Do Maryland's 1988 dollar caps on crime-victim compensation awards apply to claims that were already pending when the caps took effect?

Plain-English summary

In 1988, the Maryland General Assembly overhauled how the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board processes claims from crime victims, adding board members, changing the review process, giving the Secretary of Public Safety final decisionmaking authority, and, notably, capping how much any single claimant could receive. The Secretary asked whether these changes, effective July 1, 1988, applied to claims already pending on that date or only to new claims going forward. The Attorney General concluded that every part of the new law, including the new dollar caps on awards, applies to any claim still pending (not yet finally decided) as of the effective date. The procedural changes were easy calls because they did not touch anyone's substantive entitlement. The dollar caps were the harder question, but the opinion reasoned that because crime victims have no independent legal right to compensation from the State in the first place, only an expectation of an award granted as a matter of legislative grace, capping the amount does not take away a vested right, so the ordinary presumption favoring retroactive application of remedy-only statutes controlled, reinforced by the law's own legislative history showing the caps were meant to stretch limited appropriated funds across the fiscal year immediately.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1988. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

If a Maryland crime victim's compensation claim was already pending when a new law capped award amounts, does the old, higher limit still apply to them?
No, according to the opinion. It concluded that the new caps apply to any claim on which the Board (or, under the new law, the Secretary) had not yet issued a final decision by the law's July 1, 1988 effective date, even if the claim had been filed and was pending well before that date.

Why didn't the victims' claims count as a "vested right" that the new law couldn't touch?
The opinion reasoned that Maryland law never gave crime victims an independent legal right to be compensated by the State for their injuries; compensation was created "as a matter of moral responsibility," making the program more like government financial assistance than a lawsuit, so a claimant has no legally enforceable right until the Board actually finds the statutory prerequisites met and grants an award.

Did the change in how claims are reviewed (more board members, a new appeals structure) apply to pending cases too?
Yes. The opinion found these procedural changes were even easier to apply retrospectively than the dollar caps, since they did not alter who could file a claim, what standards governed eligibility, or how much compensation was available, so they fell squarely within the general rule that purely procedural statutes apply to pending cases.

Was there anything in the 1988 law itself that showed lawmakers wanted the caps to apply right away?
Yes. The opinion pointed to the bill's fiscal note, which predicted the caps would save roughly $450,000 in the first fiscal year, as evidence the General Assembly meant the savings, and therefore the caps, to take effect immediately rather than only for claims filed after July 1, 1988.

Background and statutory framework

Before Chapter 250, a single Board member decided each claim initially (on the papers or after a hearing if needed), with review available to the full Board, whose decision was final and appealable to circuit court. Chapter 250 replaced that with review by a three-member panel, followed by a decision from the Secretary of Public Safety and Correctional Services (who could modify, affirm, or reverse the panel), appealable to circuit court under the State Government Article. Because the amended law now gives claimants a right to a hearing before a decision, the opinion noted that the Administrative Procedure Act's "contested case" provisions, which previously did not apply to Board proceedings, now do.

Substantively, Chapter 250 also capped compensation: no more than $25,000 for a disability-related claim and $45,000 for a medical claim, with an overall $45,000 ceiling per claimant across all awards, replacing a prior scheme where a permanently and totally disabled claimant could receive open-ended compensation tied to the workers' compensation disability schedule. The opinion applied the general Maryland rule that statutes are presumed to operate only prospectively unless they affect merely procedure or remedy rather than substantive rights, in which case the presumption flips toward retrospective application to pending cases. It found the Board's procedural changes were purely that: procedure. The dollar caps were closer to the line, since they plainly affect the size of a real-world payment, but the opinion held that a cap on a government benefit program is different from a cap on a private cause of action, because the crime victim compensation program does not confer a private right of action against the State the way, for example, the Wrongful Death Act does. Drawing on the Court of Appeals' decision in Criminal Injuries Compensation Board v. Gould and out-of-state case law treating victim compensation as welfare-like assistance rather than a legal entitlement, the opinion concluded that a claimant's interest before the Board rules is only an expectation, not a vested right, so retrospective application of the caps does not run afoul of the general bar on impairing vested rights.

The opinion distinguished this situation from cases holding that changes to monetary limits on tort recovery apply only prospectively, noting that those cases involved statutes creating or regulating a private right of action against another private party, unlike the crime-victim compensation program, where the State itself is the only source of any payment and no one has an enforceable right to it before the Board acts. Finally, the opinion pointed to the General Assembly's own practice in an earlier, separate 1985 amendment to the same Act, where lawmakers had expressly limited that amendment to claims filed on or after its effective date; the absence of similar limiting language in Chapter 250, combined with the fiscal note's assumption of immediate savings, supported reading Chapter 250 to apply to all pending claims.

Citations and references

Statutes:

• Article 26A
• Former §8
• Former §9(a)
• Former §9(b)
• Former §10
• Article 26A, §8(a) and (d)
• §8(d)
• §8(f)
• SG §10-215
• SG §10-201(c)
• §10-201 through §10-214 of the State Government Article
• Article 26A, §12(b)
• Article 101, §36
• Article 101, §36(1)
• Article 101, §36(4a)
• Article 26A, §12(a)(2)
• §12(f)(2)
• Article 26A, §1
• §3-902 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article
• Chapter 250, Laws of Maryland 1988
• Chapter 120, Laws of Maryland 1985, sec. 2

Cases:

• Criminal Injuries Compensation Board v. Gould, 273 Md. 486, 499, 331 A.2d 55 (1975)
• Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm'n v. Riverdale Heights Volunteer Fire Co., 308 Md. 556, 561, 520 A.2d 1319 (1987)
• State Comm'n on Human Relations v. Amecom Division of Litton Systems, Inc., 278 Md. 120, 123, 360 A.2d 1 (1976)
• Mason v. State, 309 Md. 215, 219, 522 A.2d 1344 (1987)
• Wittel v. Baker, 10 Md. App. 531, 539
• Spielman v. State, 298 Md. 602, 607, 471 A.2d 730 (1984)
• Aviles v. Eshelman Electric Corp., 281 Md. 529, 533, 379 A.2d 1227 (1977)
• Janda v. General Motors Corp., 237 Md. 161, 168-69, 205 A.2d 228 (1964)
• Luxmanor Citizens Association v. Burkart, 266 Md. 631, 646, 296 A.2d 403 (1972)
• Breedon v. Maryland Department of Education, 45 Md. App. 73, 83, 411 A.2d 1073 (1980)
• Gee v. Mass Transit Admin., 75 Md. App. 253, 260-61, 540 A.2d 1194 (1988)
• Blocher v. Harlow, 268 Md. 571, 581, 303 A.2d 395 (1973)
• Regan v. Crime Victims Compensation Board, 455 N.Y.S.2d 552, 553 (N.Y. 1982)
• Division of Worker's Compensation, Bureau of Crimes Compensation v. Brevda, 420 So.2d 887, 891-92 (Fla. App. 1982)
• Bureau of Crimes Compensation v. Williams, 405 So.2d 747, 748 (Fla. App. 1981)
• Williams v. Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, 307 Md. 606, 614, 516 A.2d 573 (1986)
• State v. Richardson, 233 Md. 534, 541, 197 A.2d 428 (1964)
• Gryziec v. Zweibel, 426 N.Y.S.2d 616, 619 (App. Div. 1980)
• Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund Board v. Bowman, 249 Md. 705, 710, 241 A.2d 714 (1968)
• Kaczorowski v. City of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 515-16, 525 A.2d 628 (1987)
• City of Baltimore v. Hooper, 312 Md. 378, 539 A.2d 1130 (1988)
• Department of Tidewater Fisheries v. Sollers, 201 Md. 603, 611, 95 A.2d 306 (1953)

Source

• Landing page: https://oag.maryland.gov/resources-info/Pages/attorney-general%E2%80%99s-opinions.aspx
• Original PDF: https://oag.maryland.gov/resources-info/Documents/pdfs/Opinions/1988/Volume73_1988.pdf

Original opinion text

Best-effort transcription from a scanned PDF. Minor errors may remain, the linked PDF is authoritative.

STATUTES

Criminal Injuries Compensation Board—1988 Amendments To Criminal Injuries Compensation Act Apply Retrospectively.

August 2, 1988

The Honorable Bishop L. Robinson
Secretary of Public Safety and
Correctional Services

You have requested our opinion on the application of Chapter 250 (House Bill 823) of the Laws of Maryland 1988, which enacted various amendments to the Criminal Injuries Compensation Act, Article 26A of the Maryland Code. Specifically, you ask whether the amendments apply retrospectively to claims pending on Chapter 250's effective date of July 1, 1988, or must be applied only prospectively. If the provisions of Chapter 250 must be applied prospectively, you further ask whether they apply to all claims filed on or after the effective date or only to claims arising from crimes committed on or after the effective date.

For the reasons given below, we conclude that Chapter 250's provisions apply retrospectively, to all pending claims on which no final decision had been rendered by July 1, 1988.1

                                      I
                      Provisions of Chapter 250

Chapter 250 has increased the number of members of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board (the "Board") from three to five; significantly altered the procedure for reviewing and deciding claims for criminal injuries compensation; given final decisionmaking authority to the Secretary of Public Safety and Correctional Services (the "Secretary"); and limited the amount of compensation that may be granted.
Previously, Article 26A provided that each claim would be referred for initial review and decision to a single member of the Board. For that purpose, the Board members were authorized to decide the claim without a hearing, on the basis of supporting documents filed by the claimant and the report of the Board's own investigation of the claim; or to hold a hearing on the claim, if the documentary record should be inadequate to permit a decision. Former §8. The claimant had a right to seek review of the single member's decision by the full Board. Former §9(a). On review, the full Board had discretion to supplement the record by holding a hearing, if it deemed the receipt of additional evidence to be necessary, and to affirm, reverse, or modify the initial decision. In any case, the full Board's decision on the claim was final. Former §9(b). The claimant, the Secretary, and the Attorney General were entitled to appeal that decision to the appropriate circuit court. Former §10.
Under Chapter 250, a claim is to be reviewed initially by a panel of three members of the Board, who may recommend a tentative decision on the basis of the supporting documents filed and the report of the Board's investigation or may order a hearing if they are unable to decide the claim on the basis of that documentary record. Article 26A, §8(a) and (d). If a tentative decision is recommended, the claimant may request a hearing before the panel to present additional information. §8(d).2 Thereafter, the three-member panel of the Board issues its decision in the form of a report to the Secretary, who may modify, affirm, or reverse the Board's decision. §8(f). The claimant may appeal the Secretary's decision to the circuit court in accordance with SG §10-215.
In addition to these changes in the process for reviewing and deciding claims, Chapter 250 has imposed maximum limits on the amounts that may be awarded as disability benefits and for reimbursement of medical expenses, as well as on the total amount of compensation that may be awarded under all provisions of Article 26A. Article 26A, §12(b) requires that awards of disability benefits be calculated in accordance with Article 101, §36 as that section existed on July 1, 1974. Under that version of Article 101, §36, the largest amount of compensation available for a permanent partial disability is $26,000, which may be granted only for the complete loss or loss of use of an arm or a leg.3 The amount of benefits available for permanent total disability under Article 101, §36(1), however, is effectively unlimited, because those benefits are to continue throughout the period of the disability. Chapter 250 amended Article 26A, §12(a)(2) to provide that criminal injuries compensation "shall not exceed $25,000 for any disability related claim and $45,000 for any medical claim." In addition, §12(a)(2) as amended now provides that "[t]he maximum amount awarded under all of the provisions of this [Criminal Injuries Compensation] Act shall not exceed $45,000, including any subsequent and supplemental awards."

                                        II
             Retrospective or Prospective Application

A. General Principles
A retrospective application of a statute determines the legal significance of acts that occurred before the statute's effective date. Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm'n v. Riverdale Heights Volunteer Fire Co., 308 Md. 556, 561, 520 A.2d 1319 (1987). "Thus a statute, though applied only in legal proceedings subsequent to its effective date and in that sense, at least, prospective, is, when applied so as to determine the legal significance of acts or events that occurred prior to its effective date, applied retroactively." State Comm'n on Human Relations v. Amecom Division of Litton Systems, Inc., 278 Md. 120, 123, 360 A.2d 1 (1976).
The question whether a statute is applicable retrospectively is a question of legislative intent. Mason v. State, 309 Md. 215, 219, 522 A.2d 1344 (1987); Wittel v. Baker, 10 Md. App. 531, 539. Because retrospective application carries with it a potential for interference with substantive rights, however, it is presumed that the General Assembly ordinarily intends statutes to apply only prospectively. Mason v. State, 309 Md. at 221.4 Nonetheless, there is no absolute bar to retrospective application. Spielman v. State, 298 Md. 602, 607, 471 A.2d 730 (1984).
Moreover, the presumption concerning legislative intent favors retrospectivity when the statute at issue affects only procedure or remedies. If the statute neither creates nor impairs any substantive right, therefore, the statute ordinarily applies to pending proceedings, as well as to those instituted after the statute's effective date. Aviles v. Eshelman Electric Corp., 281 Md. 529, 533, 379 A.2d 1227 (1977).5

B. Revision of Decisionmaking Process
To be sure, it is not always easy to distinguish between changes in law that affect only remedies or procedural matters and those that affect vested substantive rights. For example, in Mason v. State, 309 Md. at 221-22, the Court of Appeals held that, although the Post Conviction Procedure Act is procedural in nature, an amendment limiting to two the number of petitions for relief that an inmate might file could not be applied to bar the filing of a petition after the amendment's effective date by an inmate who had filed two petitions before the effective date. To do so, the Court held, would be to extinguish rights acquired by petitioners before the effective date of the amendment. Similarly, in Gee v. Mass Transit Admin., 75 Md. App. 253, 260-61, 540 A.2d 1194 (1988), the Court of Special Appeals held that the adoption by the Commission on Human Relations of regulations promulgating its procedural rules and public hearing process did not apply to a discrimination complaint filed before the issuance of the regulations, when applying the regulations would require the Commission to dismiss the complaint. See also Blocher v. Harlow, 268 Md. 571, 581, 303 A.2d 395 (1973) (limitation period stipulated in statute creating cause of action is not ordinary statute of limitations, but substantive limitation, and amendment of limitation period does not apply to causes of action already accrued).
Nonetheless, we think it clear that certain provisions of Chapter 250 are merely procedural in nature. Those are the amendments increasing the size of the Board, altering the procedure for hearing and deciding claims, and giving the authority to issue final decisions on claims to the Secretary. Those amendments do not make any change in the circumstances under which a claim for compensation may arise; they do not change the time within which or the persons by whom an application for compensation may be filed; they do not alter the standards for dismissing an application or for determining the claimant's entitlement to an award; nor do they increase or diminish the compensation available. Because these amendments thus do not affect any substantive right, they may properly be applied to any claim pending before the Board on which a decision has not yet been rendered.

C. Limits on Compensation
The amendment to §12(f)(2), limiting the amount of compensation that may be granted, poses a more difficult problem. Under the former law, a claimant whom the Board found to be permanently and totally disabled received compensation to the full extent of the serious financial hardship caused by the disability. In addition, all claimants whom the Board found to be entitled to reimbursement of expenses received full reimbursement, without regard to the amount. Under Chapter 250, a crime victim who is permanently and totally disabled may receive compensation for the financial hardship caused by the disability only up to the amount of $25,000, or less, if the claimant also received more than $20,000 in reimbursement of medical expenses. Likewise, a claimant may receive reimbursement of medical expenses that will cause financial hardship only up to $45,000, or less, if the claimant also received other compensation. The impact of these limits on very severely injured claimants clearly may be significant.
Nonetheless, we believe that this amendment does not impair any vested substantive rights of claimants, but affects only a remedy.
An injured crime victim does not have a right to be compensated for those injuries by the State: "In the absence of statutory provision or special undertaking, of course, an innocent victim of a crime has no claim to redress by the State." Regan v. Crime Victims Compensation Board, 455 N.Y.S.2d 552, 553 (N.Y. 1982). And, the enactment of Article 26A did not confer upon crime victims a right of action against the State: The General Assembly established criminal injuries compensation, not as a legal obligation taken on by the State, but only "as a matter of moral responsibility." §1. Cf. §3-902 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article ("CJ" Article) (creating right of action for wrongful death). Thus, criminal injuries compensation is a government financial assistance program in the nature of welfare. See Criminal Injuries Compensation Board v. Gould, 273 Md. 486, 498, 331 A.2d 55 (1975). Crime victims, therefore, have only an expectation of receiving the benefits provided, not a substantive right to those benefits: "[I]t is generally held that welfare benefit laws, although creating an expectation of public benefits, do not confer a contractual right to receive the expected amount." Division of Worker's Compensation, Bureau of Crimes Compensation v. Brevda, 420 So.2d 887, 891-92 (Fla. App. 1982) (citations omitted). Accord Bureau of Crimes Compensation v. Williams, 405 So.2d 747, 748 (Fla. App. 1981).
Nor, indeed, does Article 26A confer benefits upon every person who suffers injury as a result of a crime. Rather, an injured crime victim may receive an award only if the Board finds that he or she meets the statutorily prescribed prerequisites for an award and would suffer serious financial hardship if not granted the award. See Williams v. Criminal Injuries Compensation Board, 307 Md. 606, 614, 516 A.2d 573 (1986). Consequently, a claimant has no legally enforceable right to compensation until the Board has made those findings and has granted an award. Cf. State v. Richardson, 233 Md. 534, 541, 197 A.2d 428 (1964) (right to workers' compensation is fixed by statute as soon as worker sustains injury arising out of and in course of employment).6 Under these circumstances, retrospective application of Chapter 250's limit on the amount of awards would not impair any substantive right of claimants. Accordingly, that amendment is presumed to apply to pending claims, as well as to those instituted or arising after its effective date. Aviles v. Eshelman Electric Corp., 281 Md. 529, 533, 379 A.2d 1227 (1977).
We recognize that statutes that impose, remove, or change a monetary limitation on recovery for personal injuries or death are generally applied only prospectively. Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund Board v. Bowman, 249 Md. 705, 710, 241 A.2d 714 (1968); Wittel v. Baker, 10 Md. App. 531, 541-42, 272 A.2d 57 (1970). See generally Annotation, Retroactive Effect of Statute Which Imposes, Removes, or Changes a Monetary Limitation of Recovery for Personal Injury or Death, 98 A.L.R. 2d 1105. However, those cases concern statutes that create rights of action, like the Wrongful Death Act at issue in Wittel, or statutes pertaining to the enforcement of preexisting rights of action, like the motor vehicle insurance statutes at issue in Bowman. Where a statute concerns an injured person's right of action against the person causing the injury, a change in the amount of compensation to which the injured person is entitled might well be regarded as affecting a substantive right. Because crime victims have no right to compensation from the State, there is a significant difference between the limitation imposed by Chapter 250 and the limitations considered in Bowman and Wittel, a difference that, in our view, subjects Chapter 250's limit to the general presumption of retrospectivity regarding legislative alteration of remedies.
Chapter 250 contains no clear expression of legislative intent that would overcome this presumption of retrospectivity. Further, the context of the enactment of Chapter 250 indicates that the act's purposes would be most fully effectuated by applying it retrospectively.7
House Bill 823, which was enacted as Chapter 250, was requested by the Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services against a background of recent shortfalls in the funds appropriated for awards. Under §12(a)(2), no award may be made "unless funds are appropriated and available for the full amount of the award." Therefore, if awards made early in the fiscal year absorb the full amount of the appropriation for that year, crime victims who suffer their injuries later in the fiscal year cannot be promptly compensated. The limit on awards was intended in part to ensure that each claimant found to be entitled to an award could be granted some compensation, without any necessity for special appropriations, by limiting the amount of compensation that may be awarded to any one claimant. Indeed, this office has in the past suggested that a limit on awards "may be advisable" for just this reason. 68 Opinions of the Attorney General 222, 225 n.3 (1983).
The fiscal note on the bill submitted to the General Assembly predicted substantial reductions in State expenditures as a result of the bill's enactment. Those predictions included an estimate that expenditures would be reduced by some $450,000 in fiscal year 1989, that is, the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1988. The fiscal note makes clear that an important goal of the bill was to reduce the total cost of the criminal injuries compensation program to the State. The fiscal note also indicates that it was within the General Assembly's contemplation that this goal would be achieved immediately, by application of the monetary limits to pending cases.8
Moreover, when the General Assembly previously enacted amendments to Article 26A that it intended would not apply to pending cases, it expressly stated that intent. Thus, in enacting a provision authorizing the Board to waive the general ineligibility for an award of a crime victim assaulted by a member of his or her family, the General Assembly expressly provided that the amendment "shall be applied only to claims filed on or after July 1, 1985," the effective date of the amendment. Chapter 120, Laws of Maryland 1985, sec. 2.

                                       III
                                 Conclusion

In sum, it is our opinion that all of Chapter 250's provisions, including its provision for monetary limits on awards, apply retrospectively, to all claims on which no final decision had been rendered by July 1, 1988.

          J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Attorney General
          C.J. Messerschmidt, Assistant Attorney General

Jack Schwartz
Chief Counsel
   Opinions & Advice

1
In light of our conclusion, we do not address whether the date of filing a claim or the date of the incident giving rise to the claim would determine the applicability of Chapter 250 if that enactment were applicable prospectively only.
2
Because the former law did not require that the claimant be given an opportunity for a hearing before determination of the claimant's entitlement to an award, the Administrative Procedure Act's provisions concerning agency adjudications did not apply to proceedings before the Board. See Criminal Injuries Compensation Board v. Gould, 273 Md. 486, 499, 331 A.2d 55 (1975). Those provisions, §10-201 through §10-214 of the State Government Article ("SG" Article), apply only to "contested cases." A "contested case" is a proceeding to determine a matter "that is required by law to be determined only after an opportunity for an agency hearing." SG §10-201(c). However, Article 26A, §8(d), as amended by Chapter 250, now grants the claimant a right to a hearing before the claim is decided. Therefore, the Administrative Procedure Act now applies to proceedings before the Board.
3
The workers' compensation provisions in Article 101, §36 generally require that disability compensation be calculated as a specified amount of compensation for a specified number of weeks, the number of weeks varying according to the nature and degree of the disability. The basic formulas applicable to loss of use of an arm or a leg provide compensation at $35.00 a week for 300 weeks. However, Article 101, §36(4a) treats that disability as a "serious disability," for which the compensation is increased to $65.00 per week for a total of 400 weeks.
4
In Mason, the Court of Appeals enumerated certain "well settled rules" for determining whether a statute is intended to apply retrospectively or prospectively:

     "(1) A statute is presumed to operate prospectively from its effective date, absent clear language to the contrary, or unless the manifest intention of the Legislature indicates otherwise; (2) Despite the presumption of prospectivity, a statute affecting a change in procedure only, and not in substantive rights, ordinarily applies to all actions whether accrued, pending or future, unless a contrary intention is expressed; and (3) A statute affecting or impairing substantive rights will not operate retrospectively as to transactions, matters, and events not in litigation at the time the statute takes effect unless its language clearly so indicates."

Mason v. State, 309 Md. at 219-20 (footnotes omitted). In Janda v. General Motors Corp., 237 Md. 161, 168-69, 205 A.2d 228 (1964), the Court of Appeals enumerated a similar series of four rules. The fourth rule there stated was:

 "A statute which affects or controls a matter still in litigation when it became law will be applied by the court reviewing the case at the time the statute takes effect although it was not yet law when the decision appealed from was rendered, even if matters or claims of substance (not constitutionally protected), as distinguished from matters procedural or those affecting the remedy are involved, unless the Legislature intended the contrary."

237 Md. at 169. However, that rule was expressly disapproved by the Court of Appeals in Riverdale Heights Volunteer Fire Co., 308 Md. at 565, as "inconsistent with the general body of Maryland law on the subject" of retrospectivity.
5
However, procedural changes are not applied to nullify actions taken under the former procedures before the effective date of the change in procedure. See Luxmanor Citizens Association v. Burkart, 266 Md. 631, 646, 296 A.2d 403 (1972) (decision of County Board of Appeals made by three to two vote was not nullified by subsequent amendment requiring affirmative vote of four members); Breedon v. Maryland Department of Education, 45 Md. App. 73, 83, 411 A.2d 1073 (1980) (revocation of authority of circuit courts to receive additional evidence in administrative review proceedings applied to actions pending on effective date in which evidence had not been taken under prior law).
6
In applying a victim's compensation statute virtually identical to Maryland's, a New York appellate court held that the law "creates no legally cognizable cause of action or right of recovery which can be said to vest in a person claiming to be eligible for an award .... Thus, until the board has made the necessary finding of 'serious financial hardship' ... and exercised its power to make an award as a matter of grace, a claimant can have no legally enforceable right." Gryziec v. Zweibel, 426 N.Y.S.2d 616, 619 (App. Div. 1980).
7
All enactments are to be construed in light of the purpose or goal that the General Assembly sought to achieve. Kaczorowski v. City of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 516, 525 A.2d 628 (1987). The legislative purpose or goal may be ascertained through consideration of all relevant materials. 309 Md. at 515. See also City of Baltimore v. Hooper, 312 Md. 378, 539 A.2d 1130 (1988). Moreover, the Court of Appeals has long held that "the Court may seek the legislative intention by considering the facts of contemporary history, the prior state of the law, and the particular evil, abuse or defect which the statute was designed to correct and the remedy which was intended." Department of Tidewater Fisheries v. Sollers, 201 Md. 603, 611, 95 A.2d 306 (1953).
8
The analysis of the bill's fiscal impact estimated that "[t]his bill could reduce FY 89 general fund expenditures by $451,379, representing the net result of hiring 2 additional board members ... and ... the estimated savings if the maximum award for medical and disability claims are $45,000 and $25,000, respectively." Fiscal Note, House Bill 828 (1988) at 1.