ME AG Opinion 95-10 May 30, 1995

Would a Maine bill exempting migrant-labor mobile home parks from health and safety regulation violate equal protection?

Short answer: Yes. The AG concluded LD 507, as amended, would violate the equal-protection clauses of the U.S. and Maine Constitutions. The amendment would have stripped migrant-labor mobile home parks of the licensing, inspection, fitness-for-habitation, and penalty provisions that apply to every other seasonal mobile home park. The AG found no legitimate state interest distinguishing migrant workers from tourists or other seasonal occupants, so even rational-basis review would defeat the law.

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This page answers the general question as of 1995. Ezel answers yours: what it means for your facts, under current Maine law, with citations.

Currency note: this opinion is from 1995
Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.
Disclaimer: This is an official Maine Attorney General opinion. AG opinions are persuasive authority but not binding precedent. This summary is for informational purposes only and is not legal advice. Consult a licensed Maine attorney for advice on your specific situation.
About this page: The plain-English summary, reader guidance, and Q&A below were written by Ezel based on the official AG opinion. The original opinion (linked on this page as a PDF) is the authoritative source for any reliance.
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Plain-English summary

LD 507 in the 117th Legislature, as amended by Committee Amendment A, would have exempted "mobile home parks that house migratory laborers on a seasonal basis" from the entire regulatory regime in 10 M.R.S.A. chapters 951 and 953. The exempt parks would no longer have needed a license under § 9082, would no longer have been subject to the safe-housing standards in § 9084, would no longer have been inspected under § 9086, would no longer have faced penalties under § 9087, and would no longer have carried the implied warranty of fitness for human habitation under § 9099(1). Two House sponsors asked the AG whether removing those protections from migrant workers but leaving them in place for everyone else would survive equal-protection review.

The AG's answer was no. The equal-protection clauses of the U.S. and Maine Constitutions are co-extensive (Choroszy v. Tso, 647 A.2d 803 (Me. 1994)) and prohibit treating similarly situated persons differently without a legitimate justification. The AG laid out the standard rational-basis test: differential treatment is constitutional "if facts may be reasonably conceived to justify the distinction" (Dishon v. Maine State Retirement System), and unconstitutional if the classification is not rationally related to a legitimate governmental objective (Lambert v. Wentworth).

The AG could not find any legitimate state interest justifying the proposed line. Migrant workers and tourists who use seasonal mobile home parks are, for licensing and safety purposes, similarly situated: they are seasonal occupants of the same kinds of facilities. Nothing in the nature of migrant labor justifies stripping them of housing-safety protections that apply to everyone else in the same parks. The amendment did not articulate any conceivable factual basis for the distinction (Aseptic Packaging Council v. State, 637 A.2d 457 (Me. 1994), shows the Law Court requires at least some discernible governmental objective).

A footnote flagged that if a majority of migrant workers in Maine could be shown to be racial minorities (African-American, Hispanic, or Native American), the law might trigger strict scrutiny. But the AG did not need to reach that question, because the law could not survive even rational-basis review.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1995. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

What regulations would LD 507 have removed from migrant-labor mobile home parks?

Five categories of protection: (1) licensing under 10 M.R.S.A. § 9082; (2) safe-housing standards under § 9084; (3) Manufactured Housing Board inspections under § 9086; (4) penalties for violations under § 9087; and (5) the implied warranty and covenant of fitness for human habitation under § 9099(1). The amendment would have created a regulatory black hole around migrant housing.

What is rational-basis review?

The lowest level of equal-protection scrutiny. The court asks whether the legislature's classification is rationally related to a legitimate governmental objective. The state need not prove that the classification is the best policy, just that some plausible legitimate reason exists. Most economic and social regulation survives rational-basis review.

Why didn't this amendment survive even rational-basis review?

Because the AG could not identify any legitimate governmental objective that the classification served. The amendment singled out a class of residents (migrant workers) for the removal of basic safety protections, while leaving those protections in place for all other seasonal occupants of identical facilities. With no discernible state interest in the differential treatment, even the deferential rational-basis test was not met.

Could the Legislature ever exempt migrant labor housing from these rules?

The opinion did not foreclose that in the abstract. The AG's stated reason for finding LD 507 unconstitutional was that the bill, as amended, did not articulate any conceivable set of facts to justify the distinction, and the office itself could discern no legitimate governmental objective for stripping migrant workers of protections kept for all other seasonal occupants of the same parks. The AG's review was limited to the proposal as presented; it did not say what a differently justified bill would require.

Are equal-protection clauses interpreted the same under federal and Maine law?

Yes, for Maine. The Maine Law Court has held in Choroszy v. Tso that the equal-protection guarantees of the U.S. Fourteenth Amendment and the Maine Constitution are co-extensive. So a violation of one is generally a violation of both.

Background and statutory framework

Maine's mobile home park regulatory regime in 1995 sat in 10 M.R.S.A. chapters 951 and 953, with the Manufactured Housing Board as the primary enforcement authority. The regime applied to every "mobile home park" as defined in § 9081(2) and § 9091(2), including parks operated only seasonally. LD 507 would have narrowed the definition to exclude one specific category of seasonal park: those housing migratory laborers.

The constitutional analysis runs through the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause and its Maine analog. The Law Court's settled framework requires (1) identification of differential treatment of similarly situated persons (Mahaney v. State), and (2) evaluation of whether the differential treatment is rationally related to a legitimate state interest (Lambert v. Wentworth, McNicholas v. York Beach Village Corp.). If a suspect classification or fundamental right is involved, strict scrutiny applies (State v. Rush). The AG did not need to reach the heightened-scrutiny question because the law could not pass even rational-basis review.

Citations

  • 10 M.R.S.A. § 9081(2) (definition of "mobile home park," chapter 951)
  • 10 M.R.S.A. § 9082 (mobile home park licensing requirement)
  • 10 M.R.S.A. § 9084 (housing safety standards)
  • 10 M.R.S.A. § 9086 (Manufactured Housing Board inspection authority)
  • 10 M.R.S.A. § 9087 (penalties for violations)
  • 10 M.R.S.A. § 9091(2) (definition of "mobile home park," chapter 953)
  • 10 M.R.S.A. § 9099(1) (implied warranty of fitness for human habitation)
  • U.S. Const. amend. XIV (Equal Protection Clause)
  • Me. Const. art. I (Maine equal protection guarantee)
  • LD 507, 117th Legislature, with Committee Amendment A
  • Choroszy v. Tso, 647 A.2d 803, 808 (Me. 1994) (federal and Maine equal-protection clauses co-extensive)
  • Mahaney v. State, 610 A.2d 738, 743 (Me. 1992) (equal-protection clause triggered by differential treatment of similarly situated persons)
  • Dishon v. Maine State Retirement System, 569 A.2d 1216, 1217 (Me. 1990) (rational-basis standard)
  • McNicholas v. York Beach Village Corp., 394 A.2d 264, 269 (Me. 1978)
  • Lambert v. Wentworth, 423 A.2d 527, 531 (Me. 1980)
  • State v. Rush, 324 A.2d 748, 757 n.7 (Me. 1974) (heightened scrutiny for suspect classifications)
  • Aseptic Packaging Council v. State, 637 A.2d 457, 460 (Me. 1994) (statute must articulate conceivable factual basis)

Source

Original opinion text

Best-effort transcription from a scanned PDF. Minor errors may remain, the linked PDF is authoritative.

95-10

ANDREW KETTERER
ATTORNEY GENERAL

STATE OF MAINE
DEPARTMENT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
STATE HOUSE STATION 6
AUGUSTA, MAINE 04333

May 30, 1995

Representative Patricia Lemaire
Representative Roland B. Samson
Maine House of Representatives
State House Station #2
Augusta, ME 04333

Dear Representative Lemaire and Representative Samson:

I am writing in response to your inquiry of May 25, 1995, concerning whether Legislative Document No. 507, "An Act to Exclude Certain Parks from the Definition of Mobile Home Parks," as amended by Committee Amendment A, is impermissibly discriminatory in violation of the Equal Protection Clauses of the United States and Maine Constitutions. For the reasons which follow, it is the opinion of this Department that the bill, if enacted in its amended form, would be unconstitutional.

The bill, in its amended form, would result in mobile home parks that house migratory laborers on a seasonal basis being exempt from regulation under the Maine Revised Statutes, Title 10, chapters 951 and 953. Those portions of Title 10:

(1) require parks to be licensed, 10 M.R.S.A. § 9082 (Supp. 1994);

(2) insure that housing conditions in mobile home parks do not present a danger to the health and safety of the public, 10 M.R.S.A. § 9084 (Supp. 1994);

(3) authorize the Manufactured Housing Board to conduct inspections to monitor compliance, 10 M.R.S.A. § 9086 (Supp. 1994);

(4) provide penalties for violations of the law, 10 M.R.S.A. § 9087 (Supp. 1994); and

(5) establish an implied warranty and covenant that homes and associated facilities in trailer parks be fit for human habitation, 10 M.R.S.A. § 9099(1) (Supp. 1994).

Thus, under the amended bill, migratory laborers living in seasonal mobile home parks would not receive the protections of these statutory provisions, and any rules promulgated thereunder, which were enacted to insure public health and safety. Your question is whether such treatment would violate the laborers' rights to the equal protection of the laws.

The Equal Protection Clauses of the United States and Maine Constitutions, which the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine have found to be co-extensive, Choroszy v. Tso, 647 A.2d 803, 808 (Me. 1994), are invoked when legislation treats similarly situated persons differently. Mahaney v. State, 610 A.2d 738, 743 (Me. 1992). Here, not all persons who reside in trailer parks that are operated on a seasonal basis will be treated equally. If Legislative Document No. 507, as amended, were enacted, a specific group of persons who reside in seasonal mobile home facilities, persons comprising "migratory labor," would be the sole category of persons who do not receive the basic health and safety protections that are provided to all other persons who reside in similar locations that are included in the definition of "mobile home parks." 10 M.R.S.A. § 9081(2) and § 9091(2) (Supp. 1994).

Once it is established that a person is treated differently than similarly situated persons, a court must then evaluate the purpose of the differential treatment. "A difference in treatment is constitutional 'if facts may be reasonably conceived to justify the distinction.'" Dishon v. Maine State Retirement System, 569 A.2d 1216, 1217 (Me. 1990), quoting McNicholas v. York Beach Village Corp., 394 A.2d 264, 269 (Me. 1978). Conversely, a difference in treatment is unconstitutional if the state's classification is not rationally related to legitimate governmental objectives. Lambert v. Wentworth, 423 A.2d 527, 531 (Me. 1980). It is against this constitutional standard that Legislative Document No. 507, as amended by Committee Amendment A, must be measured.

If a suspect classification like race, or a fundamental interest such as the right to vote, is involved, an equal protection challenge to a difference in treatment requires a higher standard of review: the government must show that the discrimination is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. State v. Rush, 324 A.2d 748, 757 n.7 (Me. 1974). Although it might be demonstrated that a majority of persons who comprise "migratory labor" in Maine are African-American, Hispanic, or Native American, and thus the argument could be made that statutes that discriminate against this class warrant heightened scrutiny, that possibility does not need to be addressed here because this legislative proposal does not even survive analysis under the lowest level of constitutional scrutiny.

This Department is unable to discern any legitimate governmental objective which could sustain a legislative determination to deny basic health and safety protections to migrant laborers who live a portion of the year in seasonal trailer parks, while preserving those same protections to all other persons who live in similar parks. There is nothing in the nature of migratory workers that can rationally distinguish their status from that of other persons, such as tourists, who might temporarily reside in such facilities. This Department is also unable to discern, nor does the bill, as amended, articulate any conceivable set of facts to justify this discriminatory treatment and to support the enactment of this statute. See Aseptic Packaging Council v. State, 637 A.2d 457, 460 (Me. 1994). Thus, it is the Opinion of this Department that Legislative Document No. 507, as amended, is not rationally related to any legitimate governmental objective and therefore, if enacted, would violate the Equal Protection Clauses of the United States and Maine Constitutions.

I hope this information is helpful to you, and please do not hesitate to contact this office if we can be of further assistance to you.

Sincerely,

ANDREW KETTERER
Attorney General

AK:sw

cc: Representative Richard Kneeland
Sponsor, Legislative Document 507
Senator Norman K. Ferguson, Jr.
Representative Guy R. Nadeau
Co-Chairs, Joint Standing Committee on Legal and Veterans' Affairs

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