Can a Maryland farm owner keep clergy, lawyers, health workers, or other visitors away from migrant workers living in an employer-owned labor camp?

Plain-English summary

The Governor's Commission on Migratory and Seasonal Farm Labor asked the Attorney General whether migrant workers living in housing that farmers or growers provided on privately owned labor camps had a legal right to receive guests, including clergy, medical and other service personnel, lawyers, and the press. The Commission explained that as many as 7,500 migrants came to Maryland each year to work the harvest, living in isolated rural camps for a couple of months at a time, often without their own transportation, and that some camp owners had posted "no trespassing" signs or otherwise restricted or barred visitors. The opinion concluded that migrant workers did have that legal right, in their own living quarters, subject only to reasonable and necessary rules a camp owner could set to protect the owner's legitimate business and security interests, rules that could not deny or seriously infringe the migrants' right to receive visitors. The opinion also concluded that Maryland's criminal trespass statutes could not be used to keep such visitors out.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1982. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

The opinion's conclusion rested on the Maryland trespass statutes as they existed in 1982 (including a recently enacted cultivated-land trespass provision) and on a body of out-of-state case law addressing migrant camp access, since it noted there was no fully dispositive Maryland case or statute on the question at the time. Migrant farm labor law, agricultural trespass statutes, and the underlying case law on access to labor camps have all had the opportunity to change since 1982. Anyone dealing with a similar situation today should verify current Maryland trespass law and current migrant labor law rather than relying on this opinion's 1982 analysis.

Common questions

Could a Maryland farm owner in 1982 legally bar a lawyer or member of the clergy from visiting migrant workers living in the owner's labor camp?
No, according to this opinion. It concluded that migrant workers had the legal right to receive guests, including clergy, medical and other service personnel, lawyers, and the press, in their living quarters, and that camp owners could not deny that access.

Did the camp owner have no say at all over who came onto the property?
Not quite. The opinion found that camp owners could still establish reasonable and necessary rules to protect their legitimate business and security interests, such as requiring a visitor to identify himself and state his general purpose if not already expected. What owners could not do was deny or seriously restrict the migrants' underlying right to receive visitors, for example by limiting the frequency or duration of visits without a genuine security or business reason.

Could Maryland's criminal trespass laws be used to remove an unwanted visitor from a migrant camp?
The opinion concluded that Maryland's trespass statutes, specifically the cultivated-land trespass provision enacted in 1980, were not intended to be used to deny migrant workers access to governmental and charitable organizations serving their social, health, and legal needs, based on the statute's legislative history showing the General Assembly's concern about exactly that kind of restriction.

Did this right belong to outside visitors, or to the migrant workers themselves?
The opinion was clear that the right belonged to the migrant. A migrant worker could personally choose to refuse an uninvited visitor and assert his or her own privacy, but the camp owner could not exercise that choice "on behalf of" the migrant to keep out a visitor the migrant wanted to see.

Did this right of access extend to the fields where migrants worked, not just their housing?
No. The opinion specifically limited its conclusion to migrants' living quarters and did not address, or extend to, any right of access to the fields, orchards, tobacco barns, or other work sites where migrants were actively employed.

Background and statutory framework

The Commission's request arose because some Maryland labor camp owners had begun posting "no trespassing" signs and barring migrant workers from receiving visitors, or had limited visitors to certain types of people or certain times. The opinion noted there was neither Maryland case law nor Maryland statutory law fully resolving the issue, so it surveyed decisions from state appellate courts in California, Florida, New Jersey, New York, and Washington, opinions from the Attorneys General of Michigan and New Jersey, and a number of federal court decisions, all of which consistently found migrants had a legal right to receive visitors, even though the legal theories varied.

The opinion found the New Jersey Supreme Court's approach in State v. Shack, which overturned trespass convictions of a legal services attorney and an anti-poverty field worker who had refused to leave a migrant camp, particularly persuasive, quoting the Shack court's statement that "property rights serve human values" and are limited by that purpose, and that title to real property does not include dominion over the destiny of the people an owner permits onto the premises. The opinion also drew on Marsh v. Alabama, in which the Supreme Court held that a "company town" with the characteristics of a municipality could not use trespass law to bar someone from distributing religious literature, reasoning that similar policy considerations supported migrant workers' rights given their isolation, disadvantaged status, and lack of economic and political power.

Turning to Maryland's own criminal trespass statutes, the opinion identified three that might arguably be used to bar access to migrant camps: Article 27, §576 (trespass on posted property), Article 27, §577 (wanton trespass on private land), and Article 27, §579B (trespass on cultivated land), the last enacted in 1980 by Chapter 739, Laws of Maryland 1980. The opinion reviewed the legislative history of §579B, noting that the Secretary of Health and Mental Hygiene and the Legal Aid Bureau had both raised concerns that the bill as originally drafted could block state officials, social services, legal services, and health care personnel from reaching migrant workers, concerns that led the General Assembly to add an exception preserving access for people providing lawful services. The opinion concluded that this later, more specific statute effectively superseded the earlier trespass provisions with respect to migrant camps, and that the General Assembly did not intend the criminal trespass laws to be used to cut off migrants' access to the organizations serving their social, health, and legal needs.

Applying these principles, the opinion concluded that camp owners retained the ability to set reasonable rules protecting their legitimate business and security interests, such as requiring visitors to identify themselves, but could not use those rules to deny or seriously restrict migrants' underlying right to receive clergy, medical and other service personnel, lawyers, and the press in their living quarters. The opinion emphasized that this right of access belonged to the migrant worker, who could personally choose to decline an unwanted visit, but that a camp owner could not assert that choice on the migrant's behalf to bar a visitor the migrant wished to see.

Citations

Statutes:

• Article 27, §576
• Article 27, §577
• Article 27, §579B
• Chapter 739, Laws of Maryland 1980
• COMAR 10.16.01
• Article 25, §27A of the Maryland Code

Cases:

• State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369 (N.J. 1971)
• Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946)
• State v. Fox, 510 P.2d 230, 232 (Sup. Ct. Wash. 1973)
• Franceschina v. Morgan, 346 F. Supp. 833 (S.D.Ind. 1972)
• Folgueras v. Hassle, 331 F. Supp. 615, 625 (W.D.Mich. 1971)
• Lee v. A. Duda & Sons, Inc., 310 So.2d 391 (Fla. App. 1975), cert. denied, 311 So.2d 669 (Sup.Ct.Fla. 1975)
• Illinois Migrant Council v. Campbell Soup Company, 574 F.2d 374 (7th Cir. 1978)
• Illinois Migrant Council v. Campbell Soup Company, 519 F.2d 391 (7th Cir. 1975)
• Petersen v. Talisman Sugar Corp., 478 F.2d 73 (5th Cir. 1973)
• Asociacion de Trabajadores Agricolas de Puerto Rico v. Green Giant, 518 F.2d 130 (3rd Cir. 1975)
• N.L.R.B. v. Lake Superior Lumber Corp., 167 F.2d 147 (6th Cir. 1948)
• Vasquez v. Glassboro Service Ass'n, Inc., 83 N.J. 86 (1980)
• People v. Medrano, 78 Cal. App. 3d 198, 144 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1978)
• People v. Rewald, 318 N.Y.S.2d 40 (Cayuga County Ct. 1971)
• Mid-Hudson Legal Services, Inc. v. G. & U., Inc., 437 F.Supp. 60 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)
• Velez v. Amenta, 370 F.Supp. 1250 (D. Conn. 1974)

Source

• Landing page: https://oag.maryland.gov/resources-info/Pages/attorney-general%E2%80%99s-opinions.aspx
• Original PDF: https://oag.maryland.gov/resources-info/Documents/pdfs/Opinions/1982/Volume67_1982.pdf

Original opinion text

Best-effort transcription from a scanned PDF. Minor errors may remain, the linked PDF is authoritative.

Constitutional Law—Property Law—Criminal Trespass—Migrant Farm Workers—Owners of Migrant Labor Camps May Not Prevent Access by Others to Migrants Residing in Camps

July 19, 1982

Mr. Leon Johnson, Chairman
Governor's Commission on Migratory
and Seasonal Farm Labor

On behalf of the Governor's Commission on Migratory and Seasonal Farm Labor, you have requested our opinion on whether migrant workers, while residing in housing provided by farmers or growers on privately-owned migrant labor camps in this State, have a legal right to receive guests and to be visited by clergy, medical and other service personnel, lawyers, and the press.

For the reasons given below, we have concluded that migrant workers have the legal right to receive guests in their living quarters and to be visited there by clergy, medical and other service personnel, lawyers, and the press, subject only to such reasonable and necessary rules established by the camp owners as are designed to protect the owners' legitimate business and security interests and do not deny or seriously infringe upon the legal rights of migrants.1

I
The Controversy

The Commission advises us that as many as 7,500 migrants come into Maryland each year to harvest crops and to work in orchards, in the tobacco fields, and on nursery farms. Generally, local farmers or growers contract with "crew leaders", who in turn hire the migrants to provide agricultural labor.

1 Our conclusion here applies to the right of migrants to receive visitors in the living quarters where they reside. We do not here address the right of farmers or growers to reasonably restrict access to the fields and other work areas where the migrants are actively employed. As discussed below, the right of access to migrants' living quarters does not carry with it a right to interfere with the harvest of crops and other agricultural work.

The workers often travel with their families, including infants and children, and often work the entire growing season in various states along the eastern seaboard, moving from one area to another as work becomes available. These migrants stay in Maryland for relatively short periods of time, generally less than two months, and are most usually housed in migrant camps provided for them by farmers or growers. The housing may be provided at no cost to the migrant or for a nominal fee, sometimes denoted as a "utilities fee".2

We understand that these camps are generally in isolated rural areas and that the migrants living in these camps often have no form of public or private transportation. You have explained to us that some camp owners have posted their camps with "no trespassing" signs and have prohibited the migrants from receiving visitors. Other camp owners have limited the migrants to certain types of visitors or have permitted visitors to enter the camps only at certain prescribed times.

II
Judicial Background

There is neither Maryland case law nor Maryland statutory law that is fully dispositive of this issue.3 There is, however, a substantial body of case law on point in other jurisdictions.

We have examined decisions by state appellate courts in California, Florida, New Jersey, New York, and Washington; Opinions of the Attorneys General of Michigan and New Jersey; and a number of federal court decisions. The decisions and opinions that have addressed the issue have been consistent in finding that migrants have a legal right to receive visitors.

2 Farmers and growers must obtain a permit from the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene to operate a migrant labor camp and must comply with the Department's health and safety regulations governing these camps. See COMAR 10.16.01. In addition, camp owners in Dorchester County must also obtain a permit to operate from the Dorchester County Commissioners. See Article 25, §27A of the Maryland Code.

3 However, as discussed below in Part IV of this Opinion, there is strong evidence that, at a minimum, this State's criminal trespass laws may not be used to bar access to migrant camps.

Although the conclusions reached have been uniform, the theories undergirding those conclusions have been varied.4 For the most part, the decisions and opinions have examined and balanced the various rights of the migrants, visitors, and camp owners in arriving at their conclusion. Typically, these cases involve: (i) migrants asserting their constitutional rights of freedom of speech, religion, and association, their rights as tenants, and their rights to enjoy all the liberties exercised by other citizens; (ii) farmers and growers asserting their constitutional right to privacy and to hold their property free from unwarranted intrusion; and (iii) visitors asserting their constitutional rights of free speech, religion, and association and their statutory obligation to provide services to migrants.

4 In some jurisdictions, access has been predicated on the migrants' status as tenants, and the courts have held that they enjoy the rights of free ingress and egress associated with that status. See, e.g., State v. Fox, 510 P.2d 230, 232 (Sup. Ct. Wash. 1973); Franceschina v. Morgan, 346 F. Supp. 833 (S.D.Ind. 1972); Folgueras v. Hassle, 331 F. Supp. 615, 625 (W.D.Mich. 1971). At least one court has held that federal and state statutes establishing programs to benefit migrants confer a right to access. Lee v. A. Duda & Sons, Inc., 310 So.2d 391 (Fla. App. 1975), cert. denied, 311 So.2d 669 (Sup.Ct.Fla. 1975). This theory was rejected in Illinois Migrant Council v. Campbell Soup Company, 574 F.2d 374 (7th Cir. 1978), and Petersen v. Talisman Sugar Corp., 478 F.2d 73 (5th Cir. 1973). See also Attorney General of Michigan, Report of Attorney General, No. 4727, filed April 13, 1971; and N.L.R.B. v. Lake Superior Lumber Corp., 167 F.2d 147 (6th Cir. 1948).

Federal jurisdiction has been predicated on the denial of constitutional rights (freedom of speech and association) by those standing in the shoes of the state. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946). In Marsh, the court found that, because a "company-town" had all the indicia of a municipality, the constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and religion precluded enforcement of a state trespass statute against one who distributed religious literature on the streets of the company-owned town. Federal and state cases relying on Marsh have examined the characteristics of individual migrant camps to determine whether the camp in question has sufficient indicia of a municipality such that the denial of these rights can be deemed to be "state action". See, e.g., Petersen v. Talisman Sugar Corp., 478 F.2d 73 (5th Cir. 1973) (particular camp has indicia sufficiently similar to Marsh "company-town" so that owners cannot deny constitutional rights); Asociacion de Trabajadores Agricolas de Puerto Rico v. Green Giant, 518 F.2d 130 (3rd Cir. 1975) (not enough facts in the record to find that particular camp was a Marsh "company-town"); Illinois Migrant Council v. Campbell Soup Company, 574 F.2d 374 (7th Cir. 1978) (Prince Crossing migrant camp not a "company-town" under the Marsh doctrine); Folgueras v. Hassle, 331 F. Supp. 615 (W.D. Mich. 1971) (sum total of cases applying Marsh compels the holding that the owner of the camps in question may not constitutionally deny migrant laborers living in the camps access to members of assistance organization or mere visitors). See also Attorney General of Michigan, Report of Attorney General, No. 4727, filed April 13, 1971.

At least one other court found requisite "state action" in the fact that the camps were licensed by the state and that the owners were using the state criminal trespass statute and state courts to deny access. Franceschina v. Morgan, 346 F. Supp. 833 (S.D. Ind. 1972).

III
The Shack Case

Based on our review of the law, we find the New Jersey Supreme Court's approach in State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369 (N.J. 1971), to be particularly sound, an approach that, we believe, Maryland courts are likely to follow in achieving a fair accommodation of these competing rights and interests.

In Shack, a field worker for a non-profit organization funded by the Office of Economic Opportunity and a staff attorney from the Farm Worker Division of Camden Regional Legal Services, Inc., were convicted of criminal trespass after refusing to leave a privately-owned migrant labor camp. In overturning these convictions, the New Jersey Supreme Court weighed the property rights of the farm owner against the rights of the migrant farm workers and found the balance to be tipped in favor of the fundamental rights of the farm workers. Specifically the court found that:

"Property rights serve human values. They are recognized to that end, and are limited by it. Title to real property cannot include dominion over the destiny of persons the owner permits to come upon the premises. Their well-being must remain the paramount concern of a system of law. Indeed the needs of the occupants may be so imperative and their strength so weak, that the law will deny the occupants the power to contract away what is deemed essential to their health, welfare, or dignity." 277 A. 2d at 372.

The court then catalogued the unique characteristics of migrant farm workers. The court discussed their disadvantaged status, their relative isolation, and their lack of economic and political power. Further, the court listed the government programs established to remedy the "plight" of migrants and concluded that "[t]hese ends would not be gained if the intended beneficiaries could be insulated from efforts to reach them." Id. It was within this framework that the court decided that camp operators' rights in their lands may not stand between the migrant workers and those who would aid them.5

The policy reasons on which the New Jersey court based its decision are equally valid in Maryland: The migrant workers who harvest Maryland crops are as powerless and disadvantaged as those who harvest New Jersey crops. Often, they are the same individuals.

Property rights are not absolute.6 It is beyond question that the ownership of real property does not grant the owner of the property dominion over the lives and rights of those living within its borders. As the court in Shack pointed out, "[i]t was a maxim of the common law that one should so use his property as not to injure the rights of others." 277 A.2d at 373. The court explained that this maxim expresses "the inevitable proposition that rights are relative and there must be an accommodation when they meet." Id.

We concur with the conclusion in Shack that, as a matter of property law, mere ownership of a labor camp does not carry with it the right to cut off the fundamental rights of those who live in the camp.7

6 Similar policy considerations and holdings are found in other state and federal decisions, as well as in scholarly discussions of access to migrant workers. See, e.g., Illinois Migrant Council v. Campbell Soup Company, 519 F.2d 391 (7th Cir. 1975); Petersen v. Talisman Sugar Corp., 478 F.2d. 73 (5th Cir. 1973); Mid-Hudson Legal Services, Inc. v. G. & U., Inc., 437 F.Supp. 60 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Velez v. Amenta, 370 F.Supp. 1250 (D. Conn. 1974); Franceschina v. Morgan, 346 F.Supp. 833 (S.D. Ind. 1972); Folgueras v. Hassle, 331 F.Supp. 615 (W.D. Mich. 1971); Vasquez v. Glassboro Service Ass'n, Inc., 83 N.J. 86 (1980); People v. Medrano, 78 Cal. App. 3d 198, 144 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1978); People v. Rewald, 318 N.Y.S.2d 40 (Cayuga County Ct. 1971); Spriggs, Access of Visitors to Labor Camps on Privately Owned Property, 21 U. Fla. L.Rev. 295 (1969); Note, Poverty Law—Criminal Trespass—Representatives of Federal and Local Service Organizations Granted Right of Access onto Farmer-Employer's Property, 46 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 834 (1971).

6 Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); See also Folgueras v. Hassle, 331 F. Supp. 615, 624 (W.D. Mich. 1971).

7 We note that the Attorney General of Michigan reached a similar conclusion. See Attorney General of Michigan, Report of the Attorney General, No. 4724, filed April 13, 1971, in which the Attorney General opined as follows:

"The owner or operator of a migrant agricultural labor camp by permitting occupation and movement of migrant agricultural workers and their families on the premises of the agricultural labor camp has thereby made the use of the agricultural labor camp premises, including ingress and egress therefrom, public. The freedoms of religion, speech, press and assembly guaranteed by the First and fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution are operative throughout the length and breadth of the land. They do not become suspended on the threshold of an agricultural labor camp. The camp is not a private island or an enclave existing without the full breath and vitality of federal constitutional and statutory protection."

By the nature of their work, migrant workers are particularly vulnerable to infringement of these rights. They are invariably poor, usually uneducated, and frequently not fluent in English. They lack significant ties to the various communities in which they reside for but a few weeks each year. They are, almost by definition, politically powerless. They can thus become easy prey for those who seek to take advantage of their fragile condition. It is important that the law protect the rights of those who are least able to protect themselves. We know of no principle of law that would argue otherwise.

IV
Criminal Trespass Statutes

As noted above, the issue of access to migrant camps was before the New Jersey Supreme Court on appeal from a criminal trespass conviction. In Maryland, there are three criminal trespass statutes that, arguably, might be invoked to bar access to persons attempting to visit or communicate with workers residing in migrant camps: Article 27, §576, trespass on posted property; Article 27, §577, wanton trespass on private land; and Article 27, §579B, trespass on cultivated land.

The last of these, Article 27, §579B, was enacted just recently by Chapter 739, Laws of Maryland 1980. It provides as follows:

"(a) A person, without permission from the owner or agent of the owner, who enters upon the cultivated land of another is guilty of a misdemeanor and on conviction may be fined not more than $500. 'Cultivated land' means land which has been cleared of its natural vegetation and is presently planted with a crop or orchard.

(b) It is intended that this section is only to prohibit any wanton entry upon cultivated land, and therefore this section shall not be construed:

(i) To prevent persons who reside on cultivated land from receiving any person who seeks to provide a lawful service; or

(ii) To apply to persons entering cultivated land under color of law or color of title."8

The legislative history of Chapter 739 reveals that the General Assembly was concerned about potential restrictions on persons who provide lawful services to migrants. As introduced, the bill consisted only of the portion now contained in subsection (a). The bill passed the Senate on March 29, 1980, without amendments, and it was referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary. That Committee received two letters concerning the bill. One was from Dr. Charles R. Buck, Jr., Secretary of Health and Mental Hygiene, recommending addition of the language now incorporated in subsection (b). Secretary Buck expressed his concern that the bill, as passed by the Senate, "could be used to prevent the entrance of State officials into these [migrant] camps to perform the necessary inspections [required by law to protect the health of migrants]". The Committee also received a letter from the Legal Aid Bureau, Inc., stating its concern that, as drafted, the bill would "restrict legitimate access of state officials, social services, legal services and health care personnel to agricultural workers living in camps." The Legal Aid correspondence suggested language that was nearly identical to that suggested by Secretary Buck and, ultimately, adopted by the Judiciary Committee and the General Assembly.

8 Although this section refers to trespass on "cultivated land", it was clearly the intention of the General Assembly to cover living quarters adjacent to cultivated land; obviously, no one can "reside" on property that, as defined by the statute, is "cultivated land".

At the very least, the language and history of subsection (b) is an indication of legislative policy to facilitate communications between migrants and those who seek to serve them. Inasmuch as §579B, in relation to the other trespass statutes (§§576 and 577), is both the more specific and later enacted statute, it would appear to supersede those sections with respect to migrant camps.9 It thus seems clear that the General Assembly did not intend our criminal trespass statutes to be used to deny migrant workers access to governmental and charitable organizations serving their social, health, and legal needs.10

9 Moreover, the very enactment of a new prohibition in §579B(a) suggests that trespass on cultivated land was not considered to be covered by preexisting §§576 and 577. Similarly, then, the countervailing exceptions and rights established in §579B(b) must have been understood as at least implicitly applying to those other sections as well.

10 Even without exceptions such as those found in §579B(b), courts in other jurisdictions have uniformly overturned criminal trespass convictions on the basis that the camp owners cannot legally deny access to the migrant. See, e.g., People v. Rewald, 318 N.Y.S.2d 40 (Cayuga County Ct. 1971); State v. Fox, 510 P.2d 230 (Sup. Ct. Wash. 1973); State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369 (N.J. 1971); Attorney General of Michigan, Report of Attorney General, No. 4727, filed April 13, 1971.

In response to an inquiry from the Superintendent of the State Police as to the effect of the Shack decision on the prospective enforcement of the New Jersey general trespass statute, the Attorney General of New Jersey, in Formal Opinion No. 11 (1975), explained as follows:

"The result [no trespass violation within the meaning of the statute] is predicated on the following policy considerations. Property rights are relative and must serve, not disparage, human values. Assuredly, they should not be the basis for exercising oppressive control over the lives of a rootless, isolated and disadvantaged class of citizens who the owner admits to his property to further his own pecuniary gain. Accordingly, the impotent group's fundamental and fragile right of communication can be neither stifled nor emasculated by erecting a trespass statute barrier, founded on minimal intrusions, thereby insulating migrants from services and edification proffered by a solicitous government . . . The conclusion is the unavoidable realization that itinerant farm help is entitled to the very same opportunity to live with dignity and to enjoy the private associations which are customary among all citizens of our society."

V
Analysis

Although camp owners are precluded from denying access to migrant workers residing in their camps, they are not precluded from establishing reasonable rules or restrictions necessary to protect their legitimate business and security interests. What is required is a fair accommodation of the competing interests, not the abrogation of one set of interests to benefit the other. However, under no circumstances could reasonable rules include a regulation that denies, or even seriously restricts, the legal right of migrants to receive guests and to be visited by those who seek to serve them.11

11 For instance, camp owners may not limit the frequency or duration of visits, except in the unlikely event that such restrictions are necessary to protect legitimate business or security needs.

The camp owner's primary interest and concern is in ensuring that the owner's crops be harvested and its business operations proceed in a safe and uninterrupted fashion.12 To protect this interest, camp owners may reasonably require that visits take place in a manner that does not interfere with the harvesting of crops or with the need to protect the security of employees, migrants, and property.13 To this end, we agree with the Shack court's statement that the camp owner "may reasonably require a visitor to identify himself, and also to state his general purpose if the migrant worker has not already informed him that the visitor is expected"; but, in so doing, the camp owner "may not deny the worker his privacy or interfere with his opportunity to live with dignity and to enjoy associations customary among our citizens." 277 A.2d at 374. Once the camp owner has been informed that a visitor is expected, the camp owner may not invade the migrant's privacy by inquiring into the specific nature or purpose of the visit.14

12 We are aware that migrants are also employed during other stages of the growing cycle and in the tobacco, orchard, and nursery industries. Our conclusion obviously applies to all migrants and is not limited to those who harvest crops.

13 See note 1 above. As a general rule, there is no absolute right of access by private individuals to fields, orchards, tobacco barns, and other work sites.

14 See also Letter from James R. Zazzali, Attorney General of New Jersey, to Superintendent of the State Police (December 14, 1981), in which the Attorney General opined that a request for identification sufficiently protects the camp owner's security interests and, therefore, a requirement of advance notice of a visit does not constitute a reasonable rule.

We can perceive no legitimate business or security interest, however, that would justify denying the migrant workers the opportunity to receive aid and other services offered by governmental and private service agencies and organizations. Therefore, representatives of these groups may enter the camps to seek out migrant workers who might benefit from their services, and they may remain on the premises as long as their services are needed or desired. The migrant has the right to receive these and other visitors in the privacy of the migrant's living quarters without the presence of the camp owner or any other person.15

We believe that the above constitutes a fair accommodation of the competing interests and rights of the camp owners and migrants. Other courts have arrived at similar conclusions. See e.g., Lee v. A. Duda & Sons, Inc., 310 So.2d 391 (Fla.App. 1975), cert. denied, 311 So.2d 669 (Sup.Ct.Fla. 1975); Petersen v. Talisman Sugar Corp., 478 F.2d 73 (5th Cir. 1973); Velez v. Amenta, 370 F. Supp. 1250 (D.Conn. 1974).

VI
Conclusion

In summary, it is our opinion that the migrant workers residing in housing provided by farmers or growers on privately-owned migrant labor camps have a legal right to receive guests in their living quarters and to be visited there by clergy, medical and other service personnel, lawyers, and the press, subject only to such reasonable and necessary rules established by the camp owners as are designed to protect the owners' legitimate business and security interests and do not deny or seriously infringe upon the legal rights of migrants.

Stephen H. Sachs, Attorney General
Dennis M. Sweeney, Chief General Counsel
Catherine M. Shultz, Assistant Attorney General
Avery Aisenstark
Chief Counsel,
Opinions and Advice

15 Conversely stated, it is the right of the migrant, not the camp owner, to refuse to receive uninvited visitors. While the migrant may assert his or her own personal right to privacy and, in doing so, refuse to admit into the migrant's living quarters clergy, lawyers, social workers, nurses, politicians, news reporters, and other uninvited individuals, the camp owner may not purport to exercise this personal right "on behalf of" the migrant.