Can a Maryland county use its own licensing rules or zoning restrictions to control where state-licensed child care homes can operate?

Plain-English summary

In 1987, a member of the Maryland House of Delegates asked the Attorney General whether state law preempted county authority to regulate child care homes and institutions licensed by the Juvenile Services Agency ("JSA"). The question arose because Anne Arundel County had adopted a zoning ordinance treating certain child care facilities as "group homes" subject to lot-size, spacing, and density restrictions, and a further ordinance was proposed to require a separate county license for these facilities.

The Attorney General concluded that the State had fully occupied the field of licensing and regulating child care facilities, so the County's proposed licensing ordinance would be invalid, and so would the parts of its existing zoning ordinance, like large minimum lot sizes and a cap on the number of such facilities per assessment district, that functioned as a backdoor way of controlling where these facilities could be established. The opinion reasoned that the State's comprehensive JSA regulations, its declared interest in comparable statewide rules for child care facilities, and the requirement that a facility need only one state license all pointed to an intent to keep this decision with the State alone. But the opinion drew a line: generally applicable local health, safety, and zoning rules, like building height limits or a good-faith parking-space formula that wasn't secretly designed to single out child care homes, still applied to these facilities just as they applied to any other similar use in the neighborhood.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1987. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Could a Maryland county require its own separate license for a state-licensed child care home in 1987?
According to this opinion, no. The Attorney General concluded the State had preempted the field of licensing and certifying child care facilities, so a county ordinance requiring a separate county license would be invalid.

Could a county use zoning rules, instead of a licensing ordinance, to control where child care facilities could be built?
The opinion concluded no, at least not through zoning provisions specifically aimed at these facilities (like minimum distances between them or a cap on how many could exist in an area), since that amounted to the same preempted control just exercised through a different legal mechanism.

Did any local rules still apply to a state-licensed child care facility?
Yes, according to the opinion. Generally applicable local health, safety, and zoning requirements that were not specifically targeted at child care facilities, such as a citywide building height limit or a good-faith parking-space formula applied consistently to similar uses, still governed these facilities the same way they governed any other use.

Background and statutory framework

Anne Arundel County's zoning ordinance defined a "group home" to include several categories of state- or locally-licensed residential facilities, including juvenile care facilities, and classified them by size and dwelling type into three tiers, with the largest tier ("classification three") subject to conditional-use restrictions like minimum lot sizes, spacing requirements, and caps on the number of facilities per assessment district. A separately proposed ordinance would have gone further, requiring an annual county license for child care homes and subjecting them to County health and permitting department regulations.

The opinion applied Maryland's general preemption framework from Ad + Soil, Inc. v. County Comm'rs of Queen Anne's County, under which State law can preempt local regulation either expressly or by implication where the State has acted comprehensively enough to show an intent to occupy the field, weighing the comprehensiveness of state regulation, the risk of confusing dual regulation, the tradition of state versus local control, and the chronology of state and local enactments. Building on a 1978 AG opinion that had already found a similar Prince George's County licensing ordinance preempted, the opinion pointed to the State's comprehensive JSA licensing regulations, the General Assembly's declared goal that agencies charged with child care have "comparable" rules under Article 41C, §2-125(a), and the statutory command that a child care home "may not be required to obtain a license from more than 1 State agency" under Article 41C, §2-125(e), as strong evidence the General Assembly meant to keep licensing decisions with the State alone rather than splitting them between the State and every county.

Because the opinion found "no substantive difference" between direct licensing control and zoning provisions that functioned the same way, it concluded that Anne Arundel County's minimum lot size and per-district caps on classification-three group homes were equally preempted, drawing on the New York and California cases Town of Poughkeepsie v. Hopper Plumb. & Heating Corp. and Hall v. City of Taft for the principle that a zoning restriction which in substance controls the establishment of a state-regulated use is no less preempted than an outright licensing bar. At the same time, the opinion preserved county authority over generally applicable rules, such as building height limits or a parking-space formula grounded in the same principles the county used for other uses, reasoning under East v. Gilchrist that a facially neutral rule crafted in a way that in practice singles out child care facilities would fall on the preempted side of the line, while a genuinely general rule that happened to apply to these facilities would not.

Citations

Statutes:

• CJ §3-802(a)(1), §3-802(a)(4) (juvenile court proceedings' purpose of caring for and protecting children)
• CJ §3-820(c)(2) (placement of a child in JSA or licensed private agency custody)
• Article 41C, §2-113 (requires State agencies involved in child care to cooperate with JSA)
• Article 41C, §2-125(a) (declares intent that child-care agencies' rules be "comparable")
• Article 41C, §2-125(c) (JSA's duty to notify local governing bodies of license applications)
• Article 41C, §2-125(e) (bars requiring more than one State agency license for a child care home)
• Article 25A, §5 (the Express Powers Act granting county zoning and licensing authority)
• Chapter 600, Laws of Maryland 1947 (original child care facility licensing law, enacting former Article 88A, §16A)
• Anne Arundel County Code, Article 25, §10-122(a), §10-122(b) (zoning definitions and classifications of "group homes")
• Anne Arundel County Code, Article 28, §1-128 (zoning certificate of use requirement)
• Anne Arundel County Code, Article 28, §2-204(b)(5), (b)(5)(i), (ii), (iv), (v) (classification-three group home conditions: spacing, density, lot size)
• Anne Arundel County Code, Article 28, §2-903(b)(8) (incorporates classification-three conditions into R-44 district rules)
• Anne Arundel County Code, Article 28, §10-122 (classification of group homes for zoning purposes)
• Anne Arundel County Code, Article 28, §12-104 (defines permitted uses, conditional uses, and special exceptions)
• COMAR 10.25.03.03B (license application content requirements)
• COMAR 10.25.03.09 (annual JSA inspection requirement)
• COMAR 10.25.03.14 (staffing requirements for licensed facilities)
• COMAR 10.25.03.16A, B, C, E (facilities' compliance with local zoning, environmental, health, and fire requirements)
• COMAR 25.03.01B (JSA's five classifications of juvenile care facilities)

Cases:

• Ad + Soil, Inc. v. County Comm'rs of Queen Anne's County, 307 Md. 307, 324 (1986)
• City of Baltimore v. Sitnick, 254 Md. 303, 317, 322 (1969)
• East v. Gilchrist, 296 Md. 368, 373-74 (1983)
• Backus v. County Board of Appeals, 224 Md. 28, 33 (1960)
• City of Baltimore v. State, 281 Md. 217, 224 (1977)
• City of Baltimore v. State Dep't of Health & Mental Hygiene, 38 Md. App. 570, 578 (1978)
• Carroll County v. Raymond I. Richardson Found., 71 Md. App. 434, 445 (1987)
• Kaczorowski v. City of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 515 (1987)
• In re David K., 48 Md. App. 714 (1981)
• Town of Poughkeepsie v. Hopper Plumb. & Heating Corp., 260 N.Y.S.2d 901, 905 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1965), aff'd, 272 N.Y.S.2d 974 (N.Y. App. Div. 1966)
• Hall v. City of Taft, 302 P.2d 574, 582 (Cal. 1956)
• Woodlawn Area Citizens Ass'n v. Board of County Comm'rs for Prince George's County, 241 Md. 187, 190 (1966)
• Rowe v. Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co., 65 Md. App. 527, 532 (1985)

Source

• Landing page: https://oag.maryland.gov/resources-info/Pages/attorney-general%E2%80%99s-opinions.aspx
• Original PDF: https://oag.maryland.gov/resources-info/Documents/pdfs/Opinions/1987/Volume72_1987.pdf

Original opinion text

Best-effort transcription from a scanned PDF. Minor errors may remain, the linked PDF is authoritative.

Local Government—Child Care Facilities—Preemption—Counties—Zoning—County Lacks Authority to Regulate State-Licensed Child Care Facilities, Except By Generally Applicable Zoning and Similar Ordinances.

November 4, 1987

The Honorable John C. Astle
Maryland House Of Delegates

You have requested our opinion on whether State law preempts county regulatory authority over child care homes and institutions licensed by the Juvenile Services Agency ("JSA").

For the reasons given below, it is our opinion that State law and regulations have fully occupied the field of licensing and regulating those child care facilities. Local regulations that apply to child care facilities, as distinguished from other uses or structures, are therefore invalid. However, generally applicable local health, safety, or zoning regulations are not preempted and may be applied to child care facilities licensed by JSA.

I
Anne Arundel County Regulations

A. Zoning Ordinance

In 1986, Anne Arundel County adopted a zoning ordinance addressing various aspects of the establishment of group homes in residential zoning districts. For that purpose, the term "group home" is defined by Article 25, §10-122(a) of the County Code to mean facilities "licensed or supervised by a Federal, State or local agency," which are described as being six types:

(i) "Family care facilities," which are private residences in which services and supervision are provided for one to six persons who are unrelated to the resident household and who are handicapped, aged, or in need of supervision;
(ii) "Group care facilities," which are similar to family care facilities, except that they provide services to seven or more individuals who are handicapped, aged, or undergoing mental, emotional, or physical rehabilitation;
(iii) "Sheltered housing," facilities licensed by the Maryland Office on Aging that provide housing and support services for 4 to 11 elderly persons who are unrelated to the resident household;
(iv) "Life care facilities," which consist of a combination of independent and group living units and provide services for elderly individuals that include medical supervision;
(v) "Family foster/boarding homes," which provide care and supervision for one to six minors; and
(vi) "Group foster/boarding homes," which provide care and supervision for seven or more minors.

Group homes, regardless of type, are organized for regulatory purposes into three classifications, distinguished by the number of persons served in a facility and the type of dwelling unit in which the facility is located. Classification one includes all group homes located in single-family detached dwellings and serving no more than six persons; classification two includes all group homes located in any other type of dwelling unit and serving no more than four persons; and classification three includes group homes serving seven or more persons in a single-family detached dwelling or five or more persons in any other type of dwelling unit, with the exception of sheltered housing serving no more than 11 persons. Anne Arundel County Code, Article 25, §10-122(b).1

Group homes in the first two classifications are permitted as of right and without conditions in all residential zoning districts. However, group homes in classification three, while permitted in all residential zoning districts, are permitted only as conditional uses.2 The special conditions applicable to classification three group homes are set forth in County Code, Article 28, §2-204(b)(5) and incorporated by reference into the provisions applicable to each of the other residential zoning districts. E.g., County Code, Article 28, §2-903(b)(8) (classification three group homes in R-44 High Density Multi-family Districts).

The conditions limit classification three group homes to no more than 20 in any one assessment district or to housing no more than three percent of the assessment district population, whichever is less, and require a minimum distance of one-half mile between such group homes. County Code, Article 28, §2-204(b)(5)(i) and (ii).3 The conditions also limit the number of independent dwelling units and the percentage of the facility's maximum population who may be housed in independent dwelling units: No more than 10 dwelling units per acre of net area are generally permitted, housing no more than 10 percent of the number of residents for whom the facility has capacity, unless the facility is a life care facility approved by the State Office on Aging. County Code, Article 28, §2-204(b)(5)(iv). Group homes are required to be located on sites of at least 40,000 square feet, of which no more than 60 percent may be covered by structures or parking areas. County Code, Article 28, §2-204(b)(5)(v). Finally, the conditions specify the number of parking spaces that must be provided for residents and employees, determined in part on the basis of the type of facility concerned. County Code, Article 28, §2-204(b)(iii).

Under Article 28, §1-128 of the County Code, a zoning certificate of use must be obtained from the County's Office of Planning and Zoning before using or altering any premises or structure other than a single-family residence. Article 28, §10-122(c) requires that any application for a zoning certificate of use for a classification three group home must be sent by the County's Office of Planning and Zoning to the County's Office of Community Services and Information "for notification to the appropriate community associations and to any residence within 175 feet of the proposed group home site."4

B. Proposed Ordinance

We understand that an additional ordinance has been proposed pertaining to child care homes. Anne Arundel County Sun, Oct. 28, 1987, at 4, cols. 1-3. That ordinance would require an annual County license for the operation of such a facility and would subject juvenile care facilities to regulations adopted by the County's Departments of Health and of Inspections and Permits. As a prerequisite to licensure, the applicant would be required to notify nearby property owners and the neighborhood's community association of the application, by registered mail.5

II
Legal Background

A. General Principles

Although local jurisdictions ordinarily have authority, concurrent with that of the State, to regulate a wide variety of matters, that authority may be preempted by the State. Preemption may occur expressly, when the General Assembly explicitly prohibits local legislation, or by implication, when the General Assembly acts with such force in a particular field as to evidence an intent to preclude local legislation. Ad + Soil, Inc. v. County Comm'rs of Queen Anne's County, 307 Md. 307, 324 (1986). In 69 Opinions of the Attorney General 183 (1984), this office summarized the factors that the Maryland Court of Appeals has found to be significant in determining whether local legislative authority has been preempted: (i) the comprehensiveness of the State legislative and regulatory provisions, which is the primary indicator of preemption; (ii) the likelihood that a dual system of State and local regulation would cause serious confusion; (iii) the existence or lack of a tradition of State regulation or of a constitutional mandate for State supervision of activity in the field; and (iv) the chronology of the enactment of State and local legislation.6 69 Opinions of the Attorney General at 190-93. See also Ad + Soil, Inc., 307 Md. at 325-26.

Moreover, even where the State has not fully preempted local regulation of a matter, local laws or regulations are ineffective insofar as they conflict directly or indirectly with State law or regulations. Local jurisdictions may not prohibit what the State expressly requires or permits. East v. Gilchrist, 296 Md. 368, 373-74 (1983); City of Baltimore v. Sitnick, 254 Md. 303, 317 (1969).7

B. County Licensure of Group Homes

In 63 Opinions of the Attorney General 377, 393 (1978), the Attorney General concluded that a Prince George's County ordinance purporting to require county licensure for group homes was invalid, because it had been preempted by State licensing and certification provisions. In reaching that conclusion, the Attorney General noted (i) the comprehensiveness of State legislation concerning the licensing of group facilities of all kinds; (ii) the confusion and duplication of effort that would result from any dual licensing system for those facilities; and, (iii) as to child care facilities in particular, State legislative provisions expressing an intention that those facilities be required to obtain only one license, issued by the State, and that the rules and regulations pertaining to those facilities be comparable. Id.

In addition, the opinion concluded that local zoning permit restrictions are inapplicable to State-licensed child care facilities, except to the extent that State law requires those facilities to comply with local zoning restrictions. 63 Opinions of the Attorney General at 398.8 The Attorney General noted that, while local authority in the realm of zoning is strong, local jurisdictions nonetheless do not have unlimited power "to interfere with the property, policies, or regulatory authority of the State" through zoning. That is particularly so as to matters over which local authority is otherwise weak, as is the case with regard to licensing and certification of group homes. Therefore, the opinion concluded:

"[G]roup facilities which are funded, operated, or licensed by the State, to achieve a public purpose, participate in the State's immunity from local zoning restrictions insofar as the power to distinguish among occupants making the same physical use of premises is beyond the reach of the zoning powers conferred in Article 25A, Section 5(X), Md. Ann. Code. Such restrictions are also invalid wherever they may contravene State policy, State authorization, or State licensure for group homes under Public General Law." Id.9

III
Scope of Preemption

We continue to adhere to the conclusion of 63 Opinions of the Attorney General 377 that the State has preempted the field of licensing and certifying group homes, including child care facilities. Put another way, the State has reserved for itself exclusive dominion over determinations as to whether and where child care facilities should be established and how they should be operated. See Ad + Soil, Inc., 307 Md. at 324.

Our view in this regard is bolstered by the General Assembly's expressions of the State's strong interest in the welfare of children. For example, the first enumerated purpose for which juvenile court proceedings were established is "[t]o provide for the care, protection, and wholesome mental and physical development" of children coming within the jurisdiction of the court. §3-802(a)(1) of the Courts Article ("CJ" Article). Under those proceedings, a child may be placed in the custody of the JSA or a "licensed private agency" when that is best suited to the child's needs. CJ §3-820(c)(2). See In re David K., 48 Md. App. 714 (1981).10

Thus, the licensing of child care facilities, that is, determining whether a particular facility should become or remain authorized to care for children for whom the State is responsible, is, in our view, an integral part of the State's provisions for the care and protection of those children. Indeed, the General Assembly originally enacted provisions for the licensing of child care facilities in furtherance of "its conviction that the paramount consideration of [those provisions] is the protection of the children affected by [them]." Chapter 600, Laws of Maryland 1947 (enacting former Article 88A, §16A). Viewed in this light, we think that the evidence of legislative intent to preempt the licensing of child care facilities is particularly persuasive. See Kaczorowski v. City of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 515 (1987) (legislative purpose must be determined from context of legislation).

The regulations adopted by JSA to carry out its statutory mandate to license and regulate child care facilities address in detail every aspect of the establishment and operation of those facilities. See, e.g., COMAR 10.25.03.14 (number, qualifications, and duties of staff). Those regulations require the license applicant to provide a description of the service proposed to be provided, "including capacity, eligibility requirements, and statement of territory covered and admission standards or requirements," so that those factors may be considered in determining whether to grant the license. COMAR 10.25.03.03B. Further, JSA is required to inspect each facility at least annually to ensure compliance with the State regulations. COMAR 10.25.03.09.

Moreover, the General Assembly has expressed an intent that "[a]ll children whose care is the responsibility of this State shall have similar protection for their health, their safety, and the quality of their care; and . . . [t]he rules and regulations of agencies that are charged with child care shall be comparable." Article 41C, §2-125(a). To accomplish those purposes, the General Assembly has required other State agencies involved in child care to cooperate with JSA. Article 41C, §2-113. Further, it has expressly provided that "[a] child care home or institution may not be required to obtain a license from more than 1 State agency" and has authorized State licensing agencies to "make cooperative arrangements with any other State agency to this end." Article 41C, §2-125(e). In light of that expressed legislative intent to ensure uniformity in licensing decisions and regulations pertaining to child care facilities, we concur in the view expressed in 63 Opinions of the Attorney General at 390-91: Had the General Assembly intended that the political subdivisions have concurrent power to license and regulate child care facilities, it would have provided likewise for cooperation between State and local licensing agencies.

For all of these reasons, we think that the General Assembly intended to preempt the field of determining where facilities licensed by JSA are to be located and how they are to be operated. Therefore, it is our opinion that the proposed Anne Arundel County ordinance, which would purport to impose County licensing and regulatory requirements on child care homes, would be invalid and could not be given effect.11

Certain provisions of the County's existing zoning ordinance are likewise invalid, in our opinion. The zoning ordinance does not explicitly purport to authorize the County to determine whether or where child care homes may be established, as a licensing ordinance would. Nonetheless, provisions such as the large minimum lot size clearly would have the effect of restricting the locations at which facilities in the County's classification three could be established. And the restriction on the number of classification three group homes that may be established in any one assessment district would directly limit the total number of classification three child care homes that might be established in the County.

Local regulations that might be determinative of whether or where a child care facility may be established undeniably impinge on the State's authority to license those facilities.12 We see no substantive difference between the exercise of control over the establishment and operation of child care facilities through the mechanism of a zoning ordinance and the exercise of the same control through the mechanism of a direct licensing ordinance.13 See Town of Poughkeepsie v. Hopper Plumb. & Heating Corp., 260 N.Y.S.2d 901, 905 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1965), aff'd, 272 N.Y.S.2d 974 (N.Y. App. Div. 1966). Accord Hall v. City of Taft, 302 P.2d 574, 582 (Cal. 1956). In our view, regulations that specially address State licensed child care facilities have been preempted by the State, whether those regulations take the form of direct licensing requirements or zoning restrictions.

This is not to say, however, that county laws are wholly inapplicable to State-licensed child care facilities. We do not think that the General Assembly has clearly expressed an intent to preempt the power of local jurisdictions to regulate health, safety, and land use matters in general, merely because those general regulations are applicable to State-licensed child care facilities. Rather, we think that local jurisdictions retain their power to ensure that the physical plant of any facility will be compatible with the neighborhood in which it is located and will conform to health and safety standards that the jurisdiction has found to be generally necessary. Hence, requirements or restrictions applicable generally to uses or structures in the neighborhood in which a child care facility is to be located, or to uses or structures similar to the facility, are equally applicable to that facility. For example, a juvenile care facility may not exceed a building height restriction applicable to all structures located in the zoning district in which the facility is to be located.14

However, a regulation or restriction putatively applicable to all structures or uses, but in actuality capable of application only to juvenile care facilities, would be invalid. A regulation specially designed to apply only to juvenile care facilities is no less a special regulation of those facilities than is a regulation that explicitly applies only to juvenile care facilities. Hence, what we have said regarding local laws that overtly seek to control the location of child care facilities is equally applicable to laws that, while facially general or neutral, would have the effect of imposing the identical control. Cf. East v. Gilchrist, 296 Md. 368, 373 (1983) (county charter provision that would have effect of preventing compliance with valid State regulatory order, without expressly prohibiting compliance, cannot be given effect).15

IV
Conclusion

In summary, we conclude that State law and regulations have fully occupied the field of licensing and regulating those child care facilities. Local regulations that apply to child care facilities, as distinguished from other uses or structures, are therefore invalid. However, generally applicable local health, safety, or zoning regulations are not preempted and may be applied to child care facilities licensed by JSA.

J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Attorney General
C.J. Messerschmidt, Assistant Attorney General

Jack Schwartz
Chief Counsel
Opinions and Advice

1 The regulations of JSA describe "juvenile care facilities" as being of five types:

(i) "Community residences," which are series of separate dwellings on the same ground or single dwellings that serve more than 12 youths;
(ii) "Special treatment centers," which provide therapeutic services as well as general care and supervision, without regard to the number of youths served;
(iii) "Structured shelter care" facilities, which provide short-term care for any number of youths awaiting more permanent placements;
(iv) "Youth group homes," which provide care to 5 to 12 youths; and
(v) "Runaway homes," which provide temporary shelter and aid to runaway or homeless youths aged 12 to 17 and their families. COMAR 25.03.01B.

Thus, any child care facility might fall within the County's definition of classification three group homes, depending on the size of the facility. For example, we understand that a facility has been proposed that would provide temporary shelter for six boys, aged nine to twelve, who have been abused or neglected. That facility would fall into classification one if it would be in a single-family detached house, but into classification three if it would be in any other type of dwelling unit; if it were to serve seven children, it would fall into classification three regardless of the type of dwelling unit used.

2 The zoning ordinances of Anne Arundel County provide for permitted uses, conditional uses, and special exceptions in the various zoning districts. Permitted uses are those on which no special requirements or restrictions are imposed; conditional uses are those permitted without special authorization, but on which special requirements or restrictions are imposed; special exceptions are those uses for which special authorization is required, to be granted only upon specific findings relating to the suitability of the proposed use, and which are subject to special requirements or restrictions set forth in the County Code. See County Code, Article 28, §12-104.

3 For these purposes, group homes located on adjacent properties, under common ownership, and housing no more than 20 persons in each home are regarded as a single group home. In addition, any life care facility or group care facility that has separate living units on a single site is considered to be a single group home.

4 State law requires JSA to give notice of the filing of an application for a license to the governing bodies of the county and municipality concerned and, upon request, to the members of the General Assembly from the district where the facility is proposed to be located. Article 41C, §2-125(c). Thus, State law requires that the community be notified of proposals for facilities that Anne Arundel County would classify as classification one or two group homes, as well as classification three. While JSA is not required to send its notice directly to neighboring residences, it is required to notify officials who are in positions to apprise the immediately affected neighborhood of any proposal.

5 We understand that the sponsor of the proposed ordinance has stated that it is based on an ordinance adopted by Montgomery County in 1977. An official of Montgomery County has stated that the ordinance has never been subjected to legal challenge; however, the official has also acknowledged that Montgomery County has never denied a license application. Id.

6 The General Assembly is presumed to be aware of any preexisting local legislation in a field when it enacts State legislation in that field. Therefore, the lack of an express repeal or preemption of preexisting local law is an important indication that the General Assembly did not intend to preempt the field. City of Baltimore v. Sitnick, 254 Md. 303, 322 (1969).

7 Likewise, local jurisdictions may not authorize what State law expressly prohibits. Backus v. County Board of Appeals, 224 Md. 28, 33 (1960).

8 The regulations of JSA require that child care facilities comply with local zoning requirements as to their physical plants. COMAR 10.25.03.16A, B, and E. The physical plants of the facilities must also satisfy the requirements of local environmental safety, health, and fire authorities as a prerequisite to licensing, and JSA must request an onsite inspection report on the facility from the local health department at the time a license is applied for and annually thereafter. COMAR 10.25.03.16B and C.

9 The Court of Appeals has held that the State's use of land leased from a private owner is not subject to local zoning control. City of Baltimore v. State, 281 Md. 217, 224 (1977). Likewise, the use by a private entity of State-owned land for a public purpose is not subject to local zoning control. City of Baltimore v. State Dep't of Health & Mental Hygiene, 38 Md. App. 570, 578 (1978). No reported decisions have addressed whether privately owned land used by the owner for a public purpose under State regulation is also immune to local zoning. In Carroll County v. Raymond I. Richardson Found., 71 Md. App. 434, 445 (1987), the operator of a home for boys argued, and the Court of Special Appeals held, that the home was a school and thus, under the County's zoning ordinance, permitted as a matter of right in an agricultural district.

10 The purpose for removing a child from his or her home is "to secure for him custody, care, and discipline as nearly as possible equivalent to that which should have been given by his parents[.]" CJ §3-802(a)(4).

11 We understand that there is particular concern for ensuring that residents receive notice of plans to establish child care homes in their neighborhoods. Article 41C, §2-125(c) requires JSA to give notice of its receipt of a license application to the governing body of the affected county. See note 4 above. We do not mean to suggest that the County could not by ordinance direct its Office of Community Services and Information or other appropriate agency to forward that notice to residents in the vicinity of the proposed child care facility. An ordinance of that nature would relate to the County's internal procedures for handling the notice, rather than to the licensing or regulation of child care facilities.

12 If local regulations of this sort were effective, they could, for example, nullify a JSA determination that a facility housing seven or more children is needed at a location within one-half mile of an existing classification three group home or on a lot with a net area of less than 40,000 square feet. The child care facility would be a classification three group home under County Code Article 28, §10-122. Its establishment under these circumstances would contravene County Code Article 28, §2-204(b)(5)(ii) or (v).

13 Nor is the County's power to enact zoning ordinances so much greater than or so different from its power to enact licensing ordinances as to immunize zoning ordinances from preemption. Both powers have been granted by the provisions of Article 25A, §5 (the "Express Powers Act"). Accordingly, local laws enacted in the exercise of either power are subject to preemption by public general laws. See Woodlawn Area Citizens Ass'n v. Board of County Comm'rs for Prince George's County, 241 Md. 187, 190 (1966) (local governing body has no inherent power to zone or rezone).

14 As we have noted, JSA regulations require that child care facilities comply with local health, safety, and zoning requirements as to their physical plants. See note 8 above. Therefore, we need not consider the effect that a conflict between a local law of general applicability and a JSA decision to license a particular facility would have on the applicability of the local law to that facility. See Rowe v. Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co., 65 Md. App. 527, 532 (1985) (county charter provision could not be given effect where its application would conflict with State licensing decision).

15 We recognize that the application of certain kinds of regulations pertaining to physical plant necessarily is, to some extent, use-specific. For example, the number of parking spaces needed for any particular use must be determined by reference to the nature of the use. Similarly, fire-safety needs may be significantly different for a retail store, which is occupied for only part of the day and does not house activities likely to create fire hazards, than for a home. In our view, regulations pertaining to physical plant that are based on generally applicable principles but of necessity vary in the details of their effect on particular uses may properly be regarded as general regulations. For example, we believe that the County may enact a regulation that specially prescribes the number of parking spaces required for child care facilities, so long as it represents a good-faith application of the same principles for determining parking needs and frequency of use that the County generally applies to determine the number of spaces required for other uses. COMAR 10.25.03.16A through E.