Can a Maryland city let a county licensing board hear appeals under the city's own electrical code, or does letting the county 'administer or enforce' municipal law stop short of quasi-judicial appeals?

Plain-English summary

The Mayor of Laurel, Frank P. Casula, asked the Attorney General whether the Prince George's County Board of Registration for Master Electricians and Electrical Contractors could legally be authorized to hear appeals under the City of Laurel's newly enacted electrical code. Laurel had historically relied on Prince George's County to handle its electrical plan review and inspections, but fiscal constraints led the County to stop providing most of these services, prompting Laurel to adopt its own electrical code (Ordinance 1196). That ordinance directed that appeals under the City's code, including licensee disciplinary matters, would be handled by the same County Board that already had the relevant expertise and procedures.

Prince George's County objected, arguing that Article 23A, §2B(d) of the Maryland Code, which lets a municipality ask a county to "administer or enforce" municipal legislation, did not cover the Board's quasi-judicial appellate function, and that the Board's jurisdiction was limited to county ordinances. The opinion disagreed, concluding that the statutory phrase "administer or enforce" was intended to include quasi-judicial administrative appeals, drawing on the statute's legislative history (the "Tillie Frank" law), analogous state administrative appeal schemes in place when the statute was enacted, and Maryland case law describing quasi-judicial administrative appeal boards as part of an agency's core "administer and enforce" function.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1996. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule or procedure mentioned here, particularly since Article 23A has since been recodified into Maryland's Local Government Article.

Common questions

Could a city ask a county government to run appeals under the city's own local code?
According to this opinion, yes. The opinion concluded that a municipality's statutory authority to have a county "administer or enforce" municipal legislation under Article 23A, §2B(d) was broad enough to include an administrative appellate process, not just day-to-day licensing or inspection functions.

Was the county actually required to take on this appellate role?
No. The opinion pointed out that even though the County Board had the authority to hear the appeals if the county agreed, §2B(d) is permissive: a county "may administer or enforce" the requested municipal legislation, meaning Prince George's County was not obligated to accept this role even though the opinion found it had the legal authority to do so.

Why was this called the "Tillie Frank" statute?
The opinion explained that Article 23A, §2B was enacted in 1983 to respond to Town of Forest Heights v. Tillie Frank, a Court of Appeals decision holding that a conflicting charter county ordinance prevailed over a municipal ordinance. A task force convened by the Governor developed the legislation to restore the balance between counties and municipalities that existed before that decision.

Background and statutory framework

Since 1984, Prince George's County agencies had performed fire and electrical plan review and inspection for the City of Laurel, with Laurel's local code exempting itself from most county legislation except provisions governing master electrician and electrical contractor licenses and the county electrical building code, an arrangement authorized under Article 23A, §2B of the Maryland Code. When the County notified Laurel in 1995 that it could no longer provide most of these services due to fiscal constraints, Laurel adopted its own electrical code, Ordinance 1196, which took effect April 1, 1996, while still requiring electricians working in the City to hold County licenses and directing that appeals go to the County Board.

The opinion analyzed the meaning of "administer or enforce" in Article 23A, §2B(d) by examining the statute's legislative history (the 1983 Tillie Frank Task Force report and House Bill 1277's bill analysis), by looking at how other state agencies with parallel "carry out and enforce" authority (such as the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene and the Department of Agriculture) used boards of review to hear appeals as part of their administrative function, and by applying the presumption that the General Assembly is aware of this kind of legal context when it legislates. It then applied Court of Appeals precedent describing quasi-judicial administrative appeal boards as falling within an agency's power to "administer and enforce" the law.

Citations and references

Statutes:

• Article 23A, §2B of the Maryland Code, generally known as the "Tillie Frank" law, governing the relationship between home rule counties and municipalities
• Article 23A, §2B(d) of the Maryland Code, permitting a municipality to request and authorize the county in which it is located to "administer or enforce" municipal legislation

Cases:

• Town of Forest Heights v. Tillie Frank, 291 Md. 331, 435 A.2d 425 (1981), the Court of Appeals decision that Article 23A, §2B was enacted to address, holding that a conflicting charter county ordinance prevailed over a municipal ordinance
• Condon v. State, 332 Md. 481, 632 A.2d 753 (1993), and Tucker v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 308 Md. 69, 517 A.2d 730 (1986), cited for the principle that statutory interpretation seeks to ascertain and carry out the true intention of the Legislature
• Armstead v. State, 342 Md. 38, 673 A.2d 221 (1996), cited for looking to other sources to discern legislative intent when statutory text is not definitive
• Cicoria v. State, 332 Md. 21, 629 A.2d 742 (1993), cited for the presumption that the General Assembly is aware of the legal context when it enacts legislation
• Department of Natural Resources v. Linchester Sand and Gravel Corp., 274 Md. 211, 334 A.2d 514 (1975), describing administrative agencies as taking on a "judicial coloring" and acting in a quasi-judicial capacity when adjudicating
• Prince George's County v. Blumberg, 288 Md. 272, 418 A.2d 1155 (1980), treating a county board of appeals as an administrative agency performing a quasi-judicial function for exhaustion-of-remedies purposes

Source

• Landing page: https://oag.maryland.gov/resources-info/Pages/attorney-general%E2%80%99s-opinions.aspx
• Original PDF: https://oag.maryland.gov/resources-info/Documents/pdfs/Opinions/1996/81oag133.pdf

Original opinion text

Gen. 133] 133

                    MUNICIPALITIES

C OUNTIES ) A UTHORITY OF C OUNTY B OARD TO H EAR
A DMINISTRATIVE A PPEALS I NVOLVING M UNICIPAL
E LECTRICAL C ODE

                      September 3, 1996

The Honorable Frank P. Casula
Mayor of Laurel

  You have requested our opinion whether the Prince George's

County Board of Registration for Master Electricians and Electrical
Contractors may be legally authorized to hear appeals relating to the
recently enacted electrical code of the City of Laurel. Our opinion
is that the Board may do so.

                                I

                         Background

   Since 1984, fire and electrical plan review and inspections

relating to the City of Laurel have been performed by the Prince
George's County agencies responsible for providing these services.
Section 1-7.1 of the Laurel Code exempted Laurel from County
legislation except for provisions relating to the administration of
master electrician and electrical contractor licenses and the electrical
building code.[1] This arrangement, which allowed Laurel to exempt
itself generally from County legislation except for provisions of the
County Code that the City elects by ordinance to retain, is authorized
under Article 23A, §2B of the Maryland Code.[2]

  Because of fiscal constraints, Prince George's County notified

Laurel in 1995 that the County could no longer perform most of the
services provided to Laurel, including the administration and
enforcement of the County electrical code. As a result, the City of
Laurel adopted its own electrical code, Laurel Ordinance 1196,
which became effective on April 1, 1996.[3] This ordinance requires
electrical contractors and electricians to be licensed by Prince
George's County in order to be issued electrical permits in the City.

  Ordinance 1196 also provides that appeals relating to the City's

electrical code, including complaints that could result in disciplinary
action against a licensee, would be handled by the Prince George's
County Board of Registration for Master Electricians and Electrical
Contractors ("County Board"). Ordinance 1196, §§4-266(c), 4-279,
and 4-280. The City elected to use the County appellate process
because the County Board already had the expertise and procedures
in place for appeals.

                               II

                           Analysis

A. Introduction

  Article 23A, §2B(d) of the Maryland Code provides as follows:

            Any municipality may, by ordinance,
       request and authorize the county within which
       it is located to administer or enforce any
       municipal legislation. Upon the enactment of
       such an ordinance, such county may
       administer or enforce such municipal
       legislation on such terms and conditions as
       may mutually be agreed.

Because Ordinance 1196 authorizes the County Board to handle
appeals from the City's electrical code, the City takes the position
that it has invoked Article 23A, §2B(d).

  However, Prince George's County has objected to enforcing

Ordinance 1196. The County argues that the phrase "administer or
enforce" does not encompass the County Board's appellate function.
Specifically, the County argues that, when the County Board is
hearing an appeal, it is performing a quasi-judicial function that is
neither "administration" nor "enforcement." Furthermore, according
to the County, the Board cannot adjudicate matters based on the laws
of another jurisdiction, because the Board's jurisdiction is limited to
County ordinances.

  As always, our goal in interpreting a statute is "to ascertain and

carry out the true intention of the Legislature." Condon v. State, 332
Md. 481, 490-91, 632 A.2d 753 (1993) (citing Tucker v. Fireman's
Fund Ins. Co., 308 Md. 69, 93, 517 A.2d 730 (1986)). We must
start with the words of the statute to discern legislative intent. In this
case, the words "administer" and "enforce" are both susceptible to
very broad interpretations and do not provide us with definitive
evidence of the legislative objective underlying §2B(d). Thus, we
must look to "other sources to discern the Legislature's intent" when
it enacted §2B(d). Armstead v. State, 342 Md. 38, 56, 673 A.2d 221
(1996).

B. Legislative History of Article 23A, §2B

  Article 23A, §2B, enacted as Chapter 398 of the Laws of

Maryland 1983, is often referred to as the "Tillie Frank" law,
because its purpose was to overturn the decision of the Court of
Appeals in Town of Forest Heights v. Tillie Frank, 291 Md. 331, 435
A.2d 425 (1981). In that case, a divided Court of Appeals held that
where a charter county ordinance conflicted with a municipal
ordinance enacted under the municipality's general police powers,
the county ordinance prevailed.

 Because the Tillie Frank case altered the commonly

understood relationship between home rule counties and
municipalities, in 1982 Governor Hughes established a study group,
the "Tillie Frank Task Force." The Task Force was charged with
developing legislation that would reestablish the balance between
counties and municipalities.[4] See Report of the Tillie Frank Task
Force (January 18, 1983). The recommendations of the Task Force
were embodied in House Bill 1277 of 1983, enacted as Chapter 398.

   Unfortunately, neither the Task Force Report nor the bill

analysis of the Constitutional and Public Law Committee explains
whether the phrase "administer or enforce" in §2B(d) was intended
to include an administrative appellate process. The report describes
subsection (d) as "intended to clarify that a municipality may request
that a county administer municipal legislation within a municipality,
but that the county may, but is not required to, accept this burden."
Task Force Report at 12. The bill analysis states that "[a]
municipality may, by ordinance, request or authorize its county to
administer or enforce municipal legislation." Bill Analysis of the
Constitutional and Public Law Committee at 2.

C. Other Statutes

  The Court of Appeals accepts the useful presumption that the

General Assembly is aware of the legal context when it passes a bill.
See, e.g., Cicoria v. State, 332 Md. 21, 43, 629 A.2d 742 (1993).
Accordingly, we may infer some indication of the legislative
understanding of the phrase "administer or enforce" from the statutes
of other administrative agencies at the time that §2B was enacted.
These other statutes suggest to us that the General Assembly
understood the phrase to include quasi-judicial administrative
appeals.

 Under §2-104 of the Health-General ("HG") Article, the

Secretary of Health and Mental Hygiene has the authority to "carry
out and enforce the provision of this article."[5] Included within the
Department of Health and Mental Hygiene is a Board of Review,
which hears appeals from persons aggrieved by any decision, action,
or inaction on the part of the Secretary or any unit in the
Department. HG §2-207(a). The Department of Agriculture also
has a similar statutory scheme, under which the Secretary is given
the authority to "carry out and enforce" the law, and a Board of
Review is established within the Department to hear appeals from
decisions of the Secretary or other officials of the Department. §§2-
104 and 2-404 of the Agriculture Article. See also former §1-107 of
the Natural Resources Article (Department of Natural Resources
Board of Review) (repealed by Chapter 25 of the Laws of Maryland
1990). These boards of review are part of the mechanism by which
the department secretaries "carry out" a variety of administrative
functions. This opportunity for quasi-judicial appeals -- essentially
a formal method for correcting agency mistakes -- is commonly and
correctly viewed as a part of the administrative process.

 Against this background, the General Assembly would likely

have conceived of §2B(d) as allowing a municipality to avail itself
of a county appellate process that is comparably integral to an
administrative enforcement scheme.

D. Case Law

  In two cases, the Court of Appeals discussed whether quasi-

judicial functions are within the scope of an administrative agency's
power to administer and enforce the law. Aspects of the discussion
in these cases support the conclusion that the General Assembly
intended to permit a county agency to administer or enforce a
municipal ordinance by means of an administrative appeal process.

 In Department of Natural Resources v. Linchester Sand and

Gravel Corp., 274 Md. 211, 334 A.2d 514 (1975), the Court of
Appeals reviewed the denial of a permit by the Department of
Natural Resources. The aggrieved party appealed the decision to the
Board of Review, an entity established within the Department to
hear appeals. 274 Md. at 214. In discussing the role of an
administrative agency, the Court stated:

           The primary function of administrative
           agencies is to advance the will and weal
           of the people as ordained by their
           representative -- the Legislature. These
           agencies are created in order to perform
           activities which the Legislature deems
           desirable and necessary to forward the
           health, safety, welfare and morals of the
           citizens of this State.... They in addition
           take on a judicial coloring in that
           frequently, within the exercise of their
           power, they are called upon to make
           factual determinations and thus
           adjudicate, and it is in that sense that they
           are also recurrently considered to be
           acting in a quasi-judicial capacity.

274 Md. at 222 (emphasis added).

  In Prince George's County v. Blumberg, 288 Md. 272, 418

A.2d 1155 (1980), the Court was asked to determine whether an
applicant for a license failed to exhaust all administrative remedies
when the applicant appealed a decision of the County's Department
of Licenses and Permits to the circuit court. By appealing directly
to the circuit court, the applicant bypassed the County Board of
Appeals, which had been established to hear administrative appeals,
including appeals from a final decision of a building inspector. 288
Md. at 281.

 When discussing the County Board of Appeals, the Court

indicated that it viewed the Board as an administrative agency, albeit
one performing a quasi-judicial activity:

       The principal reason for this exhaustion
       requirement with respect to administrative
       bodies are manifest -- (i) the issues are largely
       within the expertise of the involved agency to
       hear the evidence and determine the propriety
       of the request; (ii) the courts would be
       undertaking functions the legislature thought
       could be best performed by an agency; and
       (iii) courts might be called upon to decide
       matters that would never arise if the
       prescribed administrative remedy was
       followed.

288 Md. at 284 (1980) (emphasis added).

  The County Board of Appeals involved the Blumberg case is

similar to the County Board involved here, in that they both have the
authority to rule on interpretations of a building code and have the
power to affirm, modify, or reverse a decision of an inspector.
Accordingly, even when the County Board is performing a quasi-
judicial function, it would still fall within the Court's
characterization of an "administrative agency." Moreover,
Linchester illustrates that quasi-judicial functions commonly are
within the scope of the powers granted to an administrative agency.

                             III

                        Conclusion

  In summary, it is our opinion that the County Board of

Registration for Master Electricians and Electrical Contractors is
legally authorized to administer Ordinance 1196 by hearing and
deciding appeals in matters arising under the City of Laurel's
electrical code.[6]

                               J. Joseph Curran, Jr.
                               Attorney General

                               Jack Schwartz
                               Chief Counsel
                                 Opinions and Advice

[1] Since the City adopted its own electrical code, it also enacted
Ordinance No. 1202, which exempted the City from the County electrical
code.

[2] The background and purpose of this provision are explained in Part
IIB below.

[3] Since the City adopted its own electrical code, it also enacted an
ordinance exempting the City from the County electrical code.

[4] "Until the Tillie Frank decision, it was believed by many people
that county laws on matters which were within the powers of
municipalities in that county were not applicable in the municipalities, at
least where the municipal ordinance conflicted with county legislation."
Report of the Tillie Frank Task Force at 1.

[5] The term "carry out" in this context is synonymous with the term
"administer." Compare Random House Dictionary of the English
Language 26 (2d ed. 1987) (definition of verb "administer") with id. at
319 (definition of verbal phrase "carry out").

[6] Although we have concluded that the County Board has the
authority to enforce Ordinance 1196, Prince George's County is not
required to enforce the ordinance; §2B(d) provides that a county "may
administer or enforce such municipal legislation."