Could Maryland's Motor Vehicle Administration let someone keep driving to work instead of fully suspending their license in 1987?

Plain-English summary

Maryland's Motor Vehicle Administrator asked the Attorney General whether the MVA could modify a license suspension imposed under §§16-205 and 16-206 of the Transportation Article (suspensions for alcohol or drug related driving convictions, or for a driver found unfit or unsafe) by issuing a restricted license limited to employment-purpose driving, instead of a total suspension. The question arose because other suspension provisions in the same law, covering point-based suspensions and refusal to take an alcohol test, explicitly say the MVA may modify or decline to order the suspension, while §§16-205 and 16-206 are silent on modification.

The Attorney General concluded that the MVA does have this authority. The opinion reasoned that §§16-205 and 16-206 already give the MVA discretion whether to suspend or revoke at all, since they say the MVA "may" do so rather than requiring it, unlike the mandatory suspension provisions that needed explicit modification language to allow any flexibility. Combined with the MVA's separate, broadly worded authority under §16-113 to impose "any other restriction" it determines appropriate for safe driving, the opinion found the agency could choose a middle path, an employment-only restriction, rather than being limited to an all-or-nothing suspension decision.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1987. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Why did some Maryland license suspension laws in the 1980s let the MVA soften a suspension while §§16-205 and 16-206 seemed silent on it?
The opinion explained that §§16-404(a)(3) and 16-205.1(f)(4) required the MVA to suspend a license once certain conditions were met, leaving the agency no room for discretion unless the legislature separately spelled out a modification power, which it did in §§16-405(a) and 16-205.1(f)(5). By contrast, §§16-205 and 16-206 already used discretionary language ("may suspend" or "may revoke"), so the MVA did not need a separate modification clause to have flexibility in how it exercised that existing discretion.

Could a driver whose license was suspended under §16-206 for being "unfit or unsafe" ask for a restricted, work-only license instead of losing driving privileges entirely?
Based on this opinion, yes. The Attorney General concluded the MVA's general authority under §16-113 to impose "any other restriction" appropriate for safe driving, combined with its discretion under §16-206 itself, let it issue a restricted license limiting the person to employment-purpose driving rather than imposing a full suspension.

Did the opinion find any inconsistency in how the suspension statute treated drivers who requested a hearing versus those who didn't?
Yes. The opinion noted that §16-206(d) let the MVA modify a suspension when a licensee did not request a hearing, and found it illogical, and possibly constitutionally doubtful, for the law to allow modification only when someone waived a hearing but not when someone exercised the right to one. The opinion resolved this by reading the statute to avoid that absurd result, especially since an earlier version of the same provision expressly allowed modification after a hearing and nothing suggested the 1975 clarifying amendments meant to remove that power.

Background and statutory framework

Maryland's point system requires the MVA to suspend a license at 8 points and revoke it at 12 points, but §16-405(a) lets a hearing officer decline to order or modify that suspension or revocation if it would hurt the licensee's employment. Similarly, §16-205.1(f)(4) requires suspension for refusing an alcohol test, but §16-205.1(f)(5) lets the MVA modify that suspension or issue a restricted license under specified circumstances, including when the licensee must drive for work. By contrast, §16-205 (alcohol or drug related convictions) and §16-206 (unfit or unsafe drivers) use permissive "may suspend" or "may revoke" language and say nothing express about modification.

The opinion reasoned that the mandatory suspension provisions needed their own explicit modification language precisely because the MVA would otherwise have no discretion at all once the statutory trigger was met, citing the office's own prior opinion that an agency's actions must be consistent with the statute granting its authority. Sections 16-205 and 16-206, however, already vest the MVA with discretion over whether to suspend or revoke in the first place, so the opinion concluded the agency could use its general restriction authority under §16-113, which allows "any other restriction applicable to the licensee that the Administration determines appropriate to assure the safe driving of a motor vehicle," to impose a lesser, employment-only restriction instead of a full suspension. The opinion also addressed and rejected a narrow reading of §16-113 limiting restrictions to the moment a license is first issued, finding that reading inconsistent with the MVA's public-safety mission and its actual practice of imposing restrictions after issuance, and noted that a provision in §16-206(d) allowing modification only for licensees who waive a hearing supported, rather than undermined, reading the statute to allow modification generally, since a contrary reading would create an illogical and possibly unconstitutional distinction between represented and unrepresented licensees.

Citations

Statutes:

• §16-205 of the Transportation Article (suspension or revocation for alcohol or drug related convictions)
• §16-206 of the Transportation Article (suspension for an unfit or unsafe driver)
• §16-113 of the Transportation Article (MVA's general authority to impose license restrictions)
• §16-404(a)(3) of the Transportation Article (mandatory point-based suspension and revocation)
• §16-405(a) of the Transportation Article (hearing officer's authority to decline, cancel, or modify a point-based suspension)
• §16-205.1(f)(4) of the Transportation Article (mandatory suspension for refusing an alcohol test)
• §16-205.1(f)(5) of the Transportation Article (MVA's authority to modify a refusal-based suspension)
• Chapter 243, Laws of Maryland 1981 (amendment giving MVA modification authority under §16-205.1)
• Chapter 645, Laws of Maryland 1975 (clarifying amendments to administrative hearing procedures)

Cases:

• B.F. Saul Co. v. West End Park North, Inc., 250 Md. 707, 722 (1968)
• Rentals Unlimited, Inc. v. Administrator, 286 Md. 104, 114 (1979)
• Kaczorowski v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, No. 162 (September Term, 1986), slip op. at 15 (May 15, 1987)

Source

• Landing page: https://oag.maryland.gov/resources-info/Pages/attorney-general%E2%80%99s-opinions.aspx
• Original PDF: https://oag.maryland.gov/resources-info/Documents/pdfs/Opinions/1987/Volume72_1987.pdf

Original opinion text

Best-effort transcription from a scanned PDF. Minor errors may remain, the linked PDF is authoritative.

VEHICLE LAWS

Driver's License—Suspension—Extent of MVA Authority to Issue Restricted Licenses in Lieu of Total Suspension.

July 2, 1987

Mr. W. Marshall Rickert
Motor Vehicle Administrator

You have asked whether the Motor Vehicle Administration ("MVA") is permitted to modify a suspension of a driver's license under §§16-205 and 16-206 of the Maryland Vehicle Law, neither of which expressly authorizes modification of a suspension.1 Specifically, you ask whether the MVA, when it suspends a license under these sections, may permit a licensee to drive for employment purposes.

For the following reasons, we conclude that the MVA is authorized under §§16-205 and 16-206 to modify a suspension or issue a restricted license, including a restriction that driving be limited to employment purposes only, in lieu of a total suspension of the driver's license.

I
Background

Your question arises because of a difference in wording among the provisions of the Vehicle Law dealing with license suspension and revocation:

Under Maryland's point system, the MVA is required to suspend the license of an individual who accumulates 8 points and to revoke the license of an individual who accumulates 12 points. §16-404(a)(3).2 However, §16-405 authorizes an MVA hearing officer to "[d]ecline to order the suspension or revocation" or to "[c]ancel or modify the suspension or revocation" if the loss of driving privileges "would adversely affect the employment or opportunity for employment" of the licensee. §16-405(a).

Similarly, under §16-205.1(f)(4), the MVA is required to suspend the license of a driver who refuses to take a chemical test for alcohol when charged with alcohol-related driving offenses. However, §16-205.1(f)(5) authorizes the MVA to "modify this suspension or issue a restrictive license" under specified circumstances.3

By contrast, two other provisions for license suspension or revocation are silent about the MVA's authority to allow limited purpose driving, notwithstanding the suspension or revocation. Under §16-205, the MVA "may revoke" or "may suspend" a license if a driver is convicted of any of a number of alcohol or drug related offenses. And, under §16-206, the MVA "may suspend" a license upon a showing that a driver is unfit or unsafe, among other grounds. You ask whether the MVA may modify a suspension or revocation under §16-205 or 16-206 by issuing a restricted license, or whether the MVA may do so only if the General Assembly adds to these provisions express authorization comparable to that in §§16-405(a) and 16-205.1(f)(5).4

II
Analysis

We begin with the premise that the MVA would lack authority to modify a suspension or revocation ordered pursuant to §16-404(a)(3) or 16-205.1(f)(4), absent express statutory authority to do so. Both of these provisions require MVA to suspend or revoke the driver's license if the conditions set out in the statute are met. Were it not for the grants of authority in §§16-405(a) and 16-205.1(f)(5), the MVA would be wholly without discretion; it would be required simply to carry out the statutory directive. "[T]he actions of an administrative agency must be consistent with the statute that grants it the authority to act." 70 Opinions of the Attorney General 135 (1985).5

By contrast, the provisions regarding license suspension and revocation in §16-205 and 16-206 give the agency discretion, the MVA "may revoke" or "may suspend." In exercising this discretion, the MVA has at its disposal any of the other available tools for protecting the public safety.6

Pursuant to §16-113, the MVA may impose restrictions on the license instead of suspending or revoking it. Those restrictions include a restriction prohibiting "the licensee from driving or attempting to drive a motor vehicle while having alcohol in his blood" and "any other restriction applicable to the licensee that the Administration determines appropriate to assure the safe driving of a motor vehicle by the licensee."7 In our view, this broad wording authorizes the MVA to impose a restriction that a licensee may drive for employment purposes only.

Because the MVA may exercise discretion under §§16-205 and 16-206 in determining whether to suspend or revoke a license, it may choose not to suspend driving privileges totally, but rather to suspend only the privilege to engage in driving for pleasure by imposing an "employment only" restriction on the license. See 68 Opinions of the Attorney General 432, 438 n.7 (1983). The authority for imposing the restriction derives from both the MVA's authority to modify a suspension under the permissive language of §§16-205 and 16-206 and its general authority to impose restrictions under §16-113.

III
Conclusion

In summary, it is our opinion that the MVA is authorized to modify a suspension or revocation under §§16-205 and 16-206 of the Maryland Vehicle Law in order to issue a restricted license to permit driving for employment purposes only.

J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Attorney General
Edward R. K. Hargadon, Assistant Attorney General

Jack Schwartz
Chief Counsel
Opinions and Advice

1 All statutory references in this opinion are to the Transportation Article.

2 A detailed discussion of the point system may be found in 70 Opinions of the Attorney General 218 (1985).

3 These circumstances are: "(i) The licensee is required to drive a motor vehicle in the course of employment; (ii) The license is required for the purpose of attending an alcoholic prevention or treatment program; or (iii) [MVA] finds that the licensee has no alternative means of transportation available and without the license, the licensee's ability to earn a living would be severely impaired."

4 A person convicted of driving under the influence or while intoxicated, the offenses that lead to license suspension or revocation under §16-205, is assessed 8 and 12 points, respectively, for those convictions. §16-402(a)(16) and (24). Hence, the person is subject to suspension or revocation under §16-404. Thus, as a practical matter, the modification provisions of §16-405(a) are available to a hearing officer whenever action is taken under both §§16-205 and 16-404.

5 In Opinion No. 81-009 (March 4, 1981) (unpublished), this office concluded that the MVA's authority under §16-405(a) to modify a suspension applied only to suspensions under §16-404; it did not extend to mandatory suspensions under §16-205.1. §16-205.1 was then amended to give the MVA that authority. Chapter 243, Laws of Maryland 1981. We agree with this opinion, the authority to modify in §16-405(a) does not apply to any provision for suspension other than §16-404. However, the opinion does not address the MVA's authority in other contexts.

6 We note that §16-206(d) permits the MVA to "modify" a suspension if a licensee does not request a hearing. There is no logic in a statutory scheme that authorizes modification of a suspension if a hearing is not requested but precludes it if a hearing is requested. There is also reason to doubt the constitutional validity of such a distinction. In any event, a construction leading to this absurd result is to be avoided. See B.F. Saul Co. v. West End Park North, Inc., 250 Md. 707, 722 (1968). In fact, the predecessor statute to §16-206 specifically stated that, after the hearing, the MVA was permitted to "modify" the suspension. Former Article 66 1/2, §6-206(b). Although that passage was deleted in 1975, when the various provisions of the Vehicle Law relating to administrative hearing procedures were amended to improve their clarity, we see no indication that a substantive change was intended. See Chapter 645, Laws of Maryland 1975 (title). See generally Kaczorowski v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, No. 162 (September Term, 1986), slip op. at 15 (May 15, 1987).

7 Section 16-113(a) permits the MVA to impose a restriction on a licensee "when it issues a driver's license." While this language, at first blush, suggests that a restriction may be imposed only upon issuance of an original license, that narrow reading does not comport with the MVA's goal of promoting safety on the highway, nor is that reading consistent with the MVA's practice. After a license is issued, the MVA imposes restrictions for a variety of reasons, the most prominent of which is suspected alcohol abuse. The better reading of §16-113(a) is that it grants the MVA the authority to impose a restriction not only at the time of issuance but at any time while the licensee has the privilege to drive in Maryland. As the Court of Appeals observed in a different context, "[A] suspension of a registration or license is an administrative sanction imposed upon owners or drivers for the purpose of protecting the public safety and welfare . . . ." Rentals Unlimited, Inc. v. Administrator, 286 Md. 104, 114 (1979). In our view, a provision like §16-113(a), intended to promote public safety, is to be given a liberal interpretation in favor of its objectives. See 3A Sutherland Statutory Construction §71.04, at 537 (4th ed. 1986).