Can a Maryland court hold a hearing before releasing someone committed after an insanity finding?

Plain-English summary

In 1987, Baltimore City's State's Attorney asked the Attorney General whether a court could hold a hearing when the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (DHMH) applied to conditionally release someone who had been committed to a state hospital after being found criminally not responsible (the Maryland equivalent of an insanity finding). Maryland's mental health law gave the committed individual a clear right to a hearing, including a possible jury trial, when the individual applied for release. But when DHMH itself applied for a conditional release, the statute simply told the court to issue an order granting or denying it within 30 days, without spelling out any hearing procedure, which raised the question whether a court could hold one at all.

The Attorney General concluded that a court could hold a hearing on DHMH's application. The opinion reasoned that eligibility for release had to be shown by a preponderance of the evidence, which implied some process for testing that evidence; that the statute required DHMH to send copies of its application to the committed individual, counsel, and the State's Attorney, which made little sense unless those recipients could be heard; and that a court generally has inherent authority to hold a hearing on any matter before it, particularly where an individual's liberty interest is at stake. The opinion characterized DHMH's application as functioning like a civil motion, for which a hearing is a traditional part of the court's process, while making clear that the statute did not require a hearing in every case, only that the court had discretion to hold one if the application was contested or needed clarification.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1987. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Did Maryland's mental health law require a hearing when a hospital asked to conditionally release a committed patient?
According to this 1987 opinion, no, the statute did not require a hearing in every case, but the Attorney General concluded it also did not prohibit one, and that a court could hold a hearing if the application was contested or if the court, the State's Attorney, or the committed individual sought clarification.

Why did this question come up only for hospital-initiated release applications and not patient-initiated ones?
Because the opinion found that the statute governing a patient's own petition for release, HG §12-118, spelled out a detailed hearing and jury-trial procedure, while the statute governing a hospital's application for conditional release, HG §12-119, simply directed the court to rule within 30 days without describing any hearing process, leaving the question the Attorney General was asked to resolve.

Background and statutory framework

Maryland's procedure for DHMH-initiated conditional release applications traced to Chapter 709, Laws of Maryland 1967, part of a comprehensive revision of the state's insanity statutes, later codified at HG §12-119 after several minor revisions and a 1984 overhaul of the insanity law that added release-eligibility standards cross-referencing HG §12-113. The opinion noted that this mechanism let DHMH obtain judicial review of continued commitment based on a patient's current clinical condition, and gave DHMH a direct path to court when both the hospital and the committed individual agreed that conditional release was appropriate.

To find authority for a hearing despite the statute's silence, the opinion drew on the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard in HG §12-113(d), the notice requirement running to the committed individual, counsel, and the State's Attorney in HG §12-118(c)(2), and general principles about a court's inherent authority to hold hearings on matters before it, quoting treatise language on the inherent powers of judges. It also analogized DHMH's application to a civil motion under Rule 2-311, reasoning that Maryland courts liberally construe motion practice to allow a hearing, and noted that treating the application as civil in character was consistent with HG §12-118(c)(3)'s civil-jury-trial procedure and HG §12-113(d)'s civil burden of proof, even though the underlying case originated in the criminal court's jurisdiction.

Citations

Statutes:

• HG §12-101(c) (criminal court jurisdiction over commitment matters)
• HG §12-113(c) (release-eligibility standard: not a danger to self or others if conditionally released)
• HG §12-113(d) (preponderance-of-the-evidence burden of proof)
• HG §12-118(c)(2) (notice of a release petition to DHMH and the State's Attorney)
• HG §12-118(c)(3) (civil jury trial procedure for a committed individual's release petition)
• HG §12-118(c)(4) and (5) (jury verdict requirement)
• HG §12-119 (DHMH application for conditional release)
• HG §12-119(b) (court must rule within 30 days on a DHMH application)
• Chapter 709, Laws of Maryland 1967 (original enactment of the DHMH application procedure)
• Chapter 407, Laws of Maryland 1970; Chapter 551, Laws of Maryland 1971; Chapter 21, Laws of Maryland 1982; Chapter 501, Laws of Maryland 1984 (subsequent revisions)
• Chapter 685, Laws of Maryland 1949 (predecessor habeas corpus release procedure)
• Rule 2-311 and Rule 2-311(f) (motion practice and hearings)

Cases:

• Dorsey v. Solomon, 435 F. Supp. 725, 729 (D.Md. 1977), aff'd in part and remanded in part, 604 F.2d 271 (4th Cir. 1979)
• Bremer v. State, 18 Md. App. 291, 341 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 930 (1974)
• Strawderman v. State, 4 Md. App. 689, 692 (1967)
• Devilbiss v. Bennett, 70 Md. 554, 559 (1889)
• Miller v. Spring Grove State Hospital, 198 Md. 659 (1951)
• People v. Thomas, 341 N.E.2d 178 (Ill. App. 1976)

Source

• Landing page: https://oag.maryland.gov/resources-info/Pages/attorney-general%E2%80%99s-opinions.aspx
• Original PDF: https://oag.maryland.gov/resources-info/Documents/pdfs/Opinions/1987/Volume72_1987.pdf

Original opinion text

Best-effort transcription from a scanned PDF. Minor errors may remain, the linked PDF is authoritative.

HEALTH

Mental Health—Conditional Release—Courts—Hearings Court May Conduct Hearing On Departments Application For Conditional Release Of Committed Individual.

July 9, 1987

The Honorable Kurt L. Schmoke
State's Attorney for Baltimore City

Ellen Finkelstein, Esquire
Assistant State's Attorney

You have requested our opinion on whether a court may conduct a hearing on an application by the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene ("DHMH") for the conditional release of an individual committed to DHMH following a finding of criminal nonresponsibility.

For the reasons given below, we conclude that the court may conduct a hearing of this kind.

I
Background

Title 12 of the Health-General Article ("HG" Article) applies to mental health matters arising from criminal cases. The title provides the standards governing incompetence to stand trial, criminal nonresponsibility by reason of insanity, and commitment and release from DHMH of individuals found not to be criminally responsible. Your inquiry involves the procedural mechanisms through which a committed individual may be released from inpatient DHMH treatment.

Title 12 provides for two release alternatives for committed individuals: application by the committed individual for discharge or conditional release, pursuant to HG §12-118; and application by DHMH for conditional release, pursuant to HG §12-119. See Dorsey v. Solomon, 435 F. Supp. 725, 729 (D.Md. 1977), aff'd in part and remanded in part, 604 F.2d 271 (4th Cir. 1979); Bremer v. State, 18 Md. App. 291, 341 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 930 (1974).1

If the committed individual petitions the court for release under HG §12-118(c), the individual "shall send a copy of the petition for release to [DHMH] and the State's Attorney." HG §12-118(c)(2). Either agency would be able to oppose the petition before the court or a jury, which is required to "[r]ender a verdict," obviously after a hearing. HG §12-118(c)(4) and (5).

By contrast, HG §12-119 does not specify a detailed adjudicatory procedure when DHMH applies for an individual's conditional release. Section 12-119(b) provides:

"Within 30 days after receipt of the Department's application, the court shall issue an order that is in accordance with the provisions of §12-113 of this title for: (1) Continued commitment; or (2) Conditional release under the conditions it imposes after giving consideration to the recommendations of specific conditions from the Department."

Thus, the question arises as to the court's authority to conduct a hearing under HG §12-119.

II
The DHMH Application Statute

The DHMH application process now codified at HG §12-119 originated in 1967 as part of a comprehensive revision of the insanity statutes. Chapter 709, Laws of Maryland 1967, codified at former Article 59, §12. See Strawderman v. State, 4 Md. App. 689, 692 (1967). The procedure, redesignated as former Article 59, §28 in 1970, was subsequently revised in minor respects only.2 Even the overall revision of the insanity law in 1984 left the procedure essentially unchanged, although the 1984 revision added to HG §12-119 standards for release eligibility. See HG §§12-119(b) and 12-113(c).3

This provision enables DHMH to seek judicial review of its authority to continue inpatient commitment, based on the individual's current clinical condition. This procedure also permits direct access by DHMH to the courts if the committed individual and DHMH agree that conditional release is warranted.

III
Opportunity for a Hearing

For several reasons, we are of the view that a court is free to hold a hearing on DHMH's application:

First, eligibility for release is to be established by a preponderance of the evidence. HG §12-113(d). This burden of proof requirement itself implies that a hearing might be necessary so that the court can assess whether the burden has been carried.

In addition, DHMH is required to send copies of its application to the committed individual, his or her counsel, and the State's Attorney. HG §12-118(c)(2). This requirement makes little sense unless the General Assembly intended that these recipients have an opportunity to make their views known to the court, and a hearing is a traditional way for this to be done.

More generally, we believe that a court with jurisdiction over a matter has inherent authority to conduct a hearing with respect to any question before the court, if the court views a hearing as appropriate:

"The powers of a judge are those that are conferred upon him by the constitution and by statute and those that are inherent in his office. The duties of the office of judge include all those that fairly lie within its scope, those that are essential to the accomplishment of the main purposes for which the office was created, and those that, although incidental and collateral, are germane to or serve to promote or benefit the accomplishment of the principal purposes." 46 Am. Jur. 2d Judges §21, at 109 (1969).

A judge should not "allow court business to be disposed of summarily without ample opportunity for hearing all matters which are material and relevant to the cause." 48A C.J.S. Judges §60, at 643 (1981).

A DHMH application for conditional release under HG §12-119 is, in essence, a motion, because DHMH is applying for an order of the court directing the conditional release of a committed individual.4 A hearing on a motion is a traditional part of the court's decisional process. See Rule 2-311(f). Indeed, statutes that relate to motions are given a liberal interpretation in order to simplify and expedite procedure. See Sutherland Statutory Construction, §67.05, at 360 (4th ed. 1986). A liberal construction of HG §12-119 would authorize the court to hold a hearing on the application, given that an individual's liberty interest is involved.

To be sure, the language of the DHMH application statute does not compel the court to conduct a hearing on conditional release eligibility. If neither the court, the State's Attorney, nor the committed individual opposes the conditional release application, dispensing with the formality of a hearing in open court spares judicial resources and saves the public and the parties time and expense.

But, as we read it, HG §12-119 by no means prohibits a hearing. In some situations, the State's Attorney, the patient, or the court may desire to challenge, or to seek to clarify, DHMH's conditional release application by DHMH. Indeed, the committed individual might have a due process right to a hearing, under some circumstances. We understand that, since the passage of the DHMH application statute in 1967, courts have occasionally conducted hearings involving testimony by the committed individual, facility witnesses, and others. Under the general principles pertaining to the disposition of issues in judicial proceedings, a hearing may be conducted to resolve any questions raised by the application or responses to it.

IV
Conclusion

Maryland's law governing the commitment of those found not criminally responsible strikes a delicate balance between the liberty interest of the committed individual and the public safety. Part of that balancing process entails the opportunity to challenge a conditional release application by DHMH under HG §12-119. In our opinion, a court may hold a hearing if the application is contested or if the court, the State's Attorney, or the committed individual seeks clarification of the application.

J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Attorney General
C. Frederick Ryland, Assistant Attorney General

Jack Schwartz
Chief Counsel
Opinions and Advice

1 The original legal process for a redetermination of "sanity" was habeas corpus. See Devilbiss v. Bennett, 70 Md. 554, 559 (1889). In Chapter 685, Laws of Maryland 1949, the General Assembly required that the State's Attorney apply to the court for a writ of habeas corpus for a patient recommended for release by hospital officials. Miller v. Spring Grove State Hospital, 198 Md. 659 (1951), indicated that statutory judicial release procedures, and not habeas corpus, are the appropriate means for court determination of the issue of release. This remains current practice.

2 See Chapter 407, Laws of Maryland 1970; Chapter 551, Laws of Maryland 1971; Chapter 21, Laws of Maryland 1982; Chapter 501, Laws of Maryland 1984.

3 The evidentiary issue when DHMH applies for conditional release is whether "[the] individual would not be a danger, as a result of mental disorder or mental retardation, to self or to the person or property of others if released from confinement with conditions imposed by the court." HG §12-113(c). The Governor's Task Force to Review the Defense of Insanity recommended the addition of a reference to the standards in §12-113 "to make clear that the court may not deny an application if the release criteria provided by this title have been established." Task Force Comment to §12-119, reprinted in Health-General Article at 164 (1986 Supp.).

4 Generally, a motion is any application for an order made to a judge. See Rule 2-311 ("An application to the court for an order shall be by motion. . ."). See also People v. Thomas, 341 N.E.2d 178 (Ill. App. 1976); Black's Law Dictionary 913 (5th ed. 1979). In our view, the DHMH application is best characterized as a civil motion. Under HG §12-118(c)(3), "[i]f the committed individual requests a trial by jury, the trial shall be held in a circuit court with a jury as in a civil action at law." See also HG §12-113(d) (specifying burden of proof typical of civil, not criminal, matters). We see no reason why an application under HG §12-119 should not also be viewed as civil in nature, even though the court that decides the matter is the court with criminal jurisdiction. See HG §12-101(c).