Under Maryland's old Fair Election Practices Act, did contribution limits apply to money given to a PAC instead of directly to a candidate?

Plain-English summary

The administrator of Maryland's State Administrative Board of Election Laws asked the Attorney General to sort out several recurring questions about how the state's Fair Election Practices Act treated political committees, contributions routed through them, and testimonial dinners for incumbents. The opinion, written as a letter of advice and later published because the questions came up so often, addressed five separate issues: whether a political committee had to help contributors track the $1,000 and $2,500 contribution limits, whether a committee could spend money on anything besides electing candidates, whether a state political committee could transfer funds to a federal campaign committee, how to tell a genuine testimonial dinner apart from a disguised political fundraiser, and whether an officeholder who received a gift from a true testimonial dinner could later put that money into a campaign account.

The Attorney General concluded that the $2,500 aggregate limit on contributions applied in full even when money passed through a political committee before reaching a candidate, because the statute reached "indirect" contributions, but that the separate $1,000 per-contribution limit was practically unenforceable against gifts to political action committees (PACs) that were not tied to any single candidate, since there was often no way to trace a specific contribution to a specific later transfer. The opinion also found that isolated non-electoral spending by a continuing committee (bank fees, administrative costs) did not create a compliance problem, that a state PAC could transfer money to its federal counterpart to the extent federal law allowed, and that four factors, who organized the event, its timing relative to an election, the content of its solicitations, and how the proceeds were used, distinguished a genuine testimonial dinner from a political fundraiser. Finally, it concluded that an officeholder who received an unrestricted cash gift from a true testimonial dinner could later contribute that same money to his or her own campaign without retroactively converting the dinner into a fundraiser, a result the opinion itself flagged as a "potentially serious loophole" that only the legislature could close.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1985. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Under the 1985 Fair Election Practices Act, did giving money to a PAC instead of directly to a candidate get around Maryland's contribution limits?
No, at least not for the $2,500 aggregate limit. The opinion treated a contribution later transferred by a committee to a candidate as an "indirect" contribution from the original donor, so it still counted against that donor's $2,500 cap for the election.

Was the $1,000 single-contribution limit actually enforced against people who gave to political action committees?
The opinion said that limit was "unworkable and unenforceable" for contributions to PACs not linked to one candidate, because there was usually no way to connect a specific donor's gift to a specific later transfer to a specific candidate, unless the donor earmarked the money for a particular candidate.

Could a political committee spend its money on things other than helping elect a candidate?
The opinion said isolated, minor non-electoral outlays (bank charges, accounting fees, administrative costs) did not create a compliance problem, but it warned that this tolerance would not extend to a situation where the proportion of non-electoral spending became substantial, since that could undermine what contributors thought their money was funding.

How did the opinion say you could tell a real testimonial dinner from a disguised political fundraiser?
It pointed to four factors: whether a filed political committee organized the event (which alone made it a fundraiser), whether it was held well before an election or an incumbent's announcement for office, whether solicitations referred to the honoree's past service rather than future campaigns, and whether the proceeds were ultimately used in a way consistent with a genuine testimonial.

If an officeholder received cash from a genuine testimonial dinner, could that money later end up in a campaign account?
Yes, the opinion concluded that a bona fide, unrestricted gift from a true testimonial dinner became the officeholder's personal money, and a later decision to donate an equivalent sum to his or her own campaign did not violate the Act or retroactively turn the dinner into a fundraiser, since the contribution limits do not apply to a candidate's contributions to his or her own campaign.

Background and statutory framework

The Fair Election Practices Act defined a "political committee" broadly as any group of two or more people formed to help or oppose a candidate, party, or ballot question, Article 33, §1-1(a)(14), and required such a committee to file a statement of organization before it could operate, Article 33, §26-4. The Act separately recognized, without fully defining, a "political committee which continues in existence from year to year," Article 33, §26-11(c)(1) and (2)(ii), a concept the opinion traced to a 1978 predecessor opinion distinguishing "continuing committees" (PACs supporting an indefinite series of future elections) from ordinary campaign committees tied to one election cycle.

Contribution limits appeared in Article 33, §26-9(b): no more than $1,000 to any one candidate, and no more than $2,500 in total contributions "under this subsection" for a primary or general election. Transfers between committees, and from a committee to a candidate's treasurer, were exempted from those caps, Article 33, §26-9(c)(1)(ii) and (iv), which raised the question of what happened when an individual gave to a committee that then transferred the money onward. The opinion read the $1,000 cap's "directly or indirectly" language to reach money that passed through a committee to a candidate, and treated that as consistent with the office's long-standing view, but concluded the same tracing problem made the $1,000 cap unenforceable for PAC contributions where no single candidate was the intended recipient. Separately, Article 33, §26-8(a) exempted a candidate's own contributions to his or her own campaign from the limits altogether, which the opinion relied on to permit an officeholder to move a testimonial gift into a campaign account. Recordkeeping duties under Article 33, §26-7(a) and the filing requirements of Article 33, §§26-4(a) and 26-6 for treasurers rounded out the framework the opinion applied to federal-PAC transfers and testimonial-dinner outlays.

Citations

Statutes:

• Article 33, §26-9(b) of the Maryland Code (contribution limits: $1,000 per contribution, $2,500 aggregate)
• Article 33, §26-4 of the Maryland Code (statement of organization required for a political committee)
• Article 33, §26-11(c)(1) and (2)(ii) of the Maryland Code (continuing political committees)
• Article 33, §26-9(c)(1)(ii) and (iv) of the Maryland Code (transfer exemption between committees/candidates)
• Article 33, §26-4(b) of the Maryland Code (reporting of expenditures over $51)
• Article 33, §26-8(a) of the Maryland Code (candidate's own contributions to own campaign exempt)
• Article 33, §26-7(a) of the Maryland Code (treasurer's account books)
• Article 33, §26-6 of the Maryland Code (filing with a State or local election board)
• Article 33, §1-1(a)(14) of the Maryland Code (definition of "political committee")
• Article 33, §1-1(a), (6) and (18) of the Maryland Code (definitions of "election" and "treasurer")
• Article 33, §26-4(a) of the Maryland Code (filing requirements for treasurers)

Cases: none cited (the opinion relies on prior Attorney General opinions and the Federal Election Campaign Act, not judicial case law).

Source

• Landing page: https://oag.maryland.gov/resources-info/Pages/attorney-general%E2%80%99s-opinions.aspx
• Original PDF: https://oag.maryland.gov/resources-info/Documents/pdfs/Opinions/1985/Volume70_1985.pdf

Original opinion text

Best-effort transcription from a scanned PDF. Minor errors may remain, the linked PDF is authoritative.

ELECTIONS

Fair Election Practices Act—Political Committees—Contributions—Expenditures—Testimonial Dinners.

August 27, 1985

Mrs. Marie M. Garber, Administrator
State Administrative Board of Election Laws

The purpose of this letter is to outline our views on several issues involving the provisions of the Fair Election Practices Act that govern political committees and contributions. This aspect of the Act is especially troublesome, both in concept and practice. As usual, the Act itself provides singularly little guidance; the ground rules in this area are largely derived from the State Board's administrative practice over the years, in light of the Attorney General's Office's "common law".

The Act's lack of specificity and clarity, and the great increase in the number of political committees over the last several years, result in numerous, difficult interpretive questions. The following questions have been raised recently: (1) What obligation does a political committee have to assist its contributors in complying with the contribution limits in Article 33, §26-9(b)? (2) May a political committee make disbursements from its treasury for anything other than political expenditures? (3) Under what circumstances may a political committee transfer funds to a federal campaign committee? (4) What distinguishes a political committee from a non-electoral testimonial committee? (5) May the recipient of proceeds from a testimonial dinner later use them for electoral purposes?

These questions are addressed respectively in Parts II through VI of this letter.

I
Background

Under the Act, a "political committee" is "any combination of two or more persons appointed by a candidate or any other person or formed in any other manner which assists or attempts to, assist in any manner the promotion of the success or defeat of any candidate, candidates, political party, principle or proposition submitted to a vote at any election". Article 33, §1-1(a)(14) of the Maryland Code. A political committee may not function unless it files a statement of organization with the appropriate election board. See Article 33, §26-4. The nature of a political committee, and, especially, the difference between a political committee and a mere "committee" or a "partisan organization", two other entities recognized in the Act, is explored at length in 59 Opinions of the Attorney General 282, 289-99 (1974).

The Act further complicates matters by recognizing, but not defining, a "political committee which continues in existence from year to year". See Article 33, §26-11(c)(1) and (2)(ii). In 63 Opinions of the Attorney General 273 (1978), this office gave content to this concept: a "political committee which continues in existence from year to year", now commonly referred to as a "continuing committee", is one that from the outset intends to support a candidate or candidates in an indefinite series of future elections. All other "political committees", commonly referred to as "campaign" or "non-continuing" committees, intend from the outset merely to support a candidate or candidates in a particular year's elections, typically a primary and general. See 63 Opinions of the Attorney General at 275-77.

II
Obligations of a Continuing Committee Regarding Contribution Limitations

A. Applicability of Limitations

It is absolutely clear that donations by an individual or a business entity to a candidate are subject to specified dollar ceilings:

"It is unlawful for any individual, association, unincorporated association, corporation, or any other entity either directly or indirectly to contribute any money or thing of value greater than $1,000 to any candidate or to contribute money in excess of $100 except by check in any primary, general or special election. Total contributions by a contributor under this subsection shall not exceed $2,500 in any primary or general election." Article 33, §26-9(b).

It is equally clear that these contribution limitations do not apply to contributions made by political committees, because "transfers . . . from the treasurer of a committee to the treasurer of another committee" or "from the treasurer of a committee to a candidate's treasurer" are exempt from both the $1,000 and $2,500 limitations. Article 33, §26-9(c)(1)(ii) and (iv).

But do the contribution limitations apply to the contributions of an individual or entity to a political committee, as distinct from contributions made directly to a candidate? The statutory language is rather ambiguous. The $1,000 limit speaks of only those who "contribute any money or thing of value greater than $1,000 to any candidate". The $2,500 limitation addresses only "total contributions by a contributor under this subsection", arguably, that is, only contributions "to any candidate."

However, the $1,000 limitation prohibits excessive contributions made "either directly or indirectly". A contribution that is received by a political committee and later transferred to a candidate can readily be regarded as as "indirect" contribution from the original contributor to the candidate via the committee. Hence, such indirect contributions are comprehended "under this subsection" and are therefore subject to the $2,500 limitation, as well.

This latter construction of the statute, although not previously spelled out in any detail, has been the consistent view of both this office and the State Administrative Board of Election Laws. See, e.g., 59 Opinions of the Attorney General at 306; 55 Opinions of the Attorney General 100, 103 n. 1 (1970).

These limitations are applicable to institutional, as well as individual, contributors to political committees. In particular, an out-of-State political committee, one which has not filed in accordance with Article 33, §26-4(a), is subject to the limitations, even when it channels funds to a State affiliate. The "transfer" exemption in §26-9(c) is available only to Maryland-based "treasurers", "committees", and "candidates" that are in compliance with the Act.1

B. Duty of Continuing Committee to Supply Information

As discussed above, the hallmark of a continuing committee is its ongoing existence. Some such committees, in reality, are simply the creatures of particular candidates. These continuing committees function much like the traditional campaign committees, except that they are designed to support a candidate throughout his or her political career. For the most part, it is relatively easy for a contributor to such a candidate-related continuing committee to discern the election for which a contribution will be used and, therefore, to reckon the effect of that contribution on compliance with the contribution limitations in Article 33, §26-9(b).

However, many continuing committees are not candidate-related. Rather, these committees seek to advance the interest of some entity (for example, a corporation, labor union, trade association, or environmental group) through the support of numerous candidates. These are the classic political action committees, PACs. A contributor to a PAC has no way of knowing the candidates to whom his or her contribution will ultimately be transferred. Indeed, at the time of the contribution, the PAC itself may have no idea to whom the contribution will go.

Past opinions are somewhat inconsistent about the respective obligations of the committee and the contributor, in light of the contribution limitations. In 58 Opinions of the Attorney General 266, 268-69 (1973), this office wrote that political committees are under no obligation to notify contributors of the applicability of the $2,500 limit to their contributions. Moreover, "if the contributor was without knowledge of a transfer which placed him in violation of the limit, prosecution for contributing in excess of the maximum allowed would seem unlikely". 58 Opinions of the Attorney General at 269.

However, the later "continuing committee" opinion construed the limitations themselves to impose a duty of inquiry on the part of the contributor, and a corresponding duty on the part of the committee to provide necessary information:

"While the responsibility for avoiding violations of [the contribution limitations] is clearly the contributor's and not the committee's, the contributor must have some way of knowing in connection with which election he is contributing money. Indeed, it was for this reason that we concluded in an earlier opinion of this office that 'money received at a fund-raising event must be identified at the time the contribution is made as being for one election or another. . . .' 58 Opinions of the Attorney General 266, 267 (1973). If a committee is not identified as 'continuing' the contributor can assume that it is organized with one election year (usually one primary and one general election) in mind and limit his contribution accordingly. If a committee is identified as 'continuing' in nature, then a contributor is alerted to the fact that he should determine the particular election for which his contribution is to be used." 63 Opinions of the Attorney General 273, 277-78 (1978).

The contributor's duty of inquiry is reasonable with respect to the overall $2,500 limitation. Any contributor ought to be expected to keep track of his or her total contributions and to inquire, as need be, whether any or all of a contribution will be allocated to a past, rather than the forthcoming, election.

But the $1,000 limitation is, in our view, unworkable and unenforceable, as applied to contributions to PACs, continuing committees unrelated to a candidate. In most cases, there is simply no way to link a particular contribution with a later transfer to a candidate. Unless a contributor to a PAC specifically earmarks his or her contribution for a particular candidate, or has some other reason to believe that the contribution will in fact go to only one or a handful of candidates, the $1,000 limitation is inapplicable to PAC contributions.

III
Outlays of Political Committees

The question has been raised whether a political committee, in particular, a PAC, may expend money for purposes other than assisting candidates or covering its own expenses. For example, may a PAC purchase tickets to a testimonial dinner? May it donate money to help underwrite the expenses of a legislative caucus?

In essence, political committees are simply efficient conduits for individual political contributions. That is why the contribution limitations (at least, the $2,500 limitation) are applicable to those who contribute to political committees. Thus, our office has written, a mere "committee" becomes a "political committee" if it (i) supports or opposes an announced candidate and (ii) acts "in some way, either by transferring or contributing funds or by engaging in some activity involving the expenditure of its funds, which is either intended to, or could reasonably be expected to, or in fact does," support or oppose a candidate. 59 Opinions of the Attorney General 282, 295 (1974).

In 68 Opinions of the Attorney General 252 (1983), we concluded that "funds given for electoral purposes may not be converted to nonelectoral use". The reasoning was straightforward:

"[T]he Fair Election Practices Act. . . regulates electoral donations stringently and nonelectoral donations not at all. Therefore, a donor is entitled to know what kind of donation he or she is in fact making and to have the general purpose for that donation carried out." 68 Opinions of the Attorney General at 266.

At the same time, we recognized that "the Act permits a very wide range of uses for campaign funds". Id. Thus, in an earlier advice letter addressing the permissible range of expenditures by a candidate-related continuing committee, we wrote that "any lawful expense . . . which enhances a candidate's election chances and would not be incurred if there were no potential candidacy, is a proper expenditure". Letter from Stephen H. Sachs, Attorney General, to Dennis F. Rasmussen, State Senator, at 3 (April 27, 1983). So, for example, it is surely a proper expenditure for one candidate to contribute to the campaign of another. This act of support may well redound to the ultimate electoral benefit of the first candidate.

Moreover, political committees inevitably expend at least a portion of their receipts for purposes other than electoral expenditures. For example, virtually all political committees must pay bank charges, accounting fees, or the cost of other services to support their ongoing activities. These outlays are not "expenditures" within the meaning of the Act. The Act recognizes the reality of outlays that are not "expenditures": §26-7(a) requires the treasurer's account books to list, among other things, "all expenditures, disbursements and promises of payment or disbursements of money or valuable things made by any committee".

We believe that a broad view ought to be adopted as to the permissible range of outlays by a PAC. Indeed, by its very nature a PAC has broader interests than a candidate-related continuing committee. For the PAC, support of candidates is a means to an end, the advancement of the interests of the allied group, not an end in itself. We may fairly infer that contributors to the PAC likewise view their PAC contributions as fostering the PAC's broad purposes, even if those purposes are sporadically advanced through nonelectoral outlays.

Although, or maybe because, the applicability of the Act in this situation is far from clear, we would view with tolerance isolated, politically related outlays by a PAC even if they are at best only indirectly related to elections. So long as these outlays are minimal, compared to transfers or other expenditures that plainly are for electoral purposes, we do not think that a cognizable compliance problem arises. We would become concerned only if the proportion of nonelectoral outlays becomes substantial, because then the intention of contributors to the PAC may be subverted.

B. Applicability of Contribution Limitation

In any event, such nonelectoral outlays would have no effect on the applicability of the contribution limitations to contributors to the PAC. In 63 Opinions of the Attorney General 263 (1978), this office concluded that a corporation's payment of the ongoing administrative expenses of its independent political committee was not subject to the limitations in §26-9(b). The opinion pointed out that the uses of the payments, "to maintain a payroll deduction option for the corporation's employees, keep separate records of employee contributions and make the reports required by law", would not be of any "demonstrable benefit or savings to any candidate". 63 Opinions of the Attorney General at 270. Moreover, "because the donor has complete control over the administration of the political committee, it is certain that in practice the recipient cannot direct the funds to some other use." 63 Opinions of the Attorney General at 271. The opinion summarized as follows:

"Because of these two elements, the lack of any benefit to a candidate and the total control of the use of the contribution is by the donor, it is our view that this corporation's contribution to its independent continuing political committee for administrative and compliance expenses . . . is not a contribution in connection with any particular primary, general or special election. Accordingly it should not be chargeable against the contribution limitations set forth in Section 26-9(b)." Id.

Applying this reasoning to the situation in which contributions are later used by a continuing committee for nonelectoral disbursements, we conclude that the full amount of the contribution is chargeable against the contribution limitations. This is so because at least one of the two elements identified in the opinion, "the total control of the use of the contributions by the donor", is absent. It is the continuing committee, not the donor, which decides that some portion of its commingled funds can best be spent for nonelectoral purposes. Accordingly, we conclude that the $2,500 contribution limitation in §26-9(b) generally applies to the full amount of contributions to continuing committees, even if the committee subsequently disburses money from its treasury for payment of its expenses or other non-electoral purposes.2

IV
Transfers to Federal Committees

The question has arisen whether a political committee, that is, a properly filed entity that collects and expends funds in connection with State elections, may transfer funds to a committee that participates in federal elections. For example, may a State PAC transfer funds to its federal election counterpart?

In our view, it may do so to the extent permitted by the Federal Election Campaign Act. It is not clear whether State law allows this kind of transfer;3 but, in any event, any arguable prohibition in State law is "fully preempted" by the federal statute and "may not be applied in any way to contributions given in connection with campaigns for federal office". 61 Opinions of the Attorney General 363, 369 (1976).

From the perspective of a contributor to the State PAC, the full amount of his or her contribution would be chargeable against the $2,500 limitation in §26-9(b), even if a pro rata portion of the contribution was ultimately transferred to a federal PAC. See Part III B above.4

V
Testimonial Dinner Committees

Under the Act, those who organize a testimonial dinner for an incumbent officeholder are not subject to the filing and reporting requirements applicable to partisan organizations and political committees, and subscribers to the testimonial dinner need not count their outlay toward any contribution limitation, if the testimonial "is not conducted for the purpose of raising money either to eliminate a prior election campaign deficit or to accumulate a campaign fund for use in a subsequent election effort on the part of the incumbent office-holders". 61 Opinions of the Attorney General 407, 413 (1976). See also, e.g., 57 Opinions of the Attorney General 185 (1972).

The question arises as to the specific means by which one identifies a "true" testimonial committee. Put another way, how is the purchaser of a ticket to an affair honoring an incumbent to know whether his or her ticket purchase is subject to the contribution limitations?

In our view, the following elements should be considered in determining the nature of a testimonial dinner:

(1) The identity of the organizers. If a previously filed partisan organization or political committee is sponsoring the dinner, there is a conclusive presumption that the event is a political fundraiser. Ticket purchases are subject to the contribution limitations.

(2) The timing of the event. The fact that a testimonial dinner is held "well in advance of any election and of a candidate's announcing for public office" is some evidence that the event is a true testimonial, not a political fundraiser. See 57 Opinions of the Attorney General at 186. Conversely, a so-called "testimonial" event held within several months of an election ought to be viewed with heightened skepticism.

(3) Solicitations and advertisements. It is evidence that an event is a true testimonial if written solicitations and other advertisements for the affair refer exclusively to the past achievements of the honoree. By contrast, it is evidence that an event is a political fundraiser if these materials refer to future campaigns or political prospects.

(4) Use of the funds raised. If the question as to the proper categorization of an event is raised after the event is held, one may look to the use of the proceeds as evidence of the nature of the event itself. That is, the disposition of the proceeds ought to be consistent with the nonelectoral nature of a true testimonial dinner, e.g., a gift to the honoree. See Part VI below.

VI
Use of Proceeds of Testimonial Dinner by Incumbent

In Part V above, we expressed the view that the disposition of the proceeds of an event is evidence of its nature. That is, if those who sponsor the event use its proceeds in a way consistent with the purposes of a testimonial dinner, that use is itself evidence of the true testimonial nature of the event. By contrast, if the funds are used by the organizers for electoral purposes, that use is virtually irrefutable evidence that the event was in fact a political fundraiser, not a true testimonial. But a further question suggests itself: May an incumbent who receives a gift of cash from a "true" testimonial dinner subsequently use that money for his or her electoral purposes?

The problem may be clarified by a hypothetical example. Suppose that a dinner was held in early 1984 to recognize the years of service of John Doe, an incumbent officeholder. All of the indicia mentioned in Part V above suggest that the event was, indeed, a true testimonial. The organizers of the event net $10,000, which they gave to Doe. This gift was wholly unrestricted, and Doe added the $10,000 to his personal bank account. Then, in late 1985, he announces for reelection. In early 1986, he donates $10,000 to his campaign committee.

In our view, this transaction is permissible under the Act. The $10,000 contribution by the candidate to his own campaign does not violate the limitations, because they are inapplicable to the "contributions of a candidate or his spouse to the candidate's own campaign". Article 33, §26-8(a). Moreover, such a subsequent use by a candidate of money received as a bona fide gift from a testimonial dinner does not change the nature of the dinner itself. Hence, neither the sponsors of the dinner nor its attendees can be said to have breached any of the requirements of the Act, because at the time of the dinner the Act was inapplicable.

We recognize that this is a potentially serious loophole in the system of limitations and disclosures sought to be created by the Act. However, we see no solution other than legislative correction.

VII
Conclusion

To summarize, it is my view that:

(1) Political committees, including continuing committees, have an obligation to assist contributors in complying with the contribution limitations of Article 33, §26-9(b). Often the surrounding circumstances will make clear the election to which a contribution will be allocated. If they do not, and upon inquiry, the committee must provide a contributor with information about the election in which his or her contribution is used, so that the contributor can maintain compliance with the $2,500 per election limitation in §26-9(b). However, the $1,000 contribution limitation in §26-9(b) is, as a practical matter, generally unenforceable as applied to contributions to continuing committees unrelated to any candidate.

(2) Isolated nonelectoral outlays by a continuing committee that is unrelated to any candidate do not give rise to a substantial compliance problem under the Act. Any such outlays do not diminish the applicability of the $2,500 limitation to contributors to the committee.

(3) A State political committee may transfer funds to a federal committee, to the extent permitted by federal law.

(4) A testimonial dinner may be distinguished from a political fundraiser by consideration of sponsorship, timing, advertising, and disposition of proceeds.

(5) The recipient of a bona fide nonelectoral gift from a testimonial dinner may subsequently donate a sum equal to that gift to his or her own campaign.

Stephen H. Sachs, Attorney General
Jack Schwartz, Deputy Counsel
Opinions and Advice

Avery Aisenstark
Chief Counsel
Opinions and Advice

Editor's Note: The preceding opinion was originally written as a letter of advice. Because the questions addressed recur frequently, it is published here in a slightly revised format.

1 "Any committee", wherever located, is required to report direct or indirect expenditures of $51.00 or more "to aid or oppose the nomination or election of any candidate". Article 33, §26-4(b).

2 However, if a contributor specifies that his or her contribution is to be used for nonelectoral purposes, and if the committee segregates such funds, the contribution limitation would be inapplicable. See 63 Opinions of the Attorney General at 271.

3 Article 33, §26-9(c)(1)(ii) permits unlimited transfers "[f]rom the treasurer of a committee to the treasurer of another committee". A "treasurer" is someone who handles money in connection with "any election", which includes federal elections. See Article 33, §1-1(a), (6) and (18). However, the Act clearly requires that all money, from whatever source, is to be handled by treasurers who are filed with a State or local election board. See Article 33, §§26-4(a) and 26-6. Treasurers of federal PACs are not so filed.

4 If a State PAC regularly transfers funds to a federal PAC, the better practice under State law is for the State PAC to solicit and allocate the intended federal contributions separately. Then, if a contributor earmarks all or a portion of a contribution for use in a federal campaign, the contribution limitation in §26-9(b) would be inapplicable to that contribution or portion. Of course, any flow of funds from contributor to State PAC to federal PAC must comply with all of the solicitation and recordkeeping requirements of federal law.