while. Citing State ex rel. Deering v. Harmon, 115 Me. 268 (1916), and Poirier v. City of Saco, 529 A.2d 329 (Me. 1987), the AG concluded that intent alone, without a fixed dwelling in the district, was insufficient to maintain residency.
Common questions
Q: Did Commissioner Poulin actually leave office after this opinion?
The opinion gave the Governor an AG legal view; it did not itself remove her. Whether and how the Governor acted, and whether litigation followed, are factual questions outside the opinion's scope.
Q: What if a commissioner stays at a hotel for a few months while renovating their home?
The AG's analysis distinguished "merely temporary removal or absence for a limited time," with no intent to abandon the office, from a true change of residence. Renting out one's only district dwelling and buying elsewhere is different from staying somewhere temporarily while keeping a fixed home in the district.
Q: Does this rule apply to other elected county officers?
Section 333's residency-during-term requirement and § 361's vacancy rule apply broadly to county officers. The qualification language in § 61 is specific to county commissioners. Other offices have parallel provisions that would govern the same kind of analysis.
Q: What about state legislators?
The opinion noted prior AG opinions concluding that the same domicile/voting-residence analysis applies to state House districts under the Maine Constitution's residency requirement. Footnote 2 referenced earlier advice that a Representative whose district had been redrawn would have to "physically move" to maintain eligibility.
Background and statutory framework
Maine counties were divided into three (or in York County's case, five) commissioner districts in the 1969-1975 reapportionment. Each commissioner represents one district, is elected by the voters of that district, and (per § 61(1)) must be a resident of that district. Reapportionment runs every ten years under § 65.
The vacancy framework spans two titles: Title 30-A governs county government and § 63 lists how a county-commissioner vacancy may arise; Title 21-A governs elections and § 361 lists how a vacancy in any state, federal, or county office arises. The AG had to harmonize the two, and read § 63's "removal from the county" language as a leftover from pre-district practice that did not displace the broader § 361 rule.
The domicile test under § 112 has two prongs: a "fixed and principal home" (objective dwelling), and intent to return when absent. The Law Court has read "voting residence" as equivalent to common-law domicile (Poirier v. City of Saco).
Citations
- 30-A M.R.S.A. §§ 61, 63, 65 (county commissioner qualifications, vacancies, districts)
- 21-A M.R.S.A. §§ 1(40), 112, 333, 361 (residence definitions, vacancies in office)
- State ex rel. Deering v. Harmon, 115 Me. 268 (1916)
- Poirier v. City of Saco, 529 A.2d 329 (Me. 1987)
- Pennings v. Pennings, 2002 ME 3, 786 A.2d 622
- Sylvester v. Benjamin, 2001 ME 51, 767 A.2d 297
Source
- Landing page: https://www.maine.gov/legis/lawlib/lldl/agops/agops.htm
- Original PDF: https://lldc.mainelegislature.org/Open/AG/Opinions/2008/ag_20081117.pdf
Original opinion text
Best-effort transcription from a scanned PDF. Minor errors may remain — the linked PDF is authoritative.
MAINE STATE LEGISLATURE
The following document is provided by the
LAW AND LEGISLATIVE DIGITAL LIBRARY
at the Maine State Law and Legislative Reference Library
http://legislature.maine.gov/lawlib
Reproduced from scanned originals with text recognition applied
(searchable text may contain some errors and/or omissions)
2008-05
REGIONAL OFFICES:
84 HARLOW ST., 2ND FLOOR
BANGOR, MAINE 04401
TEL: (207) 941-3070
FAX: (207) 941-3075
G. STEVEN ROWE
ATTORNEY GENERAL 44 OAK STREET, 4TH FLOOR
PORTLAND, MAINE 04101-3014
TEL: (207) 822-0260
FAX: (207) 822-0259
TDD: (877) 428--8800
STATE OF MAINE
TEL: (207) 626-8800 OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 128 S\VEDEN ST., STE. 2
TTY: 1-888-577-6690 CARIBOU, MAINE 04736
6 STATE HOUSE STATION TEL: (207) 496--3792
AUGUSTA, MAINE 04333-0006 FAX: (207) 496-3291
November 17, 2008
The Honorable John E. Baldacci, Governor
State of Maine
State House Station #1
Augusta, ME 04333-0001
Dear Governor Baldacci:
You have asked whether a vacancy has been created by operation of law on the
Androscoggin County Board of County Commissioners as the result of Commissioner Helen
Poulin moving out of the district from which she was elected, even though she remains in the
county. Ms. Poulin asserts that she intends to return to the district that elected her, and that
therefore no vacancy has occurred.
CONCLUSION
While Maine courts have not addressed the issue directly, we believe that a court would
conclude that a vacancy occurs when a county commissioner changes residence to another
electoral division, even when he or she continues to reside in the county. The determination of
whether a county commissioner has changed his or her residence to another electoral division or
district is a fact-based one. Based on the facts made available to us and our interpretation of
applicable statutes and case law, we believe that a court would likely conclude that
Connnissioner Poulin has vacated her office by removing herself from the district she was
elected to represent.
FACTS
Helen Poulin represents District 3 on the Androscoggin Board of County Commissioners.
According to an affidavit, dated September 22, 2008, and provided to your office by Ms. Poulin,
she and her husband listed their home at 170 Ferry Road in Lewiston ("Lewiston home") for sale
in July 2007. Poulin Affidavit ,-r,r 2, 10-11. Although the Poulins signed an agreement to
purchase another house in Lewiston in July 2008, prior to the sale of their Lewiston home, that
purchase was never effectuated. Id. ,-r,r 12-13. Upon the sale of their Lewiston home, the Poulins
then purchased a home at 100 Vickery Road in Auburn ("Auburn home"). Id ,-r,-r 14-15. Ms.
Poulin further states in her affidavit that she intends to return to Lewiston and that her Auburn
home is on the market Id. ~15.
PRINHD ON RECYCLED E'/\Pffl
DISCUSSION
A. Whether a Vacancy is Created When a County Commissioner Moves from The
Electoral District V/hile Continuing to Reside in the County,
The qualifications of members of a board of county commissioners are specified in 30-A
M.R.S.A. § 61 ("section 61 "), which requires that "[e]ach of the commissioners of a county must
represent one of the commissioner districts established by law for the commissioner's cotmty."
In addition, section 61(1) states: "Members of each board of commissioners must be residents of
the commissioner district which they represent and shall be elected by the voters of that district."
These districts are subject to reapportionment every ten years "to establish as nearly as
practicable equally populated districts." 30-A M.R.S.A. § 65.
Thus a board of commissioners is made up of three to five members, 1 each of whom
represents the distinct interests of one district and is required to be a resident of that district.
Also relevant is Title 21-A M.R.S.A. § 333 ("section 333"), which establishes the following
residence requirement for all county officers:.
A candidate for any county office must be a resident of and a voter in the
electoral division he seeks to represent on the date established for filing
primary petitions in the year he seeks election. He must maintain a voting
residence in that electoral division during his term of office.
In the case of Ms. Poulin, an argument has been advanced on her behalf that the
requirement that she reside in the district from which she was elected does not continue for the
duration of the commissioner's four year term. This argument is contradicted by the plain
language of section 61 and that of section 333. In construing the language of a statute, the court
looks first to the statute's plain language; absent ambiguity, the inquiry ends with the text of the
statute. Pennings v. Pennings, 2002 ME 3, 786 A.2d 622 (2002)'. In this instance, section 61(1)
clearly and simply requires that commissioners must be residents of the commissioner district
which they represent. TI1is is not a temporal requirement that applies only at the moment of
election, but one which by its terms applies to. the "members" of each of the county
commissioner boards. Section 333 expressly requires that a county officer must maintain a
voting residence in her electoral division for her term of office.
We have found only one Law Court decision addressing whether a vacancy was created
by removal of the incumbent office holder from the district, and it is consistent with this
conclusion. In State ex rel. Deering v. Harmon, 115 Me. 268 (1916), the Law Court held that a
judge for the municipal comi of Saco had abandoned his position by moving to Bangor and
renting out his house in Saco, and that this abandonment of his office created a vacancy that the
Governor and Council lawfully filled by a new appointment. While the statute governing the
appointment expressly required that he "reside during the continuance in said office in said city
of Saco," the Court's discussion of residence does not focus on that specific language as the
basis of its holding.
J All of Maine's counties have three commissioners, except for York which has five. 30-A M.R.S.A. §66-A.
2
All the authorities seem to be in accord that the incumbent of an office
may abandon it by removing from the state, county, or other district to
which the officer's residence is restricted by the law of his office. The
doctrine is thus stated... : If the law requires an officer to reside in ihe
county or district in which he holds his office, and during his term he
ceases to reside in such county or district, his violation of the law operates
as an abandonment of his office and creates a vacancy therein. However, a
merely temporary removal or absence for a limited time from the county
or district to which the law restricts his residence, with no intention of
abandoning his office, or ceasing to discharge the duties thereof, will not
result in terminating his title.
Id at 275 (citation omitted). See also D01fv. Skolnick, 371 A.2d 1094, 1101 (Md. 1977) (''The
cases generally hold that when residence is a prerequisite to a given office then a change of
residence vacates that office, absent a legislative expression to the contrary.")
In Harmon, the Law Court was careful to distinguish abandonment of office that results
from moving out of the electoral district from the type of abandonment that can occur when an
officeholder fails to carry out the responsibilities of that office. In the case of Ms. Poulin, it has
not been suggested that she has failed to. carry out any responsibility of her office; rather, she
engaged in voluntary acts, i.e., selling her home in the district that elected her and purchasing a
home in a different district, that render her unqualified to continue to hold office.
It has also been argued on behalf of Ms. Poulin that a vacancy in the office of cmmty
commissioner occurs only when a conunissioner moves out of the county. This suggestion is
based on the language in 30-A M.R.S.A. § 63 ("section 63"), which provides:
When no choice is effected or a vacancy happens in the ofiice of county
commissioner by death, resignation, removal from the county, permanent
incapacity or for any other reason, the Governor shall appoint a person to
fill the vacancy.
(emphasis added).
However, the general statute in Title 21-A governing vacancies in county offices, among
others, provides in pertinent part:
A vacancy in any federal, state or county office, in the office of an election
official, or in any political committee occms when the inclllllbent dies,
resigns, becomes disqualified or changes his residence to an electoral
division other than that /tom which he was elected or when the person
elected fails to qualify.
21-A M.R.S.A. § 361 ("section 361") (emphasis added).
3
The language in section 63 ("removal from the county") does not negate the requirements
of section 61 or that of sections 333 and 361. The section 63 language survives from the time
when commissioners were each elected by the voters of the entire co1IDty, before districts were
created. It was not until 1969 that the Legislature began to divide each county into three or more
districts, with each district described by statute and represented by one commissioner. That
process continued on a county by county basis until 197 5 when all were divided. The language
in section 63 providing that removal from the county constitutes a vacancy in the office of a
county commissioner, as well as the "for any other reason" provision enacted in 1963, were both
enacted before the counties were divided into commissioner districts, and neither phrase was
amended during that process.
Androscoggin County was divided into three districts in 1973, pursuant to a statute which
concluded with this language:
Members of the board of comn11ss10ners shall be residents of the
Commissioner District which they represent and shall be elected by the
voters of the county.
P.L. 1973, c. 544, § 1. This language was amended in 1977 to provide that the Androscoggin
County Commissioners "shall be elected by the qualified voters of that district." P .L. 1977, c.
219, § 1. That language has been retained since, and now appears in 30-A M.R.S.A. § 61(1).
One of the :fimdamental principles of statutory construction requires that consideration be
given to the whole statutory scheme for which the section at issue forms a pait so that a
hannonious result, presumably giving effect to legislative intent, can be achieved. Sylvester v.
Benjamin, 2001 ME 51, 767 A.2d 297 (2001). The language in section 63 refening to removal
from the county does not override the other provisions because it predates the formation of
commissioner districts within each county. The several relevant statutes in Titles 30-A and 21-A
clearly intend that each of the three members of the board of county commissioners reside in and
represent the members of one district. If commissioners, who serve fom year terms, are able to
leave the district from which they were elected and in which they were required to reside at
election, so long as they remain in the county, it would be inconsistent with this statutory
scheme.
For these reasons, we believe that a court would likely conclude that a vacancy occurs in
the office of county commissioner if a commissioner changes his or her residence to an electoral
division other than that from which they were elected. That concllliiion is consistent with the
language in section 61 (Title 30-A) and sections 333 and 361 of Title 21-A, each of which
applies here.
B. How to Determine Whether an Office Holder Has Changed His or Her Residence
to Another Electoral District.
In deciding what test to apply to determine whether an incumbent of a county office has
"change[ d] [her] residence to another electoral division other than that from which [she] was
elected," thereby creating a vacancy pursuant to 21-A M.R.S.A. § 361, a court would look first to
4
the plain language of the statute and the definitions in Title 21-A. TI1e word "residence" is
defined in 21-A M.R.S.A. § 1(40) as follows:
"Residence" means that place where the person has established a fixed and
principal home to which the person, whenever temporarily absent, intends
to return.
The identical language appears in 21-A M.R.S.A. § 112, definmg voting residence: .
Voting residence is governed by the following provisions.
1. Residence. The residence of a person is that place where the person
has established a fixed and principal home to which the person, whenever
temporarily absent, intends to return.
"Voting residence" is also the phrase used in 21-A M.R.S.A. § 333 in describing a county office
holder's obligation to maintain such a residence in the electoral division dm-ing the entire term of
office.
The Law Court has concluded that the above quoted definition of residence is equivalent
to the common law definition of domicile. Poirier v. City of Saco, 529 A.2d 329 (Me. 1987).
Based on review of the legislative history of the vacancy provision in 21-A M.R.S.A. § 361, it
appears that domicile is, indeed, the concept that the Legislature intended to incorporate in
declaring when a vacancy occurs. When 21-A M.R.S.A. § 361 was first enacted, the definitions
included in that statutory scheme provided that "resident" and "residence" "refer to domicile."
R.S. 1954, c. 3-A, §§ 1 & 183, enacted by P.L. 1961, c. 360, § 1. .
Several prior opinions ofthis office have addressed the residency requirement in Maine's
Constitution for members of the House of Representatives, and have concluded that the
definition of voting residence is the appropriate standard to apply. See Op. 1Vfe. Atty Gen. 79-
111 (Dec. 18, 1979), at 2, citing opinions of September 12) 1978, September 1, 1978 and
February 1, 1978 ("the establishment of a bona fide residence sufficient to entitle a person to
vote in a particular district is sufficient to qualify the person to represent that district in the
House of Representatives").
We have found two Maine Law Court cases that directly address compliance with
residency qualifications for elective office. In Poirier v. City of Saco, 529 A.2d 329 (Me. 1987),
the court upheld a determination that Poirier was ineligible to serve as a city councilor for Ward
3 because he was not a "qualified voter" of that ward. At the time Poirier was elected, he owned
a house in Ward 3, which he was in the process of renovating and to which he intended to move
as soon as renovations were complete. He had owned that house for forty yeaTs, and had lived
there for twenty-five years until he and his wife divorced. At the time of his election and for the
previous few years, however, he was living in a cabin located in Ward 2 on propeiiy on which he
operated a small sawmill and lumber business. He had been registered to vote in Ward 2 but had
changed his registration address to the house in Ward 3 when he decided to run for city council.
He was scheduled to take office as a Ward 3 city councilor tn December 1985, but the
5
renovations on his Ward 3 house were not scheduled to be complete until the fall of 1986,
approximately nine months after he was scheduled to be sworn into office. 529 A.2d at 330.
Quoting the definition of voting residence in 21-A M.R.S.A. § 112(1), the court held that
Poirier's "intent to move to [the V-lard 3 house] in the future did not establish Ward 3 as 'that
place in which his habitation is fixed, and to which, whenever he is absent, he has the intention
to return."' 529 A.2d at 330.
As previously discussed, in State ex rel. Deering v. Harmon, 115 Me. 268 (1916), the
Law Court determined that a vacancy had been created in the office of municipal judge when the
incumbent moved from his home in Saco to the Bangor area to take a new job in Piscataquis
County. The judge had taken a job in Piscataquis County and had "closed his law office, ceased
housekeeping in Saco, and with his wife (there being no children) went to the township in
Piscataquis County where his new employment required him to be." A few months later, he and
his wife went to live at a hotel in Bangor, where he "continued to live except when away on
business." 115 Me. at 273. He continued to O-\Vll their house in Saco, however, and rented it to a
relative. Based on these facts, the court concluded that the judge had ceased to reside in Saco.
To demonstrate domicile or bona fide voting residence, one must have a fixed place of
habitation within the electoral district Moreover, as this office has noted in a prior opinion,
"although intent is an aspect of the test ofresidence, it clearly does not suffice alone." Op. Me.
Att'y Gen. 79-211 (Dec. 18, 1979), at 4, n. 5. "One's intention to locate at a particular place does
not become effective to establish his residence there until he is physically present at such place."
Id (citations omitted.)2 Cases from other jmisdictions addressing these questions have likewise
concluded that intent to reside in a particular district is not enough to establish residency for
purposes of voting or holding office if the person does not have an actual home in that district. 3
C. Applying the Test to Determine Whether a Vacancy Has Occurred in the Office
of Androscoggin County Commissioner for District 3.
In determining whether a change in voting residence has occurred, courts look at the
particular facts and circumstances involved, including all of the indicators listed in 21-A
2
For this reason, a member of the Maine Legislature whose House district had changed configuration due to
redistricting such that his house was now outside the district was advised that to maintain eligibility to serve as a
Representative of that district, he would have to change his residence by "physically moving to the new district."
Op. Me. Att'y Gen. (Feb. 1, 1978).
3
See, e.g., Krajicek v. Gale, 677 N. W.2d 488 (Neb. 2004) (district representative deemed to have vacated his office
when he physically moved wjth his family to house outside the district; intent to return to the district and to purchase
house where aunt and uncle lived was not sufficient, given that he was not bodily present at the address in the
district); Young v. Stevens, 968 So.2d 1260 (Miss. 2007) (comi rejected claim of residency in Humphreys County by
a candidate for county supervisor who actually resided in Hinds County; notwithstanding candidate's "strong ties" to
Humphreys County, he did not physically reside in that county and had no fixed borne there); and Manchin v. White,
318 S.E.2d 470, 483 (VI.Va. 1984) (even tl1ough state senate candidate had substantial links to community which he
sought to represent and considered that district to be his permanent place of residence, it was not sufficient to
establish residency when the evidence showed that he maintained and occupied a dwelling place with his wife and
family outside the district).
6
M.R.S.A. §112(1). Our knowledge of the facts pertinent to determining Ms. Poulin's residency
is ·limited, and we cannot predict with certainty how a cowi would analyze those facts or what
additional facts might come to light if this matter were to be fully explored in an evidentiary
hearing. Applying the domicile or voting residence test described above to these facts, however,
suggests that Ms. Poulin is not currently a resident of the county commissioner district she was
elected to represent.
Ms. Poulin has acknowledged in her affidavit that she and her husband sold their
Lewiston home last summer and purchased the Auburn home where they have resided for the
past few months. Ms. Poul.in does not claim to have any other "fixed and principal home" at this
point within the city of Lewiston, the electoral district which she was elected to represent. This is
not a situation, therefore, where an office holder owns or rents two dwellings and considers one
to be her p1incipal home. Ms. Poulin has only one place to reside, currently, and it is located
outside her electoral district.
Ms. Poulin still considers herself to be a resident of Lewiston, and notes in her affidavit
that she is registered to vote in Lewiston, and has t\:vo cars (hers and her husband's), a boat and a
boat trailer registered in Lewiston. Poulin Affidavit, ,r,r 6~9. Review of available records, 4
however, shows that the address listed on her voter registration and her vehicle registration is the
170 Fen-y Road address which Ms. Poulin and her husband no longer own, where they no longer
reside, and in which they have no legal right to reside. The address on Ms. Poulin's driver's
license is the post office box in Auburn, which she mentions in paragraph 5 of her affidavit.
Although Ms. Poulin claims to be livjng in Auburn only temporarily, she has not
indicated any plan to move back to Lewiston until the Auburn home is sold, and it is obviously
difficult to predict when that might occur. The Poulins' Lewiston home was on the market for
approximately one year before it sold. Significantly, Ms. Poulin's own words reveal that her
in.tention to move back to Lewiston is contingent upon the sale of the Auburn house: "Once we
were able to sell our Vickery Road house we could be in a position to move back to Lewiston."
.Poulin Affidavit, ,r15.
We believe a court would assess Ms. Poulin's intentions based on her actions, not just her
statements, and would likely consider that the act of buying a home in Auburn after selling her
home in Lewiston was not consistent with an intention to stay in Auburn only temporarily.
Moreover, at the time Mr. and Ms. Poulin purchased the Auburn house, Ms. Poulin appears to
have believed that she could remain a county commissioner as long as she continued to reside in
Androscoggin County, and thus a permanent move to the Aubmn home would not affect her
ability to continue as a' commissioner. It was only after your office suggested in correspondence
that section 361 required continued residency in her electoral district that Ms. Poulin expressed
an intention to remain in Aubwn only temporarily.
Even if a court were to :find that Ms. Poulin intends to return to Lewiston, she has no
home there where she can reside, and thus has no place to estabiish a voting residence. This is
not a situation where she is staying temporarily outside District 3, while retaining a dwelling in
4
These include Bureau of Motor Vehicle records and voter registration records checked during this past month.
7
Lewiston to which she intends to return. She claims no specific place in Lewiston to which she
is able to return at this point. 5 And as indicated in the cases discussed above, a mere intention to
return to one's electoral district is not enough to establish residency there. See, e.g., Young v.
Stevens, 968 So.2d at 1264 (determination of residency "is not satisfied with a simple declaration
that one intends to be a resident of a particular county when the overwhelming proof shows that
he actually resides elsewhere").
Counsel for Ms. Poulin has argued, in a letter dated October 2, 2008, that under 21-A
M.R.S.A. § 112(2), Ms. Poulin cannot be deemed to have "changed [her] residence" to one
outside Dish·ict 3 because although she has moved to Auburn, she does not intend to remain
6
there. We believe this argument is lmavailing. Subsection 2 of section 112 has to be read in
concert with subsection 1, which establishes the basic requirement that voting residence is "that
place where the person has established a fixed and principal home to which the person, whenever
temporarily absent, intends to return." If a person has two dwellings and moves from one to the
other, the act of removal alone under subsection 2 does not change their voting residence unless
it is coupled with an intent to remain in the other place. "A person can have only one [voting]
residence [i_e., domicile] at any given time," even though that person may have more than one
dwelling. Id § 112(2). Ms. Poulin has only one dwelling, and she cannot retain a voting
residence in a city where she no longer has a "fixed and principal home."
For all of the above reasons, we believe a court faced with this question would likely
conclude that Ms. Poulin changed her residence from Lewiston to Auburn last summer and that,
as a result, she vacated the position of county commissioner for District 3.
If you have fmther questions regarding this matter, please let me know.
G. Steven Rowe
Attorney General
GSR/rht
5
Commissioner Poulin' s situation is unlike that of the State Representative who was "staying temporarily at a house
outside of [her] legislative district" but who retained ownership of a house and voting residence in her legislative
district, and was thus advised by this office that she appeared to have "retained sufficient attributes of residence
within lber] electoral district to qualify as a resident." Op. Me. Att 'y Gen. (Oct. 13, 1976) at 2.
6
21-A M.R.S.A. § 112(2) provides as follows:
2. Change. A change ofresidence is made only by the act ofremova~joined with the intent to remain in
another place. A person can have only one residence at any given time.
8