Could a Maryland oil spill responder lose legal immunity if their attempt to prevent a spill failed, or if they acted without first getting sign-off from a federal or state official?
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This page answers the general question as of 1992. Ezel answers yours: what it means for your facts, under current Maryland law, with citations.
Plain-English summary
Maryland's Secretary of the Environment asked the Attorney General three questions about a 1992 amendment to the state's oil spill liability law, EN §4-419, enacted after industry concerns that responders could face open-ended lawsuits for how they handled a spill: whether the immunity covered a responder whose attempt to prevent a spill failed, whether a responder lost immunity by acting without first contacting a federal or state official, and whether the Maryland Department of the Environment (MDE) could define by regulation what counted as a proper response.
The Attorney General answered all three questions in the responder's favor. On the first, the opinion reasoned it would be illogical to protect responders who clean up an existing spill but deny protection to those who try, unsuccessfully, to prevent one, since that reading would perversely encourage people to wait until a spill happened before acting. On the second, the opinion read the statute's "or" as making prior contact with an on-scene coordinator only one of two alternative paths to immunity, the other being that the response was itself consistent with Maryland's oil spill subtitle and the National Contingency Plan, so a responder did not automatically lose immunity for acting without prior sign-off. On the third, the opinion found MDE had explicit statutory authority to issue regulations defining the actions consistent with the law, though it could not use that regulatory power to grant immunity to grossly negligent responders or to change the National Contingency Plan itself, which only the President could revise.
Currency note
This opinion was issued in 1992. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.
Common questions
Did a Maryland oil spill responder lose immunity from liability if their attempt to prevent a spill failed?
No. The opinion concluded the immunity in EN §4-419 covered a responder who rendered care, assistance, or advice in an unsuccessful attempt to prevent a discharge of oil, as long as the responder met the statute's other requirements and was not grossly negligent.
Did a responder have to contact a federal or state official before acting in order to keep their immunity?
No. The opinion concluded a responder could qualify for immunity even without first contacting the federal on-scene coordinator or an appropriate state official, so long as the response itself was consistent with Maryland's oil spill subtitle and the National Contingency Plan.
Could a commercial company claim this immunity for its everyday business activities?
No. The opinion made clear that a commercial firm not responding to an actual or threatened discharge could not claim immunity for ordinary commercial activities; the immunity only applied to actions taken to contain, clean up, remove, or prevent an oil discharge.
Did the Maryland Department of the Environment have authority to define by regulation what counted as an immune response?
Yes, within limits. The opinion concluded MDE had statutory authority to issue regulations defining actions consistent with the oil spill subtitle, but could not use regulations to grant immunity to grossly negligent responders or to alter the requirements of the federally adopted National Contingency Plan.
Background and statutory framework
Following the Exxon Valdez spill and similar incidents elsewhere, the General Assembly strengthened Maryland's authority to regulate oil transportation and respond to spills, and enacted Chapter 459 of the Laws of Maryland 1992 to address industry concerns, reportedly triggered in part by oil spill contractors refusing to participate in a 1991 U.S. Coast Guard training exercise over fear of "unlimited" liability, by amending EN §4-419(a) to shield a responder from liability for containment, cleanup, and removal costs or damages arising from care, assistance, or advice consistent with the oil spill subtitle and the National Contingency Plan, or as otherwise directed by the federal on-scene coordinator or an appropriate state official, unless the responder was the party responsible for the discharge, a "responsible party" under the federal Oil Pollution Act of 1990, or grossly negligent or engaged in willful misconduct. The legislative history showed the General Assembly modeled this standard on the federal immunity provision in the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C. §1321(c)(4).
The opinion found the statute's purpose, like the "good Samaritan" immunity concept generally, was to encourage quick intervention, and that EN Title 4, Subtitle 4's own definitions and duties (the broad definition of "discharge" in EN §4-401, the discharge prohibition in EN §4-410(a), and MDE's duty under EN §4-405 to develop pollution-prevention programs) confirmed prevention, not just cleanup, was central to the scheme, a reading reinforced by similar legislative history behind the federal Oil Pollution Act and by Maryland case law recognizing the legislature's emphasis on preventing pollution rather than waiting to penalize it after the fact. On prior authorization, the opinion parsed the statute's disjunctive phrasing, "consistent with [Subtitle 4] and the National Contingency Plan, or as otherwise directed by" an official, to mean consistency with the subtitle and the Plan was an independent path to immunity, not conditioned on having first obtained official direction, while still recommending that responders seek authorization when time allowed, since doing so avoids having to establish consistency after the fact. On MDE's regulatory authority, the opinion pointed to EN §4-405(b)(1) and EN §4-405(a)(7) and (9) as explicit statutory grants letting MDE prescribe procedures for responding to spills and enact regulations to carry out the subtitle, subject to the limits that regulations cannot conflict with the statute, cannot immunize grossly negligent conduct, and cannot alter the federally adopted National Contingency Plan.
Citations and references
Statutes:
- EN §4-419(a), the oil spill responder immunity provision
- Chapter 459 (Senate Bill 199) of the Laws of Maryland 1992, the amending legislation, "Oil Spills - Liability"
- EN §4-401(g), definition of "person responsible for the discharge"
- EN §4-401, definition of "discharge"
- EN §4-410(a), discharge prohibition
- EN §4-405, EN §4-405(a)(7) and (9), EN §4-405(b)(1), MDE's pollution-prevention duties and regulatory authority
- EN §4-417, civil and criminal penalties for violating Subtitle 4 regulations
- 33 U.S.C. §1321(c)(4), the federal Oil Pollution Act responder immunity standard
- §1001(32), Oil Pollution Act of 1990, codified at 33 U.S.C. §2701(32), definition of "responsible party"
- §4201(c) of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, National Contingency Plan revision requirement
- 33 U.S.C. §1321(d)(3), presidential authority over the National Contingency Plan
Cases:
- American Recovery Co. v. Department of Health, 306 Md. 12, 506 A.2d 1171 (1986), Maryland Court of Appeals
- Faulk v. State's Attorney, 299 Md. 493, 474 A.2d 880 (1984), Maryland Court of Appeals
- Falik v. Prince George's Hosp. & Medical Center, 322 Md. 409, 416, 588 A.2d 324 (1991), Maryland Court of Appeals
Source
- Landing page: https://oag.maryland.gov/resources-info/Pages/attorney-general%E2%80%99s-opinions.aspx
- Original PDF: https://oag.maryland.gov/resources-info/Documents/pdfs/Opinions/1992/Volume77_1992.pdf (this opinion appears at printed page 69 of the bound annual volume; Maryland's site does not publish a standalone PDF of this opinion)
Original opinion text
Best-effort transcription from a scanned PDF. Minor errors may remain — the linked PDF is authoritative.
ENVIRONMENT
Torts - Immunity - Scope of Immunity for Responders to
Potential or Actual Oil Spills
December 14, 1992
The Honorable Robert Perciasepe
Secretary of the Environment
You have requested our opinion on several questions related to §4-
419 of the Environment Article ("EN" Article), as recently amended by
Chapter 459 (Senate Bill 199) of the Laws of Maryland 1992, the short
title of which is "Oil Spills - Liability." Specifically, you ask:
1. Would the immunity provided by EN §4-419 extend to a person
who renders care, assistance, or advice in an unsuccessful attempt to
prevent a discharge of oil?
2. Is immunity lost if a person responds to a spill without first
contacting the federal on-scene coordinator or appropriate State official?
3. Does the Maryland Department of the Environment ("MDE")
have the authority to define by regulation the actions that will be consistent
with EN Title 4, Subtitle 4?
For the reasons stated below, we conclude as follows:
1. The immunity from liability for certain damages provided by EN
§4-419 applies to a responder who renders care, assistance, or advice in an
unsuccessful attempt to prevent a discharge of oil, provided the person
meets the other requirements of EN §4-419.
2. A responder may qualify for the immunity provided by EN §4-
419 even though the responder did not contact the federal on-scene
coordinator or appropriate State official prior to initiating a response
action, if the responder rendered care, assistance, or advice consistent with
EN Title 4, Subtitle 4 and the National Contingency Plan.
3. MDE has the authority to define by regulation actions that are
consistent with Subtitle 4.
I
Background
In the wake of the massive oil spill from the Exxon Valdez in Alaskan
waters and similar, though smaller, spills elsewhere, the General Assembly
considered methods to minimize the threat presented by vessels
transporting oil on State waters. In a series of amendments to EN Title 4,
Subtitle 4, the General Assembly provided MDE with the authority to
regulate the transportation of oil more strictly and with additional tools to
contain and remediate spills.
In addition to providing examples of the potential threat, the spills
in other states provoked concern among private oil emergency responders
about potential liability during a response to an oil spill emergency.
Without statutory immunity, a responder might be subject to suit resulting
from claims that the responder's actions, or inactions, resulted in greater
damage from the spill.
In response to those concerns, the General Assembly enacted
Chapter 459 of the Laws of Maryland 1992. Chapter 459 amended EN
§4-419(a) to provide as follows:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a
person is not liable for costs of containment, cleanup,
and removal of the discharge or damages as a result of
acts or omissions taken in the course of rendering care,
assistance, or advice consistent with this subtitle and
the National Contingency Plan, or as otherwise
directed by the federal on-scene coordinator or other
appropriate State official unless:
(1) The person is a person responsible for the
discharge in accordance with §4-401(g) of this
subtitle;
(2) The person is a responsible party as defined by
the federal Oil Pollution Act of 1990; or
(3) The person is grossly negligent or engages in
willful misconduct.
The legislative history of Chapter 459 shows that the General
Assembly's objective in amending EN §4-419 was to adopt a standard
similar to the federal standard of "responder" immunity. See Bill Analysis
-
Senate Bill 199 of the Senate Economic and Environmental Affairs
Committee; and Floor Report - Senate Bill 199 of the Senate Economic
and Environmental Affairs Committee. The House Environmental Matters
Committee and the Senate Economic and Environmental Affairs
Committee files contain numerous references to the federal standard of
immunity in floor reports, a bill analysis, MDE's position statement, and
testimony provided by industry trade groups.The federal immunity standard is set forth in the Oil Pollution Act of
1990, 33 U.S.C. §1321(c)(4), and provides, in relevant part, as follows:A person is not liable for removal costs or damages which result from actions taken or omitted to be taken in the course of rendering care, assistance or advice consistent with the National Contingency Plan or as otherwise directed by the President.The General Assembly evidently concluded that enactment of a
standard similar to the federal immunity standard would encourage quick
and thorough response to oil spill emergencies and thereby protect the
Chesapeake Bay and other Maryland waters.II Actions Taken to Prevent SpillsIn general, a primary purpose of "good Samaritan" immunity statutes
is to encourage those who can do so to prevent harm by quick
intervention. In the case of oil spills, the potential harm to the Bay and
other Maryland waters is so great that quick and decisive preventive action
is essential.It would be illogical to provide immunity once a spill occurred but
to deny immunity for activities taken in an attempt to prevent a spill. Such
an interpretation would encourage responders to wait until the spill
occurred before taking any activities to minimize damage. In other words,
such an interpretation would increase the likelihood of the harm that the
General Assembly sought to minimize by enactment of the bill. For
example, one hypothetical situation suggested by responders concerns an
oil laden vessel that is drifting, powerless, towards a rocky shore. No
public purpose is served by protecting the responder only if assistance is
withheld until the vessel founders on the rocks.The clear intent of that statutory scheme, like the federal scheme, is
not merely to remediate spills but to prevent an oil discharge from
occurring. "Discharge" is defined in EN §4-401 as "the addition,
introduction, leaking, spilling, or emitting [of] any oil to State waters or
the placing of any oil in a location where it is likely to reach State
waters." (Emphasis added.) Any "discharge" is prohibited by EN §4-
410(a). Further, EN §4-405 states, in part, that MDE shall have the duty
to "[d]evelop comprehensive programs and plans for the prevention,
control, and abatement of pollution of waters of the State by oil . . . "
(Emphasis added.)In addition, the legislative history of the immunity provisions of the
federal Oil Pollution Act, which shares a similar purpose, supports this
reading. The conference committee report on the Act states that the
relevant subsection "provides immunity from liability ... for those taking
action in the response to an oil spill or the threat of a spill..." H.R. Rep.
No. 101-653, at 146, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.
Code Cong. & Adm. Report 121, S25 (emphasis added). Given the
references in the legislative history of Chapter 459 to enactment of the
federal standard, this congressional statement is persuasive. See, e.g.,
Faulk v. State's Attorney, 299 Md. 493, 474 A.2d 880 (1984).In sum, to be consistent with this legislative intent and the manifest
purpose of the bill, we must interpret the statute to provide immunity to a
person who is rendering assistance to prevent an oil spill as well as to a
person who is rendering assistance to clean up a spill.You specifically asked whether the immunity is available if the
responder's actions are unsuccessful. Assuming other requirements of the
statute have been met and the responder has not been grossly negligent or
engaged in willful misconduct, the fact that the actions of the responder fail
to prevent the threatened spill does not deprive the responder of immunity.
A reading to the contrary would nullify much of the beneficial effect of EN
§4-419. Immunity is not needed if the responder's actions are successful
in preventing the spill. The statute is meant to protect responders when a
spill occurs and actual harm results.To receive the immunity provided by EN §4-419, a person must be
in the course of "rendering care, assistance, or advice." The specific
actions that will constitute "care, assistance, or advice" must be determined
on a case by case basis. A responder, however, may look to the National
Contingency Plan, and the regional response and oil spill contingency plans
for guidance as to the type of actions that are contemplated. Generally, if
a responder can show that its actions were conducted for the purpose of
containing, cleaning up, removing or preventing a discharge of oil, a
responder should be able to meet its burden to show it was in the course
of rendering care, assistance, or advice.Of course, a commercial firm that is not responding to a dischargeor a threat of a discharge cannot claim immunity for ordinary commercial
activities. Whether certain circumstances constitute a real threat of a spill
and whether a person is rendering care, assistance, or advice to prevent a
discharge are factual determinations to be made on a case by case basis.
We cannot anticipate all the circumstances that might establish the
existence of a threat or the purpose of the care, assistance, or advice.
Moreover, the responder will also need to meet the other requirements of
the bill regardless of whether the spill has occurred or is merely threatened.III Prior Approval of ActionsImmunity applies to a person who provides assistance to a vessel in
distress to prevent a discharge of oil only if the responder meets the other
requirements set forth in the statute. One of those requirements is that the
care, assistance, or advice must be "consistent with [Subtitle 4] and the
National Contingency Plan, or as otherwise directed by the federal on-
scene coordinator or appropriate State official." EN §4-419(a) (emphasis
added).Since the two requirements are stated in the disjunctive, it follows
that consistency with Subtitle 4 as well as the National Contingency Plan
are alternatives to acting at the direction of the federal on-scene
coordinator or appropriate State official. Put another way, immunity is not
lost by failure to receive direction from federal or State officials provided
that the actions taken are consistent with Subtitle 4 and the Plan.Consistency with the National Contingency Plan should be relatively
straightforward since the Plan will be specifically written to guide the
actions of responders. Subtitle 4 does not set forth specific criteria for
responses to oil spills. Subtitle 4 does, however, set forth certain
prohibitions and requirements. If the responder has acted in accordance
with those prohibitions and standards, then the responder has acted in a
manner consistent with Subtitle 4. In addition, as discussed in the
following part of this opinion, the MDE has the authority to define actions
that are consistent with Subtitle 4.IV Authority to Enact RegulationsA State agency may enact binding regulations only to the extent that
a statute so authorizes. EN §4-405 provides just such authority for the
adoption of regulations. MDE has been given explicit authority in EN §4-
405(b)(1) to issue regulations concerning procedures for responding to oil
spills:The Department shall prescribe by rule or regulation approved methods, facilities, standards and devices for transfer, storage, separating, removing, treating, transporting, or disposing of oil and other unctuous substances to prevent pollution of waters of the State, which may include rules or regulations: (i) Outlining procedures for addressing water pollution episodes or emergencies which constitute an acute danger to health or the environment ....
Moreover, EN §4-405(a)(7) and (9) broadly authorize MDE to enact
regulations to carry out Subtitle 4. Any person, including a responder,
who violates a rule or regulation issued under Subtitle 4 is liable for civil
and criminal penalties. EN §4-417. Therefore, MDE may specify by
regulation those procedures that a responder must follow in responding to
an oil spill emergency and to define by regulation the actions that are
consistent with Subtitle 4.
To be sure, regulations may not conflict with statutory requirements.
Falik v. Prince George's Hosp. & Medical Center, 322 Md. 409, 416, 588
A.2d 324 (1991). The General Assembly did not intend for a responder to
enjoy immunity if the responder acted in a manner inconsistent with the
National Contingency Plan, Subtitle 4, and the directions of proper federal
and State officials. Thus, MDE may not enact regulations that confer
immunity on responders who act in such a manner. Nor may MDE confer
regulatory immunity on responders who are grossly negligent or who are
not, in fact, rendering care, assistance, or advice as specified in the statute.
Finally, MDE may not issue regulations that change the requirements of
the National Contingency Plan. In accordance with the federal Act, the
Plan is adopted by the President and subject to his authority to revise it.
33 U.S.C. §1321(d)(3).
V
Conclusion
1. The immunity from liability for certain damages provided by EN
§4-419 applies to a responder who renders care, assistance, or advice in an
unsuccessful attempt to prevent a discharge of oil, provided the person
meets the other requirements of EN §4-419.
2. A responder may qualify for the immunity provided by EN §4-
419 even though the responder did not contact the federal on-scene
coordinator or appropriate State official prior to initiating a response
action, if the responder rendered care, assistance, or advice consistent with
EN Title 4, Subtitle 4 and the National Contingency Plan.
3. MDE has the authority to define by regulation actions that are
consistent with EN Title 4, Subtitle 4.
J. Joseph Curran, Jr.
Attorney General
Michael C. Powell
Assistant Attorney General
Jack Schwartz
Chief Counsel
Opinions & Advice
1
In this opinion, we use the term "responder" to refer to any person who
renders care, assistance, or advice to clean up, mitigate, or prevent a discharge of
oil in waters of the State.
2
We understand that during one "table top" oil spill response exercise run
by the U.S. Coast Guard in Baltimore in 1991, oil spill contractors refused to
respond to governmental requests for assistance in cleaning up the hypothetical spill
because of concern about "unlimited" liability under Maryland law at the time.
3
EN §4-401(g) provides that "the person responsible for the discharge"
is: (i) the owner of the oil; (ii) the owner, operator, or person in charge of the oil
storage facility at the time of or immediately before the discharge; or (iii) any other
person who through act or omission caused the discharge.
4
The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 provides that the "responsible party" in
the case of a vessel is "any person owning, operating, or demise chartering the
vessel." §1001(32), Oil Pollution Act of 1990, codified at 33 U.S.C. §2701(32).
5
The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 requires that the National Contingency
Plan mandated by the Clean Water Act be revised in accordance with the criteria set
forth in §4201 of the Oil Pollution Act. Those criteria require the President to
"provide for efficient, coordinated, and effective action to minimize damage from
oil..." The Plan includes designation of the federal official who shall be the federal
on-scene coordinator for each area subject to an Area Contingency Plan; procedures
and techniques to be employed in identifying, containing, dispersing, and removing
oil; and establishment of a system whereby states affected by a discharge of oil may
act to remove the discharge and be reimbursed in accordance with the Oil Pollution
Act for reasonable costs incurred from the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund.
6
A discussion of the purpose of "good Samaritan" laws, as well as the
history and development of Maryland law on this topic, may be found in 64
Opinions of the Attorney General 169 (1979).
7
Maryland courts have recognized the Legislature's evident emphasis on
the prevention of pollution. In American Recovery Co. v. Department of Health,
306 Md. 12, 506 A.2d 1171 (1986), the Court of Appeals, in determining whether
civil penalties could be assessed for the improper storage and treatment of
hazardous wastes despite the fact that there was no actual pollution, stated that
"[f]or a civil penalty assessment to be effective in preventing pollution, the agency
cannot wait until the pollution occurs to assess the penalty." 306 Md. at 19. In
reaching its conclusion, the Court pointed to statutory language indicating that one
of the goals of Maryland's hazardous waste laws is to prevent water pollution. Id.
The language of EN Title 4, Subtitle 4 is very similar. It too is aimed toward
prevention of pollution.
8
Although this opinion concludes that such explicit direction is not
essential for immunity if the actions are consistent with the National Contingency
Plan and Subtitle 4, prudence suggests that authorization for an action should be
sought when time and the exigencies of a particular situation allow. Prior
authorization makes it unnecessary to attempt to determine, in hindsight, whether
the actions were consistent with the National Contingency Plan and Subtitle 4. As
we understand the situation, obtaining such direction from the federal on-scene
coordinator and appropriate State official, both of whom are identified in the
National Contingency Plan and Regional Response Team Plan, is not difficult.
Direction may be obtained by using traditional maritime emergency radio channels.
Both the U.S. Coast Guard and the Natural Resources Police monitor emergency
channel 16. MDE also maintains a 24 hour telephone number at its Emergency
Response Center.
9
Section 4201(c) of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 required that the
National Contingency Plan be revised within one year of the enactment of the Act.
Although this revision is overdue, we understand that a draft of the revisions to the
National Contingency Plan has been prepared, albeit not yet adopted.
10
At least one responder has expressed concern that an unsuccessful
attempt to prevent a discharge might be inconsistent with the prohibition of the
discharge of oil set forth in Subtitle 4. However, as discussed in Part II above, the
immunity is intended to apply to any responder who attempts, although
unsuccessfully, to prevent a discharge. Therefore, the fact that the responder's
efforts to prevent the discharge ultimately fail does not mean that those efforts were
inconsistent with Subtitle 4.
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