Could a Maryland campaign treasurer let the candidate or someone else handle the campaign's money and required reports instead of doing it personally?

Plain-English summary

Maryland's State Prosecutor asked the Attorney General about a pattern his office had encountered while investigating alleged violations of the Fair Election Practices Act (FEPA): campaign treasurers who served "in name only," doing nothing but signing campaign fund reports, while delegating their actual responsibilities, by power of attorney or informal arrangement, to the candidate. In those arrangements the candidate, not the treasurer, endorsed contribution checks, wrote expenditure checks, and ran the campaign's day-to-day finances. The State Prosecutor asked whether the FEPA allowed a treasurer to delegate statutory duties this way.

The opinion concluded that it did not. A treasurer was personally responsible for carrying out the duties the FEPA assigned, could not serve "in name only," and could not delegate any statutory responsibility, including to the candidate, except to a properly appointed subtreasurer for a specific county or political subdivision. The opinion traced the FEPA's structure: only a treasurer (or a limited subtreasurer) could receive contributions, disburse funds, sign checks, keep the required detailed accounts, and file the periodic disclosure reports; the statute expressly barred a candidate from personally handling campaign money, and the opinion reasoned the General Assembly could not have meant to let that same result happen indirectly through delegation by the treasurer. It described the treasurer's role as a fiduciary one, owing duties of good faith and loyalty running to both the candidate and to the campaign's contributors, comparable to the duties of corporate officers and directors or those who solicit charitable contributions. The opinion did allow a treasurer to use campaign staff for purely mechanical tasks like filling out deposit tickets or typing reports, so long as the treasurer supervised the work and personally retained responsibility for signing checks, approving expenditures, and certifying the accuracy of filed reports.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1991. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Maryland's campaign finance statutes have since been recodified from Article 33's Subtitle 26 into the modern Election Law Article; verify the current statutory citations and any newer campaign-finance guidance before relying on any specific rule described here.

Common questions

Could a Maryland campaign treasurer let the candidate handle the campaign's money instead? According to this 1991 opinion, no. The FEPA made the treasurer personally responsible for receiving contributions, disbursing funds, and filing reports, and the opinion concluded a treasurer could not delegate those duties to the candidate or anyone else except a duly appointed subtreasurer.

Was it enough for someone to formally hold the title of treasurer without actually doing the job? No. The opinion specifically addressed treasurers who served "in name only" while someone else ran the campaign's finances, and concluded that arrangement did not satisfy the FEPA. The treasurer had to actually carry out the statute's duties, not merely sign reports prepared by someone else.

Could a treasurer at least use campaign staff to help with paperwork? Yes, within limits described by the opinion. A treasurer could have staff perform mechanical tasks like filling out deposit slips, typing reports, or writing (not signing) checks, but the treasurer had to supervise that work and personally retain responsibility for signing checks, approving expenditures, and the accuracy of what was filed.

Background and statutory framework

Article I, §7 of the Maryland Constitution directs the General Assembly to "pass Laws necessary for the preservation of the purity of Elections," and the Fair Election Practices Act, applicable to all State, county, and Baltimore City elections under Article 33, §§1-1(a)(6) and 26-1, was the fulfillment of that duty, succeeding the 1908 Corrupt Practices Act. The FEPA required candidates and political committees to appoint treasurers through a written filing with the appropriate election board, imposed recordkeeping and reporting duties, limited contributions and transfers, restricted the solicitation and use of campaign money, and required identification and retention of campaign advertising, all serving what the office had earlier described as an "audit" function letting any interested person trace campaign contributions and expenditures to their sources and purposes, 59 Opinions of the Attorney General 282, 293 (1974). As with federal campaign finance law, these disclosure requirements served the government's interests in letting voters evaluate a candidate's potential allegiances, deterring corruption, and detecting violations of contribution limits, see generally Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 66-67 (1976).

The FEPA defined "treasurer" as any person appointed to receive or disburse money or things of value to promote or defeat a candidate or ballot question, §1-1(a)(18), required a treasurer to be a citizen, resident, and registered Maryland voter, §§26-3(c) and 26-4(a), and barred a candidate from serving as their own treasurer or subtreasurer, §26-3(c). The appointment of a treasurer was the linchpin of the scheme: a candidate could not file a certificate of candidacy without one, §26-3(a)(1), a resigning treasurer had to be immediately replaced, §26-3(a)(2), and without an appointed and filed treasurer a political committee could not collect, receive, or disburse money for political purposes, §26-4(a). The statute assigned the treasurer, and only the treasurer, responsibility for the receipt, expenditure, and disbursement of campaign funds, providing that all contributions and other valuable things "shall be paid over to and made to pass through the hands of the treasurer," §26-6(a), and separately making it unlawful for a candidate or committee member to disburse money before it passed through the treasurer's hands, with even a candidate's own unlimited personal contributions required to pass through and be reported by the treasurer, §26-9(a) and (b); §26-8(a).

The only delegation the FEPA permitted was to a properly designated subtreasurer for a specific county or political subdivision, §26-3(d), a term limited to discrete geographic areas carrying out governmental functions such as counties, incorporated municipalities, and special taxing districts, §16-1(d). A subtreasurer's accountability under the statute was identical to the treasurer's, and a subtreasurer's reports had to be channeled to, and incorporated into, the treasurer's own filings, §26-3(d). Treasurers and subtreasurers had to deposit all funds in a designated campaign depository and could pay expenses only by check from that depository, except for limited petty cash, §26-5(b), had to keep "detailed, full and accurate accounts" of every contribution and expenditure, §26-7(a), had specific duties for issuing contribution receipts, §26-7(b), and had to file complete periodic disclosure reports with the appropriate election board, §26-11, with late or inaccurate filings triggering personal, joint-and-several late fees that could not be paid from campaign funds, §§26-11(h) and 26-13(a). The FEPA prescribed criminal penalties for violations, §26-20, and contained its own perjury provision for candidates and treasurers, §26-15.

The opinion reasoned that nothing in this scheme supported letting a treasurer delegate statutory duties to the candidate or anyone else besides a subtreasurer, and that since the FEPA expressly barred a candidate from personally handling campaign money, the General Assembly could not have intended to permit that same result indirectly through delegation. It found support in the FEPA's legislative history: unlike its 1908 predecessor, which diffused financial responsibility between the treasurer and a shifting cast of "political agents," the 1967 FEPA removed political agents from campaign finances entirely and centralized responsibility in the treasurer, permitting only the narrow, defined role of subtreasurer. The opinion described the treasurer's role as fiduciary in character, owing a duty of good faith and loyalty running to both candidate and contributors, drawing an analogy to the fiduciary duties of corporate officers and directors and those soliciting charitable contributions under Article 41, §3-217, and noting the office's earlier recognition that a political committee could not divert contributions from their intended electoral purpose, since "a donor is entitled to know what kind of donation he or she is ... making and to have the general purpose for that donation carried out," 68 Opinions of the Attorney General 252, 266 (1983). The opinion allowed a treasurer to use campaign staff for purely mechanical functions, such as filling out deposit tickets, typing reports, or writing but not signing checks, provided the treasurer supervised the work and personally retained responsibility for signing checks, approving expenditures, and ensuring the accuracy and timely filing of campaign reports, drawing on the general trust-law principle that a fiduciary "is under a duty to the beneficiary not to delegate to others the doing of acts which the trustee can reasonably be required personally to perform," Restatement (Second) of Trusts §171 (1959).

Citations and references

Statutes:

• Article I, §7 of the Maryland Constitution, directing laws to preserve the purity of elections
• Article 33, §§1-1(a)(6) and 26-1, the FEPA's scope covering State, county, and Baltimore City elections
• §1-1(a)(18), defining "treasurer"
• §§26-3(c) and 26-4(a), treasurer qualifications and the bar on a candidate serving as their own treasurer
• §26-13(b), barring appointment as treasurer while past filing obligations remain unmet
• §26-3(a)(1), requiring a treasurer before filing a certificate of candidacy
• §26-3(a)(2), requiring immediate replacement of a resigning treasurer
• §26-4(a), barring a committee from handling money without an appointed, filed treasurer
• §26-6(a), requiring all contributions and disbursements to pass through the treasurer
• §26-9(a) and (b), requiring contributions to be reported to the treasurer
• §26-8(a), requiring a candidate's or spouse's own contributions to pass through the treasurer
• §26-3(d), permitting delegation only to a properly designated subtreasurer
• §16-1(d), defining "political subdivision" for subtreasurer appointments
• §26-5(b), requiring funds in a designated depository and payment by check
• §26-7(a), requiring detailed, full, and accurate accounts
• §26-7(b), treasurer's duties for issuing contribution receipts
• §26-11, requiring periodic disclosure reports to the election board
• §§26-11(h) and 26-13(a), personal late-filing fee obligations
• §26-20, FEPA criminal penalties
• §26-15, FEPA perjury provision
• Article 41, §3-217, charitable contribution solicitation fiduciary duties (cited by analogy)
• Article 33, former §163, the pre-1967 "political agents" provision

Cases:

• Hanrahan v. Alterman, 41 Md. App. 71, 396 A.2d 272 (1972), cited on the FEPA's application to Baltimore City elections
• Parker v. Junior Press Printing Serv., Inc., 266 Md. 721, 726, 296 A.2d 377 (1972), on the FEPA's purpose of centralizing campaign-finance responsibility
• County Council v. Montgomery Ass'n, 274 Md. 52, 63, 333 A.2d 596 (1975), cited generally on the FEPA's regulatory structure
• Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 66-67 (1976), on the governmental interests served by campaign-finance disclosure
• Smith v. Higinbothom, 187 Md. 115, 130, 48 A.2d 754 (1946), on liberal construction of election-purity laws
• Healy v. State, 115 Md. 377, 80 A. 1074 (1911), the only appellate decision under the 1908 Corrupt Practices Act
• Secretary of State v. McGucken, 244 Md. 70, 73, 222 A.2d 693 (1966), on the treasurer requirement enhancing disclosure
• Maryland-National Capital Park & Planning Comm'n v. Montgomery County, 267 Md. 82, 93, 296 A.2d 692 (1972), on the meaning of "political subdivision"
• Lacy v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 794 S.W.2d 781, 789 (Tex. App. 1990), on the general definition of a fiduciary relation
• Impala Platinum v. Impala Sales, 283 Md. 296, 324, A.2d (1978), on the duty of utmost good faith and loyalty in a fiduciary relationship
• Stern v. Lucy Webb Hayes National Training School, 381 F. Supp. 1003, 1012 (D.D.C. 1974), on a fiduciary's duty of ordinary and reasonable care
• Oaks v. State, 83 Md. App. 1, 573 A.2d 392 (1990), holding a candidate was not a proper person to certify a political committee's campaign fund report

Source

• Landing page: https://oag.maryland.gov/resources-info/Pages/attorney-general%E2%80%99s-opinions.aspx
• Original PDF: https://oag.maryland.gov/resources-info/Documents/pdfs/Opinions/1991/Volume76_1991.pdf (this opinion appears at printed pages 200-208 of the bound annual volume; Maryland's site does not publish a standalone PDF of this opinion)

Original opinion text

Best-effort transcription from a scanned PDF. Minor errors may remain — the linked PDF is authoritative.

Elections - Fair Election Practices Act - Treasurer May Not Delegate Carrying Out of Statutory Duties

July 26, 1991

Stephen Montanarelli, Esquire
State Prosecutor

You have requested our opinion whether a campaign treasurer may delegate, by power of attorney or otherwise, the treasurer's responsibilities prescribed in the Fair Election Practices Act ("FEPA"), Subtitle 26 of Article 33 of the Maryland Code.

In the course of certain investigations of alleged violations of the FEPA, your office has encountered campaign treasurers who have either failed to discharge their responsibilities or who claim to have served "in name only." Some treasurers have performed no other duties except signing campaign fund reports. Some treasurers have delegated their duties to the candidate, who then endorsed campaign contribution checks, wrote expenditure checks, and generally conducted the on-going financial transactions of the campaign.

For the reasons set forth below, we conclude as follows:

A treasurer is personally responsible for carrying out the duties set forth in the FEPA. Therefore, a treasurer may not serve "in name only" and may not delegate any statutory responsibility to another person, including the candidate, except to duly appointed subtreasurers. The treasurer has a fiduciary duty to control campaign accounts in accordance with the intent of contributors and the mandates of the FEPA.

I

The Fair Election Practices Act

Article I, §7 of the Maryland Constitution enjoins the General Assembly to "pass Laws necessary for the preservation of the purity of Elections." The Fair Elections Practices Act is the fulfillment of this constitutional duty. The FEPA generally applies to all State, county, and Baltimore City elections. Article 33, §§1-1(a)(6) and 26-1.1 See Hanrahan v. Alterman, 41 Md. App. 71, 396 A.2d 272 (1972).

The FEPA is intended to "regulat[e] and control ... campaign financing and to insure a system of centralized responsibility for campaign funds and expenditures." Parker v. Junior Press Printing Serv., Inc., 266 Md. 721, 726, 296 A.2d 377 (1972). In general, the law requires the appointment, through a written filing with the appropriate election board, of treasurers by candidates and political committees; imposes certain recordkeeping and reporting duties on treasurers; limits political contributions; limits transfers made to and from filed treasurers; prohibits certain practices in the solicitation and use of campaign money; and requires the identification of campaign advertising and campaign material and the retention of that material for a certain period of time. See generally County Council v. Montgomery Ass'n, 274 Md. 52, 63, 333 A.2d 596 (1975). Our office has described the FEPA's structure and purpose as follows:

[I]ts overriding thrust is to control, and require the reporting of, contributions and expenditures of money and other valuable things made in connection with elections and to require that certain records be maintained with respect to all such contributions and expenditures. Put another way, the Fair Election Practices Act is intended to enable an interested person to "audit" all campaign activities in connection with a given election and ascertain, by an examination of both publicly filed records and records required to be maintained by various organizations, all amounts of money and valuable things expended in connection with any given election campaign ..., the purposes for which they were expended and the sources of all such expenditures.

59 Opinions of the Attorney General 282, 293 (1974).

Maryland's statute, like federal campaign finance legislation, has several objectives. First, disclosure provides information about the sources of the candidate's funds and the objects of expenditure. Thus, voters have an opportunity to evaluate the candidate's potential allegiances through exposure of the interests to which a candidate is most likely to be responsive. Second, disclosure sheds light on the sources of large contributions and expenditures, thus deterring possible corruption and illegal expenditures. Third, recordkeeping, reporting, and disclosure provide a means of detecting violations of contribution and transfer limitations. Disclosure requirements thus serve substantial governmental interests. See generally Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 66- 67 (1976). See also Smith v. Higinbothom, 187 Md. 115, 130, 48 A.2d 754 (1946) (former Corrupt Practices Act characterized as a remedial measure, to be liberally construed in the public interest to carry out the purpose of preserving the purity of elections).2

As the Court of Appeals stated in Healy v. State, 115 Md. 377, 80 A. 1074 (1911), in commenting on the predecessor to the FEPA, the 1908 Corrupt Practices Act:

The act was passed to limit the expenditure of money by candidates for public office, and to minimize the corrupt use of money in politics. It is a salutary measure, and, if rigidly enforced, would vastly improve political conditions

115 Md. at 385.3

II

The Statutory Role of the Treasurer

Within this regulatory scheme, "the treasurer of each candidate or committee plays a critical role." 71 Opinions of the Attorney General 120, 121 (1986). The appointment of a treasurer "enhance[s] the effectiveness" of laws requiring full disclosure of the financial aspects of campaigns. Secretary of State v. McGucken, 244 Md. 70, 73, 222 A.2d 693 (1966).

Candidates may undertake the financial aspects of an election - gathering contributions and making expenditures - only after appointing a treasurer for a personal candidacy account or for an authorized committee account.4 Whichever campaign vehicle is chosen, the FEPA's basic provisions relating to the qualifications of and duties imposed on treasurers are the same.5

"Treasurer" is a defined term:

"Treasurer" means any person appointed by a candidate, political agent, political committee, or political party or partisan organization to receive or disburse money or other things of value to promote or assist in the promotion of the success or defeat of any candidate, political party, principle or proposition submitted to a vote at any election.

§1-1(a)(18). A person may not be appointed or act as a treasurer unless he is a citizen, resident, and registered Maryland voter. §§26-3(c) and 26-4(a).6 A person who has not complied with past campaign filing obligations, including the payment of any fees, may not act as a treasurer. §26-13(b).

Although a treasurer for one candidate may act as a treasurer for another candidate or political committee, the FEPA specifically provides that "a candidate for public or party office or nomination to public or party office may not designate himself as his own treasurer or subtreasurer or act as the ... treasurer or subtreasurer for any other candidate or political committee." §26-3(c) (emphasis added).7

The appointment of a treasurer is the linchpin upon which the FEPA turns. A candidate may not file a certificate of candidacy unless a treasurer has been appointed. §26-3(a)(1). If the treasurer resigns, the candidate "immediately shall appoint and file a new treasurer ...." §26- 3(a)(2). Unless a treasurer is appointed and filed with the State Administrative Board of Election Laws, a political committee may not "collect, or receive, or disburse money, or other valuable things for [any political] purpose." §26-4(a). Section 26-6(a) reiterates this prohibition and extends it to candidates. Once appointed, the treasurer is assigned by law responsibility for the receipt, expenditure, and disbursement of funds for political purposes.

The FEPA does not permit the treasurer's ultimate responsibility to be borne by the candidate or any other political agent of the candidate, except for a very circumscribed role allotted to subtreasurers and for certain personal candidate expenditures.8 The assignment of personal responsibility to the treasurer could not be more clearly stated: "All contributions, money or other valuable things collected, received or disbursed by any candidate or committee for any purpose, shall be paid over to and made to pass through the hands of the treasurer and ... shall be disbursed by him." §26-6(a). This provision is so crucial to the statutory scheme that the General Assembly reiterated the point in the very next sentence in slightly different wording: "It is unlawful for any candidate or any member or members of a committee or ... of a political committee, to disburse or expend money or any other valuable things, for any purposes until the money or other valuable things so disbursed or expended has [sic] passed through the hands of the treasurer." See also §26-4(a). Contributors may not make a contribution except to the treasurer or to the candidate, who "shall report the contribution to the candidate's treasurer." §26-9(a) and (b). Even the contributions of a candidate or spouse, which are unlimited in amount, "must pass through the hands of the candidate's treasurer and be reported as required ...." §26-8(a).

The only delegation of the treasurer's duties and responsibilities permitted by the FEPA involves properly designated subtreasurers. A treasurer may appoint "a separate subtreasurer for any county or political subdivision ...." §26-3(d). The reference to "political subdivision" limits the appointment of a subtreasurer to a discrete geographic area that carries out certain governmental functions. See Maryland-National Capital Park & Planning Comm'n v. Montgomery County, 267 Md. 82, 93, 296 A.2d 692 (1972); 59 Opinions of the Attorney General 560, 564 (1974). Aside from counties, incorporated municipalities and special taxing districts are the most common geographic areas possessing the characteristics of a political subdivision. See §16-1(d).9

Although a subtreasurer may deposit funds and disburse money, §26-3(d) specifically provides that a subtreasurer's accountability under the FEPA is identical to the treasurer's. A subtreasurer must channel financial reports to the treasurer who, in turn, incorporates the subtreasurer's reports into the treasurer's own. Id.

Furthermore, treasurers and subtreasurers are bound to deposit all funds and contributions received in a designated campaign depository. Except for limited petty cash expenditures, they "may not pay any expense on behalf of a candidate, directly or indirectly ... except by check from the designated depository." §26-5(b).10

Section 26-7(a) places on every treasurer and subtreasurer the duty to keep "detailed, full and accurate accounts" of every contribution, expenditure, and disbursement, made to, by, or on behalf of the candidate or political committee. In addition, §26-7(b) places detailed responsibilities on the treasurer for issuing campaign contribution receipts. A campaign treasurer and either the candidate for a personal treasurer account or the chairman for a political committee account are required by §26-11 to file with the appropriate election board complete reports of all contributions received and expenditures made in furtherance of the candidate's nomination or election. Failure to file reports "in full and accurate detail" and in a timely manner subjects those responsible for filing to the imposition of late filing fees, which become their joint and several personal obligations and may not be paid from campaign funds. §§26-11(h) and 26-13(a).

Finally, the FEPA prescribes criminal penalties for any person, including a treasurer, who violates any of its provisions. §26-20. The FEPA also contains its own perjury provision relating to candidates and treasurers. §26-15.

In our opinion, the FEPA places upon the treasurer of a candidate or political committee a fiduciary duty to carry out the act's reporting, disclosure, and recordkeeping requirements. The duty runs not only to the candidate but to the contributors as well.

One is said to act in a fiduciary capacity or to receive money ... in a fiduciary capacity when the ... money or property he handles, is not his own or for his own benefit, but for the benefit of another person, as to whom he stands in a relation implying and necessitating great confidence and trust on the one part and a high degree of good faith on the other part.

Black's Law Dictionary 625 (6th ed. 1990). See also, e.g., Lacy v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 794 S.W.2d 781, 789 (Tex. App. 1990) ("'Fiduciary relation' applies to legal relations between parties, created by law or by ... contract ..., where equity implies confidence and reliance in consummation of purposes for which the relation was created.").

A fiduciary relationship carries with it the requirement of utmost good faith and loyalty. Impala Platinum v. Impala Sales, 283 Md. 296, 324, A.2d (1978). Fiduciaries are required to exercise ordinary and reasonable care in the performance of their duties, exhibiting honesty and good faith, including acquiring the information necessary to supervise employees under their control and using due diligence to perform the necessary acts of supervision. Stern v. Lucy Webb Hayes National Training School, 381 F. Supp. 1003, 1012 (D.D.C. 1974). In our view, the fiduciary duties of the campaign treasurer are analogous to the fiduciary duties placed by law upon officers and directors of profit and non-profit corporations, as well as on those engaged in soliciting, collecting, or expending funds for charitable organizations. See Article 41, §3-217 (charitable contribution solicitations).

Our office has alluded to the nature of this fiduciary duty in a general way in earlier opinions. For example, one opinion concluded that a political committee may not convert funds given by contributors for electoral purposes into non-electoral uses: "A donor is entitled to know what kind of donation he or she is ... making and to have the general purpose for that donation carried out." 68 Opinions of the Attorney General 252, 266 (1983). We have also addressed the treasurer's recordkeeping duties and the treasurer's obligation to use campaign funds for proper expenditures only. 71 Opinions of the Attorney General 120 (1986); 68 Opinions of the Attorney General 252 (1983). These opinions consistently recognized that the treasurer's role is critical as a point of control and accountability, to help ensure that public disclosure is complete and accurate and that money given for political purposes is used for those purposes only.11

III

Delegation of Treasurer's Duties

Nothing in the FEPA supports an interpretation that a treasurer may delegate to the candidate or anyone else, apart from a duly appointed subtreasurer, any part of the treasurer's statutory duties. Indeed, given that the FEPA expressly prohibits the candidate from handling the campaign's money personally (§§26-3(c), 26-8, and 26-9), we cannot conceive that the General Assembly meant to allow this result indirectly, through a delegation by the treasurer.12

The legislative history supports our view. From 1908 through 1967, a campaign's financial affairs were diffused between the treasurer and a category of persons termed "political agents."13 For almost sixty years the treasurer, albeit the only person who could receive and deposit contributions, shared both the spending and reporting of political funds with an ever-changing array of political agents. When the General Assembly enacted the FEPA in 1967, it removed political agents from involvement in the financial affairs of campaigns, allowed a carefully circumscribed delegation to subtreasurers, but otherwise centralized responsibility in the treasurer.

We do not mean to suggest that the treasurer may not use an employee or member of the campaign staff, with appropriate supervision, to perform mechanical functions like filling out deposit tickets, writing out (but not signing) checks, typing election reports, or making bank deposits. However, the treasurer may not permit anyone other than a subtreasurer to perform the duties that the General Assembly has entrusted to the treasurer alone, including signing checks, making proper expenditures, receiving contributions, ensuring complete and accurate account books, and ensuring the timely filing of complete and accurate campaign reports.14 Cf. Restatement (Second) of Trusts §171 (1959) (trustee, as fiduciary, "is under a duty to the beneficiary not to delegate to others the doing of acts which the trustee can reasonably be required personally to perform").

IV

Conclusion

In summary, it is our opinion that:

A treasurer is personally responsible for carrying out the duties set forth in the FEPA. Therefore, a treasurer may not serve "in name only" and may not delegate any statutory responsibility to another person, including the candidate, except to duly appointed subtreasurers. The treasurer has a fiduciary duty to control campaign accounts in accordance with the intent of contributors and the mandates of the FEPA.

J. Joseph Curran, Jr.
Attorney General

Elizabeth L. Nilson
Assistant Attorney General

Jack Schwartz
Chief Counsel
Opinions and Advice

1
All further statutory references in this opinion will be to Article 33 unless otherwise indicated.
2
The Corrupt Practices Act was enacted in 1908 and remained in effect until the FEPA was enacted in 1967.
3
Healy v. State appears to be the only appellate decision concerning a conviction under the Corrupt Practices Act in the 60 years of its existence. The Court of Appeals upheld a fine of ten cents levied upon a subtreasurer who failed to report the names of persons to whom he disbursed funds. Furthermore, it has been reliably reported that only one major conviction resulted from enforcement of the Corrupt Practices Act during that same period of time. See Pettengill, Regulation of Campaign Finance - The Maryland Experience, 19 Md. L. Rev. 90, 101-02 (1959).
4
An authorized committee may be either a non-continuing committee (a committee limited to a specific election) or a continuing committee (a committee formed to support a candidate indefinitely).
5
The statutory responsibilities placed upon treasurers for State and local party committees are identical to those placed upon a candidate's treasurer. The conclusions reached in this opinion apply equally to party committee treasurers.
6
A member or employee of the State Administrative Board of Election Laws or local boards of election may not be appointed as a treasurer during the person's term of office or period of employment. §26-3(a)(3).
7
The only exception is that "candidates for party office who are members of central committees are not prohibited from being the treasurer of a central committee during their candidacy." §26-3(c).
8
A candidate or the candidate's spouse may personally pay "filing fees, telegrams, telephoning, travel, and board ...." §26-8(a). These disbursements are not considered "contributions." 9
Section 26-5(a) authorizes party central committees to appoint one subtreasurer for each voting precinct.
10
The petty cash fund authorized by §26-5(c) is limited to $250 at any one time; no more than $25 may be paid from this fund to any one recipient in an election.
11
Although Article 33 does not contain a precise listing of permissible campaign expenditures, the Attorney General has set forth the following guideline:
"In the absence of any other directive from the legislature, it is our view that any lawful expense, that is, an expense not prohibited by some other provision of State or federal law or Constitution, which enhances a candidate's election changes and would not be incurred if there were no potential candidacy, is a proper expenditure so long as the expense is reported in accordance with the reporting requirements of the Election Code."
68 Opinions of the Attorney General at 267 (citation and emphasis omitted). See also 70 Opinions of the Attorney General 96, 101 (1985).
12
In Oaks v. State, 83 Md. App. 1, 573 A.2d 392 (1990), the Court of Special Appeals held that a candidate "was not a proper person to sign and attest to the authenticity of a campaign fund report of a political committee." Cf. note 14 below.
13
These "agents" included "all persons appointed by any candidate before any election ... to assist him in his candidacy." Article 33, former §163.
14
The last duty is statutorily shared with a candidate for a candidate- treasurer account and with a chairman for a political committee account.