Did Louisiana’s sex-offender school-property restriction cover a house where children used a home study program?

Plain-English summary

Representative Nancy Landry asked whether a residence used for a home study program counted as school property under La. R.S. 14:91.2, which restricted certain sex offenders’ presence or residence near schools. In January 2016, the Attorney General concluded that the restriction did not include locations where home study was conducted.

The AG read the specific reference to a public or private elementary or secondary school together with the statutory definition of school property. It treated that definition as property in the custody or control of such a school, not every home in which children received instruction. The opinion answered the reach of this provision; it did not address other restrictions or facts.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2016. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Did teaching children at home turn the residence into school property under this provision?

The AG said no. It linked the statute’s school-property definition to a public or private elementary or secondary school.

Did the opinion eliminate all limits on sex offenders near homes?

No. It interpreted the named school-property restriction in La. R.S. 14:91.2 and did not decide other possible restrictions.

What part of the statute drove the answer?

The opinion emphasized the words “school property of any public or private elementary or secondary school” and read the related definition in that context.

Background and statutory framework

The question concerned the crime of unlawful presence or residence of certain sex offenders near covered schools. The AG applied the plain wording of La. R.S. 14:91.2 to home study locations and concluded those locations fell outside the school category at issue.

Source

• Landing page: https://www.ag.state.la.us/Opinions
• Original PDF: https://www.ag.state.la.us/Opinion/Download/15-0147

Original opinion text

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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
P.O. BOX 94005
BATON ROUGE
JAMES D. "BUDDY" CALDWELL
70804-9005
ATIORNEY GENERAL

January 7,2016
OPINION 15-0147

16 - CRIMINAL LAW - Crimes and Offenses
97 - SCHOOLS & SCHOOL DISTRICTS -
Property,
Han. Nancy Landry
Contracts, etc.
State Representative
District 3
The restrictions described by La. R.S. 14:91.2 relative to
certain sex offenders and school property do not include
P.O. Box 53529
locations where home study programs are conducted.
Lafayette, LA 70505

Dear Representative Landry:

You have requested an opinion from our office regarding the application of La.
RS. 14:91.2, which places restrictions on certain sex offenders with respect to being physically present or establishing a residence near schools.

Specifically you ask whether the restrictions in La. R.S. 14:91.2 apply to residences where children are educated in a home study program.

La. R.S. 14:91.2 establishes the crime of "unlawful presence of a sex offender" and criminalizes, inter alia, the presence or residence of certain sex offenders within one thousand feet of a public or private elementary or secondary school.

The specific provisions pertinent to your inquiry are found in La. RS.
14:91.2(A)(1) and (2), which read as follows:

The following acts when committed by a person convicted of a sex offense ... when the victim is under the age of thirteen years shall constitute the crime of unlawful residence or presence of a sex offender:

(1) The physical presence of the offender in, on, or within one thousand feet of the school property of any public or private elementary or secondary school. ..

(2) The offender establishing a residence within one thousand feet of any public or private elementary or secondary school or child care facility as defined in RS. 46:1403.

Page 2

Honorable Nancy Landry
OPINION 15-0147
Page 2

La. R.S. 14:91.2(E)(6) defines "school property" as "any property used for school purposes, including but not limited to school buildings, playgrounds and parking lots."

We turn to well-settled principles of statutory interpretation to answer your questions. Legislation is the solemn expression of the will of the legislature. The determination of the legislature's will regarding legislation must start with the language of the statute itself. The words used must be interpreted as they are generally understood. When the words of a statute are clear and unambiguous, and the application of the law does not lead to absurd consequences, the statute should be applied as written.' .

Additionally, since La. RS. 14:91.2 is a penal statute, it must be strictly construed and given a narrow interpretation. As the Louisiana Supreme Court has stated:

The principle of lenity is premised on the idea that a person should not be criminally punished unless the law provides a fair warning of what conduct will be considered criminal. The rule is based on principles of due process that no person should be forced to guess as to whether his conduct is prohlbited.'

It is the opinion of this office that La. R.S. 14:91.2 does not apply to or encompass locations where home study takes place. The statute at issue refers explicitly in subparagraph (A)(1) to "school property of any public or private elementary or secondary school." (emphasis added). The definition of "school property" in SUbparagraph (E)(6) relates back to the term "school property" in subparagraph (A)(1) and thus refers only to property in the custody or control of a public or private elementary or secondary school.

Since the words of this statute are clear and unambiguous, and the application of the statute according to their plain meaning does not lead to absurd consequences, it is the opinion of this office that the restriction in La. RS. 14:91.2 applies only to public or private elementary schools and their property, not to locations where home study is conducted.

1 First Nat. Bank, USA v. DDS Canst, LLC, 2011-1418 (La. 1/24/12), 91 So. 3d 944,953 (internal citations omitted). 2 State v Anders, 01-0556, p. 5 (La.6/21/02), 820 So.2d 513, 516; State v, Carr, 1999-2209 (La. 5/26/00),761 So. 2d 1271, 1274.

State v. Carr, 99-2209 (La. 2000) 761 So. 2d 1271, 1274.

Page 3

Honorable Nancy Landry
OPINION 15-0147
Page 3

We hope this sufficiently answers your inquiry; however, if we may be of any further assistance, please do not hesitate to contact our office.

With best regards,

JAMES D. "BUDDY" CALDWELL
A NEY GENERAL

BY:
Pa icia H. Wilton
As istant Attorney General

JDC:PHW