Could Waldo County's budget committee set county officers' salaries differently from Maine's salary statute?

Plain-English summary

In 1986, Maine Attorney General James Tierney concluded that the Waldo County Budget Committee could not change the salaries of county officers from the amounts specified by 30 M.R.S.A. § 2. A separate 1985 law gave the committee power to approve Waldo County's budget, but the opinion read that power as distinct from authority to override salaries already fixed by the Legislature.

The Attorney General compared Waldo County's law with a Cumberland County statute. The Cumberland statute expressly allowed its commissioners to budget “notwithstanding section 2,” which had supported a prior opinion allowing different salary amounts there. Waldo County's statute contained no comparable exception. The Attorney General also rejected the idea that Waldo's budget law had implicitly repealed the salary provision: the two statutes could operate together, and the opinion found no legislative history showing an intent to repeal the salary rule.

The conclusion concerned the named offices whose pay was set by the statute, including county commissioners, treasurer, sheriff, judge and register of probate, and register of deeds. It did not decide salaries for positions outside that statutory list.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1986. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Q: Could Waldo County's budget committee lower or raise officers' statutory salaries?
A: The Attorney General said no. The committee's budget approval power did not include authority to set those salaries at a level different from 30 M.R.S.A. § 2.

Q: Why was Cumberland County treated differently?
A: The opinion said Cumberland County's law expressly operated “notwithstanding section 2,” while Waldo County's law contained no express exception to that salary statute.

Q: Did the Waldo budget law replace the salary statute by implication?
A: No. The Attorney General said implied repeal was disfavored and found the budget law and salary statute consistent with one another.

Background and statutory framework

The Waldo County law transferred budget approval from the county legislative delegation and Legislature to a committee of county and municipal officials. The opinion read its stated purpose as a new way to appropriate money according to a county budget, not as a transfer of legislative power over officer salaries. Section 2 separately set salaries for the specified Waldo County offices. The Attorney General said the two provisions could be followed together without an implied repeal.

Citations and references

• 30 M.R.S.A. § 2: salary provision for the named county officers.
• 30 M.R.S.A. § 1401: Waldo County budget committee provision discussed in the opinion.

Source

• Landing page: https://www.maine.gov/legis/lawlib/lldl/agops/agops.htm
• Original PDF: https://lldc.mainelegislature.org/Open/AG/Opinions/1986/ag_19860115b.pdf

Original opinion text

Best-effort transcription from a scanned PDF. Minor errors may remain — the linked PDF is authoritative.

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ATTORNEY GENERAL
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STAn: OF MAl'iE
DEPARn1E'\T OF THE ATTOR'\EY Gf.'\ERAL
STATE HOl'SE STATIO'.\ o
Al Gl'STA. ~1Al:\E 04333

January 15, 1986

Honorable Dana P. Stevenson
House of Representatives
State House Station #2
Augusta, Maine 04333

Dear Representative Stevenson:

This will respond to your oral request for an Opinion frorr. this Department as to whether 30 M.R.S.A. § 1401, e t ~ - , as enacted by Chapter 223 of the Public Laws of 1985, allows the Waldo County Budget Committee to set the salaries of county officers at a level different from those set by 30 ~~R.S.A.
§ 2. For the reasons discussed below, this Department answers ( your question in the negative.

30 M.R.S.A. § 2(1)(N) (1985-86 Supp.) establishes the salaries of the Commissioners, Treasurer, Sheriff, Judge of Probate, Register of Probate and Register of Deeds in Waldo County. 30 M.R.S.A. § 1401,, as enac,ted by Chapter 223 of the Public Laws of 1985, provides:

The purpose of this chapter is to establish in Waldo County a method of appropriating money for county expenditures, according to a budget, which shall first receive approval of a budget committee.
This chapter amends the present statutory method in sections 252 and 253 by transferring the authotity of the Waldo
County legislative delegation and the
Legislature to approve the Waldo County budget to a committee comprised of Waldo County and municipal officials. This chapter shall apply only to Waldo County.

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The "Statement of Fact" accompanying the original bill ( (Legislative Document 971), which ultimately became Cha.pter 223, describes its purpose as follows:

The purpose of this bill is to establish a county budget committee in Waldo County which would be responsible for approving the county budget. The present authority of the Waldo County legislative delegation and the full Legislature to approve the county budget would be transferred to a committee comprised of elected Waldo County municipal selectmen and councilors.

In an Opinion date9 October 18, 1985, (Op.Me.Atty.Gen.
No. 85-21), this Department concluded that pursuant to 30 M.R.S.A. § 1651 (1985-86 Supp.) the Cumberland County Commissioners did have the authority to set the salaries of county officers at a level different from those set by 30 M.R.S.A. § 2 for the reason that Section 1651 expressly provides that the Cumberland County Commissioners are authorized to appropriate money according to a budget "notwithstanding section 2." The legislation creating the Waldo County budget committee, on the other hand, ~9ptains no express reference to 30 M.R.S.A. § 2, and unlike the legislation dealing with Cumberland County, does not expressly ( exempt the Waldo County budget committee fr.om the operation of 30 M.R.S.A. § 2.

Moreover, the fact-that the Legislature has authorized the Waldo County budget committee to approve the budget for Waldo County does not carry with it the authority to set the salaries of county officers at a level different from that already established by the Legislature in 30 M.R.S.A. § 2, in the absence of express legislative language to that effect, as in the case of Cumberland County.

Finally, in order for this Department to conclude that the Waldo County budget committee has the authority, by virtue of 30 M.R.S.A. § 1401, to set the salaries of county officials at a level different from that established in 30 M.R.S.A.
§ 2(l)(N), it would be necessary for this Department to hold that the latter statute was implicitly repealed ·by the former.
The repeal of a statute is generally disfavored and will only be determined if the two statutes are so repugnant that they cannot stand together evidencing a legislative intent that one should repeal the other. See State ex rel. Tierney v. Ford Motor Co., 436 A.2d 866 (Me. 1981). The two statutes in ,,.
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question here, 30 M.R.S.A. §§ 2 and 1401, are not mutually
repugnant or inconsistent, and there is nothing in the legislative history of Section 1401 to suggest that the Legislature intended an implied repeal of 30 M.R.S.A.
§ 2(l)(N). On the contrary, the two statutes are entirely consistent with each other.

I hope this information is helpful to you, and please do not hesitate to contact this office if we can be of further assistance to you.

JET/ec

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