Could a Maryland health club refuse membership to a blind or deaf person in the 1980s?

Plain-English summary

A member of the Maryland House of Delegates asked whether a health club that was otherwise open to the general public could exclude a blind person from membership, and specifically whether such a club counted as a "public facility" under Maryland's "White Cane Law," Article 30, §33 of the Maryland Code. The opinion concluded that it did. Tracing the statute's history from a narrow 1964 law protecting only blind people using guide dogs in lodging and dining establishments, through a series of amendments that broadened it to cover "all... places of public accommodations, amusement, or resort, or other places to which the general public is invited," the opinion found that a health club fell squarely within that broad language. It relied heavily on a Michigan appellate decision, Vidrich v. Vic Tanny International, Inc., which read a similar Michigan statute to cover health and exercise clubs and rejected a "safety exception" for excluding blind members. The opinion held that a health club open to the public, like the specific club at issue (Grecian Health Spa and Fitness Center of Laurel, Maryland), was required to give blind and hearing-impaired people full and equal access to its facilities.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1984. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

An editor's note on the official text records that Chapter 568, Laws of Maryland 1986, later amended Article 30, §33(g) to add a civil action for injunctive relief for violations of the White Cane Law, on top of the criminal penalty the opinion discussed. Maryland's disability-discrimination statutes have also been substantially reorganized and renumbered since 1984 (protections against disability discrimination in public accommodations are today found in Maryland's Human Relations statutes, not Article 30). Readers should not assume the article and section numbers cited in this opinion are still current.

Common questions

Could a health club in Maryland deny membership to a blind person under this 1984 opinion?
No. The opinion concluded that a health club open to the general public was a "public facility" under the White Cane Law and could not deny full and equal access to blind or hearing-impaired people.

Did the opinion recognize any exception, such as for safety reasons?
No safety exception was recognized. The opinion pointed to the Michigan Vic Tanny decision, which held that similarly broad statutory language left no room for a judicially created "safety exception" based on a member's blindness.

Would a private club with selective membership have been covered?
The opinion suggested a possible narrow exception for a true "private club," one with a select membership that controls its own admissions and shares in ownership of club property. It noted that most health clubs, including the one at issue, do not have those characteristics and are ordinary commercial businesses open to anyone who pays the membership fee.

Did this 1984 opinion also decide whether health clubs are covered by Maryland's separate Public Accommodations Law?
No. The opinion expressly declined to address whether a health club is also a "place of public accommodation" under the different Public Accommodations Law, Article 49B, §5, saying that question was best left to the Human Relations Commission that administered that law.

Background and statutory framework

Maryland's White Cane Law began in 1964 as a narrow protection for blind people accompanied by guide dogs at lodging and dining establishments. The General Assembly broadened it repeatedly: in 1966 to cover a wider set of public places, in 1967 to drop the guide-dog focus and protect "public facilities" generally, and in 1971 to combine those protections with new employment and housing provisions under the "White Cane Law" name. In 1978 and 1979 the law's protections were extended to deaf and hearing-impaired people, and in 1983 the criminal penalty for violations was raised from $50 to $500. As of the 1984 opinion, Article 30, §33(d)(1) guaranteed "full and equal" access to a long list of transportation and lodging facilities plus "places of public accommodations, amusement, or resort, or other places to which the general public is invited," and §33(g) made a knowing violation a misdemeanor. The opinion reasoned that this catch-all language had been construed by courts in other states to sweep in facilities not specifically named in the statute, including pool halls, swimming pools, race tracks, roller rinks, cemeteries, and amusement parks, and that a Michigan court applying nearly identical language had specifically held health and exercise clubs covered.

Citations

Statutes:

• Article 30, §33 of the Maryland Code (the "White Cane Law")
• Article 30, §33(d)(1) of the Maryland Code (guarantees full and equal access to public facilities for blind, visually handicapped, deaf, and hearing-impaired persons)
• Article 30, §33(g) of the Maryland Code (misdemeanor penalty for denying access)
• Article 49B, §5 of the Maryland Code (separate Public Accommodations Law, not addressed by this opinion)
• Chapter 137, Laws of Maryland 1964 (original White Cane Law, guide-dog access)
• Chapter 190, Laws of Maryland 1966 (expanded guide-dog access to more public places)
• Chapter 663, Laws of Maryland 1967 (broadened the law to general "public facilities")
• Chapter 390, Laws of Maryland 1971 (created the "White Cane Law" covering employment, public accommodations, and housing)
• Chapter 875, Laws of Maryland 1974 (expanded the separate Public Accommodations Law to cover physical handicap)
• Chapter 929, Laws of Maryland 1978 (extended White Cane Law protections to the deaf and hearing impaired)
• Chapter 565, Laws of Maryland 1979 (same, further amendment)
• Chapter 649, Laws of Maryland 1983 (raised criminal penalty from $50 to $500)
• Chapter 568, Laws of Maryland 1986 (per editor's note, added civil injunctive relief remedy)

Cases:

• Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969), "place of entertainment" under the federal Civil Rights Act includes a recreational facility offering swimming, boating, and dancing
• Drews v. State, 236 Md. 349 (1964), noted that Maryland's public accommodations law did not then cover amusement parks
• Maryland Comm'n on Human Relations v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 295 Md. 586 (1983), cited on the Human Relations Commission's role
• Maryland Comm'n on Human Relations v. MTA, 294 Md. 225 (1982), cited on the Human Relations Commission's role
• Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984), a national membership organization with non-selective local chapters is a "place of public accommodation"
• Village of Atwood v. Otter, 129 N.E. 573 (Ill. 1920), pool rooms covered by similar accommodations language
• State of New Jersey v. Rosecliff Realty Co., 62 A.2d 488 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1948), swimming pools covered
• Suttles v. Hollywood Turf Club, 114 P.2d 27 (Cal. Ct. App. 1941), race tracks covered
• Jones v. Broadway Roller Rink Co., 118 N.W. 170 (Wis. 1908), roller skating rinks covered
• Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n v. Altoreste Park Cemetery Ass'n, 306 A.2d 881 (Pa. 1973), cemeteries covered
• National Organization for Women, Essex County Chapter v. Little League Baseball, Inc., 318 A.2d 33 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1974), little league organizations covered
• New York Roadrunners Club v. State Division of Human Rights, 437 N.Y.S.2d 681 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981), marathon courses covered
• Brown v. Loudon Golf and Country Club, Inc., 573 F. Supp. 399 (D. Va. 1983), golf clubs covered
• Smith v. Young Men's Christian Ass'n of Montgomery, 316 F. Supp. 899 (M.D. Ala. 1970), recreational facilities covered
• Browning v. Slenderella Systems of Seattle, 341 P.2d 859 (Wash. 1959), reducing salons covered
• Vidrich v. Vic Tanny International, Inc., 301 N.W.2d 482 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980), health and exercise clubs directly held covered under similar Michigan statute; no judicially created safety exception for blind members

Source

• Landing page: https://oag.maryland.gov/resources-info/Pages/attorney-general%E2%80%99s-opinions.aspx
• Original PDF: https://oag.maryland.gov/resources-info/Documents/pdfs/Opinions/1984/Volume69_1984.pdf

Original opinion text

Best-effort transcription from a scanned PDF. Minor errors may remain, the linked PDF is authoritative.

CIVIL RIGHTS

Public Accommodations-"White Cane Law"-Discrimination Against Blind or Deaf-"Place of Public Accommodations, Amusement, or Resort"-Health and Exercise Clubs Are Prohibited from Denying Blind or Deaf Full and Equal Access to Club Facilities.

August 6, 1984

The Honorable Elijah E. Cummings
Maryland House of Delegates

You have requested our opinion on whether the exclusion of a blind person from membership in a health club that is otherwise open to the general public violates this State's "White Cane Law", Article 30, §33 of the Maryland Code. More specifically, you ask whether such a health club is a "public facility" within the meaning of that law.

For the reasons given below, we have concluded that a health club which otherwise opens its membership to the general public is a public facility subject to the provisions of Article 30, §33. Accordingly, it is prohibited by law from denying the blind (or, indeed, any person with a visual or hearing impairment) "full and equal" access to and use of its facilities.1

I

The Statute

Article 30, §33(d)(1) and (g) of the Maryland Code makes it unlawful in this State to deny or interfere with the admittance to or enjoyment of "public facilities" by persons with visual or hearing impairments:

"(d)(1) The blind or the visually handicapped and the deaf or hearing impaired are entitled to full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of all common carriers, airplanes, motor vehicles, railroad trains, motor buses, streetcars, boats or other public conveyances or modes of transportation, hotels, lodging places, places of public accommodations, amusement, or resort, or other places to which the general public is invited, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable to all persons.

(g) Any person or persons, firm, or corporation, or the agent of any person or persons, firm, or corporation, who denies or interferes with admittance to or enjoyment of the public facilities enumerated in this section, or otherwise interferes with the rights of a blind or visually handicapped person or a deaf or hearing impaired person under this section, is guilty of a misdemeanor and subject upon conviction to a fine not exceeding $500 for each offense."

As originally enacted in 1964, the law was designed to "prohibi[t] discrimination against blind persons in places of accommodations when such persons are accompanied by their dog guides". Chapter 137, Laws of Maryland 1964. The term "place of public accommodation" was then somewhat narrowly defined to include only an "establishment ... regularly engaged in the business of providing sleeping accommodations, or serving food, or both, for a consideration, and which is open to the general public".

In 1966, the law was revised to "mak[e] it unlawful for any person to prohibit, hinder, or interfere with" the right of a blind person "to take a dog guide into certain public places". Chapter 190, Laws of Maryland 1966. Again, the range of "public places" subject to the law was a relatively narrow one, limited to "any public building, restaurant or eating place, conveyance, hotel, inn, tourist cabin or motel, elevator, or other similar public place".

But, just one year later, in 1967, the scope of this law was significantly broadened. No longer did the statute focus primarily on the right of the blind to use guide dogs. Rather, the statute was revised generally to "make it unlawful to interfere or deny admittance to or enjoyment of public facilities or to otherwise interfere with the rights of blind ... persons". Chapter 663, Laws of Maryland 1967. And, for this purpose, the range of "public facilities" to which the blind were guaranteed "full" access was itself broadened to include "all... places of public accommodation, amusement or resort, and other places to which the general public is invited".

In 1971, this broad prohibition became part of a new "White Cane Law", "providing for equal rights and treatment for blind or visually handicapped persons in employment, public accommodations, and housing". Chapter 390, Laws of Maryland 1971. New rights with respect to housing and public employment were added, and what is now §33(d)(1) was expanded to provide both "the blind [and] the visually handicapped" with "full and equal" access to the broad range of public facilities there enumerated, including, again, "all... places of public accommodations, amusement, or resort, or other places to which the general public is invited".2

II

Analysis

A health club, quite obviously, does not fall within the statute's more specific listing of "common carriers, airplanes, motor vehicles, railroad trains, motor buses, streetcars, boats or other public conveyances or modes of transportation, hotels [and] lodging places". The question, then, is whether it falls within the statute's far broader reference to "places of public accommodations, amusement, or resort, or other places to which the general public is invited". We have no doubt but that it does.3

The phrase "places of public accommodations, amusement, or resort" is not uncommon to public accommodations laws. And, when following a list of specifically described places, this and similar phrases have been construed by courts around the country to be an enlargement upon that list and, as such, to encompass a wide range of other places and facilities not specifically listed. These include, for example, pool rooms, Village of Atwood v. Otter, 129 N.E. 573 (Ill. 1920); swimming pools, State of New Jersey v. Rosecliff Realty Co., 62 A.2d 488 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1948); race tracks, Suttles v. Hollywood Turf Club, 114 P.2d 27 (Cal. Ct. App. 1941); roller skating rinks, Jones v. Broadway Roller Rink Co., 118 N.W. 170 (Wis. 1908); cemeteries, Pennsylvania Human Relations Comm'n v. Altoreste Park Cemetery Ass'n, 306 A.2d 881 (Pa. 1973); little league baseball organizations, National Organization for Women, Essex County Chapter v. Little League Baseball, Inc., 318 A.2d 33 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1974); marathon courses, New York Roadrunners Club v. State Division of Human Rights, 437 N.Y.S.2d 681 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981); amusement parks, Drews v. State, 236 Md. 349 (1964); golf clubs, Brown v. Loudon Golf and Country Club, Inc., 573 F. Supp. 399 (D. Va. 1983); recreational facilities, Smith v. Young Men's Christian Ass'n of Montgomery, 316 F. Supp. 899 (M.D. Ala. 1970); and reducing salons, Browning v. Slenderella Systems of Seattle, 341 P.2d 859 (Wash. 1959).

Indeed, at least one reported case has directly held the phrase "places of public accommodation, amusement, and recreation" to encompass health and exercise clubs. Vidrich v. Vic Tanny International, Inc., 301 N.W.2d 482 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980). Coincidentally, that case also involved, as here, a blind person who had been denied access to the club in question:

"The issue is whether a legally blind person may validly be refused unrestricted membership in a health and exercise club on the ground that the physical limitations deriving from his blindness constitute a significant safety hazard effectively precluding his safe use of club facilities. We recognize no such 'safety exception' to the equal accommodations act and, consequently, reverse the trial court's determination that [the club's] exclusion of plaintiff was proper." 301 N.W.2d at 483.

In Vic Tanny, the court considered a Michigan equal accommodations law strikingly similar to Article 30, §33(d)(1):

"All persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of inns, hotels, motels, government housing, restaurants, eating houses, barber shops, billiard parlors, stores, public conveyances on land and water, theatres, motion picture houses, public educational institutions, in elevators, on escalators, in all methods of air transportation and all other places of public accommodation, amusement, and recreation, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and applicable alike to all citizens and to all citizens alike, with uniform prices." 301 N.W.2d at 483 (quoting M.C.L. §750.146; M.S.A. §28.343).4

The defendant argued that the law did not apply to health clubs given the absence of "specific language encompassing such facilities". 301 N.W.2d at 484. The court responded:

"This argument is without merit in light of the comprehensive wording of [the statute,] providing for equal accommodations in 'all other places of public accommodations, amusement, and recreation'. We hold that defendant's business is within the purview of that language." Id.

In reaching this conclusion, the court also rejected the defendant's argument that a "safety exception" be judicially incorporated into the equal accommodations act:

"Where, as here, the language of the act is clear, unequivocal, and absolute on its face, judicial construction or interpretation of the statutory language in the manner argued for by defendant would be improper. Our function is to give full credence to 'the legislative will as we find it, without regard to our own views as to the wisdom or justice of the act'." 301 N.W.2d at 485 (citations omitted).

Article 30, §33 is, if anything, even broader than the Michigan statute construed and applied in Vic Tanny: §33 applies not only to "all... places of public accommodations, amusement, or resort" but, indeed, to "all... other places to which the general public is invited". Like the court in Vic Tanny, then, we have no hesitation in concluding that Article 30, §33 applies fully to health clubs and similar facilities in which membership is generally open to the public. Those clubs, therefore, are required to provide blind persons, as well as persons with hearing impairments, "full and equal" access to their facilities, without discrimination in the scope, terms, or conditions of that access.

IV

Conclusion

In summary, it is our opinion that a health club or similar facility which otherwise opens its membership to the general public is a "public facility" subject to the provisions of Article 30, §33. As such, it is prohibited from denying persons with visual or hearing impairments "full and equal" access to and use of its facilities.

Stephen H. Sachs, Attorney General

Avery Aisenstark
Chief Counsel
Opinions and Advice

Editor's Note: Chapter 568, Laws of Maryland 1986 amended Article 30, §33(g) to provide for a civil action for injunctive relief against violations of the "White Cane Law," in addition to the criminal penalty mentioned in the opinion.

1 You have not asked, nor do we here address, whether a health club might also be considered a "place of public accommodation" subject to this State's Public Accommodations Law, Article 49B, §5 of the Maryland Code. Article 49B, §5 defines "place of public accommodation" to include, among other things, a "place of exhibition or entertainment". It might well be that a health club is a "place of exhibition or entertainment" within the scope of that definition. See, e.g., Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969) (term "place of entertainment" in Civil Rights Act of 1964 not confined to spectator entertainment and includes a recreational facility that offers swimming, boating, miniature golf, and dancing). But see Drews v. State, 236 Md. 349, 354 (1964) ("there is no provision in the public accommodation law enacted by the State ... with respect to amusement parks"). In any event, we believe that questions about the scope and applicability of the Public Accommodations Law are, in the first instance at least, best left to the expertise of the Human Relations Commission, the agency charged with enforcing and administering that law. See Maryland Comm'n on Human Relations v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 295 Md. 586 (1983); Maryland Comm'n on Human Relations v. MTA, 294 Md. 225 (1982).

2 Three years later, in 1974, the provisions of the Public Accommodations Law, Article 49B, §5 [then §11], were expanded to encompass discrimination on the basis of "physical... handicap". See Chapter 875, Laws of Maryland 1974. That the General Assembly did not intend or consider the broad protections afforded by Article 30, §33 to be supplanted by this newly expanded Public Accommodations Law is evidenced by the fact that, since 1974, Article 30, §33 has itself been reenacted and amended several times by the General Assembly, most notably, in 1978 and 1979, to extend its protections to the deaf and hearing impaired [Chapter 929, Laws of Maryland 1978; Chapter 565, Laws of Maryland 1979] and, in 1983, to increase the criminal penalty from $50 to $500 [Chapter 649, Laws of Maryland 1983].

3 A possible, narrow exception might exist for a health club facility that is, in the true sense of the term, a "private club", e.g., one composed of a select group of members who themselves have a say in admitting or rejecting new applicants, who themselves exercise control over club operations and facilities, and who themselves own equity in club property or share in club profits. See, e.g., Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298, 301 (1969) (respondent recreational facility not a private club but "simply a business operated for a profit with none of the attributes of self-government and member-ownership traditionally associated with private clubs"). Cf. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984) (national membership organization, having local chapters that are neither small nor selective, is a "place of public accommodation" under Minnesota Human Rights Act). Most modern health clubs, we suspect, fail to exhibit these indicia of a private club. Certainly, the particular health club to which your inquiry relates, the Grecian Health Spa and Fitness Center of Laurel, Maryland, is not a "private club". It is, rather, a commercial enterprise in which membership is open and nonselective, subject only to payment of a membership fee and adherence to the rules and regulations adopted by the facility's owner and operator, Grecian Health Spa, Inc.

4 An accompanying provision, not unlike Article 30, §33(g), imposed criminal sanctions upon "[a]ny ... owner, lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any such place who shall directly or indirectly refuse, withhold from or deny to any person any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges thereof... on account of... blindness". 301 N.W.2d at 483 (quoting M.C.L. §750.147; M.S.A. §28.344).