Does Maryland's Domestic Violence Act still protect a victim if the abuser has since moved out of the house?

Plain-English summary

A member of the Maryland House of Delegates asked the Attorney General to resolve a split among Maryland courts over the Protection from Domestic Violence Act's definition of "household members." Some courts had apparently refused to issue protective orders because the alleged abuser, though living with the victim when the abuse happened, had since moved out and was no longer living in the home by the time of the court hearing. The Attorney General concluded those courts had it wrong: the statute's plain language, "spouses, parents, stepparents, children, stepchildren, or blood relatives, who live together at the time of an act of abuse," only required the relatives to have lived together when the abuse occurred, not at the time of the later court hearing. The opinion traced the statute's legislative history to confirm this reading and warned that the opposite interpretation would let an abuser dodge a protective order simply by moving out after being served with a petition and staying away until the hearing.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1988. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Could a Maryland court deny a domestic violence protective order just because the abuser had already moved out?
No, according to this opinion. The Attorney General concluded that FL §4-501(e) only required the two people to have been living together at the time the abuse happened, not at the time of the court hearing, so an abuser's later move-out was not a reason to deny a protective order.

What relationships counted as "household members" under the 1988 version of the Act?
The opinion listed spouses, parents, stepparents, children, stepchildren, and blood relatives who lived together when an act of abuse occurred. An editor's note to the opinion recorded that the General Assembly expanded this list later in 1988 to also cover unmarried people who share a minor child living with the person seeking protection.

Why did the Attorney General think requiring the abuser to still live in the home would be a bad reading of the law?
The opinion reasoned that reading the statute that way would let an abuser escape a protective order simply by moving out after a petition was filed and staying away until the hearing, defeating the law's purpose of protecting people who remained in the household from an abuser who had left.

Background and statutory framework

FL §4-501(e) was part of Maryland's Protection from Domestic Violence Act, first enacted in 1980, which let a household member (or someone acting for a minor household member) petition a court for protection from an abuser who was also a household member. The Delegate's question focused on the statute's definition of "household members," which some courts had construed to require that the abuser still be living in the home at the time of the protective-order hearing, denying relief when the abuser had already moved out.

The opinion applied ordinary statutory interpretation principles, citing Heileman Brewing v. Stroh Brewery for the rule that unambiguous statutory language consistent with the law's purpose is ordinarily controlling, and State v. One 1984 Toyota Truck for giving full effect to clear statutory language that produces no absurd result. Reading FL §4-501(e)'s text, the opinion found it set only two criteria: a listed family relationship, and living together "at the time of an act of abuse," with no separate requirement about where the parties lived afterward.

The opinion also traced the provision's legislative history. As originally introduced, House Bill 1945 (1980 Session) would have covered relatives "who reside together," in the present tense, but the General Assembly amended it before passage into Chapter 887 of the Laws of Maryland 1980, which instead covered relatives "who resided together at the time of the act of abuse." The 1984 recodification into the Family Law Article carried forward the same substantive definition, with the Revisor's Note stating the only changes were "in style," which the opinion treated as confirming, per Office and Professional Employees Int'l v. MTA, that no substantive change was intended.

Finally, the opinion reasoned from the Act's purpose and remedial structure, noting that some of the Act's own relief provisions, FL §§4-505(a)(2)(i) and (ii) and 4-506(e)(1) and (2), expressly contemplated ordering an abuser who still lived in the home to move out (citing Zerhusen v. Zerhusen), while other provisions, like the requirement that a protective order direct the abuser to "refrain from abusing household members," were worded broadly enough to protect people the abuser no longer lived with. Interpreting the statute to require continued cohabitation at the time of the hearing, the opinion concluded, would let an abuser sidestep the Act entirely by moving out after being served with a petition, which would frustrate the General Assembly's evident purpose of protecting continuing victims of household abuse.

Citations and references

Statutes:

• FL §4-501(e)
• FL §§4-505 and 4-506
• FL §§4-505(a)(2)(i) and (ii)
• FL §4-506(e)(1) and (2)
• Chapter 887 of the Laws of Maryland 1980
• Chapter 112 (House Bill 67) of the Laws of Maryland 1988

Cases:

• Heileman Brewing v. Stroh Brewery, 308 Md. 746, 754, 521 A.2d 1225 (1987)
• State v. One 1984 Toyota Truck, 311 Md. 171, 181, 533 A.2d 659 (1987)
• Kaczorowski v. City of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 515, 525 A.2d 628 (1987)
• Potter v. Bethesda Fire Dep't, 309 Md. 347, 355, 524 A.2d 61 (1987)
• Office and Professional Employees Int'l v. MTA, 295 Md. 88, 100, 453 A.2d 1191 (1982)
• Zerhusen v. Zerhusen, 73 Md. App. 386 (1988)

Source

• Landing page: https://oag.maryland.gov/resources-info/Pages/attorney-general%E2%80%99s-opinions.aspx
• Original PDF: https://oag.maryland.gov/resources-info/Documents/pdfs/Opinions/1988/Volume73_1988.pdf

Original opinion text

Best-effort transcription from a scanned PDF. Minor errors may remain, the linked PDF is authoritative.

FAMILY LAW

Domestic Violence Act-"Household Members" — Act Applies To Specified Relatives Who Lived Together When Abuse Occurred, Whether or Not They Live Together At Time of Court Hearing.

January 12, 1988

The Honorable Timothy F. Maloney
Maryland House of Delegates

You have requested our opinion on the applicability of the Protection from Domestic Violence Act to an alleged abuser who has left the family home. Specifically, you ask whether that person is a "household member" within the meaning of §4-501(e) of the Family Law Article ("FL" Article).
For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that the Act applies to a spouse, blood relative, stepparent, or stepchild who abuses another such relative while they live together. As long as the relatives lived together when the abuse occurred, they are "household members" as defined in FL §4-501(e), whether or not they live together at the time of any court action.

                                I
                         Background

FL §4-501(e) is a part of the Protection from Domestic Violence Act ("Act"), enacted in 1980 and codified at Subtitle 5, Title 4 of the FL Article. Under the Act, a household member, or certain persons acting on behalf of a minor household member, may petition the court for protection from continuing abuse by another household member. See 72 Opinions of the Attorney General 115 (1987).
Specifically, you seek clarification of the definition of the term "household members" in FL §4-501(e). Under that provision, "'[h]ousehold members' means spouses, parents, stepparents, children, stepchildren, or blood relatives, who live together at the time of an act of abuse." You have advised us that some courts have interpreted this definition to require that the abuser be living in the family home at the time of the hearing on a petition for a protective order. Apparently, courts have sometimes refused to issue protective orders solely because the abuser, who was living in the family home when the abuse occurred, subsequently moved.

                                II
             Meaning of "Household Members"

"The cardinal principle of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and carry out the legislative intent." Heileman Brewing v. Stroh Brewery, 308 Md. 746, 754, 521 A.2d 1225 (1987). Although external evidence of intent like legislative history may be considered, statutory language that is unambiguous, consistent with the statute's apparent purpose, and not illogical is ordinarily determinative. Heileman Brewing, 308 Md. at 755. "Sometimes the language in question will be so clear in its import and not productive of any absurd result that we will give full effect to its meaning." State v. One 1984 Toyota Truck, 311 Md. 171, 181, 533 A.2d 659 (1987). See also Kaczorowski v. City of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 515, 525 A.2d 628 (1987); Potter v. Bethesda Fire Dep't, 309 Md. 347, 355, 524 A.2d 61 (1987).
The language of FL §4-501(e) is plain and unambiguous. It establishes two criteria for determining whether individuals are household members: that they are "spouses, parents, stepparents, children, stepchildren, or blood relatives"; and that they "live together at the time of an act of abuse." Neither FL §4-501(e) nor any other provision of the Act requires the household members to be living together at the time of the court action. The plain and unambiguous language of §4-501(e) evidences a legislative intent to consider relatives to be household members as long as they lived together when the abuse occurred.
The legislative history confirms that the statutory language expresses the actual legislative intent. As originally proposed, House Bill 1945 (1980 Session) would have defined "household members" as certain related persons "who reside together." But after amendment, Chapter 887 of the Laws of Maryland 1980 defined "household members" as certain related persons "who resided together at the time of the act of abuse." See former §4-501(e) of the Courts Article. In amending the definition, the General Assembly manifested its intent that certain related persons would be "household members" if they lived together when the abuse occurred, no matter where they lived afterwards.
In 1984, the Act was recodified into the FL Article and the current definition of "household members," related persons "who live together at the time of an act of abuse," was adopted. As the Revisor's Note states, "the only changes [were] in style." Thus, FL §4-501(e) simply carried forward the legislative decision that the Act is to apply to related persons who live together at the time of an act of abuse. See Office and Professional Employees Int'l v. MTA, 295 Md. 88, 100, 453 A.2d 1191 (1982).
Moreover, if FL §4-501(e) were interpreted so as to require an abuser to be living in the family home, the result would be illogical. "It is axiomatic that a court must shun a construction of a statute that will lead to absurd consequences." Heileman Brewing, 308 Md. at 755 n. 9.
The Act's purpose is to provide victims of domestic violence with protection from continued violence. The Act's essential mechanism is a court order that requires the abuser to refrain from violence and that may include other relief. See FL §§4-505 and 4-506. In describing the relief that a court may afford, the Act recognizes that sometimes the alleged abuser will still be residing in the family home and will have to be ordered out, if only temporarily. FL §§4-505(a)(2)(i) and (ii) and 4-506(e)(1) and (2). See Zerhusen v. Zerhusen, 73 Md. App. 386 (1988). But other remedial provisions are worded more broadly, especially the requirement that "[t]he protective order shall order the alleged abuser to refrain from abusing household members ..." Presumably, the General Assembly recognized that an order will often be most valuable when it protects those remaining in the household against the abuser who has moved out.
If the Act applied only if the abuser were in the family home at the time of the court hearing, an abuser could avoid the reach of the Act merely by moving out of the home after a petition is filed and staying out until the hearing. That interpretation would provide no recourse to the victim and would frustrate the General Assembly's intent in enacting the Act.

                              III
                         Conclusion

In summary, it is our opinion that a spouse, blood relative, stepparent or stepchild who abuses another relative at a time when both are living together is a "household member" under FL §4-501(e). The individuals need not be living together at the time of any court action for the Act to apply.

        J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Attorney General
        Sarah R. Kaplan, Assistant Attorney General

Jack Schwartz
Chief Counsel
Opinions & Advice

Editor's Note: Chapter 112 (House Bill 67) of the Laws of Maryland 1988 amended FL §4-501(e) to include within the definition "individuals who are not married but have at least one minor child in common residing with the petitioner."