Does Maryland's 15-day limit on domestic violence protective orders apply to custody or counseling relief too?

Plain-English summary

In 1987, a member of the Maryland House of Delegates asked the Attorney General to clarify a recurring confusion among judges about Maryland's Protection from Domestic Violence Act. The Act let a court grant several kinds of relief in a protective order: an order for the abuser to vacate the family home, temporary custody of children, mandatory counseling, and other necessary relief. One part of the statute capped the vacate-the-home order at 15 days (25 days if the alleged abuse was against a child). Some courts had started reading that 15-day cap as if it limited every type of relief in the order, including counseling, which meant judges were declining to order counseling at all because 15 days was too short for it to do any good.

The Attorney General concluded that reading was wrong. The opinion held that the durational limits in FL §4-506(e) applied only to the two specific paragraphs that contained them, the order to vacate the family home under paragraph (1) (15 days) and the child-abuse version of that order under paragraph (2) (25 days), and did not apply to custody awards, counseling orders, or other relief under paragraphs (3), (4), and (5). This reaffirmed a 1981 opinion from the office that had reached the same conclusion under the statute's earlier, differently numbered version, and the opinion found the 1984 recodification and 1985 amendments made the point even clearer because the durational language appeared only inside the specific paragraphs it modified.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1987. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Did Maryland's 15-day limit on domestic violence protective orders apply to child-custody or counseling provisions?
According to this 1987 opinion, no. The Attorney General concluded the 15-day limit (25 days for a child-abuse case) applied only to the specific paragraphs authorizing an order to vacate the family home, and did not limit the duration of custody awards, counseling orders, or other relief a court included in the same protective order.

Why were some Maryland courts declining to order counseling in domestic violence cases?
The opinion explained that some courts had misread the statute's 15-day cap as applying to every type of relief in a protective order, so they avoided ordering counseling because 15 days was too short a window for counseling to be arranged or to be useful, a problem the opinion aimed to correct by clarifying that the cap did not apply to counseling orders.

Background and statutory framework

The Protection from Domestic Violence Act, enacted by Chapter 887, Laws of Maryland 1980 and originally codified as former CJ §4-503(b), let a court include up to four types of relief in a protective order, with a durational cap appearing only in the paragraph authorizing an order to vacate the family home. A 1981 opinion of the office, Opinion No. 81-005, had already concluded that the cap applied only to that one paragraph, reasoning that the General Assembly would have placed the durational language in the statute's introductory text if it meant the limit to apply across the board. The provision was amended twice more (Chapter 584, Laws of Maryland 1981, and Chapter 905, Laws of Maryland 1982) without changing that structure, then recodified without substantive change as FL §4-506(e) in the 1984 Family Law Article, Chapter 296, Laws of Maryland 1984. A 1985 amendment, Chapter 493, Laws of Maryland 1985, added a separate 25-day cap for cases involving an alleged child abuser, again placed only within its own paragraph.

The 1987 opinion treated the recodified statute's structure, five separately numbered paragraphs with durational language appearing only in two of them, as confirming the 1981 opinion's reading, and cited the Court of Appeals' general rule that a statute's plain language controls when it is unambiguous, from In Re Criminal Investigation No. 1-162. An editor's note appended to the opinion recorded that the General Assembly, in Chapter 247 (House Bill 889), Laws of Maryland 1987, extended the two durational limits to 30 days but still did not add any durational limit to custody, counseling, or other relief under FL §4-506(e)(3), (4), or (5).

Citations

Statutes:

• FL §4-506(e) (protective order relief provisions, Family Law Article)
• FL §4-506(e)(1) (order to vacate the family home, non-child-abuse cases; durational cap)
• FL §4-506(e)(2) (order to vacate the family home, child-abuse cases; durational cap)
• FL §4-506(e)(3) (temporary custody of a minor household member; no durational cap)
• FL §4-506(e)(4) (mandatory counseling; no durational cap)
• FL §4-506(e)(5) (other necessary relief; no durational cap)
• Former CJ §4-503(b) (predecessor provision, Courts Article)
• Chapter 887, Laws of Maryland 1980 (original enactment of the Protection from Domestic Violence Act)
• Chapter 584, Laws of Maryland 1981, and Chapter 905, Laws of Maryland 1982 (amendments to former CJ §4-503(b))
• Chapter 296, Laws of Maryland 1984 (recodification as FL §4-506(e))
• Chapter 493, Laws of Maryland 1985 (added the 25-day child-abuse cap)
• Chapter 247 (House Bill 889), Laws of Maryland 1987 (post-opinion extension of the two caps to 30 days, per the Editor's Note)

Cases:

• In Re Criminal Investigation No. 1-162, 307 Md. 674, 687 (1986)

Source

• Landing page: https://oag.maryland.gov/resources-info/Pages/attorney-general%E2%80%99s-opinions.aspx
• Original PDF: https://oag.maryland.gov/resources-info/Documents/pdfs/Opinions/1987/Volume72_1987.pdf

Original opinion text

Best-effort transcription from a scanned PDF. Minor errors may remain, the linked PDF is authoritative.

FAMILY LAW

Domestic Violence Act—Scope of Relief—15-Day Limit Applies Only to Relief Under FL §4-506(e)(1).

February 18, 1987

The Honorable Pauline H. Menes
Maryland House of Delegates

You have requested our opinion on whether all domestic violence protective relief granted under §4-506(e) of the Family Law Article ("FL" Article) is limited to an effective period of not more than 15 days.

For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that the statute places durational limits only on protective relief that (i) requires the alleged abuser to vacate the family home and (ii) grants temporary possession of the home to another individual. The statute imposes no durational limit on other types of relief. Specifically, relief under FL §4-506(e)(1) is limited to a maximum of 15 days and relief under FL §4-506(e)(2) is limited to a maximum of 25 days. Relief under FL §4-506(e)(3), (4), and (5) is not limited to any particular duration.

I
Background

FL §4-506 is a part of the Protection from Domestic Violence Act, enacted in 1980. Chapter 887, Laws of Maryland 1980. The Act provides a mechanism by which a person who has been abused by another member of a household may petition the court for protection from continued abuse. The court may grant a protective order that orders "the alleged abuser to refrain from abusing household members." In addition, the order may require the alleged abuser to vacate the family home and grant temporary possession of the home to another, FL §4-506(e)(1) and (2); award temporary custody of minor household members, FL §4-506(e)(3); require counseling, FL §4-506(e)(4); or provide other necessary relief, FL §4-506(e)(5).

Your specific question seeks clarification of the scope of FL §4-506(e)(1), which provides that, "except in a case of alleged child abuse, [the court may] order the alleged abuser to vacate the family home immediately and grant temporary possession of the family home to the petitioner for not more than 15 days." In a prior unpublished opinion, this office concluded that the 15-day limit in the predecessor of FL §4-506(e)(1) applied only to the specific type of relief authorized by that paragraph. Opinion No. 81-005 (February 10, 1981). However, you have advised us that, since the issuance of that opinion, the 15-day limit often has been interpreted as applying to all relief in any order issued under FL §4-506(e). One result of this interpretation is that protective orders requiring counseling, for example, are not issued because 15 days is too short a period of time for counseling to be arranged or to be of use to the participants.

In light of this continuing problem, you asked us to address once again the applicability of the 15-day durational limit.

II
The Original Act and Opinion No. 81-005

As enacted in 1980 and codified in the Courts Article ("CJ" Article), the Act contained the following provision regarding protective orders:

"If the court determines by clear and convincing evidence that the alleged abuse has occurred, the court may grant a protective order to stop the abuse of the household member. The relief may include the following: (1) An order to refrain from abusing household members; (2) The original order may require the respondent to vacate the family home and grant temporary possession of the family home to the petitioner for up to 5 days. In no event may the order and any extensions exceed a total period of 15 days; (3) An award of temporary custody of a minor; and (4) An order directing any or all of the household members to participate in a professionally supervised counseling program." Former CJ §4-503(b).

In Opinion No. 81-005, this office was asked whether the 15-day limit in former CJ §4-503(b)(2) applied only to an order to vacate the family home or applied across-the-board to any relief under the subsection. The opinion observed that "some courts have read the language in item (2), 'In no event may the order and any extension exceed a total period of 15-days', to require that the orders described in items (1), (3), and (4) also be limited to 15 days." The opinion continued:

"In our opinion, such an interpretation of the application of the 15-day limit is simply incorrect. The clear and unambiguous language of the statute leads inexorably to the conclusion that the 15-day limit applies only to an order requiring an abuser to vacate the family home. Section 4-503(b) enumerates four different types of . . . relief that a court might grant, listing them in four, separately numbered items. The 15-day limit, however, is included only as a part of one of these items: item (2).

We can find no basis for interpreting that limitation so as to apply to the other items as well. Indeed, we believe that, if the General Assembly had intended the 15-day limit to apply to all four types of relief, it would have included the operative language, which now appears within item (2), either as part of the introductory language of §4-503(b) or as a separate paragraph following the complete recitation of all of the various types of relief.

In summary, it is our opinion that the 15-day limit set forth in item (2) of §4-503(b) applies only to those orders described in that item, to orders requiring an abuser 'to vacate the family home and grant temporary possession of the family home to the petitioner'. The 15-day limit does not apply to any of the orders described in items (1), (3), and (4) of that section. This does not mean, of course, that, in exercising its discretion, a court is precluded from limiting the duration of these other orders to 15 days; it does mean, however, that a court is not at all required by the Act to so limit the duration of these other orders." Opinion No. 81-005, at 2-3.

III
Recodification and Current Language

In 1984, the Act was recodified as part of the new Family Law Article. Chapter 296, Laws of Maryland 1984. Former CJ §4-503(b) was redesignated, "without substantive change," as FL §4-506(e).1 Revisor's Note to FL §4-506.

In 1985, FL §4-506(e) was amended to establish additional procedures for protecting the victim of child abuse by a household member. Chapter 493, Laws of Maryland 1985. FL §4-506(e) now reads as follows:

"The protective order shall order the alleged abuser to refrain from abusing household members and may: (1) except in a case of alleged child abuse, order the alleged abuser to vacate the family home immediately and grant temporary possession of the family home to the petitioner for not more than 15 days; (2) in a case of alleged child abuse, order the alleged abuser to vacate the family home immediately and grant temporary possession of the family home to an adult household member for not more than 25 days; (3) award temporary custody of a minor household member; (4) direct any or all of the household members to participate in a professionally supervised counseling program; and (5) order any other relief as necessary."

The language of FL §4-506(e) is plain and unambiguous. The General Assembly provided that protective orders may include one or more of five types of relief. Only two of these are limited in duration: relief under FL §4-506(e)(1), requiring an alleged abuser (other than one alleged to have abused a child) to vacate the family home immediately and granting temporary possession of the home to the petitioner, which the General Assembly specifically restricted to "not more than 15 days"; and relief under FL §4-506(e)(2), requiring a person alleged to have abused a child to vacate the family home and granting temporary possession of the home to an adult, which the General Assembly specifically restricted to not "more than 25 days." The General Assembly placed no restrictions on the duration of a grant of temporary custody of a minor under FL §4-506(e)(3), the requiring of counseling under FL §4-506(e)(4), or the provision of any "other relief as necessary" under FL §4-506(e)(5).

Given the presence of differing durational limits in paragraphs (1) and (2) and the absence of any limits whatsoever in paragraphs (3), (4), and (5), we conclude that the construction of the statute adopted in the 1981 opinion is even more certain now. The 15-day limit set forth in FL §4-506(e)(1) applies only to relief authorized by that paragraph. The 15-day limit does not apply to relief otherwise authorized by FL §4-506(e). Cf. Opinion No. 81-005, at 3.2

IV
Conclusion

In summary, it is our opinion that:

1. Relief under FL §4-506(e)(1) is limited in duration to 15 days.

2. Relief under FL §4-506(e)(2) is limited in duration to 25 days.

3. Relief under FL §4-506(e)(3), (4), and (5) is subject only to such durational limits as the court, in its discretion, imposes.3

J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Attorney General
Sarah R. Kaplan, Assistant Attorney General

Jack Schwartz
Chief Counsel
Opinions and Advice

Editor's Note: In Chapter 247 (House Bill 889) of the Laws of Maryland 1987, the General Assembly increased the durational limit of orders under FL §4-506(e)(1) and (2) to 30 days. The General Assembly did not add durational limits to relief under FL §4-506(e)(3), (4), or (5).

1 Former CJ §4-503(b) was amended twice prior to its recodification in the Family Law Article. Chapter 584, Laws of Maryland 1981, amended paragraph (2) to read: "An order to require the respondent to vacate the family home immediately and grant temporary possession of the family home to the petitioner for up to 5 days. Any extensions to the order to vacate the family home and grant temporary possession of it to the petitioner, granted for good cause shown, may not exceed a total period of 15 days." Chapter 905, Laws of Maryland 1982, further amended the first sentence of paragraph (2) to read: "An order to require the respondent to vacate the family home immediately and grant temporary possession of the family home to the petitioner on service of the ex parte order for up to 5 days." However, neither amendment altered the application of the 15-day limit, as interpreted in Opinion No. 81-005.

2 As the Court of Appeals recently reiterated: "In construing a statute, a court must ascertain and carry out the real legislative intent. The court looks first to the language of the statute, assuming that it is to be afforded its ordinary and generally understood meaning. If the statutory language contains no ambiguity or obscurity, the court generally looks no further." In Re Criminal Investigation No. 1-162, 307 Md. 674, 687 (1986) (citations omitted).

3 House Bill 889, currently pending in the General Assembly, would extend the durational limit for relief under FL §4-506(e)(1) to 45 days and for relief under FL §4-506(e)(2) to 55. Enactment of this bill would not affect our conclusion about the applicability of these limits.