Could Maryland's Office of Administrative Hearings dismiss an appeal because someone failed to pay a required filing fee?

Short answer The Attorney General concluded that Maryland's Chief Administrative Law Judge had the discretion to adopt a regulation providing that a nonindigent party's appeal would be dismissed for failing to pay a required filing fee, but that dismissal was not automatic under the 1992 fee statute itself; it required the Chief Administrative Law Judge to first put a dismissal rule in place by regulation.
State
Maryland
Opinion
77 Op. Att'y Gen. 3
Issued
May 29, 1992
Issued by
J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Attorney General of Maryland
Requested by
The Honorable John W. Hardwicke, Chief Administrative Law Judge

Apply this to your situation

This page answers the general question as of 1992. Ask about yours and see what current Maryland law means for your facts, with citations you can check.

Disclaimer: This is an official Maryland Attorney General opinion. AG opinions are persuasive authority in Maryland but are not binding precedent like a court ruling. This summary is for informational purposes only and is not legal advice. Consult a licensed Maryland attorney for advice on your specific situation.
About this page: The plain-English summary, reader guidance, and Q&A below were written by Ezel based on the official AG opinion. The original opinion (linked on this page as a PDF) is the authoritative source for any reliance.
View original AG opinion (PDF)

Plain-English summary

Chapter 134 of the Laws of Maryland 1992 let the Chief Administrative Law Judge of Maryland's Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) charge filing fees for appeals and subpoenas, while exempting state agencies and petitioners the OAH found unable to pay, and requiring a refund of the fee to anyone who filed an appeal and later won. The law did not say what happened if a nonindigent party simply failed to pay the fee. Chief Administrative Law Judge John W. Hardwicke asked the Attorney General whether OAH could dismiss such an appeal for nonpayment.

The Attorney General concluded that OAH could dismiss a nonindigent party's appeal for failing to pay a required filing fee, but only if OAH first adopted a regulation making dismissal the stated consequence of nonpayment. The fee statute did not, on its own, authorize case-by-case dismissal the way some other Maryland fee statutes expressly did. But the Chief Administrative Law Judge already had general authority to "adopt regulations to implement this subtitle," and the opinion reasoned that a dismissal regulation would be a reasonable way to carry out the Legislature's evident goal of securing prompt payment of the new fees, since the statute would not have needed a refund provision for parties who later won if nonpayment were simply irrelevant to whether an appeal proceeded.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1992. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Could OAH dismiss my appeal automatically just for not paying the filing fee, according to this opinion? No. The opinion concluded that Chapter 134 itself did not make dismissal an automatic consequence of nonpayment; the Chief Administrative Law Judge first had to adopt a regulation stating that a nonindigent party's failure to pay the fee would result in dismissal of the appeal.

Did this 1992 fee law apply to everyone appealing to Maryland's Office of Administrative Hearings? No, according to the opinion, Chapter 134 exempted state agencies from the fee entirely, and also exempted petitioners that OAH determined were unable to pay.

What happened to the filing fee if a party won their appeal? The opinion recounts that Chapter 134 required the fee to be refunded to a party who initiated the appeal and received a favorable decision from the Administrative Law Judge.

Background and statutory framework

Chapter 134 (House Bill 248) of the Laws of Maryland 1992 amended § 9-1604(b) of the State Government Article to authorize the Chief Administrative Law Judge to assess fees covering OAH's administrative expenses, capped at $15 for filing an appeal and $5 for a subpoena, effective July 1, 1992. The new provisions barred charging the fee to state agencies or to petitioners OAH found unable to pay, and required a refund to a party who filed an appeal and later prevailed.

The opinion noted that Chapter 134 did not include language like § 7-201(a) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, which expressly bars docketing a case or issuing certain writs unless a required court fee is paid. Absent that kind of express consequence, the opinion reasoned that OAH could not treat nonpayment alone as grounds for dismissal without first establishing that consequence by regulation. It drew a comparison to the State Court Administrator's fee-setting authority under § 7-102 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, where a similarly general grant of authority to set fee amounts had been read to support a schedule requiring advance or concurrent payment, backed by the Maryland Rules governing notices of appeal and petitions for certiorari.

Citations and references

Statutes:

  • SG §9-1604(b)(1), (b)(3), State Government Article, OAH filing fee authority and refund requirement
  • CJ §7-201(a), Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, court fee-payment prerequisite for docketing
  • CJ §7-102, Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, State Court Administrator's fee-setting authority
  • Rules 8-201(b), 8-303(a), Maryland Rules on notice of appeal and petition for certiorari fee timing
  • COMAR 11.11.03.08A(3)
  • Chapter 134 (House Bill 248) of the Laws of Maryland 1992

Cases:

  • Glanville v. David Hairstylist, 249 Md. 162, 238 A.2d 1917 (1968)
  • Parissi v. Telechron, Inc., 349 U.S. 46 (1955)
  • Gould v. Members of NJ Div. of Water Policy & Supply, 555 F.2d 340 (3d Cir. 1977)
  • In re Marriage of Gray, 144 Ariz. 89, 695 P.2d 1127 (1955)
  • Prowswood, Inc. v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 676 P.2d 952 (Utah 1984)

Source

Original opinion text

Best-effort transcription from a scanned PDF. Minor errors may remain — the linked PDF is authoritative.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

CONTESTED CASES - CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE MAY Provide By Regulation for Dismissal of Appeal for Nonindigent Party's Failure to Pay Filing Fee

May 29, 1992

The Honorable John W. Hardwicke
Chief Administrative Law Judge

You have requested our opinion whether, upon the effectiveness of Chapter 134 of the Laws of Maryland 1992, a nonindigent party's request for a hearing may be dismissed if the party fails to pay a filing fee.

For the reasons stated below, we conclude that the Chief Administrative Law Judge has the discretion to provide by regulation that a nonindigent party's appeal will be dismissed if the party fails to pay a required filing fee.

I

Chapter 134

Chapter 134 (House Bill 248) of the Laws of Maryland 1992 was enacted, according to the bill title, for "the purpose of authorizing the Chief Administrative Law Judge to assess fees to cover certain administrative expenses." When the law becomes effective on July 1, 1992, §9-1604(b)(1) of the State Government Article ("SG" Article) will contain the following new grant of authority:

The Chief Administrative Law Judge may:

(vi) Assess fees to cover administrative expenses as follows:

1. To file an appeal, a fee not exceeding $15; and a subpoena, a fee not exceeding $5.

Chapter 134 also adds the following new paragraphs to SG §9-1604(b):

(2) Fees charged under paragraph (1) of this subsection for administrative expenses may not be charged to:

(i) State agencies; or

(ii) Petitioners who are determined by the Office of Administrative Hearings to be unable to pay the fees.

(3) A fee charged under paragraph (1) of this subsection for filing an appeal shall be refunded to a party who initiates the appeal if the party receives a favorable decision from the Administrative Law Judge.

II

Analysis

Chapter 134 does not expressly state the consequence of a nonindigent party's failure to pay a fee that has been assessed for the filing of an appeal. That is, Chapter 134 did not enact a provision akin to §7- 201(a) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article ("CJ" Article), which provides that, with certain exceptions, "no case may be docketed and no writ of attachment, fieri facias, or execution on judgment may be issued unless the plaintiff or appellant pays the required fee." In the absence of such a provision, the mere fact that fees are payable does not itself authorize the Office of Administrative Hearings to dismiss an appeal upon a party's failure to pay the filing fee. See Glanville v. David Hairstylist, 249 Md. 162, 238 A.2d 1917 (1968). Cf. Parissi v. Telechron, Inc., 349 U.S. 46 (1955); Gould v. Members of NJ Div. of Water Policy & Supply, 555 F.2d 340 (3d Cir. 1977); In re Marriage of Gray, 144 Ariz. 89, 695 P.2d 1127 (1955). But see Prowswood, Inc. v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 676 P.2d 952 (Utah 1984).

In our view, however, the Office of Administrative Hearings may dismiss an appeal because of an unpaid filing fee if you first adopt a regulation stating that a nonindigent party's failure to pay the fee will result in dismissal of an appeal. The Chief Administrative Law Judge has authority to "adopt regulations to implement this subtitle." SG §9- 1604(b)(1)(v). A regulation imposing the sanction of dismissal for nonpayment would be a reasonable implementation of this new component of the OAH subtitle, because the manifest legislative objective underlying Chapter 134 is to secure prompt payment of the fees. Otherwise, Chapter 134 would not have provided that a fee "shall be refunded to a party who initiates the appeal if the party receives a favorable decision from the Administrative Law Judge." SG §9-1604(b)(3) (emphasis added).1

A similar grant of fee-setting authority to the State Court Administrator has been authoritatively construed to encompass more than the mere designation of amounts. Under CJ §7-102, "The State Court Administrator shall determine the amount of fees to be charged by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals and the Clerk of the Court of Special Appeals, with the approval of the Board of Public Works." The statute does not expressly require payment in advance. Nevertheless, acting under this authority, the State Court Administrator has not only determined the amount of the fees but also provided that "[e]ach fee set forth in this schedule shall be paid in advance of or concurrently with the filing or delivery of the record, document, copy, or certificate specified. No fee is refundable." Revised Schedule of Fees IJIIIA.2

III

Conclusion

In summary, it is our opinion that the Chief Administrative Law Judge has the discretion to adopt a regulation providing that a nonindigent party's failure to pay a filing fee will result in the dismissal of the party's appeal.3

J. Joseph Curran, Jr.
Attorney General

Jack Schwartz
Chief Counsel
Opinions & Advice


1
Of course, other regulatory choices - for example, a regulation stating that no hearing would be scheduled until the fee was paid - would also serve the legislative objective. The General Assembly has left this policy decision to your discretion. See also note 3 below.

2
This aspect of the appellate fee schedule is underscored by provisions in the Maryland Rules requiring an appellant or petitioner to pay the required fee at the time of filing a notice of appeal in a civil case or at the time of filing a petition for a writ of certiorari. See Rules 8-201(b) and 8-303(a).

3
We recognize that, given the large numbers of appeals involving the suspension of a driver's license, the mechanics of implementing such a regulation will require careful coordination with the Motor Vehicle Administration. We also note that a delay in a hearing caused by a party's failure to pay the prescribed fee, with the result that a suspension of the party's driver's license would take effect, would not be a case of "the Administration's delay or oversight." Hence, the dismissal sanction in COMAR 11.11.03.08A(3) would not apply.

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