Can the current Maine Legislature pass a statute that appropriates money for all three years of a state-employee collective bargaining contract, even though the third year of the contract falls outside the Legislature's two-year term?

Plain-English summary

Representative Donald V. Carter, House Chair of the Joint Standing Committee on Appropriations, asked AG James E. Tierney whether the 114th Legislature could constitutionally pass a statute appropriating money for all three years of a state-employee labor agreement. The Bureau of Employee Relations had negotiated a three-year contract with state employee bargaining units under 26 M.R.S.A. § 979 et seq., as authorized by § 979-D(1)(C). The agreement now needed legislative funding.

Tierney's answer was that the Legislature could fund the first two fiscal years (1989-90 and 1990-91) but not the third (1991-92). The fundamental rule of Maine constitutional law is that one Legislature, by its actions, cannot bind future Legislatures. The Law Court had stated the rule plainly in Opinion of the Justices, 146 Me. 183, 189-190 (1951): "One Legislature cannot obligate succeeding Legislatures to make appropriations. One Legislature may, within constitutional limitations, impose a contractual obligation upon the State which it is the duty of the State to discharge, but one Legislature cannot impose a legal obligation to appropriate money upon succeeding Legislatures." Edgerly v. Honeywell Information Services, Inc., 377 A.2d 104 (Me. 1977) and Maine State Housing Authority v. Depositors Trust Co., 278 A.2d 699, 707-08 (Me. 1971) confirmed the rule.

The principle was reinforced by Me. Const. art. IX, § 14, which forbids the creation of debts or liabilities in excess of $2 million absent a bond issue. Any attempt by the 114th Legislature to commit funds for FY 1991-92 (after the Legislature's term ended) would not only violate the binding-the-next prohibition but would also create a long-term debt without the bond-issue mechanism required by the constitutional debt limit.

Tierney noted that the Executive Branch had drafted its funding legislation in recognition of these constitutional limits. The bill submitted in August was expected to include language expressly recognizing the need to introduce additional legislation in the 115th Legislature to fund the third year. The public-employee unions were aware that the third year of the tentative agreement was not enforceable or binding until funded by the next Legislature. The 1991-92 funding was, in effect, a moral commitment subject to future legislative action, not a binding contractual obligation.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1989. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Why can one Legislature not bind the next?

The rule rests on two foundations: representative democracy (each Legislature reflects the will of the voters who elected it, so the current Legislature cannot impose its policy choices on a future, differently-composed body) and the structure of the appropriations power (the Constitution vests the power to appropriate in the Legislature, not in any one Legislature in perpetuity). The rule does not bar the State from incurring contractual obligations the next Legislature must respect; it bars the current Legislature from binding the next Legislature's appropriation decisions.

What's the difference between a "contractual obligation" and an "appropriation obligation"?

Tierney quotes the 1951 Opinion of the Justices to draw the line. One Legislature may impose a contractual obligation upon the State (committing the State to do or pay something), and the next Legislature must respect that obligation if and to the extent funded. But the current Legislature cannot legally compel the next Legislature to appropriate the money to fund the obligation. The next Legislature retains constitutional discretion over appropriations.

Did this opinion mean public-sector unions had no protection beyond two years?

The third-year provisions in the 1989-1992 tentative agreement were enforceable only if and when the 115th Legislature appropriated funds. The unions accepted that risk. In practice, multi-year state-employee agreements often work this way: the negotiated terms run for the contract period, but funding requires separate biennial action. If the next Legislature declines to fund, the third year of negotiated raises and benefits does not take effect.

What is 26 M.R.S.A. § 979-D(1)(C)?

Section 979-D(1)(C) of the State Employees Labor Relations Act authorizes collective bargaining agreements with state employee bargaining units to cover up to three years. The statute itself does not address the funding question; it just sets the maximum length of a single negotiated agreement.

Did Tierney take any position on the substance of the 1989 contract?

No. He explicitly disclaimed any view on "the wisdom of a three-year contract or about the specifics of this contract," and noted that questions about whether the negotiated raises would apply to positions funded by dedicated revenues or federal funds were Executive Branch policy questions, not AG questions.

Background and statutory framework

Maine state-employee collective bargaining in 1989 operated through the State Employees Labor Relations Act and its companion provisions. The Bureau of Employee Relations negotiated under gubernatorial authority. The Legislature appropriated funding through biennial budget acts. The 1989 tentative agreement marked the first time the bureaus had negotiated a three-year deal rather than the more typical two-year alignment with the biennial budget cycle. Tierney's opinion is a clean application of well-settled doctrine: the binding-the-next rule and the constitutional debt limit operating together to require year-by-year appropriations. The opinion did not change Maine constitutional law; it confirmed how the existing rules applied to a new fact pattern.

Citations

• 26 M.R.S.A. § 979 et seq. (State Employees Labor Relations Act)
• 26 M.R.S.A. § 979-D(1)(C) (three-year contract authorization)
• Me. Const. art. IX, § 14 (state debt limit)
• Edgerly v. Honeywell Information Services, Inc., 377 A.2d 104 (Me. 1977)
• Maine State Housing Authority v. Depositors Trust Co., 278 A.2d 699, 707-08 (Me. 1971)
• Opinion of the Justices, 146 Me. 183, 189-190 (1951)

Source

• Landing page: https://www.maine.gov/legis/lawlib/lldl/agops/agops.htm
• Original PDF: https://lldc.mainelegislature.org/Open/AG/Opinions/1989/ag_19890810b.pdf

Original opinion text

Best-effort transcription from a scanned PDF. Minor errors may remain, the linked PDF is authoritative.

89-12

JAMES E. TIERNEY
ATTORNEY GENERAL

STATE OF MAINE
DEPARTMENT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
STATE HOUSE STATION 6
AUGUSTA, MAINE 04333

August 10, 1989

Representative Donald V. Carter
House Chairman, Joint Standing Committee on Appropriations
State House Station #2
Augusta, Maine 04333

Dear Representative Carter:

You have asked whether the 114th Maine Legislature may constitutionally pass a statute appropriating monies for a three-year period to fund a contract entered into by the Executive Branch with various bargaining agents for state employees. For the reasons which follow, it is the Opinion of this Department that while the Legislature may pass a statute funding such an agreement for the two-year life of the Legislature, such a statute would not be binding on the 115th Legislature with regard to the third year of the agreement. That Legislature would therefore have to enact additional legislation to fund the third year of the contract.

The facts underlying your request, as this Department understands them, are as follows. Earlier this year, the Bureau of Employee Relations of the Department of Administration, acting under the authority of the Governor, negotiated a labor agreement with various bargaining agents for state employee bargaining units, pursuant to the State Employees Labor Relations Act, 26 M.R.S.A. § 979 et seq. As authorized by Section 979-D(1)(C) of the Act, the agreement covers a period of three years. The agreement must now be presented to the Legislature for funding. You have asked whether the Legislature may enact legislation binding upon the State to fund the agreement for its entire three-year duration.

It is a fundamental principle of constitutional law in Maine, as well as elsewhere, that one Legislature, by its actions, cannot bind future Legislatures. Edgerly v. Honeywell Information Services, Inc., 377 A.2d 104 (Me. 1977); Maine State Housing Authority v. Depositors Trust Co., 278 A.2d 699, 707-08 (Me. 1971); Opinion of the Justices, 146 Me. 183 (1951). In particular, with regard to making appropriations beyond the two-year life of a particular Legislature, the Justices of the Maine Supreme Judicial Court have stated:

One Legislature cannot obligate succeeding Legislatures to make appropriations. One Legislature may, within constitutional limitations, impose a contractual obligation upon the State which it is the duty of the State to discharge, but one Legislature cannot impose a legal obligation to appropriate money upon succeeding Legislatures.

Opinion of the Justices, 146 Me. at 189-190.

Moreover, the Justices observed, any attempt to create obligations which would be binding upon succeeding Legislatures not only violates the prohibition against one Legislature binding the next, but would also violate the provisions of Article IX, Section 14 of the Maine Constitution, which forbids the creation of debts or liabilities in excess of $2,000,000 without a bond issue.

Applying these principles to the problem which you present, it is clear that the Legislature may appropriate money funding the labor relations agreement during the two fiscal years (1989-90 and 1990-91) which are within its financial control. The operation of the principles just set forth, however, would prevent the Legislature from enacting binding legislation for the 1991-92 fiscal year. It is the understanding of this Department, however, that the Executive Branch is aware of these constitutional limitations and that therefore the legislation to be submitted by it in August to fund the contract will include language expressly recognizing the need to introduce legislation in the 115th Legislature to fund the third year of the contract. This Department further understands that the public employee unions are aware that the third year of the contract tentatively agreed to is not enforceable or binding in any way until funded by the next Legislature.

Needless to say, this Department expresses no opinion on the wisdom of a three-year contract or about the specifics of this contract. As to the impact which the proposed agreement may have on positions funded by dedicated state revenues or federal funds, this Department also expresses no view, except to observe that it is our understanding that the proposed increases would apply to such positions. These questions, however, are better addressed to the Executive Branch to determine its intentions in negotiating the agreements.

I hope the foregoing answers your question. Please feel free to reinquire if further clarification is necessary.

Sincerely,
JAMES E. TIERNEY
Attorney General

JET/ec

cc: Honorable John R. McKernan, Governor; Honorable Charles P. Pray, President of the Senate; Honorable John L. Martin, Speaker of the House; Honorable Michael D. Pearson, Senate Chairman, Joint Standing Committee on Appropriations