Can a city ban loitering in public places without violating the First Amendment?

Plain-English summary

In August 1988, Cambridge's police chief, Russell E. Wroten, asked the Attorney General whether the city's anti-loitering ordinance, §12-1 of the Cambridge City Code, could survive a constitutional challenge. The ordinance defined "loitering" broadly (remaining idle, spending time idly, loafing, walking about aimlessly, or "hanging around") and made it unlawful to loiter in a public place in a way that created a danger of a breach of the peace, disturbed or annoyed another person's comfort, obstructed pedestrians or vehicles, or interfered with someone lawfully present, backed by a police officer's power to order a person to leave and an infraction charge for refusing. The Attorney General concluded that the ordinance could be read narrowly enough to avoid the vagueness and overbreadth problems that had struck down similar loitering laws elsewhere, largely by following a New Jersey court's construction of a nearly identical ordinance in Camarco v. City of Orange. But the opinion was explicit that this conclusion depended entirely on Cambridge applying only the narrowing construction it supplied for each of the ordinance's four prohibitions, since the ordinance's language, read at face value, would likely have been unconstitutional.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1988. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Could Cambridge police arrest someone just for "hanging around" in public under the 1988 ordinance?
No, not under the construction the opinion gave the ordinance. The opinion concluded that loitering by itself, even conduct matching the ordinance's broad definition of "spending time idly, loafing, or walking about aimlessly," was not enough for an arrest. A violation required both conduct falling within one of the ordinance's four specific prohibitions in §12-1(b) and a refusal to obey a police officer's order to leave under §12-1(c).

Did the Attorney General think Cambridge's loitering ordinance was constitutional as written?
Only if applied narrowly. The opinion warned that loitering and vagrancy laws with language like Cambridge's had repeatedly been struck down by the U.S. Supreme Court and other courts as unconstitutionally vague or overbroad. It advised that Cambridge's ordinance could be upheld only if police and the city applied the specific narrowing construction the opinion worked out for each of the four substantive prohibitions, not the ordinance's broader plain language.

Could Cambridge police order someone to leave just because their presence might possibly cause a disturbance?
No. The opinion concluded that a police order to leave under §12-1(c) required a clearly imminent threat of a disturbance, not a merely speculative or remote possibility, and that an arrest for disobeying the order could follow only if the person had also engaged in conduct that violated one of the ordinance's four substantive prohibitions.

Could offensive or insulting language alone lead to a loitering arrest under the ordinance?
Only in narrow circumstances. The opinion concluded that the ordinance's ban on remarks "calculated to annoy or disturb" could constitutionally reach only face-to-face "fighting words": direct personal insults inherently likely to provoke an immediate violent reaction from the specific person they were spoken to, not merely offensive, vulgar, or unpopular speech in general.

Background and statutory framework

The opinion opened by laying out the two constitutional doctrines most often used to strike down loitering and vagrancy laws. Under the void-for-vagueness doctrine, a criminal law must give ordinary people fair notice of what conduct is forbidden and must not hand police, prosecutors, and juries so little guidance that they can enforce it however they personally see fit, citing Kolender v. Lawson and Smith v. Goguen. Under the overbreadth doctrine, a law that implicates First Amendment speech or assembly rights can be struck down if it reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct, even if it also has legitimate applications, citing City of Houston, Texas v. Hill and Gooding v. Wilson. The opinion noted that Maryland's own former "tramp law," Article 27, §581, had been flagged in 1985 by an assistant attorney general as being of doubtful validity on vagueness grounds before the General Assembly repealed it in 1986.

Cambridge's ordinance closely tracked a New Jersey municipal ordinance that the New Jersey courts had already upheld in Camarco v. City of Orange, so the opinion used the New Jersey courts' reasoning as its main guide, departing from it only where Cambridge's own related ordinances (§12-2's ban on disturbing the peace by violent conduct, and §12-4's ban on loud noise disturbing a residential neighborhood) meant a New Jersey-style construction would have made one Cambridge provision redundant with another.

Working through the ordinance provision by provision, the opinion concluded: §12-1(b)(1) ("danger of a breach of the peace") reached conduct, including speech, that was inherently likely to incite a violent reaction in others, going beyond §12-2's ban on the person's own violent conduct; §12-1(b)(2) ("disturbance or annoyance to comfort or repose") was read more narrowly than the New Jersey courts had read their parallel language, limited to disrupting a lawful assembly of people or making excessive noise in nonresidential areas, so as not to duplicate §12-4's residential-noise ban; §12-1(b)(3) ("obstruct the free passage of pedestrians or vehicles") was clear on its face and posed no constitutional problem at all; and §12-1(b)(4) ("obstruct, molest, or interfere with any person lawfully in any public place") split into two parts, with its first sentence limited to conduct directed at a particular person that was inherently likely to frighten or seriously annoy them and that continued after a police warning to desist, and its second sentence (offensive or insulting remarks) limited to in-person "fighting words" under Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire and the Maryland Court of Appeals' application of that doctrine in Downs v. State.

Finally, the opinion addressed §12-1(c), the provision letting a police officer order a person to leave. Following Camarco, it concluded that an arrest required both a violation of one of the four substantive prohibitions and a subsequent refusal to obey a reasonable police order to leave, and that the officer's order itself had to be based on a clearly imminent threat of a disturbance rather than a merely speculative one. The opinion closed by cautioning Cambridge that even this narrowed reading had to be applied carefully, since the Supreme Court had separately warned that ordinances of this kind can still be unconstitutionally applied in individual cases even after being upheld on their face.

Citations and references

Statutes:

• Cambridge City Code §12-1
• Cambridge City Code §12-2
• Cambridge City Code §12-3
• Cambridge City Code §12-4
• Article 27, §121
• Article 27, §121A
• Article 27, §122
• Article 27, §123
• Article 27, §555A
• Article 27, §581
• Model Penal Code (U.L.A.) §250.6 (1974)
• N.J. Stat. Ann. §2A: 170-28
• Chapter 71 of the Laws of Maryland 1986

Cases:

• Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983)
• Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972)
• Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972)
• People v. Bright, 526 N.Y.2d 66 (1988)
• Musselman v. Commonwealth, 705 S.W.2d 476 (Ky. 1986)
• State v. Williams, 479 N.E.2d 687 (Mass. 1985)
• Pompano Beach v. Capalbo, 455 So. 2d 468 (Fla. App. 1984)
• Childers v. City of Tulsa, 658 P.2d 497 (Okla. App. 1983)
• Gates v. Santa Clara County, 185 Cal. Rptr. 330 (App. 1982)
• State v. Stilley, 416 So. 2d 928 (Cal. 1982)
• Bullock v. City of Dallas, 281 S.E.2d 613 (Ga. 1981)
• State ex rel. C.M., 630 P.2d 593 (Colo. 1981)
• State v. Bloss, 613 P.2d 354 (Haw. 1980)
• United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954)
• Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974)
• Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489 (1982)
• Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971)
• Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940)
• City of Houston, Texas v. Hill, 107 S.Ct. 2502 (1987)
• Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974)
• Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957)
• United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1 (1947)
• Diehl v. State, 294 Md. 466, 451 A.2d 115 (1982)
• Camarco v. City of Orange, 295 A.2d 353 (N.J. 1972)
• State v. Crawley, 447 A.2d 565 (N.J. 1982)
• People v. Berck, 347 N.Y.S.2d 33 (1973)
• Fields v. City of Omaha, 810 F.2d 830 (8th Cir. 1987)
• Bell v. State, 313 S.E.2d 678 (Ga. 1984)
• D.A. v. State, 471 So. 2d 147 (Fla. App. 1985)
• People v. Smith, 254 N.W.2d 654 (Mich. App. 1977)
• Detroit v. Hodges, 164 N.W.2d 781 (Mich. 1968)
• Derby v. Town of Hartford, 599 F. Supp. 130 (D. Vt. 1984)
• Kaczorowski v. City of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 525 A.2d 628 (1987)
• Boulden v. Mayor, 311 Md. 411, 535 A.2d 477 (1988)
• Davis v. State, 294 Md. 370, 451 A.2d 107 (1982)
• In re Nawrocki, 15 Md. App. 252, 289 A.2d 846 (1972)
• Hallengren v. State, 14 Md. App. 43, 286 A.2d 213 (1972)
• Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949)
• Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195 (1966)
• Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942)
• State v. Chaplinsky, 18 A.2d 754 (N.H. 1941)
• In re B.N., 238 A.2d 486 (N.J. App. Div. 1968)
• Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971)
• Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965)
• Members of City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984)
• Caldwell v. State, 26 Md. App. 94, 337 A.2d 476 (1975)
• Downs v. State, 278 Md. 610, 366 A.2d 41 (1976)
• People v. Agnello, 66 Cal. Rptr. 571 (1968)
• Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 383 U.S. 87 (1965)
• Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969)

Source

• Landing page: https://oag.maryland.gov/resources-info/Pages/attorney-general%E2%80%99s-opinions.aspx
• Original PDF: https://oag.maryland.gov/resources-info/Documents/pdfs/Opinions/1988/Volume73_1988.pdf

Original opinion text

Best-effort transcription from a scanned PDF. Minor errors may remain, the linked PDF is authoritative.

Constitutional Law—Criminal Law—Vagueness—Overbreadth—
Cambridge Loitering Ordinance Not Unconstitutional If It Is
Applied Only in Accordance with Narrowing Construction.

August 10, 1988

Chief Russell E. Wroten
Chief of Police
City of Cambridge

You have requested our opinion on the constitutionality of the anti-loitering ordinance of the City of Cambridge, §12-1 of the City Code.
For the reasons given below, we conclude that the ordinance may properly be construed so that it is not unconstitutional. At the same time, we caution that it must be applied in strict accordance with this narrowing construction to avoid unconstitutional applications.

                                          I
                         Constitutional Principles

Loitering, vagrancy, and disorderly conduct statutes and ordinances have been challenged in numerous cases, and a number of those enactments have been invalidated. E.g., Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972). Those decisions have found the challenged enactments unconstitutionally vague or overbroad.1

1 In recent years, a number of state courts have also invalidated statutes or ordinances pertaining to loitering or disorderly conduct on grounds of their vagueness or overbreadth. People v. Bright, 526 N.Y.2d 66 (1988) (loitering in transportation facility); Musselman v. Commonwealth, 705 S.W.2d 476 (Ky. 1986) (harassment); State v. Williams, 479 N.E.2d 687 (Mass. 1985) (obstructing travel); Pompano Beach v. Capalbo, 455 So. 2d 468 (Fla.App. 1984) (sleeping in vehicle); Childers v. City of Tulsa, 658 P.2d 497 (Okla. App. 1983) (refusal to obey peace officer's order to leave public place); Gates v. Santa Clara County, 185 Cal. Rptr. 330 (App. 1982) (loitering for purpose of solicitation); State v. Stilley, 416 So. 2d 928 (Cal. 1982) (loitering at polling place); Bullock v. City of Dallas, 281 S.E.2d 613 (Ga. 1981); State ex rel. C.M., 630 P.2d 593 (Colo. 1981) (loitering on school property); State v. Bloss, 613 P.2d 354 (Haw. 1980) (loitering near pinball machine).

A. Vagueness
"As generally stated, the void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." Kolender, 461 U.S. at 357. Thus, the doctrine has two aspects. First, it requires that a criminal law "give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute." United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954). Accordingly, "the Legislature may not criminalize conduct that is inherently innocent merely because such conduct is 'sometimes attended by improper motives,' since to do so would not fairly inform the ordinary citizen that an otherwise innocent act is illegal ...." People v. Bright, 526 N.Y.2d 66, 69 (1988) (citations omitted). Second, the doctrine requires that "a legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement." Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574 (1974). The second aspect is the more important, for the lack of enforcement guidelines "may permit 'a standardless sweep [that] allows policemen, prosecutors, and juries to pursue their personal predilections.'" Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358 (quoting Smith, 415 U.S. at 575).2
Nonetheless, the Constitution does not demand absolute precision in the wording of statutes and ordinances. "[L]ack of precision is not itself offensive to the requirements of due process. '... [T]he Constitution does not require impossible standards'; all that is required is that the language 'conveys sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practices ....'" Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 491 (1957) (quoting United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1947)).

2 Relying on Kolender and Papachristou, Assistant Attorney General Richard E. Israel advised that the State's then-existing tramp law, former Article 27, §581, was "of doubtful validity on account of vagueness." Letter to Delegate Virginia Thomas at 2 (April 5, 1985). That statute provided:

     Every person, not insane, who wanders about in this State and lodges in market houses, marketplaces, or in other public buildings, or in barns, outhouses, barracks, or in the open air, without having any lawful occupation in the city, town or county in which he may so wander, and without having any visible means of support, shall be deemed to be a tramp, and to be guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall be subject to imprisonment, at the discretion of the court hearing the charge, for a period of not less than thirty days, nor more than one year. This section does not apply to Allegany County.

Mr. Israel concluded that the statute did not clearly apprise ordinary people of what conduct is forbidden, in light of the vagueness of the phrase "wanders about," and vested very broad discretion in law enforcement officers to decide whether particular conduct violated the statute. The tramp law was repealed by Chapter 71 of the Laws of Maryland 1986.

Further, "a scienter requirement may mitigate a law's vagueness, especially with respect to the adequacy of notice to the complainant that his conduct is proscribed." Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 499 (1982).3 Thus, the void-for-vagueness doctrine will invalidate an enactment only if it is vague "not in the sense that it requires a person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard, but rather in the sense that no standard of conduct is specified at all." Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971).

B. Overbreadth
The closely related doctrine of overbreadth may lead to the invalidation of a statute or ordinance if the enactment implicates First Amendment rights of freedom of speech or assembly. "In every case the power to regulate must be so exercised as not, in attaining a permissible end, unduly to infringe the protected freedom." Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940). "Criminal statutes must be scrutinized with particular care ...; those that make unlawful a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct may be held facially invalid even if they also have legitimate application." City of Houston, Texas v. Hill, 107 S.Ct. 2502, 2508 (1987) (citations omitted). For example, an enactment that regulates speech "must be carefully drawn or be authoritatively construed to punish only unprotected speech ...." Gooding, 405 U.S. at 522. It must not be "susceptible of application to speech, although vulgar or offensive, that is protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments." Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 134 (1974).
The overbreadth doctrine does not mean, however, that municipalities may never enact ordinances that might impinge to some extent upon the exercise of First Amendment rights. "Only a statute

3
A "scienter" requirement is a provision in a criminal law that makes the deliberateness of an accused person's conduct a necessary element of the offense. For example, a State statute makes it unlawful to "wilfully disturb any neighborhood... by loud and unseemly noises ...." Article 27, §121. Thus, the statute was not violated by one who shouted extremely vulgar language in protest against a police officer's actions because he did not do so to disturb the neighborhood. Diehl v. State, 294 Md. 466, 472, 451 A.2d 115 (1982). See also 66 Opinions of the Attorney General 73, 77-78 (1981).

that is substantially overbroad may be invalidated on its face." Hill, 107 S.Ct. at 2508.
Municipalities are "free to prevent people from blocking sidewalks, obstructing traffic, littering streets, committing assaults, or engaging in countless other forms of antisocial conduct." Coates, 402 U.S. at 614. See also Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554 (1965). Further, municipalities "are free to ban the simple use, without demonstration of additional justifying circumstances, of so-called 'fighting words,' those personally abusive epithets which, when addressed to the ordinary citizen, are, as a matter of common knowledge, inherently likely to provoke violent reaction." Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971). The overbreadth doctrine invalidates an enactment only if it is not narrowly directed to activity that may be prohibited, but also significantly inhibits the exercise of constitutionally protected rights. Members of City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 801 (1984).

                                II
               Cambridge Loitering Ordinance

The loitering ordinance of the City of Cambridge, §12-1 of the City Code, provides as follows:

   (a) As used in this section, 'loitering' shall mean remaining idle in essentially one location and shall include the concepts of spending time idly, loafing, or walking about aimlessly, and shall also include the colloquial expression 'hanging around.' Public places shall include not only streets, alleys, and sidewalks but those establishments generally open for the public convenience.
   (b) No person shall loiter in a public place in such manner as to:
      (1) Create or cause to be created a danger of a breach of the peace;
     (2) Create or cause to be created any disturbance or annoyance to the comfort or repose of any person;
       (3) Obstruct the free passage of pedestrians or vehicles;
      (4) Obstruct, molest, or interfere with any person lawfully in any public place.
  This paragraph shall include the making of unsolicited remarks of an offensive, disgusting, or insulting nature or which are calculated to annoy or disturb the person to, or in whose hearing they are made.
     (c) Whenever the presence of any person in any public place is causing or is likely to cause any of the conditions enumerated in subsection (b), any police officer may order that person to leave that place. Any person who shall refuse to leave after being ordered to do so by a police officer shall be guilty of a violation of this section.
     (d) Any person violating this section may be deemed to be guilty of an infraction, the fine for which shall be fifty dollars ($50.00). Repeat offenses occurring within a period of one year from the initial violation shall be subject to a fine of one hundred dollars ($100.00).

Courts reviewing statutes or ordinances challenged on constitutional grounds will construe the enactments to avoid doubts as to their constitutionality, if the construction is reasonable. Davis v. State, 294 Md. 370, 278, 451 A.2d 107 (1982). Therefore, in examining the constitutionality of §12-1, we consider whether its language may reasonably be construed to avoid problems of vagueness or overbreadth.
This question, like all questions of statutory construction, is one of legislative intent — that is, of the legislative purpose, aim, or policy reflected in the enactment. Kaczorowski v. City of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 513, 525 A.2d 628 (1987). The legislative purpose or goal is sought first from the language of the enactment. Boulden v. Mayor, 311 Md. 411, 414, 535 A.2d 477 (1988). But that language is not to be read in isolation; it must be construed in light of the enactment's context. Kaczorowski, 309 Md. at 514-15. In particular, the ordinance under consideration must be read in conjunction with related enactments to determine its intended scope and effect. 309 Md. at 516-17.

                                 III
     Narrowing Construction of the Loitering Ordinance

A. New Jersey Precedent
The New Jersey state courts have upheld a loitering ordinance virtually identical to that of Cambridge. Camarco v. City of Orange, 295 A.2d 353 (N.J. 1972), aff'g 283 A.2d 122 (N.J. App. Div. 1971), aff'g 268 A.2d 354 (N.J. Super. 1970).4 The definition of "loitering" in Cambridge City Code §12-1(a) and the substantive prohibitions of §12-1(b) are word-for-word the same as the parallel provisions of the New Jersey ordinance.5 The New Jersey ordinance's provision paralleling §12-1(c), however, provides as follows:

   Whenever any police officer shall, in the exercise of reasonable judgment, decide that the presence of any person in any public place is causing or is likely to cause any of the conditions enumerated in Section 2 [the equivalent of §12-l(b)], he may, if he deems it necessary for the preservation of the public peace and safety, order that person to leave that place. Any person who shall refuse to leave after being ordered to do so by a police officer shall be guilty of a violation of this Section.

(Emphasis added.)

4
More recently, the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that an identical ordinance of the city of Newark has been preempted by state law. State v. Crawley, 447 A.2d 565, 568-69 (N.J. 1982). Although the court noted concerns about the constitutionality of loitering laws that had led the state legislature to decriminalize loitering, it did not reconsider its decision in Camarco.
5
The trial court in Camarco indicated that the New Jersey ordinance was closely patterned on a draft proposal for the Model Penal Code's section on loitering. 268 A.2d at 357. However, as finally adopted in 1974, that Model Penal Code section provides:

     "A person commits a violation if he loiters or prowls in a place, at a time, or in a manner not usual for law-abiding individuals under circumstances that warrant alarm for the safety of persons or property in the vicinity. Among the circumstances which may be considered in determining whether such alarm is warranted is the fact that the actor takes flight upon appearance of a peace officer, refuses to identify himself, or manifestly endeavors to conceal himself or any object. Unless flight by the actor or other circumstance makes it impracticable, a peace officer shall prior to any arrest for an offense under this section afford the actor an opportunity to dispel any alarm which would otherwise be warranted, by requesting him to identify himself and explain his presence and conduct. No person shall be convicted of an offense under this Section if the peace officer did not comply with the preceding sentence, or if it appears at trial that the explanation given by the actor was true and, if believed by the peace officer at the time, would have dispelled the alarm."

Model Penal Code (U.L.A.) §250.6 (1974). This final version of the section was proposed "in order 'to save the section from attack and possible invalidation as a subterfuge by which the police would be empowered to arrest and search without probable cause.'" People v. Berck, 347 N.Y.S.2d 33, 39 (1973) (quoting Model Penal Code §250.6 comment (Proposed Official Draft, 1962)). Courts have nonetheless differed on the

Note 5 continued
constitutionality of the final Model Penal Code formulation. Compare Fields v. City of Omaha, 810 F.2d 830 (8th Cir. 1987) (invalidating ordinance) with Bell v. State, 313 S.E.2d 678 (Ga. 1984) (upholding statute). Moreover, one court has stated that a statute patterned on the final Model Penal Code provision, "although constitutional, plainly reaches the outer limits of constitutionality and must be applied by the courts with special care so as to avoid unconstitutional applications." D.A. v. State, 471 So. 2d 147, 153 (Fla. App. 1985). The New Jersey Supreme Court, discussing that state's decision to delete the Model Penal Code's provision from the revised state penal code, took note of criticism by the chairman of the New Jersey Criminal Law Revision Commission that "'[t]he Model Penal Code draftsmen ... tried with little success to develop a defensible statute on loitering that would be definite enough to give notice, provide a standard of guilt, and prevent official harassment.'" State v. Crawley, 447 A.2d at 568, n.3 (quoting Knowlton, "Comments Upon the New Jersey Penal Code," 32 Rut. L. Rev. 1 (1979)).
6
Another state court has noted that "'[t]he word "loiter" has no sinister meaning and, by itself, implies no wrongdoing or misconduct, or engagement in prohibited practices.' Thus, loitering is not a crime in itself and cannot be punished constitutionally." People v. Smith, 254 N.W.2d 654, 656 (Mich. App. 1977) (quoting Detroit v. Hodges, 164 N.W.2d 781, 782 (Mich. 1968)). Accord People v. Bright, 526 N.Y.S.2d 66, 70 (1988). The United States Supreme Court has similarly pointed out that the overt actions targeted by laws that criminalize vagrancy or loitering in themselves — such actions as idling, loafing, and walking about aimlessly — "are historically part of the amenities of life as we have known them." Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 164 (1972).
7
We note, however, that another ordinance similar to Cambridge's has more recently been invalidated. Derby v. Town of Hartford, 599 F. Supp. 130 (D. Vt. 1984). Hartford's ordinance defined "loitering" to mean "remaining idle in essentially one location and shall include the concept of spending time idly; to be dilatory; to linger; to stay; to

Note 7 continued
saunter; to delay; to stand around and shall also include the colloquial expression "hanging around."' The substantive provisions were as follows:

  "(a) It shall be unlawful for any person to loiter, loaf, wander, stand or remain idle either alone and/or in consort with others in a public place in such manner so as to:
      (1) Obstruct any public street, public highway, public sidewalk or any other public place or building by hindering or impeding or tending to hinder or impede the free and uninterrupted passage of vehicles, traffic or pedestrians [sic],
      (2) Commit in or upon any public street, public highway, public sidewalk or any other public place or building any act or thing which is an obstruction or interference to the free and uninterrupted use of property or with any business lawfully conducted by anyone in or upon or facing or fronting on any such public street, public highway, public sidewalk or any other public place or building, all of which prevents the free and uninterrupted ingress, egress, and regress, therein, thereon and thereto.
  (b) When any person causes or commits any of the conditions enumerated in Subsection (a) herein, a police officer or any law enforcement officer shall order that person to stop causing or committing such conditions and to move on and disperse. Any person who fails or refuses to obey such orders shall be guilty of a violation of the Ordinance."

599 F. Supp. at 131, n.2. The town asserted that the ordinance would be violated only if a person causing an obstruction in a public place failed to "refrain from obstructing" after being warned by police to do so. 599 F. Supp. at 135. Nonetheless, the court held that the ordinance was unconstitutionally vague, noting that "there is no indication as to how long one can remain 'idle in essentially one location' before that conduct constitutes loitering." Thus, the court concluded that the language of the ordinance was not in reality limited to obstructive conduct, but would permit an arrest merely for remaining idly in one place. Id.
8
"Disorderly conduct" is a term of indefinite meaning, "signifying generally any behavior that is contrary to law, and more particularly such as tends to disturb the public peace or decorum, scandalize the community, or shock the public sense of morality." Black's Law Dictionary, 422 (5th ed. 1979).

The New Jersey courts "readily recognized that if the ordinance broadly proscribed loitering or idling without more it would be unconstitutional." Camarco, 295 A.2d at 354.6 With that constitutional inevitability in mind, those courts construed the ordinance instead to "simply proscrib[e] loitering which obstructs, molests or interferes with others lawfully in public places or which threatens an immediate breach of the peace." Thus circumscribed, the reach of the ordinance was constitutional. In addition, they held that a violation of the ordinance may arise only when a person who is committing one of the prohibited acts of loitering refuses to obey a police officer's order to move. Id. Because the ordinance considered in Camarco is essentially identical to the Cambridge loitering ordinance, we will look to the New Jersey courts' opinions for guidance in construing the Cambridge ordinance.7

B. Construction With Other Law
In our construction of §12-1 of the Cambridge City Code, we will not follow precisely the same path trod by the New Jersey courts in Camarco; nor do we reach precisely the same terminus. The New Jersey courts found no related ordinance to which it was necessary to refer in construing the loitering ordinance. However, the Cambridge City Code does include additional ordinances also pertaining to disorderly conduct.8 We believe that §12-1 must be construed in light of those ordinances. See Kaczorowski v. City of Baltimore, 309 Md. at 515 (context of enactment includes related enactments).
Section 12-2 of the Cambridge City Code provides:

     It shall be unlawful for any person within the corporate limits of the City to disturb, tend to disturb, or aid in disturbing the peace of others by violent, tumultuous, offensive, or obstreperous conduct and no person shall knowingly permit such conduct upon any premises owned or possessed by him or under his control. Any person violating this section may be deemed to be guilty of an infraction, the fine for which shall be fifty dollars ($50.00). Repeat offenses occurring within a period of one year from the initial violation shall be subject to a fine of one hundred dollars ($100.00).

Section 12-4 of the Cambridge City Code provides:

     No person shall indulge in loud and boisterous laughing or talking, engage in the blowing of horns, or with the voice or by any other means make any loud or unseemly noises to the disturbance of the quiet or comfort of the people who may reside or be in the neighborhood. Any person violating this section shall be fined not less than one dollar ($1.00) or more than one hundred dollars ($100.00).9

Enactments pertaining to disorderly conduct not infrequently appear to overlap each other to a certain extent. Compare Article 27, §121 with §122 and §123. See In re Nawrocki, 15 Md. App. 252, 257-59, 289 A.2d 846 (1972) (construing statutes). Nonetheless, §12-1 was clearly intended to do more than merely duplicate any of the provisions of §§12-2 and 12-4. Therefore, while §12-1 may reach some of the same general kind of conduct reached by §§12-2 and 12-4, §12-1 must be construed to also reach different forms of conduct. Accordingly, we will follow Camarco as a guide, but we will not adhere completely to the construction of the loitering ordinance there adopted. To the extent that the Camarco construction may simply duplicate §§12-2 or 12-4, it is not fully applicable to §12-1.

9
Section 12-3 prohibits the keeping of a disorderly house, including a house of prostitution or a place for gambling. Thus, it also forms a part of the City's general system for controlling disorderly conduct, although its provisions are not directly relevant to our discussion of §12-1.

                                    IV

                    Cambridge City Code §12-1

A. "Create or cause to be created a danger of a breach of the peace" - §12-1 (b)(1)

The New Jersey Appellate Division concluded that "breach of the peace" imports conduct that is violent or that incites or provokes others to violence and destruction of public order. 283 A.2d at 124-25.10 Therefore, it held that the first prohibition is directed to "only such loitering conduct as clearly will cause an immediate, actual, physical violent reaction from any person, which violent reaction will cause a threat to the peace and order of the public." 283 A.2d at 125.
However, another provision of the Cambridge City Code reaches conduct of this kind. Section 12-2 of the City Code prohibits "disturb[ing], tend[ing] to disturb, or aid[ing] in disturbing the peace of others by violent, tumultuous, offensive, or obstreperous conduct ....11 Thus, this other ordinance is aimed specifically at conduct that is violent or belligerent. In addition, we think that the references to conduct "tending" toward or "aiding" in a disturbance, as well as the described nature of the prohibited conduct, indicate that §12-2 is aimed at disturbances involving more than one participant. Accordingly, we conclude that §12-2 is aimed at conduct that, by virtue of its violent nature, is a direct participation with others in a disturbance or incites or provokes others to engage in similarly violent or obstreperous behavior.
The construction given to the equivalent of §12-l(b)(1) by the New Jersey courts would reach some conduct of the same type addressed by §12-2 — conduct that, because of its violent nature, "will cause an immediate, actual, physical violent reaction from any person ...."

10
Of the three published decisions in Camarco, only that of the Appellate Division explains the basis of the construction given to the ordinance; the Supreme Court of New Jersey adopted that construction without additional comment. 295 A.2d at 354-355. Hence, our discussion will focus on the decision of the intermediate court.
11
In addition, §12-2 prohibits "knowingly permit[ting] such conduct upon any premises owned or possessed by [the actor] or under [the actor's] control."

283 A.2d at 125. Thus, under this construction, some violent conduct would be punishable under either §12-1(b)(1) or §12-2.12 However, the New Jersey courts did not limit the provision's applicability to conduct that induces a violent reaction by virtue of its own violent nature. To the contrary, the Appellate Division indicated that the term "breach of the peace" "'includes not only violent acts but acts and words likely to produce violence in others.'" Id. (quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308 (1940)). Thus, the construction adopted by the New Jersey courts would reach both the violent conduct that we believe to be embraced by §12-2 and additional conduct — specifically, conduct that, albeit not violent in itself, nonetheless is inherently likely to induce a violent reaction in others.
Because the New Jersey courts' construction reaches beyond the scope of §12-2, we believe it is a proper construction of §12-1(b)(1). Our view in this regard is bolstered by consideration of the definition of "loitering" in §12-1(a) in conjunction with the substantive provision of §12-l(b)(1). While "breach of the peace" undeniably includes violent conduct, "spending time idly, loafing, walking about aimlessly, and ... 'hanging around'" denote conduct that simply cannot be described as inherently violent. We believe that the conduct described by the definition may, however, include inciting others to violence.
We believe that this provision, as thus construed, is not unconstitutional on its face. While it would unquestionably apply to speech, it would prohibit only speech that "advocate[s] imminent lawless action and [is] likely to incite a breach of the peace ...." Diehl v. State, 294 Md. 466, 472, 451 A.2d 115 (1982) (applying Article 27, §121). Speech of that nature may constitutionally be prohibited. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). See also Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971) (state may prevent a speaker from intentionally provoking a given group to hostile reaction).
At the same time, we caution that the provision must be applied with great care to avoid unconstitutional applications. The Supreme Court has made it clear that the expression of ideas or opinions may not be punished merely because the speech disturbs those who hear it. The constitutionally guaranteed freedom of speech "may indeed

12
To be sure, a person may not be convicted under both §12-l(b)(1) and §12-2 for the same conduct. However, a single sequence of acts may comprise differing conduct violative of each. See, e.g., Hallengren v. State, 14 Md. App. 43, 52, 286 A.2d 213 (1972) (making loud and unseemly noises violated Article 27, §121; exhorting crowd to kill police and throwing stone and bottle violated §123; and convictions did not merge, although conduct constituted "a continuous sequence of criminal acts").

best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger." Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 3 (1949)13 The determination of whether a violation has occurred cannot "involv[e] calculations as to the boiling point of a particular person or a particular group, [rather than] an appraisal of the comments per se." Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195, 200 (1966).

B. "Create or cause to be created any disturbance or annoyance to the comfort or repose of any person" — §12-1 (b)(2)
The New Jersey Appellate Division found this provision to be "very similar" to a previously upheld New Jersey statute punishing "'any person who by noisy or disorderly conduct disturbs or interferes with the quiet or good order of any place of assembly ....'" 283 A.2d at 125 (quoting N.J. Stat. Ann. §2A: 170-28). In addition, the Appellate Division took note of Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942), in which the United States Supreme Court held that states may constitutionally prohibit the unjustified use of words that, by their nature, will provoke the ordinarily sensitive addressee to a violent reaction. 283 A.2d at 126. The Appellate Division pointed out that, in an earlier case, it had held that "an ordinance proscribing loud, offensive, disorderly, threatening, abusive, or insulting language and offensive, disorderly, threatening, abusive, or insulting manner" prohibited only "'actions ... such as would usually be considered as having a direct tendency to cause acts of violence by the persons to whom addressed.'" Id. (quoting In re B.N., 238 A.2d 486, 489 (N.J. App. Div. 1968)). The Appellate Division concluded that this provision of the loitering ordinance "proscribes loitering which will so disturb a person as to cause such person to react immediately in such a way as to threaten by physical violence the peace and order of the public." Id.
As thus construed, there is no apparent distinction between this provision and the first — both prohibit conduct, including "fighting words," that will provoke another person to physical violence. Indeed, a partial concurrence in the Supreme Court of New Jersey rejected the Appellate Division's construction of this provision expressly on the ground of its redundancy:

13
In Terminiello, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional an ordinance that had been construed to punish speech that "stirs the public to anger, invites dispute, brings about a condition of unrest, or creates a disturbance." Id.

  To read into [this provision], as the Appellate Division did, the qualification that the forbidden conduct must be as to threaten physically "the peace and order of the public" is to ignore that the ordinance separately, in [the equivalent of §12-l(b)(1)], already forbids loitering which would "create or cause to be created a danger of a breach of the peace" and that therefore the other [provisions] must have meant to proscribe conduct which need not create a danger of breach of the peace.

295 A.2d at 356 (Conford, J., concurring in part).14 We are likewise unable to conclude that a legislative body intends, when it adopts differently worded provisions in a single law, that those provisions should have the same effect. See Kaczorowski v. City of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 513, 525 A.2d 628 (1987) ("[W]hat the legislature has written in an effort to achieve a goal is a natural ingredient of analysis to determine that goal.") Therefore, we believe that §12-l(b)(2) is intended to reach conduct that is not within the reach of §12-l(b)(1).
In seeking to delineate that conduct, we believe it necessary to consider §12-4 of the Cambridge City Code. That section prohibits the making of "any loud or unseemly noises to the disturbance of the quiet or comfort of the people who may reside or be in the neighborhood." In our view, this ordinance's reference to "the people who may reside or be in the neighborhood" indicates that its aim is to prevent the making of excessive and unseemly noise that disturbs the peace of residential areas. Section 12-1, in contrast, is concerned with conduct in public places, specifically including "those establishments generally open for the public convenience." Reading §12-l(b)(2) in the context of §12-4, therefore, we infer that §12-l(b)(2) was intended to prohibit the making of excessive and unseemly noise to the disturbance of the peace in nonresidential areas or to the disturbance of any lawful assemblage of persons in a public place. Thus, we construe this provision more narrowly than did the New Jersey courts.

14
This partial concurrence applied the same criticism to the Appellate Division's construction of the fourth substantive provision. See Part IIB4 below. Feeling constrained to reject that construction, the concurrence was also unable to uphold the validity of those provisions: "[T]hose paragraphs extending, inter alia, to conduct which is an 'annoyance' to, or 'calculated to annoy or disturb,' others, they fall afoul of the strictures against facial overbreadth in relation to freedom of expression ...." Id. The concurrence agreed with the majority only that the appellants were not aggrieved by the decision of the Appellate Division.

Giving §12-1(b)(2) this construction, we believe that it is not unconstitutional on its face. Disruption of lawful assemblies is one of the "countless ... forms of antisocial conduct" that a city is free to prevent. See Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971). Put another way, §12-l(b)(2) represents a restriction "designed to promote the public convenience in the interest of all ...." Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554 (1965). The Maryland Court of Appeals has pointed out that, while speech intended to convey a message is ordinarily protected by the First Amendment, "if however, the verbal conduct was noncommunicative but, nevertheless could be reasonably expected to cause a potentially violent disruption, then there was no speech interest involved and the conduct may be constitutionally controlled." Diehl v. State, 294 Md. 466, 471, 451 A.2d 115 (1982).

C. "Obstruct the free passage of pedestrians or vehicles" — §12-l(b)(3)
The New Jersey Appellate Division found "nothing vague about the conduct proscribed by this portion of the ordinance." 283 A.2d at 126. In that conclusion we fully concur: §12-l(b)(3) clearly and simply prohibits loitering in such a way as to block a sidewalk, a street, or any other passage used by pedestrians or vehicles.
We also concur in the New Jersey courts' conclusion that this provision is constitutional. It can hardly be questioned that the city may constitutionally prohibit blocking sidewalks and obstructing traffic. Indeed, the Supreme Court has expressly noted that "[t]he control of travel on the streets is a clear example of governmental responsibility to insure men [the] necessary [public] order [for the preservation of liberty] .... Governmental authorities have the duty and responsibility to keep their streets open and available for movement." Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. at 554-55. But see State v. Williams, 479 N.E.2d 687 (Mass. 1985) (invalidating as unconstitutionally vague ordinance prohibiting sauntering or loitering so as to obstruct travel).

D. "Obstruct, molest, or interfere with any person lawfully in any public place" — §12-l(b)(4)
This provision "include[s] the making of unsolicited remarks of an offensive, disgusting, or insulting nature or which are calculated to annoy or disturb the person to, or in whose hearing they are made." The New Jersey Appellate Division found it unnecessary to discuss this provision at any length. That court concluded that the first sentence "is clear and suffers from no possible constitutional infirmity," and it applied to the second sentence the same construction it had given to the equivalent of §12-l(b)(2). 283 A.2d at 126.15 Because we believe it necessary to construe the provisions of §12-1 to avoid redundancy, we believe that this provision requires some additional discussion.
We have concluded that §12-l(b)(2) prohibits disrupting lawful public assemblies and that §12-l(b)(3) prohibits obstructing traffic generally. That is, those provisions prohibit conduct aimed against groups or the public at large. In contrast, this provision seems clearly to be concerned with conduct directed against particular individuals. The first sentence, which prohibits conduct that "[o]bstruct[s], molest[s] or interfere[s] with any person lawfully in any public place" was evidently intended to punish the harassment of a person who is peaceably going about his or her business. Cf. Article 27, §121A (prohibiting following another about or maliciously engaging in course of conduct that alarms or seriously annoys another, with intent to harass, alarm or annoy). The words used to describe the prohibited conduct are generally understood to refer to behavior that is deliberate and hostile. To "molest" another, for example, means to "interfere with or meddle with unwarrantably so as to injure or disturb." Webster's New International Dictionary 1580 (2d ed. 1953). Thus, we think that this provision is intended to reach conduct that does not merely inconvenience another person, but that is inherently frightening or seriously annoying.
Although the question is a close one, we conclude that this first part of the provision, as thus construed, is not facially unconstitutional. Because we conclude that it should be construed to reach only conduct inherently likely to frighten or seriously annoy another, its violation does not turn on the sensitivity of a particular person. Cf. Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. at 614 (ordinance prohibiting conduct annoying to passersby lacks specification of standard of conduct because "[c]onduct that annoys some people does not annoy others"); Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195, 200 (1966) (statute prohibiting conduct "calculated to create" disturbances of peace "involves calculations as to the boiling point of a particular person or a particular group, not an appraisal of the nature of the comments per se"). Therefore, it does not fail to warn the ordinary person of what conduct is prohibited nor fail to provide standards for its enforcement.

15
As noted above, that construction also duplicated the construction given to the equivalent of §12-l(b)(1). See text accompanying note 13 above.

But see Musselman v. Commonwealth, 705 S.W.2d 476 (Ky. 1986) (invalidating as overbroad statute prohibiting harassment by coarse or abusive language).
However, this part of the provision must be applied with special care. We note that a State statute prohibiting harassment by the use of the telephone has been held by the Court of Special Appeals to be constitutional because it explicitly requires proof of the actor's specific intent to "annoy, abuse, torment, harass, or embarrass ...." Caldwell v. State, 26 Md. App. 94, 105, 337 A.2d 476 (1975) (upholding Article 27, §555A).16 Similarly, the State's harassment statute, Article 27, §121A, is clearly constitutional because it prohibits "engag[ing] in a course of conduct that alarms or seriously annoys another person ... with intent to harass, alarm, or annoy the other person ... after reasonable warning or request to desist by the other person ... without a legal purpose." In a letter of advice, a member of this office concluded that the intent requirement obviates any problem of vagueness and the remaining provisions obviate any problem of overbreadth. Letter from Staff Attorney Kathryn M. Rowe to Senator Leo E. Green (January 20, 1986).
The Cambridge ordinance does not explicitly include a specific intent requirement, nor is it worded as precisely as Article 27, §121A. Therefore, to avoid unconstitutional applications of this provision, it should be applied only to conduct directed against a particular person that is of a nature inherently likely to frighten or seriously annoy the other person and that is persisted in after a police officer's warning to desist.17
The New Jersey court indicated that both §12-l(b)(2) and the second sentence of §12-l(b)(4) should be construed to prohibit the use of "fighting words." We did not so construe §12-l(b)(2); however, that construction is clearly applicable to the second sentence of §12-l(b)(4). The Supreme Court first upheld a prohibition against the use of "fighting words" in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). Notably, the statute at issue in that case was worded similarly to §12-1(b)(4): It provided that "'[n]o person shall address any offen-

16
The Court of Special Appeals also held that there was insufficient evidence to sustain a conviction under the statute where the evidence showed that the target of the telephone calls was disturbed by them, but not that the caller intended to harass, alarm, or annoy her. 26 Md. App. at 113.
17
We believe that refusal to obey a police officer's warning or order to desist is a prerequisite to any arrest under §12-1. See Part IIIE below.

sive, derisive or annoying word to any other person who is lawfully in any street or other public place, nor call him by any offensive or derisive name ....'" State v. Chaplinsky, 18 A.2d 754, 757 (N.H. 1941). The New Hampshire court construed that statute to reach only such words "as have a direct tendency to cause acts of violence by the person to whom, individually, the remark is addressed." 18 A.2d at 758. Hence, "[d]erisive and annoying words can be taken as coming within the purview of the statute ... only when they have this characteristic of plainly tending to excite the addressee to a breach of the peace." 18 A.2d at 762. In our view, the loitering ordinance's prohibition against "offensive, disgusting, or insulting" remarks or remarks "calculated to annoy or disturb" is likewise properly construed as reaching only those direct personal insults that are inherently likely to provoke a violent reaction on the part of the person to or of whom they are spoken.
In light of the Supreme Court's decision in Chaplinsky, we think that this second part of §12-l(b)(4), as we construe it, is clearly constitutional. To be sure, the city may not punish speech merely because it is offensive to some who hear it. Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 527 (1972). See also Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195, 200 (1966) ("to make an offense of conduct which is 'calculated to create disturbances of the peace' leaves wide open the standard of responsibility"). As the Supreme Court observed in another case: "Surely the State has no right to cleanse public debate to the point where it is grammatically palatable to the most squeamish among us." Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971). Nonetheless, the city may prohibit the use of epithets "which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace." Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
In Downs v. State, 278 Md. 610, 614-15, 366 A.2d 41 (1976), the Court of Appeals noted that, in light of the Supreme Court's decisions in Cohen and Gooding:

   [T]he only speech which can be punished, in this context, is that which has '"a direct tendency to cause acts of violence by the person to whom, individually, the remark is addressed."'... In effect, "fighting" words have been recognized as having some social value and are punishable now not on a "per se" basis but only when there is a likelihood of imminent disturbance.

(Citations omitted.)18 The correctness of that summary has recently

18
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals held that a vulgarly worded racial slur could not be punished as "fighting words" where there was no evidence that it was spoken to or heard by anyone who would regard it as a personal insult; there was no evidence that anyone was in fact offended; "[a]nd, even if someone were offended by it, there was no evidence that any person was so aroused as to respond in a violent manner." 278 Md. at 618.

been confirmed in City of Houston, Texas v. Hill, 107 S.Ct. 2502, 2509-10 (1987). Therefore, this provision may be applied only to the face-to-face utterance of direct personal insults inherently likely to cause an imminent disturbance.19

E. "[R]efuse to leave after being ordered to do so by a police officer" — §12-1(c)
The New Jersey Supreme Court held that the provision equivalent to §12-l(c) establishes an essential and limiting element of a loitering violation. Thus, "where there is conduct contrary to [the substantive prohibitions] there must, in addition, be a refusal to obey a police order to move on before a charge under the ordinance may be prosecuted." 295 A.2d at 354. The partial concurrence disapproved this aspect of the ordinance's construction because a later section of the ordinance "says the violation of any provision of the ordinance is punishable as an offense. Thus conduct violative of any [substantive] provision ... is a completed offense even if there is no officer present to require the offender to move on." 295 A.2d at 356 (Conford, J., concurring in part). The Cambridge ordinance contains no such provision; it provides simply that a violation of "this section" is a municipal infraction. §12-1(d). Therefore, we have no hesitation in concurring with the New Jersey courts that a violation of the loitering law arises only when a person who is engaged in one of the prohibited forms of conduct refuses to obey a police officer's order to leave.
We note that §12-1(c) authorizes a police officer to order a person to leave not only when that person is actually causing any of the

19
We note particularly that, in Hill, the Supreme Court acknowledged that its earlier decision in Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974), suggests that the "fighting words" doctrine enunciated in Chaplinsky "might require a narrower application in cases involving words addressed to a police officer," because police officers may be reasonably expected to have been trained to exercise restraint [107 S.Ct. at 2510]. The Maryland Court of Appeals has likewise pointed out that "there is some question as to whether words addressed to the police can be classified as 'fighting words,' or whether a different and higher standard applies when the addressee is a police officer." Diehl v. State, 294 Md. 466, 477, 451 A.2d 115 (1982). In any case, "the First Amendment protects a significant amount of verbal criticism and challenge directed at police officers." Hill, 107 S.Ct. at 2502.

prohibited conditions, but also when "the presence of any person in any public place ... is likely to cause any of the conditions enumerated ...." In our view, that language does not authorize a police order to leave unless there is a clearly imminent threat of a disturbance. See People v. Agnello, 66 Cal. Rptr. 571, 574 (1968) ("likely" means at least probable, if not something stronger).
Accordingly, we do not think that the additional language contained in the ordinance considered in Camarco adds any vital substance to this provision. See Part IIA above. In our view, Cambridge's ordinance inherently requires that a police order to leave be reasonable and "necessary for the preservation of the public peace and safety."
Because we construe this provision to authorize an arrest only when there is both conduct that violates one of the substantive prohibitions and a refusal to obey a reasonable police order to move, we conclude that §12-1(c) is constitutional. See Cox v. Louisiana, 376 U.S. 536, 551 (1965) (refusal to move on, as element of offense, "is narrow and specific"). Cf. Childers v. City of Tulsa, 658 P.2d 497 (Okla. App. 1983) (invalidating ordinance prohibiting remaining on public property after demand by peace officer to leave, where no other unlawful conduct required). Yet we point out that, in upholding a similar ordinance, the Supreme Court remarked that "it requires no great feat of imagination to envisage situations in which such an ordinance might be unconstitutionally applied." Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 383 U.S. 87, 91 (1965). We caution that care must be taken to ensure that this provision, like the other provisions of §12-1, is not applied merely to remove from the streets persons whose presence is an irritant to a police officer or other person.

                              V
                          Conclusion
In summary, we conclude that Cambridge's loitering ordinance, §12-1 of the Cambridge City Code, may properly be construed so that it is not unconstitutional. At the same time, we caution that it must be applied in strict accordance with this narrowing construction to avoid unconstitutional applications.

       J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Attorney General
       C. J. Messerschmidt, Assistant Attorney General

Jack Schwartz
Chief Counsel
Opinions & Advice