Can Maryland release the personal email addresses of citizens who sign up for a county newsletter under the Public Information Act?

Plain-English summary

Carroll County asked the Attorney General whether it had to release, under the Public Information Act (PIA), the email addresses of private citizens who correspond with county officials or sign up for county newsletters, or whether the county could refuse on the ground that disclosure would harm the public interest. The question arose after a requester used the PIA to obtain a large county email distribution list and posted it on a website, prompting complaints from the people whose addresses were exposed.

The Attorney General agreed with the county attorney on the core point: the PIA contains no exemption for personal email addresses as such. The Act's mandatory exceptions (State Government §§ 10-615 through 10-617) and its discretionary law-enforcement and related exceptions (§ 10-618) do not include a general "catch-all" protecting personal privacy, and the Legislature's decision to shield only narrow categories (such as the email addresses of senior-center enrollees and of students at public universities) implied that a broader exemption should not be read in. So a custodian cannot simply refuse to release ordinary citizens' email addresses on privacy or public-interest grounds alone.

The opinion diverged from the county attorney on one point of emphasis. There is a fifth exception, § 10-619, which lets an official custodian temporarily withhold a record when the custodian believes disclosure "would cause substantial injury to the public interest," but only by filing a petition in circuit court within ten working days and letting a judge decide. The opinion concluded that a custodian could reasonably use that route for personal email addresses in some circumstances, because email addresses carry a recognizable privacy interest and, in some contexts, disclosure could chill people from signing up for county communications like extreme-weather and school-closing alerts. Whether that harm is "substantial" is a fact question for the custodian and then the court. The opinion surveyed how Maryland courts and federal FOIA cases weigh privacy against the public interest, but stressed that Maryland's standard is more demanding than FOIA's and that any categorical exemption for email addresses is for the General Assembly to create.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2012. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Does Maryland's Public Information Act have an exemption for personal email addresses?
No, not a general one. The opinion concluded that none of the PIA's mandatory or discretionary exceptions (§§ 10-615 through 10-618) categorically protects personal email addresses. The Act shields only narrow categories, such as the email addresses of senior-center enrollees (§ 10-617(m)) and of public-university students and applicants (§ 10-618).

Can a records custodian just refuse to release email addresses to protect people's privacy?
No. The opinion was clear that a custodian may not unilaterally withhold email addresses on privacy or public-interest grounds alone. The custodian bears the burden of fitting a record within a recognized exception.

Is there any way for a government body to withhold email addresses?
Yes, through § 10-619. A custodian who believes disclosure would cause "substantial injury to the public interest" may temporarily withhold the record, but must file a petition in circuit court within ten working days and let a judge decide whether continued withholding is justified.

When might withholding email addresses actually succeed?
The opinion said this is fact-specific. It suggested a custodian could reasonably invoke § 10-619 where an email address sheds no light on government activity and where disclosure could substantially harm the public interest, for example by discouraging citizens from signing up for emergency notices like severe-weather or school-closing alerts.

Does it matter whether the email address shows "what the government is up to"?
Yes. Drawing on federal FOIA cases, the opinion explained that a list of citizens who signed up for a newsletter usually reveals little about the government's own conduct, which weakens the public interest in disclosure, whereas an address that is the only way to identify someone trying to influence public policy weighs toward disclosure.

Background and statutory framework

The Public Information Act, State Government §§ 10-601 to 10-630, rests on the principle that "[a]ll persons are entitled to have access to information about the affairs of government" (§ 10-612(a)), and the Court of Appeals has repeatedly said the Act should be construed in favor of disclosure (Ireland v. Shearin, 417 Md. 401, 408 (2010); Kirwan v. The Diamondback, 352 Md. 74, 81 (1998)). The Act directs that it be read in favor of inspection "unless an unwarranted invasion of the privacy of a person in interest would result" (§ 10-612(b)). A public record is presumptively open unless it fits one of the exceptions in §§ 10-615 through 10-619, and the custodian bears the burden of proving an exception applies (Office of the Governor v. Washington Post Co., 360 Md. 520, 545 (2000)).

The opinion had already concluded that an email is a "public record" subject to the PIA, so an email address is disclosable as part of the record unless an exception fits. It worked through the first four sets of exceptions and found none that categorically covers personal email addresses: § 10-615 (records privileged or confidential "by law"), § 10-616 (specific record categories), § 10-617 (specific information categories, including the narrow senior-center email exception in § 10-617(m)), and § 10-618 (discretionary exceptions for investigatory and security records and certain university email addresses). Maryland courts have held there is no general "catch-all" privacy exception in these sections (citing Police Patrol Sec. Sys. v. Prince George's County and Office of the Attorney General v. Gallagher, 359 Md. 341, 343 (2000)).

That left § 10-619, the Act's true catch-all. It permits temporary withholding when the official custodian believes inspection "would cause substantial injury to the public interest" (§ 10-619(a)), but conditions that on filing a court petition within ten working days (§ 10-619(b)); it is reserved for the "unusual case" where no specific exemption fits (Cranford v. Montgomery County, 300 Md. 759, 776 (1984)). The opinion reasoned that personal privacy can be a "public interest" cognizable under § 10-619, pointing to the seven illustrative harms in § 10-618(f)(2), which include the "unwarranted invasion of personal privacy" (§ 10-618(f)(2)(iii)). It then walked through how Maryland and federal courts weigh privacy against disclosure, drawing on FOIA law under 5 U.S.C. § 552 (including Exemption 7(C), 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C)) and cases such as Reporters Committee, Bibles v. Oregon Natural Desert Ass'n, and Ostergren v. Cuccinelli for the "secrecy" and "control" aspects of privacy and for when contact information sheds light on government activity. The opinion cautioned that Maryland's "substantial injury to the public interest" standard is more demanding than FOIA's privacy test, so the value of the federal cases lies in how they frame the competing interests, not in their outcomes, and it closed by noting that any categorical email-address exemption is a matter for the General Assembly.

Citations and references

Statutes:
- Md. Code Ann., State Gov't §§ 10-601 to 10-630, the Public Information Act
- § 10-612(a), general right of access to information about government
- § 10-612(b), construction in favor of inspection absent an unwarranted invasion of privacy
- § 10-615, records privileged or confidential "by law"
- § 10-616, mandatory record-category exceptions
- § 10-617, mandatory information-category exceptions
- § 10-617(m), narrow exception for senior-center enrollees' email addresses
- § 10-618, discretionary exceptions for investigatory, security, and certain university-email records
- § 10-618(f)(2)(iii), unwarranted invasion of personal privacy as an illustrative harm
- § 10-619, § 10-619(a), § 10-619(b), the "substantial injury to the public interest" exception requiring a court petition
- 5 U.S.C. § 552, the federal Freedom of Information Act
- 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C), FOIA Exemption 7(C)

Cases:
- Ireland v. Shearin, 417 Md. 401, 408 (2010), Maryland Court of Appeals
- Kirwan v. The Diamondback, 352 Md. 74, 81 (1998), Maryland Court of Appeals
- Office of the Attorney General v. Gallagher, 359 Md. 341, 343 (2000), Maryland Court of Appeals
- Office of the Governor v. Washington Post Co., 360 Md. 520, 545 (2000), Maryland Court of Appeals
- Cranford v. Montgomery County, 300 Md. 759, 776 (1984), Maryland Court of Appeals
- United States Dept. of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 753 (1989), U.S. Supreme Court
- Bibles v. Oregon Natural Desert Ass'n, 519 U.S. 355, 355-56 (1997), U.S. Supreme Court
- Ostergren v. Cuccinelli, 615 F.3d 263, 282 (4th Cir. 2010), federal appeals court

Source

• Landing page: https://oag.maryland.gov/resources-info/Pages/attorney-general%E2%80%99s-opinions.aspx
• Original PDF: https://oag.maryland.gov/resources-info/Documents/pdfs/Opinions/2012/97oag95.pdf

Original opinion text

PUBLIC INFORMATION ACT
PERSONAL E-MAIL ADDRESSES – NOT CATEGORICALLY EXEMPT
FROM DISCLOSURE, BUT CUSTODIAN MAY REASONABLY
PETITION FOR A § 10-619 COURT ORDER ALLOWING THE
WITHHOLDING OF E-MAIL ADDRESSES THAT DO NOT
SHED LIGHT ON GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES

                     December 21, 2012

The Honorable J. Douglas Howard, President
Board of County Commissioners of Carroll County
On behalf of the Board of County Commissioners of Carroll
County, you have requested our opinion on two related questions
arising under the Public Information Act, Md. Code Ann., State
Gov’t §§ 10-601 to 10-630 (“the Act” or the “PIA”). Specifically,
you ask whether the County’s custodian of records must grant a
PIA request for the e-mail addresses of private citizens who
correspond electronically with County officials and employees or
sign up for County newsletters, or whether the custodian may
refuse to release those e-mail addresses on the grounds that the
Commissioners reasonably believe that doing so will harm the
public interest. You provided us with the County Attorney’s
opinion, which concluded that none of the statutory exemptions
from disclosure applies to such e-mail addresses and that the
County’s likelihood of success in obtaining a court order to
withhold the information under § 10-6191 would be “slight.”
We agree with the County Attorney’s conclusion that the
County would need leave of court to withhold the personal e-mail
addresses it has collected from citizens who have signed up for a
newsletter or written letters to County officials or employees; as
we explain below, the PIA contains no exemptions for e-mail
addresses per se. We slightly diverge, however, from the County
Attorney’s assessment of the County’s chance of success in such
a lawsuit because we think that a Maryland court might find that
the disclosure of personal e-mail addresses in some circumstances
intrudes on privacy interests, or discourages citizens from
contacting their government, in a way that is unwarranted by the
public’s interest in disclosure.

1
Except as otherwise noted, all statutory citations in this opinion
refer to Title 10 of the State Government Article of the Maryland
Annotated Code (2009 Repl. Vol., 2011 Supp.).

  The determinations to be made by an official custodian when

considering whether to invoke the § 10-619 procedures are fact-
specific and thus do not lend themselves to bright-line rules.
Nonetheless, the cases provide some general guidance on when an
official custodian might reasonably pursue that course in response
to a request for personal e-mail addresses. We write to convey
that guidance, as well as to confirm the County Attorney’s
conclusion that the PIA does not authorize a custodian to
unilaterally withhold e-mail addresses on public interest grounds
alone.
I
Background
You indicate that your request was prompted by a situation
in which a requester used the PIA process to obtain from the
County a large e-mail distribution list of addressees “consisting
primarily of citizens with certain policy preferences.” The
requester then posted the list on a website. Various addressees
protested that their security and identity had been compromised
and that they found the website offensive. Some asked to be
removed from the County’s e-mail distribution lists.
The County’s information technology expert has since
advised the Commissioners that e-mail addresses “serve as a ‘key’
to many citizens’ bank accounts; credit card statements; private
phone records; and health insurance accounts.” The expert
further advised the Commissioners that the disclosure of the e-
mail addresses “increased the vulnerability of these citizens to
mischief or cyber-theft.” You relate the “firm belief of the
Commissioners that e-mail address redaction is appropriate and
necessary in order to protect the public interest and promote the
free flow of information between elected officials and their
constituents . . . .”
In compliance with our policy on opinion requests from
local governments, you provided the County Attorney’s opinion
on whether e-mail addresses contained in correspondence with
County officials or compiled in a County database are subject to
disclosure under the Act. He concluded that e-mail addresses are
subject to disclosure under the PIA because they do not fall within
the categories of records and information explicitly excepted from
the PIA’s broad and presumptive grant of access to public
records. He further explained that the General Assembly’s
enactment of a narrow exception for the e-mail addresses of
senior citizens, see § 10-617(m)(2), suggests that a broader ex-
ception for personal e-mail addresses should not be inferred. The
County Attorney noted that the County could temporarily
withhold e-mail addresses on the ground that disclosure “would

cause substantial injury to the public interest,” see § 10-619, but
that it would need leave of court under that provision in order to
permanently withhold the e-mail addresses for that reason.
Finally, he opined that the County would have only a “slight”
chance in court of succeeding on a petition to withhold the e-mail
addresses on public interest grounds alone.
After you submitted your request, legislation was introduced
in the General Assembly to require a custodian to “deny
inspection of the part of a public record that includes the
electronic mail addresses of individuals who were sent a [certain
type of] newsletter from a public official . . . .” The bill, which
received an unfavorable vote by the House Health and
Governmental Operations Committee, would have applied to
newsletters “sent by a mass electronic mailing,” “intended to be
for informational purposes only,” and “related to the official
duties of the public official.” House Bill 1202, § 1 (2012)
(proposing language to be codified at § 10-617(h)) (available at
http://mlis.state.md.us/2012rs/billfile/hb1202.htm (last visited
Nov. 30, 2012)). The bill was ultimately withdrawn by its
sponsor.
II
Analysis
The PIA rests on the principle that “[a]ll persons are entitled
to have access to information about the affairs of government and
the official acts of public officials and employees.” § 10-612(a).
The Court of Appeals has “reiterated on numerous occasions that
the PIA reflects the need for wide-ranging access to public
records, and therefore, the statute should be construed in favor of
disclosure for the benefit of the requesting party.” Ireland v.
Shearin, 417 Md. 401, 408 (2010); see also, e.g., Kirwan v. The
Diamondback, 352 Md. 74, 81 (1998) (“[T]he provisions of the
[PIA] reflect the legislative intent that citizens of the State of
Maryland be accorded wide-ranging access to public information
concerning the operation of their government.”) (internal
quotation marks omitted). The presumption in favor of disclosure
is reflected in the Act itself, which directs generally that, “unless
an unwarranted invasion of the privacy of a person in interest
would result, [the Act] shall be construed in favor of permitting
inspection of a public record . . . .” § 10-612(b).
There are exceptions to this general rule of disclosure,
however, as codified in five sections of the Act. See §§ 10-615
through 10-619; see also Office of the Attorney General v.
Gallagher, 359 Md. 341, 343 (2000). These enumerated ex-
ceptions delineate certain categories of records and information
that variously must, or may, be excluded from public inspection.

Id. Nonetheless, a public record is presumptively available for
inspection and copying unless the record (or part of it) is exempt
from disclosure under any of the exceptions recognized in the
Act. 92 Opinions of the Attorney General 26, 28-30 (2007). The
records custodian bears the burden of proving the applicability of
the exception that the custodian has claimed as the basis for
nondisclosure. Office of the Governor v. Washington Post Co.,
360 Md. 520, 545 (2000).
A. The First Four Sets of Exceptions to the PIA Disclosure
Mandate Offer No Categorical Protection for E-mail
Addresses Generally
We have previously concluded that an e-mail constitutes a
“public record” subject to the PIA. See 81 Opinions of the
Attorney General 140 (1996). The e-mail address would thus be
subject to disclosure as part of the e-mail unless it fits within one
of the five exceptions provided in the Act. Three sets of
exceptions—those contained in §§ 10-615 through 10-617—
specify the categories of records or information that a custodian
must withhold from the public. See generally Maryland Office of
the Attorney General, Public Information Manual, at 3-2 through
3-28 (revised 2011) (“PIA Manual”) (available at http://
www.oag.state.md.us/Opengov/pia.htm (last visited Aug. 24,
2012)). Section 10-615 contains exceptions that require the
custodian to deny access to records which must be withheld under
other law, such as a court order or a statute such as the federal
Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974.2 Section 10-
616 lists several specific categories of records, such as certain
adoption records, that must be withheld in their entirety. See, e.g.,
§ 10-616(b). Section 10-617 sets forth the types of information

 2
  Section 10-615 provides, in part, that “[a] custodian shall deny

inspection if . . . by law, the public record is privileged or confi-
dential . . . .” The Court of Appeals has explained that the term “law,”
for purposes of the section, does not include ordinances enacted by
local governments. Police Patrol Sec. Sys. v. Prince George’s County,
378 Md. 702, 714 (2003) (“[T]he General Assembly never intended to
give counties the right to create additional or new non-disclosure
exceptions not contemplated within the MPIA by declaring information
‘confidential’ in local laws.”). And while the exception for
“sociological information,” § 10-617(c), authorizes governmental
units—including counties—to issue regulations describing the records
that fall within that category, the background you provided does not
suggest that the e-mail distribution lists in question would convey
information that could be described as “sociological.” Accordingly, we
do not believe that the County would be authorized under the PIA to
promulgate regulations that would exempt personal e-mail addresses
from disclosure pursuant to § 10-617(c).

that must be withheld from a record that would otherwise be
disclosable; examples include confidential business or financial
information. See, e.g., § 10-617(d), (f). Section 10-617(m) shields
the e-mail addresses of enrollees of senior citizen centers but does
not shield e-mail addresses generally.
The fourth set of exceptions, those set forth in § 10-618, also
pertains to specified categories of records or information, but the
exceptions are discretionary in that they permit a custodian to
deny inspection when it would be “contrary to the public
interest.” Examples of the records and information covered by
the discretionary exceptions in § 10-618 include records of certain
investigations and security procedures and the e-mail addresses of
students of, or applicants to, public institutions of higher
education. See, e.g., § 10-618(f), (j), (m).
The County Attorney concluded, and we agree, that none of
the statutory exceptions set forth in §§ 10-615 through 10-618
allows custodians to categorically withhold personal e-mail
addresses on privacy grounds alone. Put another way, those four
sections do not include a “catch-all” protection for personal
privacy. Police Patrol Sec. Sys., Inc. v. Prince George’s County,
378 Md. 702, 716-17 (2003); see also Office of the Governor, 360
Md. at 554 (explaining the lack of specific exceptions that would
permit a custodian to unilaterally withhold records on the grounds
that disclosure would harm the “public interest,” release “personal
information,” or constitute an “unwarranted invasion of privacy”);
Kirwan, 352 Md. at 88-89 (explaining that the directive in § 10-
612(b) that the PIA be construed to avoid the “unwarranted
invasion of privacy” does not create an exception, but rather
limits the presumption of disclosure); 61 Opinions of the Attorney
General 702, 709-10 (1976) (explaining that a custodian may not
unilaterally deny inspection of information on the sole grounds
that the “disclosure of names and addresses contained in public
records may be commercially exploited or otherwise used in a
manner irksome or offensive to the individuals concerned”). That
leaves the Act’s fifth type of exception, available under § 10-619,
as the only route to a public body’s non-disclosure of personal e-
mail addresses on privacy grounds alone.
B. Section 10-619: The “Public Interest” Exception, By Leave
of Court
Section 10-619 permits an official custodian to deny a
request when he or she “believes that inspection would3 cause
substantial injury to the public interest . . . .” § 10-619(a). This
3
Section 10-619 provides in its entirety:

                                                  (continued . . .)

grant of discretion comes with restrictions, the most important of
which is that the official custodian may not invoke § 10-619 to
deny access to a record without filing an action in circuit court,
within ten working days of the denial, for an order permitting the
continued denial of access. § 10-619(b). The need to petition to
obtain a court order is the defining feature of this exception; the
failure to do so may be a misdemeanor under § 10-627 and could
subject the official custodian to potential liability “for actual
damages that the court finds appropriate.” § 10-623(d)(2).
In contrast to the specific exceptions stated in §§ 10-615
through 10-618, § 10-619 potentially applies to every public
record subject to the Act. For this reason, § 10-619 has been
referred to as the Act’s “catch-all” public interest provision.
Bowen v. Davison, 135 Md. App. 152, 165 (2000). It is an
exception, however, that is reserved for the “unusual case where a
public policy factor should control but none of the specific
exemptions applies.” Cranford v. Montgomery County, 300 Md.
759, 776 (1984); see also 63 Opinions of the Attorney General
355, 363 (1978) (observing that the need for § 10-619 is based on
the fact that the Legislature “cannot anticipate every situation in

      (a) Whenever this Part III of this subtitle
      authorizes inspection of a public record but the
      official custodian believes that inspection would
      cause substantial injury to the public interest, the
      official custodian may deny inspection
      temporarily.
      (b)(1) Within 10 working days after the denial,
      the official custodian shall petition a court to
      order permitting the continued denial of
      inspection.
      (2) The petition shall be filed with the circuit
      court for the county where:
      (i) the public record is located; or
      (ii) the principal place of business of the official
      custodian is located.
      (3) The petition shall be served on the applicant,
      as provided in the Maryland Rules.
      (c) The applicant is entitled to appear and to be
      heard on the petition.
      (d) If, after the hearing, the court finds that
      inspection of the public record would cause
      substantial injury to the public interest, the court
      may pass an appropriate order permitting the
      continued denial of inspection.

which it is appropriate to refuse to disclose public records”).4 But
when the official custodian reasonably believes that a particular
disclosure would substantially harm a particular public interest,
§ 10-619 provides a fairly broad basis on which the official
custodian may temporarily withhold a public record pending the
court’s ruling.
The official custodian should not withhold records under
§ 10-619 on a generalized basis, however; the courts have
required “a particularized justification for withholding each
portion of a public record that [a custodian claims] is exempt from
public disclosure.” Prince George’s County v. Washington Post
Co., 149 Md. App. 289, 310 (2003). Nor should the official
custodian invoke § 10-619 routinely, as § 10-619 is a stopgap
exception, intended for the “unusual case,” Cranford, 300 Md. at
776, where the broader exceptions do not prevent disclosures that
would substantially harm the public interest.
C. Personal Privacy as a “Public Interest” Protected By § 10-
619
Section 10-619 does not mention privacy considerations, and
the Maryland appellate courts have not addressed whether its
“public interest” standard provides protection for personal
privacy. The courts have, however, addressed privacy consid-
erations in the context of § 10-618, which permits a custodian to
withhold certain records when disclosure would be “contrary to
the public interest.” In that context, the Court of Special Appeals
has treated the unwarranted invasion of privacy as a public
interest concern. See City of Frederick v. Randall Family, LLC,
154 Md. App. 543, 573 (2004). More generally, the Court of
Appeals has recognized the seven circumstances listed in § 10-
618(f)(2), which pertain to various investigatory and security
records, as “illustrative of the concerns that would make
disclosure contrary to the public interest,” see Baltimore v. Md.
Comm. Against Gun Ban, 329 Md. 78, 96 (1993), and those
4
That the § 10-619 process is reserved for the “unusual case” may
explain why the process appears to have been only rarely invoked. It
may also be, however, that requesters withdraw their requests in order
to avoid the litigation costs that they believe will follow when the
agency makes clear its intention to proceed to court. You draw our
attention to e-mail correspondence between the Governor’s Office and
an unnamed PIA requester where that appears to have occurred.
However, § 10-619 does not require the requester to appear in court; it
instead entitles the requester to notice and an opportunity to be heard.
See § 10-619(b), (c). An official custodian’s intention to pursue the
remedy therefore should not be perceived as a threat of litigation
against the requester.

enumerated circumstances include the “unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy.” § 10-618(f)(2)(iii). Moreover, the Act directs
that it is to be construed in favor of permitting inspection of a
public record “unless an unwarranted invasion of the privacy of a
person in interest would result.” § 10-612(b).
Accordingly, the concern you state—that the County’s
disclosure of the e-mail addresses of members of the public would
result in the harmful dissemination of private information—could
properly be evaluated by the official custodian as a potential harm
to the public interest when that official is considering whether to
temporarily withhold e-mail addresses under § 10-619.
D. Weighing the Competing Public Interests of Privacy and
Disclosure under § 10-619: The “Balancing Test”
The Maryland courts have applied § 10-619 in only two
reported decisions, and neither involved the question of when an
“unwarranted invasion of privacy” might result in a “substantial
injury to the public interest.” See Moberly v. Herboldsheimer,
276 Md. 211 (1975) (applying the exception as then codified at
Art. 76A, § 53(f)) and Mayor of Baltimore v. Burke, 67 Md. App.
147 (1986). We therefore must look to the Maryland cases
interpreting other provisions of the Act, and, to a certain extent, to
the federal cases on requests under the Freedom of Information
Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (“FOIA”), for documents containing e-mail
addresses.
1. Maryland Law
In addressing § 10-618—which, like § 10-619, provides for
the discretionary withholding of records—the courts have applied
a balancing test to determine whether the statutorily-mandated
5
In both cases, the court concluded that the custodian had not
established that disclosure would cause a “substantial injury to the
public interest.” In Moberly, a publicly-controlled hospital denied a
request for records of various salaries and attorneys’ fees. The hospital
alleged, among other things, that producing the records would
contravene the public interest because the requester wanted the records
“to find something for the pruriency of curious ears” and to pursue a
“vendetta.” 276 Md. at 227. The Court of Appeals concluded that the
allegations about the requester’s motives did not establish an injury to
the public interest. Id. at 227-28. In Burke, the city sought leave to
withhold records pertaining to a waste water treatment plant on the
grounds that disclosure would reveal weaknesses in the city’s position
in pending and future litigation. 67 Md. App. at 153. The court held
that such a “tactical disadvantage” did not establish a “substantial
injury to the public interest.” Id. at 155.

interest in disclosure is outweighed by another cognizable
interest. See Office of the Governor, 360 Md. at 562 (remanding
the case to the circuit court to perform “an in camera review and
balancing test . . . to assure proper vindication of the competing
interests” in disclosure and executive privilege). The Court of
Special Appeals performed such a balancing in Randall Family,
LLC, to determine whether disclosure of the customer list, or
“black book,” seized from the operator of a “house of
assignation” would be “contrary to the public interest” under §
10-618. Weighing in favor of the public’s interest in disclosure
was a citizen’s allegation that the police department had
improperly used the black book to exert influence on a particular
public official. 154 Md. App. at 573-74. On the other side of the
balance was that the requested disclosure “might embarrass” the
people listed as customers of the house. Id. at 571. The court
concluded that “the invasion of [the customers’] privacy in this
way cannot be characterized as ‘unwarranted’ when balanced
against the public’s right to know and evaluate information of this
sort.” Id.; see also Faulk v. State’s Attorney for Harford County,
299 Md. 493, 511 (1984) (holding that the public interest in
disclosure was “outweighed by the likelihood that the disclosure
of [investigative reports during a criminal proceeding] would
disturb the existing balance of relations in criminal proceedings”);
64 Opinions of the Attorney General 236, 241 (1979) (with
respect to the public interest determination to be made under § 10-
618, advising that the custodian “must carefully weigh the
asserted secrecy interest against the asserted public interest”).
Although the Maryland cases are useful for the general
proposition that a custodian should weigh a person’s privacy
interest against the public interest in disclosure, they do not
provide much guidance on what “privacy” is for purposes of the
PIA, whether a privacy interest attaches to an individual’s e-mail
address, and how an official custodian might identify the public’s
interest in the disclosure of an e-mail address.6 The federal cases
6
Maryland’s PIA was likely modeled on either Colorado’s and
Wyoming’s public records laws, PIA Manual at 1-2, both of which
entitle a custodian to seek judicial relief when the disclosure of records
not exempted from those laws would harm the public interest. In those
states, too, the few reported cases that address the provision do not
provide much guidance on your questions. See Pagel v. Franscell, 57
P.3d 1226 (Wyo. 2002) (affirming the custodian’s determination that
the records were shielded by other law; not reaching the alternative
claim that disclosure would harm the public interest); Bodelson v.
Denver Publ. Co., 5 P.3d 373, 377 (Colo. App. 2000) (stating that “[a]
substantial injury to the public interest is not defined in the [Act]” and
that “the substantial injury to the public interest exemption contained in
§ 24-72-204(6)(a) is to be used only in those extraordinary situations
which the General Assembly could not have identified in advance”);
(continued . . .)

on FOIA, by contrast, do address such questions, and the
Maryland courts traditionally turn to FOIA cases when the PIA
provision at issue has a counterpart in FOIA. See, e.g., Faulk,
299 Md. at 506; see also Blythe v. State, 161 Md. App. 492, 528
(2005) (referring to certain enumerated exemptions under § 10-
618 as “linguistic clones of7 . . . enumerated dangers under
Exemption 7 of the FOIA”). Although federal law does not
contain a counterpart to the “substantial injury to the public
interest” standard in § 10-619, FOIA does employ the same
phrase 8“unwarranted invasion of privacy” that appears in § 10-
612(b). Accordingly, we believe that Maryland courts would
look to federal case law for guidance on how to identify
circumstances that involve an “invasion of privacy” and when
such an invasion is “unwarranted.” See, e.g., Randall, 154 Md.
App. at 573 (relying on federal FOIA cases when applying § 10-
618(f)).
2. The Federal Courts’ Identification of the Competing
Privacy and Disclosure Interests in E-Mail
Addresses and Mailing Lists.
The federal courts have developed a body of law on the
aspects of “privacy” protected by FOIA and, applying that law,
have often found that personal e-mail addresses implicate a
privacy interest sufficient to trigger the balancing of the

Freedom Newspapers v. Tollefson, 961 P.2d 1150, 1155-56 (Colo.
App. 1998) (holding, in part, that the disclosure of the City employees
who had received severance benefits would not cause substantial injury
to the public interest in personal privacy).
7
The exceptions, or “exemptions,” from disclosure under FOIA are
traditionally referred to by the paragraph of 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) in which
they are set out. “Exemption 7” refers to 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7).
8
See 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(b)(6) (Exemption 6, stating a broad ex-
ception for “personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure
of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy”); 552(b)(7)(C) (Exemption 7(C), stating a narrower exception
for certain law enforcement records, “but only to the extent that the
production . . . could reasonably be expected to constitute an
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy”). Although the “magnitude”
of the privacy interest needed to outweigh the interest in disclosure is
higher for Exemption 6 than for Exemption 7(C), the courts use the
same test for both exemptions in other respects. United States Dep’t of
Defense v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 510 U.S. 487, 496 n.6
(1994). These provisions allow a custodian of records to unilaterally
withhold requested documents on privacy grounds, something the PIA
does not allow without subsequently obtaining a court order under §
10-619.

competing interests in disclosure and personal privacy under
FOIA Exemptions 6 and 7(C). The federal courts have also
addressed the extent to which the disclosure of e-mail and postal
addresses contained in an agency’s mailing lists and other records
serves the public interest in disclosure of information about public
business. We did not find reported cases involving FOIA requests
for a government agency’s list of e-mail addresses for individuals
who have signed up to receive agency notices or newsletters.
The Privacy Interest in an E-Mail Address Requested Under
FOIA
In the context of FOIA, the federal courts have recognized
two aspects of an individual’s interest in personal privacy. The
first, called the “secrecy” interest, applies to matters “one would
prefer to keep hidden from other people because disclosure would
be embarrassing or compromising.” Ostergren v. Cuccinelli, 615
F.3d 263, 282 (4th Cir. 2010). Because that interest hinges on
secrecy, it diminishes once the matter has been disclosed. Id.
The secrecy aspect of privacy is exemplified by the “black book”
sought in Randall Family; recognizing that type of privacy
interest, the Court of Special Appeals noted that the disclosure of
the customers’ names “might embarrass” them. 154 Md. App. at
571. Based on your inquiry, we assume that there is nothing
inherently “embarrassing or compromising” about the presence of
an e-mail address on the County’s e-mail distribution lists.9
The second aspect of privacy, the “control” interest, is a
“conception of privacy whereby one does not mind publicity itself
but nonetheless would prefer to control how personal information
will be used or handled.” Ostergren, 615 F.3d at 283. As applied
by the federal courts, “control privacy” comes into play when, as
with a Social Security number, an individual “worr[ies] only
about how [the information] will be used—more specifically,
about whether some unscrupulous person will steal their identity.”
Id.; see also Sherman v. U.S. Dep’t of the Army, 244 F.3d 357,

9
We address your question as to County lists of people who have
signed up to receive notices generally, and not the list you mention of
people “with certain policy preferences,” as we do not know what that
list would have revealed about them or the Government. We note,
however, that the presence of an individual’s identifying information
on some lists would, if disclosed, cause the individual embarrassment.
See Department of State v. Ray, 502 U.S. 164, 177 n.12 (1991)
(“[W]hether disclosure of a list of names is a significant or a de minimis
threat depends upon the characteristic(s) revealed by virtue of being on
the particular list, and the consequences likely to ensue.”) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted).

365 (5th Cir. 2001) (referring to “informational privacy,”
implicated when the disclosure of a person’s name and Social
Security number would expose that person to fraud); Nat’l Cable
& Telecomms. Ass’n v. FCC, 555 F.3d 996, 1001 (D.C. Cir. 2009)
(“It is widely accepted that privacy deals with determining for
oneself when, how and to whom personal information will be
disclosed to others.”).
Control privacy also comes into play when the government
has compiled a record from already-public information.
Ostergren, 615 F.3d at 283. The Supreme Court articulated that
interest in United States Dept. of Justice v. Reporters Committee
for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 753 (1989), when it held
that a criminal “rap sheet” implicated a privacy interest despite
the fact that the information compiled therein was separately
available from other public sources. In so concluding, the court
saw “a vast difference between the public records that might be
found after a diligent search of courthouse files, county archives,
and local police stations throughout the country and a
computerized summary located in a single clearinghouse of
information.” Id. at 764; see also Fed. Labor Relations Auth.,
510 U.S. at 500 (“[A]n individual’s interest in controlling the
dissemination of information regarding personal matters does not
dissolve simply because that information may [already] be
available to the public in some form.”). The privacy concerns you
raise—that the disclosure of personal e-mail addresses might
expose the address holders to fraud and harassment—pertain to
the control aspect of personal privacy.
Because “personal privacy” under FOIA has long extended
to personal information that an individual has an interest in
controlling, the federal courts have often simply treated individual
e-mail addresses like other personal contact information and have
assumed, without discussion, that disclosure would implicate a
personal privacy interest. See, e.g., Electronic Frontier
Foundation v. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 595
F.3d 949, 961 (9th Cir. 2010) (requiring agency to disclose
telecommunications lobbyists’ names, but stating that “we can
easily envision possible privacy invasions resulting from public
disclosure of the e[-]mail addresses”); Performance Coal Co. v.
U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 847 F. Supp. 2d 6, 18 (D.D.C. 2012)
(referring to personal information such as miners’ cell phone
numbers and mine inspectors’ e-mail addresses as implicating “a
substantial privacy interest”). Even the “somewhat diminished”
privacy interest of government employees includes “an
identifiable privacy interest in avoiding disclosures of information
that could lead to annoyance or harassment.” Nat’l Day Laborer
Org. Network v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf. Agency, 811 F.
Supp. 2d 713, 747 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also Pinson v. Lappin, 806 F. Supp. 2d 230, 234-35

(D.D.C. 2011) (approving 10 the redaction of government
employees’ e-mail addresses).
This is not to say that the federal court decisions
unequivocally recognize a privacy interest in personal e-mail
addresses. One federal magistrate, in addressing the discover-
ability of information in civil litigation, questioned the
assumption that e-mail addresses are “private” information:
[C]ommon experience is that most people do
not adequately protect from disclosure their
birth dates, home addresses or telephone
numbers, e-mail addresses, or drivers’ license
numbers so as to reasonably call them private
or confidential. Instead, that information is
regularly disclosed to friends, relatives,
vendors, credit card companies, schools,
childrens’ [sic] sports teams, on hotel
registers, and the like. There is no evidence
here that the [Defendants] have maintained
this information as private or confidential.
Estate of Rice v. City & County of Denver, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
42381 (D. Colo. May 27, 2008). Nevertheless, the clear majority
of the federal cases we have 11
reviewed recognize a privacy interest
in personal e-mail addresses.

10
We note that the definitions of “personal information” and
“personal record” appearing in §§ 10-611(f) and 10-624(a) of the PIA
are not inconsistent with the conclusion that one has a privacy interest
in one’s personal e-mail address. Although neither definition mentions
e-mail addresses specifically, both definitions are inclusive and
encompass information that “identifies an individual.” See §§ 10-
611(f) (“‘[P]ersonal information’ means information that identifies an
individual including an individual’s address . . . .”); 10-624(a) (“‘[P]ersonal
record’ means a public record that names or, with reasonable certainty,
otherwise identifies an individual by an identifying factor such as . . .
an address . . . .”).
11
See, e.g., Am. Mgmt. Servs., LLC v. Dep’t of the Army, 842 F.
Supp. 2d 859, 864 n.4 (E.D. Va. 2012) (referring to “names or
[personal] contact information” as implicating “the individuals’
substantial privacy interest”); Gov’t Accountability Project v. U.S.
Dep’t of State, 699 F. Supp. 2d 97, 106 (D.D.C. 2010) (upholding
agency’s redaction of personal e-mail addresses of applicants for board
positions; stating that “the private individuals mentioned in these
records have a clear privacy interest in avoiding the disclosure of their
personal email addresses”); Budik v. Dep’t of the Army, 742 F. Supp.
2d 20, 38 (D.D.C. 2010) (affirming redaction of an e-mail address
(continued . . .)

  In fact, the federal courts have recognized a control interest

in contact information even when that information reveals little or
nothing about the identity of the person. For example, one federal
court has found that the telephone numbers in cell phones of
agency employees “constitute information that applies to
particular individuals . . . despite the fact that it is unknown from
the records which individuals are associated with these numbers.”
Nat’l Right to Work Legal Def. & Educ. Found., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t
of Labor, 828 F. Supp. 2d 183, 192 (D.D.C. 2011); see also
Strunk v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 845 F. Supp. 2d 38, 45 (D.D.C.
2012) (finding that coded identities of terminal users implicated
the users’ privacy interest because they could be used to identify
the users). And, in Havemann v. Astrue, the court upheld the
denial of personal information that did not directly identify
individuals, because the agency established that the disclosure
“would permit cross-referencing between all of the data sets
[already] released to [the requester], as well as publicly available
databases, such that private information can be identified as
belonging to a specific individual.” No. ELH-10-1498, 2012 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 136292, at 31 (D.Md. Sept. 24, 2012). The court
explained that “an individual’s privacy interest does not diminish
merely because several steps are needed to connect private
information to the individual’s identity.” Id. at 24. Thus, control
privacy also comes into play when the information given to a
government agency may be combined with other publicly
available information in a way that identifies the person.
Although Maryland courts have not explicitly addressed
whether “privacy” under the PIA includes the “control” aspect of
privacy articulated by the federal courts, we think they would turn
to the FOIA law on privacy, as they have turned to the FOIA law
on other analogous terms, and recognize that an individual has
some degree of a privacy interest in controlling the dissemination

when the signature block in the message had been disclosed; stating
that there was no public interest in disclosure “sufficient to outweigh
the privacy interest involved”); Nkihtaqmikon v. Bureau of Indian
Affairs, 493 F. Supp. 2d 91, 108 (D. Me. 2007) (holding that disclosure
of personal e-mail addresses would result in a “clearly unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy”) (internal quotation marks omitted);
Physicians Comm. for Responsible Medicine v. Glickman, 117 F. Supp.
2d 1, 6 (D.D.C. 2000) (ordering agency to disclose resumes of
applicants for advisory board positions, “presumably [to] be redacted to
protect personal data such as home addresses, telephone numbers, e-
mail addresses, and social security numbers”); Kim v. U.S. Dep’t of
Interior, 859 F. Supp. 2d 13 (D.D.C. 2012) (upholding, without
discussion, an agency’s redaction of public employee’s personal e-mail
address).

of his or her personal contact information.12 The questions for the
official custodian then become whether that interest is outweighed
by the public’s interest in the disclosure of the address, and, if so,
whether disclosure would substantially injure the public interest.
The Public Interest in Disclosure of Addresses on
Distribution Lists and E-Mail Addresses in Other Types of
Records
Whether an individual’s e-mail address or other contact
information conveys information about public business depends,
of course, on the context in which the individual provided it. In
Electronic Frontier, 595 F.3d 949, which involved a FOIA
request for the names and e-mail addresses of telecommunications
carriers’ lobbyists who had contacted the agency on behalf of
their clients, the court instructed that the e-mail addresses were
protected by Exemption 6, but only “when not needed to identify

12
We acknowledge that the court’s statement in Prince George’s
County v. Washington Post Co., 149 Md. App. at 326, that “[t]he intent
of the MPIA . . . is not to exclude from the public information that had
previously been disseminated to or known by the public” would seem
to signal a rejection of the concept of control privacy, as it has been
described by the federal courts. But the context in which the court
made the statement suggests otherwise. There, the custodian sought to
withhold a police duty roster comprised of information that “in many
instances” had been disseminated in press releases and that the officers
lacked the power to control—name, rank, badge number—because they
were required to provide it to members of the public on request. Id. at
326-27. Disclosure of that information thus would not have intruded
upon either the secrecy interest or the control interest.
We also acknowledge that this Office has previously predicted that
the disclosure of one’s marital status and other personal information
from marriage records would not result in “substantial injury” under the
predecessor to § 10-619 when that information is often made public
anyway. 61 Opinions of the Attorney General at 708-09. We issued
that opinion well before the Supreme Court opined that an individual’s
interest in controlling his or her personal information “does not
dissolve” because the information is publicly available “in some form,”
Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 510 U.S. at 500, and well before the rise of
“data brokers” and others who compile personal information on
individuals by electronically aggregating bits of information from
public and private sources. See Federal Trade Commission, Protecting
Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change: Recommendations for
Businesses and Policymakers (2012) (available at http://ftc.gov/os/
2012/03/120326privacyreport.pdf (last visited Dec. 20, 2012)). We
believe that these developments may well have rendered obsolete our
earlier opinion’s implicit limitation of “privacy” to matters that are
secret.

the party communicating with the government . . . .” Id. at 961.
The court continued:
If, however, a particular email address is the
only way to identify the carriers’ agent at
issue from the disputed records, such
information is not properly withheld under
Exemption 6 because this minor privacy
interest does not counterbalance the robust
interest of citizens’ right to know “what their
government is up to.”
Id. (quoting Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 773) (internal
quotation marks omitted, emphasis in original)). As reflected in
Electronic Frontier, the public interest in disclosure will likely
outweigh privacy interests when the personal e-mail address is the
only means of identifying the person who is seeking to influence
public policy.
When the requested addresses merely appear on
government-held lists of people who have signed up to receive
information or comply with a registry requirement, however,
federal courts have questioned whether the information sheds
light on “what the government is up to.” Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted). In Bibles v. Oregon Natural Desert Ass’n, 519
U.S. 355, 355-56 (1997), the Bureau of Land Management had
denied a private organization’s request for the agency’s mailing
list of individuals who had signed up to receive a newsletter. The
only asserted public interest in disclosure was the organization’s
interest “in knowing to whom the government is directing
information . . . so that those persons may receive information
from other sources that do not share the [Bureau’s] self-interest in
presenting government activities in the most favorable light.”
Oregon Natural Desert Ass’n v. Bibles, 83 F.3d 1168, 1171 (9th
Cir. 1996). Although the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had
concluded that that interest outweighed any privacy interest held
by those who appeared on the mailing list, the Supreme Court
reversed, stating that the requester’s intended use of the records
had “no bearing” on whether FOIA required disclosure of the
mailing list. Bibles, 519 U.S. at 356. Instead, the Court
instructed the lower court to determine whether disclosing the
addresses would “‘she[d] light on an agency’s performance of its
statutory duties’ or otherwise let citizens know ‘what their
government is up to.’” Id.
Similarly, in Minnis v. United States Dept. of Agriculture,
737 F.2d 784 (9th Cir. 1984), the Ninth Circuit upheld the denial
of a lodging operator’s request for the names and addresses of
entrants in a lottery for river access permits. Concluding that
“there is little or no public interest served by disclosure of the

information sought,” the court noted that the commercial
requester had not shown either “that government disclosure of this
list is needed to inform the interested public” about
accommodations on the river or that “disclosure would help him
oversee the lottery’s fairness.” Id. at 786-87; see also Wine
Hobby USA, Inc. v. I.R.S., 502 F.2d 133 (3d Cir. 1974) (upholding
the denial of an equipment distributor’s request for the names and
addresses of people who had registered as producers of wine for
family use on the ground that the requester had not established a
public interest in disclosure); Lakin Law Firm, P.C. v. Federal
Trade Comm’n, 352 F.3d 1122 (7th Cir. 2003) (upholding
agency’s refusal to provide law firm with names and addresses
submitted by people who had complained about fraudulent billing
practices because that information did not bear on the agency’s
activities); HMG Marketing Associates v. Freeman, 523 F. Supp.
11, 14 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (court observing that it finds itself “hard
pressed to discern any public interest” in advertiser’s acquisition
of the mailing list of people who ordered specially minted silver
dollars).
One theme that emerges from the federal cases is that the
degree to which the disclosure of a list of private e-mail addresses
sheds light on government activities depends on who generates
the list. For example, a mailing list populated automatically by
constituents signing up for a newsletter may reveal much about
the constituents’ policy preferences, but it sheds no light on the
government’s own conduct. See Electronic Frontier, 595 F.3d at
961 (“‘[I]nformation about private citizens that is accumulated in
various governmental files but that reveals little or nothing about
an agency’s own conduct is not the type of information to which
FOIA permits access.’”) (quoting Forest Serv. Employees for
Envtl. Ethics v. U.S. Forest Serv., 524 F.3d 1021, 1025 (9th Cir.
2008)). But if the government were to generate that list itself,
through the application of a set of criteria that it devises, the
decision to whom to direct its message may reveal much about
governmental conduct.
We think a Maryland court would find federal cases such as
Electronic Frontier, Bibles, and Minnis generally illustrative on
when personal information has a bearing on what the government
“is up to.” The federal courts’ objective approach to the public’s
interest in disclosure is consistent with that taken by Maryland
courts, which also look to the interest of the public rather than the
motives or needs of the particular requester. See Moberly and
Burke, discussed supra at n.5.
Applicability of the FOIA Privacy Cases to the PIA
Although the federal cases provide useful guidance on how
to analyze the competing public interests in privacy and

disclosure, important differences between the PIA and FOIA
caution against following the outcomes of federal case law in the
same manner. FOIA does not contain an analog to the
requirement in § 10-619 that records may be withheld only where
the disclosure of the requested records would “cause substantial
injury to the public interest.” Instead, the standard for non-
disclosure under Exemptions 6 and 7(C) focuses entirely on
“personal privacy.” As a result, whenever disclosure implicates
even a “very slight” privacy interest, Fed. Labor Relations Auth.,
510 U.S. at 500, the burden under federal law shifts to the
requester to show that “the public interest sought to be advanced
is a significant one,” and that the information is “likely to advance
that interest.” Casa de Maryland, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland
Security, 409 Fed. Appx. 697, 700 (4th Cir. 2011) (quoting
National Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157,
172 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also
Yonemoto v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, No. 10-15180, 2012 U.S.
App. LEXIS 1108, *23-29 (9th Cir. Jan. 18, 2012) (summarizing
Supreme Court cases on the balancing test). The PIA does not
have this burden-shifting scheme, but instead places the burden
squarely on the agency to establish that disclosure would “cause
substantial injury to the public interest.” Maryland’s more
demanding standard means that federal FOIA precedents are less
persuasive with regard to determining the ultimate weight to be
accorded the competing interests in privacy and disclosure.
So, while FOIA’s broadly-worded exemptions might make
“personal identifying information . . . regularly exempt from
disclosure,” Lakin, 352 F.3d at 1124, § 10-619 will apply only to
the non-routine circumstance in which the specific exceptions
created by the General Assembly do not provide the protection
needed to avoid a particular and substantial harm to the public
interest. The usefulness of the federal cases, then, is not in the
outcomes they reach, but in how they describe the relevant
privacy and disclosure interests at stake.
3. The Upshot for Official Custodians in Maryland
In our view, it would usually be reasonable for the official
custodian to infer that some degree of a privacy interest attaches
to a personal e-mail address, whether or not the address is
associated with information that would embarrass or compromise
the individual to whom it belongs. If there is a personal privacy
interest in a requested e-mail address, the next step would be to
identify the competing public interest in disclosure, as the court
did in Randall. In this regard, too, a Maryland court might find
persuasive, and we think an official custodian could reasonably
turn to, the federal courts’ reasoning on the extent to which e-mail
addresses and other contact information, by themselves, shed light
on government activities. The official custodian should identify

the disclosure interest objectively, without consideration of the
requester’s motives or intended use.
Finally, the official custodian should evaluate whether the
disclosure of the e-mail addresses would “cause substantial
injury” to the public interest. This standard might seem hard to
meet, but a by-product of the prospect that the government might
disseminate one’s personal contact information to others is that
people will be reluctant to provide that information. While that
by-product might not substantially injure the public interest in all
circumstances, we can imagine that in some cases a chilling effect
on a person’s willingness to sign up for e-mail notices—such as
extreme weather alerts and emergency school closings—could
reasonably be deemed a substantial injury to the public interest in
the County’s ability to disseminate such notifications. The
possibility of such a chilling effect, as well as the security
concerns you state, would pose questions of fact for the official
custodian, and then the circuit court, to evaluate in gauging the
magnitude of the potential harm to the public interest.
III
Conclusion
While the Public Information Act contains exceptions
applicable to certain senior citizens’ and students’ e-mail
addresses, it does not permit records custodians to unilaterally
withhold an e-mail address solely on the grounds that disclosure
would substantially harm the public interest. Official custodians
may temporarily withhold or partially redact a personal e-mail
address on public interest grounds alone, pending a court’s review
under § 10-619, when (a) they reasonably believe that the e-mail
address either would provide no information about the County
government, or, if it does provide such information, that it can be
partially redacted to disclose that information, and (b) the
circumstances are such that the disclosure would cause
“substantial injury” to the public interest. These determinations
will depend on the facts of each case. The creation of any
categorical exception for e-mail addresses under the PIA,
however, is a matter for the General Assembly.
Douglas F. Gansler
Attorney General
Ann MacNeille
Assistant Attorney General
Adam D. Snyder
Chief Counsel
Opinions & Advice