In Maryland, does the legislature have to wait for the governor to submit a redistricting map before it can vote on its own?

Plain-English summary

A state senator asked the Attorney General two related questions about Maryland's constitutional redistricting process under Article III, Section 5: could the General Assembly adopt its own legislative redistricting plan at a special session later in 1991, and if it did, would that eliminate the Governor's obligation to submit his own plan at the start of the 1992 regular session?

The opinion concluded that the General Assembly could not adopt a redistricting plan before the Governor submitted his. Article III, Section 5 gives the Governor the job of preparing and presenting a plan, and separately says the General Assembly "may by joint resolution adopt a plan." Read in isolation, that second sentence could support the General Assembly moving first. But the opinion found that reading undermined the Governor's plainly mandatory duty to prepare and present a plan, and concluded, after tracing the provision's legislative history back to the 1960s, that the framers intended the Governor's plan to be the starting point for the process, with the General Assembly free to hold hearings and do preparatory work at any time but not to formally adopt a plan until the Governor's plan was on the table.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1991 and interpreted Article III, Section 5 of the Maryland Constitution as it existed after the 1972 ratification described in the opinion's own legislative history. Subsequent constitutional amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis, and Maryland's redistricting timeline and procedures have been the subject of continued litigation and amendment in the decades since 1991. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify the current text of Article III, Section 5 and any more recent case law before relying on any specific rule described here.

Common questions

Could Maryland's legislature pass its own redistricting map before the governor released his? According to this 1991 opinion, no. The Attorney General concluded that Article III, Section 5 of the Maryland Constitution reserved to the Governor the role of initiating the redistricting process, so the General Assembly could not adopt a plan, whether at a regular or special session, until after the Governor formally submitted his own plan.

Could the legislature at least start working on its own map before the governor acted? Yes, according to the opinion. It distinguished between preparation and adoption: the General Assembly could hold hearings and take "all steps legally required" to develop a plan in advance, but the actual vote to adopt a plan by joint resolution had to come after the Governor's plan was presented.

Why did the opinion rely so heavily on a legislative history going back to the 1960s? Because the constitutional text itself was ambiguous. The sentence describing the General Assembly's power to "adopt a plan" could be read to let it move first, but the opinion found that reading would make the Governor's mandatory duty to prepare and present a plan pointless, so it traced the provision's drafting history, including a 1972 attempt to strip the Governor of any role, to confirm that the final version preserved his role as initiator.

Background and statutory framework

Article III, Section 5 of the Maryland Constitution requires the Governor, following each decennial census, to prepare a legislative redistricting plan and present it to the presiding officers of the Senate and House no later than the first day of the regular session in the second year following the census, with the option to call a special session to present it earlier. The same section allows the General Assembly to adopt its own plan by joint resolution, and provides that if the General Assembly has not adopted a plan by the 45th day of that regular session, the Governor's plan becomes law by default.

The opinion traced this language through several rounds of constitutional amendment. A 1965 Constitutional Convention Commission proposal would have made the Governor's plan the default if the General Assembly failed to act. That basic structure reappeared in Chapter 785 of the Laws of Maryland 1969 (ratified in 1970), which required the Governor to prepare and present a plan and the General Assembly to enact it "by law," giving the Governor veto power over the General Assembly's version. A competing 1970 proposal from the Legislative Council's Subcommittee on Constitutional Revision would have flipped the sequence, letting the General Assembly move first and the Governor only step in if the legislature missed its deadline, but that proposal (Senate Bill 1 and House Bill 1 of 1970) died in committee after being amended to match the existing 1969 language.

In 1971 and 1972, House Bill 626 tried again to remove the Governor from the process entirely, proposing an independent legislative redistricting commission and switching plan adoption from enactment "by law" to adoption "by joint resolution," which would strip the Governor's veto power. The commission-based approach was dropped, but Chapter 363 of the Laws of Maryland 1972, ratified that November, kept the joint-resolution method, meaning the modern Article III, Section 5 preserves the Governor's role as the plan's initiator while removing his veto over the General Assembly's plan. The opinion read this history as showing a deliberate compromise: the Governor's initiating role survived years of legislative attempts to remove it, and the opinion declined to let a special session upset that balance by letting the General Assembly adopt a plan before the Governor's was on the table. The opinion also noted that under Article III, Section 5 itself, the Court of Appeals has original jurisdiction to review the legislative districting of the state, so the Attorney General suggested that if the General Assembly wanted to test the limits of its authority, it should do so in a way that let the Court resolve the question promptly.

Citations and references

Statutes:

• Article III, §5, the Maryland Constitution's legislative redistricting provision requiring the Governor to prepare and present a plan and allowing the General Assembly to adopt its own plan by joint resolution
• Article III, §14, the constitutional provision authorizing the General Assembly to require a special session, noted as adopted alongside the original version of §5
• Article II, §17, the Governor's general veto power, relevant to how the 1972 switch to "joint resolution" adoption removed his veto over redistricting plans
• Chapter 788, Laws of Maryland 1969, enacting Article III, §14
• Chapter 576, Laws of Maryland 1970, re-enacting Chapter 788 without change
• Chapter 785 of the Laws of Maryland 1969, the original version of Article III, §5 requiring the Governor to prepare and present a plan and the General Assembly to enact a plan "by law"
• Chapter 356 of the Laws of Maryland 1971, a further amendment to Article III largely concerning membership and election districts, retaining the 1969 language of §5
• Chapter 363 of the Laws of Maryland 1972, the amendment that restored the Governor's role as plan initiator while changing plan adoption to "joint resolution," ratified November 7, 1972, and substantially the version of §5 in effect when this opinion was written

Cases:

• Richards Furniture Corp. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 233 Md. 249, 257, 196 A.2d 621 (1964), Maryland Court of Appeals decision cited for the principle that the General Assembly's power at a special session equals its power at a regular session
• Kenneweg v. Allegany County, 102 Md. 119, 123, 62 A. 249 (1905), Maryland Court of Appeals decision cited for the General Assembly's plenary legislative power
• Maryland Committee v. Tawes, 228 Md. 412, 438-39, 180 A.2d 656 (1962), modified on other grounds, 229 Md. 406, 184 A.2d 715 (1962), rev'd, 377 U.S. 656 (1964), the case (reversed by the U.S. Supreme Court) that forced Maryland to overhaul its reapportionment scheme and led to the drafting of Article III, §5
• State Admin. Bd. of Election Laws v. Calvert, 272 Md. 659, 679-84, 327 A.2d 290 (1974), Maryland Court of Appeals decision discussing the history of the 1967-68 proposed Maryland constitution and its redistricting commission proposal
• Baltimore County Coalition v. Baltimore County, 321 Md. 184, 203, 582 A.2d 510 (1990), Maryland Court of Appeals decision cited for construing constitutional text "reasonably with reference to the purpose, aim, or policy of the enacting body"
• In re Legislative Districting, 299 Md. 658, 666, 475 A.2d 428 (1982), Maryland Court of Appeals decision cited for the Governor's clear duties under Article III, §5 to prepare and present a redistricting plan

Source

• Landing page: https://oag.maryland.gov/resources-info/Pages/attorney-general%E2%80%99s-opinions.aspx
• Original PDF: https://oag.maryland.gov/resources-info/Documents/pdfs/Opinions/1991/Volume76_1991.pdf (this opinion appears at printed pages 249-259 of the bound annual volume; Maryland's site does not publish a standalone PDF of this opinion)

Original opinion text

Best-effort transcription from a scanned PDF. Minor errors may remain, the linked PDF is authoritative.

GOVERNOR

General Assembly - Legislative Reapportionment and Redistricting - Although General Assembly May Take Steps to Prepare Its Own Redistricting Plan At Any Time, Adoption of Plan Must Await Submission of Governor's Plan

April 10, 1991

The Honorable John A. Cade
Maryland Senate

You have requested our opinion on two questions related to the legislative redistricting procedures of Article III, §5 of the Maryland Constitution: (1) May the General Assembly adopt a redistricting plan at a special session later this year?1 (2) If so, and if a plan of redistricting were enacted at the special session, would this action preclude the necessity of the Governor's submitting a plan at the beginning of the 1992 session?

The questions you pose are novel, and until the Court of Appeals addresses them no one can answer them definitively. The issue comes down to a judgment call about the role intended for the Governor in the redistricting process. Does Article III, §5 give the Governor the role of initiator of the process? Or is the Governor intended to be no more than a kind of safety net, ensuring that even if the General Assembly fails to adopt a plan, nonetheless the election can go forward?

Based on what we believe is the better reading of the constitutional text and its history, we are of the view that the Constitution reserves to the Governor the prerogative to take the first step in redistricting. Hence, we conclude that, although the General Assembly may consider a redistricting plan at a special session and may at any time take steps to develop a plan, it may not adopt a plan prior to its receipt of the Governor's plan.

1
The General Assembly will have to meet in special session this fall to deal with congressional redistricting, a topic not treated in Article III, §5 or this opinion.

I

Constitutional Text

Article III, §5 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

Following each decennial census of the United States and after public hearings, the Governor shall prepare a plan setting forth the boundaries of the legislative districts for electing of the members of the Senate and the House of Delegates.

The Governor shall present the plan to the President of the Senate and Speaker of the House of Delegates who shall introduce the Governor's plan as a joint resolution to the General Assembly, not later than the first day of its regular session in the second year following every census, and the Governor may call a special session for the presentation of his plan prior to the regular session. The plan shall conform to Sections 2, 3, and 4 of this Article. Following each decennial census the General Assembly may by joint resolution adopt a plan setting forth the boundaries of the legislative districts for the election of members of the Senate and the House of Delegates, which plan shall conform to Sections 2, 3, and 4 of this Article.
If a plan has been adopted by the General Assembly by the 45th day after the opening of the regular session of the General Assembly in the second year following every census, the plan adopted by the General Assembly shall become law. If no plan has been adopted by the General Assembly for these purposes by the 45th day after the opening of the regular session of the General Assembly in the second year following every census, the Governor's plan presented to the General Assembly shall become law.

This provision focuses on events at the regular session in the second year after the census, and in that session the Governor's role as initiator of the process is explicit. Whatever happens subsequently, the Governor's plan is on the table on the first day and therefore serves as a starting point and basis for comparison to competing proposals.

Article III, §5 is not nearly as descriptive about events at a special session. The only reference to a special session deals with the Governor's presentation of his plan: "[T]he Governor may call a special session for the presentation of his plan prior to the regular session." The provision is silent about the General Assembly's authority either to adopt a plan at a special session called by the Governor for another purpose or to call a special session on its own initiative in order to adopt a plan.2

Nevertheless, one reasonable reading of Article III, §5 leads to the conclusion that the General Assembly does have the power to act in advance of the Governor's submission of his plan. The third sentence of the second paragraph states: "Following each decennial census the General Assembly may by joint resolution adopt a [redistricting] plan

• " (Emphasis added.) The emphasized phrase is the same as that
  introducing the first sentence of §5, setting out the Governor's role.

  The General Assembly, on this view of the provision, is authorized
  to adopt its plan at any time between the completion of the census and the 45th day of the regular session, just as the Governor is free to present his plan at any time between the completion of the census and the first day of the regular session.3 We acknowledge the force of this analysis, giving as it does full weight to the language "[f]ollowing each decennial census the General Assembly may ... adopt [its] plan ..." If the General Assembly is required to wait for the Governor's plan, which itself can only be prepared and presented "[f]ollowing each decennial

  2
      At the same session at which the General Assembly enacted the original
  

  version of Article III, §5, it also enacted the provision found in Article III, §14 of the Constitution that authorizes the General Assembly to require the convening of a special session. Chapter 788, Laws of Maryland 1969. The act embodying this and certain other proposed amendments was repealed and reenacted (in this instance, without change) the next year. Chapter 576, Laws of Maryland 1970, ratified November 3, 1970. See generally Bourbon v. Governor, 258 Md. 252, 265 A.2d All (1970).
  In general, the power of the General Assembly at a special session is
  identical to its power at a regular session. Richards Furniture Corp. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 233 Md. 249, 257, 196 A.2d 621 (1964); 11 Opinions of the Attorney General 70, 71 (1926). And the General Assembly's power to legislate is "plenary"; the General Assembly ordinarily needs no express grant of power in order to act. See, e.g., Kenneweg v. Allegany County, 102 Md. 119, 123, 62 A. 249 (1905). Concerning legislative redistricting, however, this principle does not apply, for Article III, §5 is the sole source of the General Assembly's power. Cf. Maryland Committee v. Tawes, 228 Md. 412, 438-39, 180 A.2d 656 (1962), modified on other grounds, 229 Md. 406, 184 A.2d 715 (1962), rev'd, 377 U.S. 656 (1964).
  3
  See advice letter to Delegate Samuel I. Rosenberg (December 31,
  1990).

census," the repetition of this phrase in the sentence about the General Assembly's authority is arguably pointless.4

Yet this textual analysis has its own difficulty - namely, its evisceration of the language mandating the Governor's role. The Governor has two clear duties: he "shall prepare a plan" and he "shall present the plan" not later than the first day of the regular session (though he "may call a special session" if he wishes to do so earlier). See In re Legislative Districting, 299 Md. 658, 666, 475 A.2d 428 (1982).

We think it unlikely that this language would be so absolute if the sentence about the General Assembly's power meant that the General Assembly could render the Governor's duty superfluous. What point would be served by a mandate to the Governor to go forward with his plan despite the fact that the General Assembly had already adopted its plan? If the framers of Article III, §5 had intended to authorize legislative supplanting of the Governor's duty to prepare and present a plan, one would think that the Governor's duty would be expressly contingent, preceded by language like "Unless the General Assembly shall have adopted a plan ...."

In short, we think that, taken as a whole, the language of Article III, §5 more readily supports the view that the Governor's plan was meant to be the starting point, a prerequisite to the General Assembly's final action on a redistricting plan at a special session, just as it is at the regular session. But the text cannot be said to be dispositive. We turn next to the legislative history, in an effort to construe Article III, §5 "reasonably with reference to the purpose, aim, or policy of the enacting body." Baltimore County Coalition v. Baltimore County, 321 Md. 184, 203, 582 A.2d 510 (1990).

II

Legislative History

A. Evolution of Article III, §5

As a result of Maryland Committee v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656 (1964), Maryland was required to overhaul its reapportionment scheme. See

4
Perhaps the reiteration of this phrase merely was intended to emphasize that redistricting plans, whether the Governor's or the General Assembly's, are to reflect current census data.

The History of Legislative Apportionment in Maryland, 25 Md. Law Rev. 1 (1965).

The Constitutional Convention Commission, appointed by Governor Tawes in 1965, was the first body to grapple with constitutional language that would deal with the requirement for decennial redistricting. Under its proposal, the Governor was given responsibility "to present plans for ... legislative districting and reapportionment to the General Assembly three months after each ... census." Comment to Section 3.03, Draft Constitution and Commentary 129 (1967). The Governor was required to call a special session for this purpose if the General Assembly was not in regular session. The General Assembly could "either enact without change the governor's pla[n] ..., amend [it], or adopt [a] wholly new pla[n]. Should the General Assembly fail to act on any plan within the period specified, however, the governor's plan would become law." Id.5

This proposal reflected a careful balancing of the roles of the Governor and the General Assembly. The Governor was viewed as both the initiator of the process, whose plan would start the legislative process (whether in regular or special session), and as the safeguard against inaction, whose plan would become law in default of legislation. The General Assembly was given "the responsibility for adopting plans of redistricting and reapportionment because of the Commission's opinion that the legislative branch of government can most appropriately deal with this issue." Id. (emphasis added). However, the Governor could exercise veto power over the General Assembly's plan, which was required to be enacted "by law." See Article II, §17.

5
The commission's proposed constitutional provision was as follows:
Within three months after official publication of the population figures of each decennial census of the United States, the governor shall present to the General Assembly plans of congressional districting and legislative districting and apportionment. If the General Assembly is not in session, the governor shall convene a special session. The General Assembly shall by law enact plans of congressional districting and legislative districting and apportionment. If no plan has been enacted for any one or more of these purposes within four months prior to the final date for the filing of candidates for the next general election occurring after publication of such census figures, then the pertinent plan as presented to the General Assembly by the governor shall become law.

This proposed language was substantially changed by the Constitutional Convention itself, whose own proposal was of course defeated along with the rest of the proposed constitution. See generally State Admin. Bd. of Election Laws v. Calvert, 272 Md. 659, 679-84, 327 A.2d 290 (1974).6

Nevertheless, the basic outlines of the Commission's proposal reappeared in 1969, when the General Assembly enacted the precursor to present §5.

Chapter 785 of the Laws of Maryland 1969 provided in pertinent part as follows:

Following each decennial census of the United States, the Governor shall prepare a plan for legislative districting and apportionment. The Governor shall present the plan to the General Assembly not later than the first day of its regular session in the second year following the census, and may call a special session to present it prior thereto....
Following each decennial census the General Assembly shall by law enact the plan for legislative districting and apportionment. If no plan has been enacted for these purposes by the 45th day after the opening of the regular session of the General Assembly of the second year following the census, the plan presented to the General Assembly by the Governor shall become law.

In 1970, while this proposed amendment was awaiting voter ratification or rejection, the Legislative Council's Subcommittee on Constitutional Revision proposed a new constitutional amendment, which if adopted by the General Assembly was to be placed on the 1970

6
The Convention's Committee on the Legislative Branch proposed, and the Convention accepted, a process under which an independent redistricting commission largely chosen by the General Assembly would prepare a plan, to be submitted on the first day of the regular session. "If any other plan has not been provided by law within 50 days after the transmission of the commission plan to the General Assembly, then the commission plan shall become law." Proposed Section 3.03a. One avowed objective of this procedure was that "[t]he governor should play a minor role in redistricting ...." Committee Memorandum No. LB2, at 5.
A similar proposal to diminish the Governor's role was rejected in 1972.
See note 8 below and accompanying text.

ballot in lieu of Chapter 785 of the Laws of Maryland 1969. In relevant part the proposed amendment provided as follows:

After each decennial census of the United States, the General Assembly shall pass a law embodying a plan for legislative districting and apportionment by February 15, 1972 and each ten year interval thereafter. If this plan is not fully and finally acted into law and signed by the Governor by March 1, 1972, or by the same day in each succeeding ten year interval, the Governor shall present a plan to the General Assembly not later than March 2, of the next ensuing regular session.

(Emphasis added.)

In support of this legislation, the committee wrote the following:

[The proposal] ... allows the General Assembly to initiate the plan for legislative districting and apportionment .... If this plan is not enacted into law by March 1, 1972, or by the same date in each succeeding ten year period, then the Governor is to present his own plan for legislative districting and apportionment not later than March 2 of the next ensuing regular session - The Subcommittee believe[s] that the impetus and initiative for any reapportionment plan should come from the General Assembly since it is that body that is to be reapportioned according to population data.

Legislative Council of Maryland, Report to the General Assembly of 1970, Proposed Bills, Special Committee Reports 832 (emphasis added). If the 1969 proposal were ratified, by contrast, the initiative for redistricting would be given to the Governor.

This proposal was introduced as Senate Bill 1 and House Bill 1 of the 1970 session. Senate Bill 1 was then significantly amended to reverse the initiative for introduction of redistricting legislation. That is, the Senate adopted an amendment providing that "the Governor shall propose a plan for presentment to the General Assembly not later than the first day of the second session following a decennial census." (Emphasis added.) With this amendment, Senate Bill 1 cleared the Senate and was sent to the House. Of course, with this amendment, Senate Bill 1 simply mirrored the existing language of the version of Article III, §5 adopted in 1969 and then awaiting ratification. Since the

bill merely maintained the status quo, presumably it was judged to be superfluous. Accordingly, both Senate Bill 1 and companion House Bill 1 died in committee.

Chapter 785 of the Laws of Maryland 1969 was ratified on November 3, 1970. Thus, at the end of the 1970, Article III, §5 required the Governor to prepare a plan to be sent to the General Assembly and gave the Governor the power to veto the General Assembly's plan, which was to be enacted "by law."

However, the issue of the role of the Governor in redistricting plans was not yet settled. In fact, it arose again as a result of Chapter 356 of the Laws of Maryland 1971. This enactment focused primarily on other provisions of Article III, concerning membership and election districts for the General Assembly. With minor conforming amendments, §5 retained its 1969 language. This act cleared the General Assembly and was to be submitted to the voters in the 1972 election. However, in the interval between enactment and ratification, some members of the General Assembly attempted to repeal the 1971 enactment and substitute a new procedure for voter approval in the 1972 election.

Their proposal, House Bill 626 of the 1972 session, sought to oust the Governor from any involvement in the reapportionment process. As introduced, House Bill 626 significantly rewrote Article III, §5 in two important respects.

First, the bill provided for a legislative redistricting commission akin to that presented to the voters in 1968 as part of the proposed constitution.7 This commission comprised seven members appointed as follows: two each by the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House; one each by the minority leaders; and one Chairman, appointed by the Governor. Members of the commission were required to be registered voters of the State and could not hold any elective public or party office during their tenure.

Following each decennial census, the commission was to prepare a plan for redistricting. That plan was to be introduced by the President of the Senate and Speaker of the House on behalf of the commission not later than the first day of its regular session in its third year following the 1970 census and the second year following every census thereafter. The Governor, at his discretion, could call a special session for the presentation of the commission's plan prior to the regular session. The law also provided that the General Assembly could adopt its own plan

7
See note 6 above.

of redistricting. If a plan were adopted by the General Assembly by the 55th day of the appropriate session, that plan would become law. If no plan had been adopted by the General Assembly by the 55th day, the commission's plan became law. In short, the Governor would have had no authority to submit a redistricting plan to the General Assembly.8

The second important change embodied in House Bill 626 was the manner by which a plan would be adopted. Then existing Article III, §5 required that "the General Assembly shall by law enact a plan" for redistricting. The 1971 proposal required that both the commission plan and the plan of the General Assembly would be adopted by "joint resolution," rather than by law. This change was instituted to preclude any action by the Governor to veto the redistricting plan. See 58 Opinions of the Attorney General 371 (1973); 57 Opinions of the Attorney General 259 (1972).

The 1972 proposal calling for a legislative redistricting commission was shortlived. House Bill 626 was significantly amended to restore Article III, §5 to its 1969 contours. That is, once again §5 provided that the Governor would submit his plan to the General Assembly, and he retained the power to convene a special session for consideration of his plan. Chapter 363 of the Laws of Maryland 1972.

One holdover, however, from the 1972 proposal was a change in the method by which a districting and apportionment scheme was to be adopted: the 1972 act provided that the plan be adopted by joint resolution. Thus, while the role of the Governor in preparing reapportionment plans was restored, the requirement that the plan be adopted by joint resolution stripped the Governor of his ability to veto a General Assembly plan. The 1972 act withdrew and repealed Chapter 356 of the Laws of Maryland 1971 and was placed on the 1972 ballot in its stead. Chapter 363 of the Laws of Maryland of 1972 was ratified on November 7, 1972. With minor technical amendments, Article III, §5 remains the same today.

B. Analysis

This legislative history reflects a struggle over several years to find a balance point about the role of the Governor in redistricting. In the first version of Article III, §5, echoing the proposal of the Constitutional Convention Commission, the Governor was given the role of initiator of the process in the regular session and was given veto power over the

8
House Bill 626 thus echoed the procedure favored by the Constitutional Convention of 1967.

General Assembly's plan. After years of legislative back-and-forth, his veto power is gone, but his role as initiator has been retained. The constitutional balance having been reached at last, we cannot conclude that Article III, §5 allows the balance to be shifted dramatically merely because the redistricting decision is made in a special session.

If the General Assembly were to adopt a redistricting plan during a special session in 1991, the net result of that action would be to nullify the carefully preserved requirement that the Governor play the initiating role in the adoption of a redistricting plan. We do not think that such a reversal of the intended sequence is permissible under Article III, §5.

To be sure, legislative efforts to frame a plan in advance of the Governor's submission would not be inconsistent with §5. Thus, hearings and other preparatory steps may be initiated at any time. In our view, however, the General Assembly must take all steps legally required for the adoption of a joint resolution after the Governor submits his plan, be it at a special session or at the 1992 regular session.

III

Conclusion

At the outset of this opinion, we noted the difficulty presented by this novel question. Should the General Assembly decide that it wants to test the limits of its authority, it should do so in a manner that permits a prompt and definitive resolution of the matter by the Court of Appeals.9

9 The Court of Appeals has "original jurisdiction to review the legislative districting of the State and may grant appropriate relief, if it finds that the districting of the State is not consistent with requirements of either the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of Maryland." Article III, §5.

For our part, we would argue in the Court, as we conclude here, that the General Assembly may not adopt a redistricting plan prior to its receipt of the Governor's plan.

J. Joseph Curran, Jr.
Attorney General

Jack Schwartz
Chief Counsel
Opinions and Advice

Mary O. Lunden
Staff Attorney