Could a Maryland resident get a driver's license without a photograph in the 1990s if being photographed violated their religious beliefs?

Plain-English summary

Delegates James F. Ports, Jr. and Alfred W. Redmer, Jr. asked the Attorney General whether a Maryland resident who objected on religious grounds to being photographed had a legal right to obtain a driver's license without a photograph, given that Maryland law required nearly every license to carry one. The request followed a constituent's complaint about the photograph mandate.

The opinion concluded the state was not required to issue a religious objector a nonphoto license. It analyzed the question under the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), which Congress had just passed to restore a "compelling governmental interest" test for laws burdening religious exercise, after the U.S. Supreme Court's 1990 decision in Employment Division v. Smith had eliminated that heightened protection for religiously neutral, generally applicable laws. Applying that compelling-interest standard, the opinion found Maryland's photograph requirement served a compelling interest in preventing driver's license fraud and protecting public safety, citing a recent, highly publicized Maryland case in which a fraudulently altered license was used to commit an abduction and murder, and it distinguished cases from other states that had struck down photo requirements because those states, unlike Maryland, issued many permanent nonphoto licenses to other drivers.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1994. Its central legal foundation, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act's "compelling interest" test for state and local laws, was invalidated three years later, and the opinion's own editor's note flags this directly: in City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S.Ct. 2157 (1997), the U.S. Supreme Court held that RFRA could not constitutionally be applied to state and local government because Congress exceeded its Fourteenth Amendment authority in enacting it. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. The underlying question (whether Maryland's photo requirement survives a religious-liberty challenge) would need to be reanalyzed today under whatever standard currently governs, which may again be the Smith framework the opinion describes, a state constitutional standard, or a subsequently enacted state-level RFRA if Maryland has one. Verify current law before relying on any conclusion in this opinion.

Common questions

Did Maryland ever let religious objectors skip the driver's license photo entirely? No, according to this opinion. It found Maryland only issued temporary nonphoto licenses in narrow circumstances unrelated to religion (for residents out of state during renewal, or briefly while a lost license was being replaced), and concluded the state was not constitutionally required to create a religious exemption from the permanent photograph requirement.

Why did a Maryland murder case matter to a driver's license opinion? The opinion pointed to a widely reported 1993 Baltimore case in which a perpetrator obtained a fraudulent replacement license bearing his own photo but his victim's personal information, then used it to run up charges on the victim's credit cards and evade police, as evidence that Maryland's interest in accurate license photographs was not just administrative convenience but went to preventing serious fraud and protecting public safety.

Is this opinion's conclusion still good law today? Not on its original reasoning. The opinion relied heavily on the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act's compelling-interest test, and the U.S. Supreme Court struck down that federal law's application to states in 1997, three years after this opinion issued. Anyone relying on this opinion today would need to check what religious-liberty standard currently applies to Maryland state action, since the framework this opinion used no longer governs state laws.

Background and statutory framework

Under TR §16-111(c), Maryland driver's licenses were required to include a photograph, either a profile photo for licensees under 21 or a frontal photo for those 21 and older. Narrow nonphoto exceptions existed under TR §16-115(e) for licensees out of Maryland during a renewal period and under longstanding MVA practice for individuals awaiting replacement of a lost license under TR §16-114(b), but both were temporary.

The opinion worked through the Free Exercise Clause doctrine as it stood in 1994: the Supreme Court's 1990 decision in Employment Division v. Smith had eliminated the "compelling governmental interest" balancing test of Sherbert v. Verner for religiously neutral, generally applicable laws, but Congress responded with the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, which purported to restore that compelling-interest, least-restrictive-means test for all laws substantially burdening religious exercise, including state laws. The opinion applied RFRA's framework, first assuming a sincere religious objection existed, then finding Maryland's interest in preventing fraudulent driver's licenses (and the public safety consequences of such fraud) compelling enough to justify the photograph requirement, distinguishing contrary decisions from other states whose broader nonphoto license practices undercut their own claimed interest in universal photo requirements.

Citations and references

Statutes:

• TR §16-111(c), requiring a photograph on every Maryland driver's license
• TR §16-114(b) and (e), governing temporary nonphoto licenses for lost or duplicate licenses
• TR §16-115(e), authorizing nonphoto renewal licenses for individuals out of Maryland during the renewal period
• U.S. Const., amend. 1, the Free Exercise Clause
• Maryland Declaration of Rights, Article 36, the state constitutional religious liberty provision
• Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. §2000bb, §2000bb-1(b), §2000bb-1(6), and §2000bb(b)(1), restoring the compelling-interest test for laws burdening religious exercise
• 42 U.S.C. §1983, cited regarding Congress's Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power

Cases:

• Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), incorporating the Free Exercise Clause against the states
• Employment Div., Dept. of Human Res. v. Smith, 110 S.Ct. 1595 (1990), eliminating the compelling-interest test for neutral, generally applicable laws
• Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), the original compelling-interest balancing test RFRA sought to restore
• United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944), holding freedom of religious belief is absolute even though conduct may be regulated
• Snyder v. Holy Cross Hosp., 30 Md. App. 317, 352 A.2d 334 (1976), applying the belief/conduct distinction under Maryland law
• Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), requiring a sincerely held religious belief for a free exercise claim
• Syska v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 45 Md. App. 626, 415 A.2d 301 (1980), distinguishing secular philosophical objections from religious ones
• Thomas v. Review Board of Indiana Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981), on indirect burdens on religious exercise
• United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982), on the limits of religious accommodation in an organized society
• McMillan v. State, 258 Md. 147, 265 A.2d 453 (1970), and Mercy Hosp. v. Jackson, 62 Md. App. 409, 489 A.2d 1130 (1985), applying the Sherbert compelling-interest standard in Maryland
• Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S.Ct. 2217 (1993), summarizing the post-Smith neutral-and-generally-applicable-law standard
• Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880); and Kletschka v. Driver, 411 F.2d 436 (2d Cir. 1969), on Congress's Fourteenth Amendment Section 5 enforcement power, relevant to RFRA's constitutionality
• Quaring v. Peterson, 728 F.2d 1121 (8th Cir. 1984), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 472 U.S. 478 (1985); Dennis v. Charnes, 646 F. Supp. 158 (D. Colo. 1986); and Bureau of Motor Vehicles v. Pentecostal House of Prayer, Inc., 380 N.E.2d 1225 (Ind. 1978), out-of-state cases striking down photo requirements, distinguished by the opinion because those states issued broader permanent nonphoto licenses
• Riley v. National Federation of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781 (1988), cited on narrowly tailored regulation
• City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S.Ct. 2157 (1997), the later U.S. Supreme Court decision (noted in the opinion's own editor's note) holding RFRA unconstitutional as applied to state and local government

Source

• Landing page: https://oag.maryland.gov/resources-info/Pages/attorney-general%E2%80%99s-opinions.aspx
• Original PDF: https://oag.maryland.gov/resources-info/Documents/pdfs/Opinions/1994/79oag045.pdf

Original opinion text

Gen. 45]
45

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

F REEDOM OF R ELIGION ) F REE E XERCISE C LAUSE ) V EHICLE L AWS ) L ICENSING ) I NDIVIDUAL W HO O BJECTS ON R ELIGIOUS G ROUNDS TO P HOTOGRAPH R EQUIREMENT F OR D RIVER'S L ICENSE N OT E NTITLED TO L ICENSE W ITHOUT P HOTOGRAPH

May 10, 1994

The Honorable James F. Ports, Jr.
The Honorable Alfred W. Redmer, Jr.
House of Delegates

You have requested our opinion whether an individual has a legal entitlement to obtain a Maryland driver's license without a photograph (a "nonphoto license") if being photographed would be contrary to the individual's religious beliefs.

For reasons given below, we conclude that the State is not required to provide a non-photo license to an individual who objects on religious grounds to the inclusion of the individual's photograph on the license.

I

Background

Under §16-111(c) of the Transportation ("TR") Article, every driver's license "shall include" a photograph:

(i) If the licensee is under the age of 21 years, a profile photograph of the licensee; or

(ii) If the licensee is at least 21 years old, a frontal photograph of the licensee.

TR §16-115(e) does authorize the Motor Vehicle Administration ("MVA") to issue a renewed driver's license without a photo for individuals who are not in Maryland during the renewal period. The nonphoto license must bear the notation, however, that "it is valid without a photo until 15 days after the licensee first returns to the State." See also TR §16-114(e) (same provision for duplicate license). Additionally, under long-standing practice, the MVA will issue a 45-day, nonphoto license for an individual who has lost the original photograph license, but only if the individual seeking a duplicate license does not have the information necessary for reissuance. Once the individual furnishes the necessary information, a license bearing a photograph is issued. See TR §16-114(b).[1]

II

Free Exercise of Religion

A. Introduction

The First Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." U.S. Const., amend. 1 (emphasis added). See also Article 36 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. The Fourteenth Amendment makes the First Amendment, including the portion commonly referred to as the Free Exercise Clause, binding on the states. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).

The Free Exercise Clause excludes all "governmental regulation of religious beliefs as such." Employment Div., Dept. of Human Res. v. Smith, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 1599 (1990) (quoting Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402 (1963)). For example, the government may not compel affirmation of religious belief or punish the expression of religious doctrines it believes to be false. Smith, 110 S.Ct. at 1599. In other words, the freedom of belief is absolute. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944). See also Snyder v. Holy Cross Hosp., 30 Md. App. 317, 327, 352 A.2d 334, cert. denied, 276 Md. 750 (1976).

The manner in which one acts on one's beliefs, however, is not immune from governmental regulation. Ballard, 322 U.S. at 86. See also Snyder, 30 Md. App. at 327. Actions may be regulated even when performed out of religious duty. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403.

B. Threshold Elements of a Free Exercise Claim

The party objecting on religious grounds to a state regulation must demonstrate that the objection is grounded upon a sincerely held religious belief. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972). On that point, the Supreme Court said:

Although a determination of what is a
"religious" belief or practice entitled to constitutional protection may present a most delicate question, the very concept of ordered liberty precludes allowing every person to make his own standards on matters of conduct in which society as a whole has important interests.

406 U.S. at 215-16 (footnote omitted). That is, the belief must be something more than a purely secular philosophical or personal belief. See Syska v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 45 Md. App. 626, 632, 415 A.2d 301, cert. denied, 288 Md. 744 (1980), appeal dismissed, 450 U.S. 961 (1981) (objection to compulsory immunization, based on purely secular considerations, "are philosophical and personal rather than religious [and] do not rise to the demands of the Religion Clauses").[2] For purposes of this opinion, we shall simply assume that an individual who objects to a photo license does so because of a sincerely held religious belief.[3]

Upon a showing that religious beliefs are sincere, the determination must next be made whether the law infringes upon those beliefs. A burden on religion exists when "the state conditions receipt of an important benefit upon conduct proscribed by a religious faith, or where it denies such a benefit because of conduct mandated by a religious belief, thereby putting substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs ...." Thomas v. Review Board of Indiana Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 717-18 (1981).[4]

The MVA will not issue a driver's license without a photograph except temporarily, and only for the limited reasons discussed in Part I above. An individual who for religious reasons objects to a photo license is faced with the dilemma of choosing between violating an important religious principle or surrendering his or her driving privileges. "While the compulsion may be indirect, the infringement upon free exercise is nonetheless substantial." Thomas, 450 U.S. at 718.

C. Standard For Assessing Constitutionality of Burden

Not all burdens upon religion violate the Free Exercise Clause.
United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257 (1982). Nor does the fact that a person's religious practice is burdened by a governmental program mean that an exemption accommodating his or her practice must be granted. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 718.

The test for determining the legality of a governmental burden on religiously motivated practice has undergone a remarkable set of reverses. More than 30 years ago, the Supreme Court held that any "incidental burden on the free exercise of religion may be justified by a compelling state interest in the regulation of a subject within the state's constitutional power to regulate ...." Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "[N]o showing merely of a rational relationship to some colorable state interest would suffice .... Only the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests, give occasion for permissible limitation." 374 U.S. at 406 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). See also McMillan v. State, 258 Md. 147, 152, 265 A.2d 453 (1970); Mercy Hosp. v. Jackson, 62 Md. App. 409, 415, 489 A.2d 1130 (1985), vacated as moot, 306 Md. 556 (1986); Snyder, 30 Md. App. at 326.

In a 1990 tour de force, however, Justice Scalia, for a five- justice majority, eviscerated Sherbert. 110 S.Ct. at 1602-03. The Court eliminated the "compelling governmental interest" standard espoused in Sherbert for generally applicable laws by limiting it to unemployment compensation cases. Religiously neutral laws of general applicability that have the effect of burdening particular religious practice cannot be evaluated under the balancing test of Sherbert, the Court held. 110 S.Ct. at 1603. Instead, as the Supreme Court recently explained, the standard under Smith is this:

[A] law that is neutral and of general applicability need not be justified by a compelling governmental interest even if the law has the incidental effect of burdening a particular religious practice. Neutrality and general applicability are interrelated, and ... failure to satisfy one requirement is a likely indication that the other has not been satisfied.
A law failing to satisfy these requirements must be justified by a compelling governmental interest and must be narrowly tailored to advance that interest.

Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S.Ct. 2217, 2226 (1993) (citation omitted).

The latest and perhaps last chapter in the story was written by the United States Congress. In the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (the "RFRA"), Congress restored the compelling interest requirement of Sherbert. The RFRA is applicable retroactively to both federal and state law. 42 U.S.C. §2000bb-1(6).[5] The heart of the RFRA, subsection (3), provides as follows:

Government may substantially burden a person's exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person )

(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and

(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.

42 U.S.C. §2000bb-1(b). The RFRA is intended "to restore the compelling interest test set forth in Sherbert ..., to guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened ...." 42 U.S.C. §2000bb(b)(1) (emphasis added, citations omitted).

The legislative history of the RFRA expresses the intent that "the courts will look to free exercise cases decided prior to Smith for guidance in determining whether the exercise of religion has been substantially burdened and the least restrictive means have been employed in furthering a compelling government interest." S. Rep. No. 103-111, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 8-9 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892, 1898.

The constitutionality of the RFRA itself might be challenged in the future, of course. Congress' constitutional authority to enact the RFRA depends on the scope of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which empowers Congress "to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions" of the amendment. In the past, Congress has generally exercised its Section 5 authority with respect to the Equal Protection Clause. See, e.g., Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880) (Civil Rights Act of 1875).

However, "[a] right or an immunity, whether created by the Constitution or only guaranteed by it, even without any express delegation of power, may be protected by Congress." Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1880). Moreover, "there is express authority to protect the rights and immunities referred to in the Fourteenth Amendment, and to enforce observance of them by appropriate congressional legislation." Id. at 311. See also, e.g., Kletschka v. Driver, 411 F.2d 436, 447 (2d Cir. 1969) (Congress has power under the Fourteenth Amendment "to legislate against state action of every kind having the effect of impairing federally guaranteed rights, and Congress had exercised that power in [42 U.S.C.] §1983") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Because the Free Exercise Clause has been incorporated into the "liberty" component of the Fourteenth Amendment, we think it most unlikely that a court would strike down the RFRA, and we shall apply it in analyzing your question.

III

The Validity of the Photograph Requirement

In Quaring v. Peterson, 728 F.2d 1121 (8th Cir. 1984), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 472 U.S. 478 (1985), the federal appellate court held that a provision of Nebraska driver's licensing law requiring applicants to sit for a color photograph, to be affixed on the license, unconstitutionally burdened an applicant's free exercise of her religious belief that forbade the making of graven images. 727 F.2d at 1126. The court said that the government's interest in providing police officers with an accurate and instantaneous means of identifying a motorist was not compelling, particularly in view of the fact that Nebraska exempts numerous motorists from having personal photographs on their licenses.[6] See also Dennis v. Charnes, 646 F. Supp. 158 (D. Colo. 1986) (state's interest in facilitating its identification of vehicle operators at accident scenes and during traffic stops, though legitimate, was not sufficiently compelling where other drivers were issued special licenses without photographs); Bureau of Motor Vehicles v. Pentecostal House of Prayer, Inc., 380 N.E.2d 1225 (Ind. 1978) (state's interest in ensuring driver competency did not require a photograph and in turn was not sufficiently compelling).

Unlike the state interests advanced by Colorado, Nebraska, or Indiana in these cases, Maryland's interest in the photograph requirement goes to the core of government's role in protecting its citizens against victimization. The State's interest in preventing individuals from establishing a false identification by means of a driver's license is not simply a matter of administrative convenience. Since driver's licenses are used to establish identity for a host of commercial transactions, the photograph requirement, intended to permit a merchant to establish that the license is really that of the individual proffering it, serves the compelling interest in protecting the public from fraud.[7] Sherbert v. Verner itself recognized that the prevention of fraud was potentially a sufficiently compelling "abuse or danger." 374 U.S. at 407.[8] See Lawrence N. Tribe, American Constitutional Law §14-13, at 1273 (2d ed. 1988). See also Riley v. National Federation of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 792 (1988) (discussing an interest that would justify a narrowly tailored regulation of speech).

Furthermore, the photograph requirement and its vital role in preventing fraudulent identification is directly linked to what is an even more compelling governmental interest ) safeguarding public safety. Few will have forgotten the shocking events surrounding the abduction and murder of Vitalis Pilius, whose killer, Dontay Carter, "was able to obtain a replacement driver's license in the name of the man he killed by claiming the license had been lost in a fire. Carter used the license to rack up charges on [the victim's] credit cards and to elude police." Peter Jensen, MVA Updating Security, Baltimore Sun, May 30, 1993, at 1B. Carter got the false credentials by burning parts of the license, including the picture of the victim, but not the personal information on the license, i.e, address, height, weight, etc. He then presented the burned license to an MVA employee. Another license was reissued with Carter's picture and the personal information of the victim.

In immediate response to this tragic incident, MVA implemented an entirely new driver's licensing system. Baltimore Sun, May 30, 1993, at 5B. The new system captures a digitized image and signature of the applicant, which are placed into the MVA database and used to verify the applicant's identity for renewal and reissuance if the license is ever lost or stolen. The linch-pin of the new system is the requirement that an applicant have his or her photograph taken. In fact, the photograph of the applicant is indispensable to the effectiveness of the new system. Thus, the compelling State interest is assuring the reduction, if not elimination, of fraudulent use of a driver's license by issuing licenses with accurate photographs.[9]

Furthermore, unlike the states in the three cases cited above, which provided permanent nonphoto licenses, MVA only issues temporary nonphoto license. When a state allows many of its drivers to hold nonphoto licenses, it is easy to see how a court would infer that the state's interest in having photographs on driver's licenses is not really so compelling. No such inference is possible in Maryland.

Nor is it reasonable to conclude that the State's compelling interest could be served just as well by other means of identification. In Bureau of Motor Vehicles v. Pentecostal House of Prayer, Inc., the Indiana court, in addition to holding that Indiana's interest in ensuring driver competency was not sufficiently compelling, opined that the state's interest in speedy, positive identification could be met through alternatives to a photograph. Specifically, the court wrote, "statistics which are traditionally included on driver's license, such as license number, height, weight, eye and hair color, have long proven adequate to enable the [state] to fulfill its important duties." 380 N.E.2d at 1229.

This reasoning is faulty, for it ignores the reality that thousands of people share similar height, weight, and other physical characteristics and that observers overlook differences when given these data without a photograph.[10] Even when these features are described on a license, they are far less effective in identifying an individual than a photograph ) particularly, as under the new MVA system, when the photograph itself becomes immediately available from MVA's computer database.

The Supreme Court has said:

To maintain an organized society that guarantees religious freedom to a great variety of faiths requires that some religious practices yield to the common good. Religious beliefs can be accommodated but there is a point at which accommodation would radically restrict the operating latitude of the legislature.

Lee, 455 U.S. at 259 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In our view, the General Assembly and MVA have the "operating latitude" to decide that driver's licenses with photographs are the only effective means to achieve the compellingly important end of deterring fraudulent access to or use of driver's licenses.

V

Conclusion

In summary, the State may deny a driver's license to an individual who objects on religious grounds to the inclusion of the individual's photograph on the license.

J. Joseph Curran, Jr.
Attorney General

Jack Schwartz
Chief Counsel
Opinions & Advice

Kimberly Smith Ward
Assistant Attorney General

Editor's Note:

Contrary to the prediction in Part II of this opinion, the United States Supreme Court held that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act could not constitutionally be applied to state and local government, because its enactment exceeded Congress' power under the Fourteenth Amendment. City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S.Ct. 2157 (1997).

[1] The temporary nonphoto license may become unnecessary under the new driver's licensing system discussed in Part III below, because a digitized image and signature of the license will be on file. In the event that the license is lost or stolen, the MVA database can retrieve the photo and signature to verify the applicant's identity for reissuance. See Motor Vehicle Administration Press Release, November 29, 1993, at 1.

[2] The sincerity of one's belief is not the same as the truth or falsity of the belief. An inquiry into the latter is forbidden. See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. at 86.

[3] Your inquiry was prompted by a constituent's contention about the impact of the photo requirement on his religious practice. We do not believe it to be appropriate in an opinion to assess the particulars of your constituent's claim.

[4] Thomas involved a state's denial of unemployment benefits to someone who quit a job after being assigned to a department that made weapons components. The employee's sincerely held religious beliefs precluded his participation in the production of armaments. 450 U.S. at 709-10.

[5] The RFRA, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1489, was signed into law on November 16, 1993.

[6] Nebraska exempted from the photograph requirement learner's permits, school permits issued to farmers' children, farm machinery permits, special permits for those with restricted or minimal driving ability, or temporary licenses for individuals outside of the state whose old licenses have expired.

[7] In fact, as the single most important identifying document, a driver's license is the key that enables someone to obtain other documents under the same name. thus, a fraudulent driver's license is a passport to wider document fraud.

[8] In Sherbert, the state failed to show that this abuse of its unemployment benefits system was likely or could not be dealt with by other means. Id.

[9] Moreover, while the predominant State interest is that of public safety, the State also has an interest in aiding law enforcement officials, who have access to the database, to identify motorists on the highways and in administrative efficiency.

[10] Dontay Carter weighed much less than his victim and had different hair and eye color, but nevertheless, he was able to deceive an MVA employee and obtain a fraudulent replacement license, and later deceive a law enforcement officer. Thus, personal information alone was not effective in preventing the fraud.