Could a Louisiana notary with a felony conviction regain a commission through an automatic first-offender pardon?

Plain-English summary

Louisiana's Secretary of State asked whether a notary whose commission was suspended after a felony conviction could regain notarial authority through an automatic first-offender pardon, and whether waiting a certain number of years would change the answer. The official opinion answered no. It read the pardon references in the notary statutes as requiring a governor's or presidential pardon.

The AG reasoned that a notarial appointment was an appointment of honor, trust, or profit under La. Const. art. I, § 10.1. It distinguished a full governor's pardon from the limited effect of an automatic first-offender pardon. Reading the statutes consistently with the constitution, it concluded that the latter did not restore eligibility to receive or exercise a notarial commission.

The opinion said passage of time after completion of the sentence did not substitute for the required pardon.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2023. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Did an automatic first-offender pardon restore notarial eligibility?
No. The AG interpreted the relevant notary statutes as requiring a governor's or presidential pardon.

Would waiting several years after the sentence change the answer?
No. The opinion said the required pardon applied irrespective of the passage of time following the sentence.

Which notarial roles did the opinion address?
The AG referred to appointment as a notary or ex officio notary, holding a commission, and exercising notarial functions.

Background and statutory framework

The opinion harmonized the notary provisions identified as La. R.S. 35:15, 16, 191, 391, and 602 with the felony-disqualification provision of La. Const. art. I, § 10.1. It relied on the distinction in Louisiana decisions between a full executive pardon and the limited first-offender pardon.

Citations and references

Law cited: La. Const. art. I, § 10.1; La. R.S. 35:15, 16, 191, 391, and 602.

Source

• Landing page: https://www.ag.state.la.us/Opinions
• Original PDF: https://www.ag.state.la.us/Opinion/Download/23-0002

Original opinion text

State of Louisiana
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
CIVIL DIVISION
RD. BOX 94005
BATON ROUGE
70804 -9005
Jeff Landry
Attorney General
May 23, 2023
OPINION 23-0002

73 NOTARIES Azpoir.tments & QuaI:fieat ens
Honorable R. Kyle Ardoin
—

    Secretary of State                            La coast. at I. § 10.1                   La. R.S. 35 191

La const. art. IV. §5
LaPS 35391
Louisiana Department of State La. R.5. 35:15 La. P S. 35:602
P.O. Box 94125 La R.S. 35:16 La RS 15:512
Baton Rouge, LA 70804-9125
The “pardon” referred to in La R.S. 35:15. 16. 191. 391. and 602 means
a governors pardon or president;aI pardon

Dear Secretary Ardoin:

This office is in receipt of your letter on behalf of the Louisiana Department of State requesting an opinion of the Attorney General. You ask whether a notary whose notarial commission is suspended because of a felony conviction may have his commission restored by a first offender pardon, or whether a governor’s pardon is needed; and, if a governor’s pardon is not needed, how many years must pass before a first offender pardon will restore the notary’s ability to have his commission restored.

Your request specifically references La. R.S. 35:15 concerning revocation or suspension of a notarial commission or the authority to exercise notarial powers by reason of a felony conviction. We find that there are several statutory provisions—La. R.S. 35:15, 16, 191, 391, and 602—pertaining to notaries that refer to a convicted felon’s disqualification for appointment, commission, or exercise of notarial functions, except where a pardon has been issued. None of the foregoing statutory provisions specify that a governor’s pardon, as distinguished from a first offender pardon, is required to restore or reinstate the notary’s authority.

Pardons by the governor and automatic first offender pardons are provided for in La.
Const. art. IV. §5, as well as La. AS. 15:572. While authority for both pardons is found in La. Const. art. IV, § 5(E)(1) and La. R.S. 15:572, the governors pardon is full and complete while the automatic first offender pardon is limited. State v. Easter, 2014-1 630 (La. App. 1 Cir. 4/24/15), 170 So. 3d 1051, 1058, writ denied, 2015-0979 (La. 5/20/16), 191 So. 3d 1063. The law of this State has never recognized the automatic first offender pardon as being a full pardon restoring the pardoned individual to the status of innocence.
Touchet v. Broussard, 2010-0380 (La. 3/3/10), 31 So. 3d 986, 994. On the contrary. the law has consistently distinguished between the full and complete scope of the governor’s pardon and the limited scope of the first offender pardon. id.1

1
See also State v. Riser, 30,201 (La. App. 2 Gir. 12/12/97) for a good discussion of a governor’s pardon and a first offender pardon.

Page 2

OPINION 23-0002
Hon. A. Kyle Ardoin
Page 2

[T]he paramount consideration in statutory construction is ascertainment of the legislative intent and the reason or reasons which prompted the Legislature to enact the law. M.J. Farms, Ltd. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 07—2371 (La.7/1108), 998 So.2d 16, 27, citing State v. Johnson, 03—2993 (La.1O/19/04), 884 So.2d 568, 575. The starting point for the interpretation of any statute is the language of the statute itself. Dejoie v Medley, 2008—2223 (La.5/5/09), 9 So.3d 826, 829. In the event the language of a statute is susceptible of different meanings, the interpretation must best conform to the purpose of the law. La. CC. art. 10. When analyzing legislative history, it is presumed the Legislature’s actions in crafting a law were knowing and intentional. M.J. Farms, Ltd., 2007—2371 at pp. 13—14, 998 So.2d at 27. It must be assumed the Legislature was aware of existing laws on the same subject, as well as established principles of statutory construction and the effect ot their legislative acts. Id.

Application of these principles leads us to conclude that the references to a pardon in La. R.S. 35:15, 16, 191, 391, and 602 mean a governor’s (or presidential) pardon. Because we conclude that an appointment of notary is an appointment of honor, trust, or profit, La. Const. art. I, §10.1 disqualifies a convicted felon from the appointment or commission of notary or ex officio notary or from the exercise of notarial functions, except where a governor’s (or presidential) pardon has been issued. An interpretation that the various notarial statutory provisions only require a first offender’s pardon is inconsistent with La. Const. art. I, §10.1. Statutory interpretation rules favor interpretations that harmonize and uphold legislative enactments. Furthermore, all the statutory provisions discussed herein with the exception of La. R.S. 35:391 were adopted by the Legislature after either La. Const. art. I, §10 or 10.1 were in effect.2 Whereas it is presumed that the Legislature was aware of existing law, we are further guided toward the conclusion that the references to a pardon mean a governor’s (or presidential) pardon.

In conclusion, it is the opinion of this office that the appointment of a notary is an appointment of honor, trust or profit and that the requirement of a “pardon” contained in La. R.S. 35:15, 16, 191, 391, and 602 means a governor’s pardon or presidential pardon as described in La. Const. art. I, §10.1. Further, we conclude that the Legislature has in these statutory provisions applicable to notaries affirmatively required a governor’s pardon of any person convicted of a felony, irrespective of the passage of any time period following the service of sentence for the conviction, to be appointed a notary, receive and hold a commission as notary, and exercise notarial functions.

2 For reference, we note that La. Const. art I, § 10.1 was added in 2018 following the Louisiana Supreme court’s ruling in Shepherd v. Schedler, No. 2015-1750 (La. 1/27/1 6), 209 So. 3d 752.

Page 3

OPINION 23-0002
F-Ion. P. Kyle Ardoin
Page 3

We trust that this opinion of the Attorney General adequately responds to your inquiry. However, if our office can be of further assistance, please do not hesitate to contact us.

Sincerely yours,

JEFF LANDRY