Can a Maryland county's budget office block a State's Attorney from spending on out-of-state staff training?

Plain-English summary

In 1989, Howard County's Executive and its State's Attorney disagreed over training for the State's Attorney's office's clerical staff on a new case-management computer system. The State's Attorney wanted to send six secretaries to the vendor's training site in Sacramento, California, as the cheapest option; the County Administrator declined to approve the trip, apparently believing a less costly arrangement was possible. Both officials asked the Attorney General to sort out who had the final say. The opinion concluded that a State's Attorney's office is generally subject to its county's budget and fiscal policies, including decisions about how to obtain goods and services, because Article 24, §8-101 of the Maryland Code expressly makes each State's Attorney's office subject to the budget, fiscal, and purchasing rules of its county. But the opinion found a constitutional limit built into that rule: if a county's fiscal control would actually prevent the State's Attorney from carrying out an aspect of the job, once the State's Attorney certifies that paying for a specific item is necessary to the office's proper functioning, the county cannot refuse funding for it. Applied to the Howard County dispute, the opinion split the difference: the county had to defer to the State's Attorney's judgment that this kind of training was necessary at all, but the State's Attorney had to defer to the county's judgment about which training location was more cost-effective, since the choice of site alone did not threaten the office's ability to function.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1989. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

In 1989, could a Maryland county's budget office block a State's Attorney's office from a specific purchase? Generally yes, according to this opinion, because Article 24, §8-101 subjected each State's Attorney's office to its county's budget, fiscal, and purchasing policies. But the opinion found a constitutional limit: if the State's Attorney certified that failing to pay for an item would prevent the office from properly functioning, the county could not use its fiscal authority to block it.

Did the opinion say a State's Attorney could always get whatever training or equipment the office wanted? No. The opinion distinguished between whether a type of training was necessary at all (a call for the State's Attorney to make) and where or how cheaply to obtain it (a call the opinion left to the county), since choosing among comparably effective options did not threaten the office's ability to carry out its duties.

What Maryland constitutional provision limited the county's control here? Article 8 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, the state's separation-of-powers clause, which the opinion applied by analogy to an earlier opinion about a circuit court's budget dependency on its county; the same reasoning applied because a State's Attorney, like a court, exercises an independent constitutional function that a county's fiscal power cannot be used to choke off.

What happened if the county and the State's Attorney simply could not agree? The opinion noted that if a county declined to approve an expenditure even after the State's Attorney certified its necessity, the dispute would have to be resolved through litigation; the opinion itself did not purport to resolve every possible future disagreement, only to state the general legal framework.

Background and statutory framework

The dispute arose because the Howard County State's Attorney's office was purchasing a case-management computer system tailored to Maryland law from a California vendor, and needed to train six secretaries to use it. The office had three training options: send the secretaries to the vendor's site in Sacramento, bring the vendor's trainers to the office, or send staff to Washington, D.C. for vendor-led training. The State's Attorney determined that sending staff to California was the least expensive option, but the County Administrator declined to authorize that trip, apparently believing a cheaper option existed. The office's budget in fact contained sufficient funds to cover the training regardless of which option was chosen, so the dispute was about which option the county could compel, not about whether funds existed at all.

The opinion worked from three linked provisions. Article V, §9 of the Maryland Constitution lets the General Assembly prescribe a State's Attorney's duties and provide for payment of the office's expenses. Article 10, §40(a) sets a general statutory rule that State's Attorneys receive their expenses "as are provided by law and by the current practice in the several counties," with Article 10, §40(n) supplying Howard County's specific salary and expense details and authorizing an audit by the county auditor. Article 24, §8-101(2) then makes each State's Attorney's office "subject to the budget and fiscal policies and purchasing laws of the county in which it is located." The opinion assumed, for purposes of the question, that Howard County's fiscal policies required the County Administrator's approval for this kind of out-of-state training.

To reconcile that county control with the State's Attorney's independent constitutional role, the opinion drew directly on its own earlier analysis in 73 Opinions of the Attorney General 92 (1988), which had considered the same statute, Article 24, §8-101, as applied to a circuit court. That opinion held the General Assembly could subject a court to a county's budget and fiscal policies without violating Article 8 of the Declaration of Rights (Maryland's separation-of-powers clause), but only so long as the county's control did not deprive the court of "adequate and suitable facilities, equipment, or personnel reasonably necessary to carry out the court's judicial function." Applying that same framework to a State's Attorney's office, and citing Murphy v. Yates and Yangming Transport v. Revon Products for the principle that a statute should be construed to avoid constitutional problems where possible, the opinion concluded that a county must refrain from exercising its fiscal supervision in a way that would prevent the office from obtaining "adequate and suitable goods or services" to meet its needs, once the State's Attorney certifies that a specific item is necessary to proper conduct of the office. The opinion noted its own office had used similar reasoning just months earlier, in the same volume, to protect the Attorney General's own prosecutorial discretion in a procurement-approval statute. 74 Opinions of the Attorney General 230 (1989).

Citations and references

Statutes:

• Article V, §9 of the Maryland Constitution, authorizing the General Assembly to prescribe a State's Attorney's duties and provide for payment of office expenses
• Article 10, §40(a) of the Maryland Code, the general rule for payment of each State's Attorney's office expenses
• Article 10, §40(n) and §40(n)(5), Howard County's specific salary and expense provisions and county-auditor authority
• Article 24, §8-101 and §8-101(2), subjecting each State's Attorney's office to its county's budget, fiscal, and purchasing policies
• Article 8 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, the state constitutional separation-of-powers clause

Cases:

• Murphy v. Yates, 276 Md. 475, 348 A.2d 837 (1975), cited for the principle that constitutional problems from a statute's application should be avoided where a permissible construction exists
• Yangming Transport v. Revon Products, 311 Md. 496, 509, 536 A.2d 633 (1988), cited for the same constitutional-avoidance canon of statutory construction

Source

• Landing page: https://oag.maryland.gov/resources-info/Pages/attorney-general%E2%80%99s-opinions.aspx
• Original PDF: https://oag.maryland.gov/resources-info/Documents/pdfs/Opinions/1989/Volume74_1989.pdf (this opinion appears at printed pages 263-267 of the bound annual volume; Maryland's site does not publish a standalone PDF of this opinion)

Original opinion text

Best-effort transcription from a scanned PDF. Minor errors may remain, the linked PDF is authoritative.

STATE'S ATTORNEY

Counties - Application Of County Budget And Fiscal Policies To State's Attorney's Office

March 9, 1989

The Honorable Elizabeth Bobo
County Executive

The Honorable William R. Hymes
State's Attorney for Howard County

You have each requested our opinion concerning the relationship between the budget and fiscal policies of Howard County and the conduct of the Office of State's Attorney, as this relationship is determined by State law. The specific question is whether the county's chief budgetary official may disapprove the State's Attorney's request for certain out-of-state staff training.

For the reasons stated below, we conclude that the Office of the State's Attorney is generally subject to the county's budget and fiscal policies, including county policies on such matters as out-of-state training. Hence, the county is generally free to determine the particular circumstances under which goods or services are to be obtained by the State's Attorney. However, the county may not apply its policies so as to prevent the State's Attorney from carrying out an aspect of his official duties if the State's Attorney certifies that failure to pay the item would prevent the proper conduct of his office.

I

Background

This question arises out of a disagreement between the County Administrator and the State's Attorney for Howard County over a proposal to train certain clerical employees at a training site in California. The State's Attorney's office is purchasing a particular computer system to serve its case management needs. The system, sold by a California company, will be tailored to the characteristics of Maryland law and the particular requirements of the State's Attorney's office.

In order to make effective use of the system, the staff of the office must be trained. The six secretaries who were to be trained had three options: go to a training center in Sacramento, California, where the vendor is located; attend training in the office, conducted by representatives of the vendor; or attend training in Washington, D.C., conducted by the vendor's representatives. In the latter two cases, the expenses of the vendor's representatives would have to be paid by the office. The State's Attorney concluded that the first option, sending the secretarial staff to California, was the least expensive. However, the County Administrator declined to authorize payment for the trip, apparently on the view that less costly arrangements were possible.1

II

Constitutional and Statutory Provisions

Under the Constitution, "the State's Attorney shall perform such duties ... as shall be prescribed by the General Assembly." Article V, §9 of the Constitution. That same section of the Constitution authorizes the General Assembly to provide for the payment of the "expenses for conducting the Office of the State's Attorney ...."

In Article 10, §40(a) of the Maryland Code, the General Assembly has provided the following general rule for the payment of the office expenses of each State's Attorney:

1 We understand that the budget of the State's Attorney's office contains sufficient funds to defray the training costs, whichever alternative is chosen. This opinion does not address the circumstances, if any, in which a county might be compelled to provide nonbudgeted funds to a State's Attorney's office. See generally 58 Opinions of the Attorney General 201 (1973). Cf. 60 Opinions of the Attorney General 647 (1975).

The State's Attorneys in the several counties of the State shall receive annually the respective salaries set forth for performing the duties required of them by their respective public local laws and by the public general laws, and such expenses as are provided by law and by the current practice in the several counties. The State's Attorneys shall receive annual payments for office, traveling, and other expenses.
All payments for salaries and expenses shall be made by the respective counties ....

Article 10, §40 then sets out more particular provisions for each county. The provision for Howard County, §40(n), itemizes certain detail about the salaries of the State's Attorney and others in the office. It also expressly authorizes an audit by the county auditor. Article 10,
§40(n)(5).

In addition, Article 24, §8-101(2) provides that the State's Attorney's office for each county "is subject to the budget and fiscal policies and purchasing laws of the county in which it is located." For purposes of this opinion, we assume that the fiscal policies of Howard County require the approval of the County Administrator for the kind of out-of-state training contemplated by the State's Attorney for the six secretaries.2

III

Analysis

In 73 Opinions of the Attorney General 92 (1988), we considered the validity of Article 24, §8-101 as applied to the Circuit Court for Prince George's County. Like a State's Attorney's office, a circuit court "is subject to the budget and fiscal policies and purchasing laws of the county in which it is located." We analyzed the statute against the separation of powers requirements of Article 8 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.3 We concluded that the General Assembly did not violate Article 8 by subjecting the circuit court to the "budget and

2 In accordance with our office policy, we express no views on any local law questions that might be raised in connection with the proposed expenditure.
3 Article 8 provides as follows: "That the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial powers of Government ought to be forever separate and distinct from each other; and no person exercising the functions of one said Departments shall assume or discharge the duties of any other."

fiscal policies and purchasing laws" of the county in which the court sits. We advised, however, that the constitutional prohibition would be violated if a county's application of its regulations to the court "would deprive the court of adequate and suitable facilities, equipment, or personnel reasonably necessary to carry out the court's judicial function." 73 Opinions of the Attorney General at 92.

Our analysis of the present question is similar. The General Assembly has acted within its constitutional power by generally subjecting each State's Attorney's office to the budgetary and fiscal supervision of each county. However, problems of a constitutional dimension would arise if a county exercised this grant of power so as to prevent a State's Attorney from carrying out his or her constitutional responsibilities. See generally Murphy v. Yates, 276 Md. 475, 348 A.2d 837 (1975). Article 24, §8-101 should be applied so as to avoid these problems. See Yangming Transport v. Revon Products, 311 Md. 496, 509, 536 A.2d 633 (1988).4

Paraphrasing our earlier opinion about Article 24, §8-101, we see it as the county's obligation to refrain from exercising its supervisory power over fiscal matters if its supervision would prevent the State's Attorney's office from obtaining "adequate and suitable goods or services" to meet the office's needs. 73 Opinions of the Attorney General at 96.

Disagreements over the necessity of a particular item of expenditure usually are resolved through discussion. Indeed, because disputes of this kind ordinarily get worked out, we are aware of no case in Maryland or elsewhere that sheds light on the situation when a county and a State's Attorney are at loggerheads.

In our view, a disagreement of this kind should be resolved in favor of the State's Attorney if the State's Attorney asserts that application of the county's fiscal procedures would pose unacceptable interference with the conduct of the State's Attorney's office. Were it otherwise - that is, if a county were free to insist upon its view of the necessity of a purchase of goods or services - the threat to the conduct

4 In a very recent opinion, we construed a statute governing the approval of certain procurement contracts to avoid the possibility of interference with the Attorney General's prosecutorial discretion. 74 Opinions of the Attorney General 230 (1989). See also 61 Opinions of the Attorney General 166 (1966).

of the State's Attorney's office that we regard as constitutionally unacceptable will have materialized.5

To use the current dispute as an example, it is our view that the State's Attorney for Howard County may determine that a particular form of training is required for the effective conduct of his office. If the State's Attorney so determined, the county may not exercise its fiscal powers so as to prevent the training. However, we see no State law impediment to the county's deciding the site of training (assuming no significant difference in the quality of training among the sites). Whether the secretaries are trained in one place rather than in another does not, of itself, affect the conduct of the State's Attorney's office, so long as they are trained.

IV

Conclusion

In summary, our opinion is as follows: Howard County should defer to the determination of the State's Attorney for Howard County that a particular kind of training is essential to the conduct of his office. However, the State's Attorney should defer to the county's determination about the cost-effectiveness of one training site over another, because the exercise of the county's powers as to that question does not pose a threat to the effective conduct of the State's Attorney's office.

J. Joseph Curran, Jr.
Attorney General

Jack Schwartz
Chief Counsel
Opinions & Advice

5 Of course, if a county declined to approve an item of expenditure even in the face of the State's Attorney's certification of its necessity, the matter would then need to be resolved through litigation.