Could a married Maryland woman get a driver's license back in her maiden name without going to court, even after being licensed under her husband's name?

Plain-English summary

The Motor Vehicle Administrator asked the Attorney General whether a married woman who had taken her husband's surname could later obtain a Maryland driver's license in her former name without first getting a court order changing her name back. The Motor Vehicle Administration's existing policy, based on a 1974 Attorney General opinion, barred this once a woman had already been licensed under her married name. The new opinion concluded that the 1974 opinion had been wrong and overruled it, holding that the Motor Vehicle Law's definition of "name," which included a person's birth name, a name changed by marriage, or a name changed by court order, did not strip away a married woman's underlying common-law right, recognized by the Court of Appeals in Stuart v. Board of Supervisors of Elections, to use any name she chooses consistently and without fraudulent intent. Because nothing in the statute expressly barred switching back to a name previously used, and Maryland courts had consistently read name-related statutes as reinforcing rather than replacing the common law right to choose one's own name, the opinion concluded the Administration should issue a license in a woman's former name once she showed a consistent, nonfraudulent intent to use it, which could be demonstrated through financial records, voter registration, other identification, a personal affidavit, or similar evidence.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1983. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

The opinion interpreted Tr §11-137 of the Maryland Vehicle Law and overturned the Motor Vehicle Administration's own prior policy, itself based on a 1974 AG opinion, 59 Opinions of the Attorney General 521 (1974). Maryland's driver's license name-change statute and Motor Vehicle Administration practice may have changed further since 1983; verify the current version of the Transportation Article and current MVA procedures before relying on any specific rule described here.

Common questions

Did a married Maryland woman need a court order to switch her driver's license back to her maiden name?
No, according to this opinion. It held that the Motor Vehicle Law's definition of "name," which listed a birth name, a name changed by marriage, or a name changed by court order, did not require a woman to obtain a court order before reverting to a name she had used before, since the underlying common law right to use any name consistently and without fraud remained intact absent a clear statute to the contrary.

What did a woman have to show to get her license changed back to her former name?
The opinion said she needed to show the name fell into one of the statute's listed categories (her birth name or an earlier marital name) and that she intended to use it consistently, evidence the opinion said could come from financial records, voter registration records, other forms of identification, a personal affidavit, or similar proof, none of which was individually required.

Was there ever an official Maryland policy against this?
Yes, but this opinion reversed it. A 1974 Attorney General opinion had approved the Motor Vehicle Administration's practice of barring a woman from reverting to her former name once she had been licensed under her husband's name absent a court order; this 1983 opinion concluded that earlier opinion misread the statute and expressly declined to follow it.

Background and statutory framework

The opinion centered on Tr §11-137's definition of "name," which for an individual meant "the name given at birth . . . or as changed by marriage or by court order," with a separate provision added in 1978 letting a divorced person elect to use any previously used legal or true name consistently and nonfraudulently. Reading this definition against the common law backdrop recognized in Stuart v. Board of Supervisors of Elections, that any person has the right to "adopt any name by which he may become known" absent a contrary statute, the opinion found nothing in §11-137 that expressly stripped a married woman of the ability to revert to a name she had used before once she had been licensed under her husband's surname, since the statute's list of permissible name categories said nothing about a one-way, no-going-back rule.

The opinion relied on Klein v. Klein for the principle that Maryland name-change statutes typically confirm rather than displace the common law right to choose one's name, and distinguished the argument that the divorced-persons provision added in 1978, allowing an explicit right to revert to a prior name, implied that married women lacked the same right by negative inference; the opinion read that 1978 addition instead as a targeted response to the flawed 1974 opinion and the Administration practice it endorsed, not a considered legislative judgment that married women should be treated differently. The opinion accordingly overruled 59 Opinions of the Attorney General 521 (1974) and directed the Administration to issue a license in a woman's former name upon a showing that the name fell within one of §11-137(2)'s categories and would be used consistently, with no reason to suspect fraud, while noting a related but separate divorce statute, Article 16, §32, that already let a court restore a party's former name in a divorce decree.

Citations

Statutes:

• Tr §11-137 (Maryland Vehicle Law definition of "name" for driver's license purposes)
• Tr §11-137(1) (requirement that the license name be the "true or legal" name)
• Tr §11-137(2) (birth name, marriage name, or court-ordered name)
• Tr §11-137(3) (divorced person's election of a prior name, added 1978)
• Article 16, §32 (court restoration of a party's former name in a divorce decree)
• Article 16, §123 (chancery jurisdiction over name changes)
• Chapter 534, Laws of Maryland 1970 (enactment of §11-137(1) and (2))
• Chapter 511, Laws of Maryland 1978 (addition of §11-137(3))
• Former Article 66½, §1-151 (predecessor codification of §11-137)

Cases:

• Stuart v. Board of Supervisors of Elections, 266 Md. 440, 446 (1972)
• Romans v. State, 178 Md. 588, 597 (1940)
• Klein v. Klein, 36 Md. App. 177, 181 (1977)
• Forbush v. Wallace, 341 F.Supp. 217, 221-22 (M.D. Ala. 1971)

Source

• Landing page: https://oag.maryland.gov/resources-info/Pages/attorney-general%E2%80%99s-opinions.aspx
• Original PDF: https://oag.maryland.gov/resources-info/Documents/pdfs/Opinions/1983/Volume68_1983.pdf

Original opinion text

Best-effort transcription from a scanned PDF. Minor errors may remain, the linked PDF is authoritative.

VEHICLE LAWS

Driver's Licenses—Names—Married Woman May Readopt Former Surname Even Absent Court Order.

January 20, 1983

Mr. William T. S. Bricker
Motor Vehicle Administrator

You have requested our opinion on whether and under what circumstances a married woman may be issued a driver's license in her former surname if, when she married, she had assumed her husband's surname and, since her marriage, has not obtained a court order to readopt her former name.1

In our opinion, the Motor Vehicle Administration should permit a married woman to obtain a driver's license in her former name, notwithstanding her prior use of her married name and even absent legal process to change her name, if she can show that the use of her former name is intended to be a consistent one and if the Administration has no reason to believe that the purpose of the change is a fraudulent one.2

1 We use the phrase "former name" to mean the woman's birthgiven surname or another surname used by her as a result of a prior marriage or court order.
2 We advised you of this conclusion in a letter from Avery Aisenstark, Chief Counsel for Opinions and Advice, dated July 19, 1982. We understand that the Administration has changed its policy in accordance with that letter. This Opinion explains the reasons underlying our conclusion.

I
Background

Section 11-137 of the Maryland Vehicle Law defines "name" as follows: "(1) True or legal name; and (2) In the case of an individual, the name given at birth to the individual by his parents or as changed by marriage or by court order; and (3) In the case of an individual divorced a vinculo matrimonii, the individual may elect to use any legal or true name previously used by the individual if this name is used consistently and nonfraudulently." Transportation Article, §11-137.3

3 The language now in items (1) and (2) of this section was enacted in 1970. Chapter 534, Laws of Maryland 1970 (codified as former Article 66½, §1-151 of the Maryland Code). Item (3) was added to the definition in 1978. Chapter 511, Laws of Maryland 1978. See note 6 below.

For some time, the Administration interpreted this definition to allow a married woman to obtain a driver's license in either her husband's surname or her former name. However, once a woman obtained a license using her husband's name, she was precluded by this policy from reassuming her former name without court order. See, e.g., Application of Mary Emily Stuart, (Motor Vehicle Administration, October 10, 1972).

In 1974, an Opinion of this Office held that the Administration's policy was lawful. 59 Opinions of the Attorney General 521 (1974). That Opinion apparently read into the statute a restriction on a married woman's right to reassert her former name, and it held that such a restriction was consistent with the case law concerning name changes. Because we believe that its analysis was incorrect, we decline to follow that Opinion.

II
Change of Name at Common Law

The Court of Appeals has summarized the general rule governing an individual's use of a name as follows: "We have heretofore unequivocally recognized the common law right of any person, absent a statute to the contrary, to 'adopt any name by which he may become known, and by which he may transact business and execute contracts and sue or be sued.'" Stuart v. Board of Supervisors of Elections, 266 Md. 440, 446 (1972) (quoting Romans v. State, 178 Md. 588, 597 (1940)).

In Stuart, the Court held that a married woman had the right to be entered on the voter registry under her birthgiven name, provided that she used that name "consistently and nonfraudulently". 266 Md. at 449. A statute requiring notice to the Election Board of a woman's "change of name by marriage" did not require use of the husband's surname, as the Board claimed; the statute could not fairly be read to produce "such an effect in derogation of the common law". Id.

Indeed, statutes directly addressing name changes do not ordinarily supplant the common law.4 Rather, they typically "are in furtherance of and confer an official sanction upon a common law prerogative". Klein v. Klein, 36 Md. App. 177, 181 (1977).

4 Article 16, §32 of the Maryland Code provides as follows: "When the court grants a decree of final divorce, the court, on the request of a party who assumed a new name on marriage and desires to discontinue using it, and in the absence of an illegal, fraudulent, or immoral intent by the party, shall state in the decree of divorce either the birth given name or other previous name that the person desires to use." See also Article 16, §123 (jurisdiction of chancery over name changes).

III
Change of Name under the Maryland Vehicle Law

In our view, the definition of "name" in the Maryland Vehicle Law should be read in light of the common law right and the evident judicial reluctance to find "a statute to the contrary" of that right. Nothing in §11-137 restricts a married woman's common law right to revert to her former name after she had adopted her husband's surname.5

5 We do not here address the interplay of the common law with §11-137 in other situations in which someone seeks to change the name on his or her license. See generally Forbush v. Wallace, 341 F.Supp. 217, 221-22 (M.D. Ala. 1971), aff'd mem., 405 U.S. 970 (1972) ("[T]he state has a significant interest in maintaining close watch over its licensees. The confusion which would result if each driver were allowed to obtain licenses in any number of names he desired is obvious.").

As applied to a married woman, §11-137(1) and (2) requires that the name on the license be "true or legal . . . and" one of the following: the name as given at birth, as changed by marriage, or as changed by court order. The statute does not expressly provide, or even clearly imply, that, once having obtained a license in one of these names, a woman may not later reapply for a license in another of them. Without a statutory basis, such a restriction would improperly abridge the woman's common law right.6

6 Perhaps such a restriction might be inferred by comparing §11-137(2) with §11-137(3). That is, the explicit right of a divorced person in §11-137(3) to assume a prior name may be thought to imply that other individuals do not have that right. However, we believe that §11-137(3) was enacted simply to clarify the status of divorced people. Chapter 511, Laws of Maryland 1978. The bill that added §11-137(3) did not address, and in our view does not diminish, the alternatives available to a married woman under §11-137(2). Indeed, §11-137(3) may only have been intended as a response to the 1974 Opinion referred to in Part I above, which we now overrule, and to the practice that the Opinion endorsed.

IV
Conclusion

In summary, it is our opinion that 59 Opinions of the Attorney General 521 (1974) was wrong. The Maryland Vehicle Law permits a married woman who has adopted her husband's surname to later obtain a license in a former name if she shows that the name falls within one of the three categories of §11-137(2) and is to be used consistently. The latter requirement can be met through financial records, voter registration records, other forms of identification, an affidavit by the applicant, or other evidence of use of her former name in her social and business community.7 If this showing is made, and if the Administration has no reason to believe that the purpose of the change is a fraudulent one, a license in the former name should be issued.

7 These examples are intended to be illustrative only. An applicant certainly need not submit all of these forms of evidence. Conversely, an applicant should not be precluded from submitting other relevant forms of evidence.

Stephen H. Sachs, Attorney General
Jack Schwartz, Assistant Counsel,
Opinions and Advice
Avery Aisenstark
Chief Counsel,
Opinions and Advice