Must a Louisiana narcotics officer use a marked car, and when do threats against an officer count as public intimidation?

Short answer The AG said the cited arrest rule did not require a marked car or uniform for the described narcotics interdictions, absent a contrary provision. Threats against an officer amounted to public intimidation only if a judge or jury found specific intent to influence the officer's future official conduct.
State
Louisiana
Opinion
La. Atty. Gen. Op. 05-0165
Issued
July 25, 2005
Issued by
Office of the Louisiana Attorney General
Requested by
Charles Hall, investigator, Concordia Parish Narcotics Task Force

Apply this to your situation

This page answers the general question as of 2005. Ask about yours and see what current Louisiana law means for your facts, with citations you can check.

Disclaimer: This is an official Louisiana Attorney General opinion. AG opinions are advisory; they inform Louisiana officials but are not binding precedent like a court ruling. This summary is informational and is not legal advice. Consult a licensed Louisiana attorney before relying on the opinion for a specific situation.
About this page: The plain-English summary, reader guidance, and Q&A below were written by Ezel based on the official AG opinion. The original opinion (linked on this page as an official web page) is the authoritative source for any reliance.
View original AG opinion (official page)

Plain-English summary

The Concordia Parish Narcotics Task Force asked whether highway narcotics interdictions required a marked police vehicle or uniformed officer. In 2005, the Attorney General said the cited arrest statute imposed neither requirement, absent another contrary provision. For a warrantless arrest, LA-C.Cr.P. Art. 218 instead required the officer to state the intention to arrest, authority, and cause, subject to the exigent circumstances the opinion mentioned.

The task force also described an arrested person's repeated threats to kill or harm the arresting officer. The AG declined to decide whether those particular threats constituted public intimidation. It said a judge or jury had to determine whether the speaker specifically intended to influence the officer's future conduct in official duties. Threats alone did not resolve that factual question.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2005 about the cited arrest and intimidation provisions. Verify current law and any other rules governing a particular stop, arrest, or threat before relying on it.

What this means for you

Narcotics officers and departments

The opinion did not identify a marked-car or uniform prerequisite in the arrest rule it examined. It emphasized the officer's communication of intention, authority, and cause for a warrantless arrest, while qualifying its answer where another provision might require otherwise.

Prosecutors and people facing intimidation charges

The AG said a threat against an officer required a specific intent to influence future official conduct to qualify as public intimidation. It left the intent finding in the described incident to the judge or jury.

Common questions

Does this opinion require a marked car for narcotics interdictions?

No. The AG said no such prerequisite appeared in the arrest rule it cited and, absent a contrary provision, officers could conduct the described interdictions without a marked unit.

Is any threat made after an arrest automatically public intimidation?

No. The AG said the offense required specific intent to influence the officer's future conduct in relation to official duties. A fact finder had to decide whether the described threats met that element.

Did the AG decide whether the named officer's case could be charged?

It did not decide the facts of the incident. The opinion identified the legal intent requirement and assigned the factual determination to a judge or jury.

Background and statutory framework

LA-C.Cr.P. Art. 218 stated what an officer had to tell a person during a warrantless arrest. LA-R.S. 14:122 defined public intimidation as violence, force, or threats against specified public officials or employees with intent to influence conduct related to their duty. The opinion quoted State v. Mead on the required specific criminal intent and the fact finder's role.

Citations

  • LA-C.Cr.P. Art. 218 (notice of intention, authority, and cause for warrantless arrest).
  • LA-R.S. 14:122 (public intimidation).
  • State v. Mead, 823 So.2d 1045 (La.App. 2 Cir., 8/14/02) (specific-intent requirement).

Source

Original opinion text

July 25, 2005
OPINION NO. 05-0165

Investigator Charles Hall
6 ARRESTS
Concordia Parish Narcotics Task Force
LA-C.Cr.P. Art. 218, LA-R.S. 14:122
Vidalia Police Department
602 John Dale Drive
Under Title V governing arrest only 3 elements are given
Vidalia, LA 71373
for a warrantless arrest, the officer must inform the
individual of his intention, authority and cause for arresting the person. The presence of a marked car is not
Dear Mr. Hall: necessary.

This office is in receipt of your Attorney General’s opinion wherein the Concordia Parish Narcotics Task Force presented the following questions as we understand it:

1. When performing highway interdictions, for the express purpose of narcotics intervention, is a marked unit required, or is only the officer required to be in uniform?

2. After an individual has been arrested, he makes five threats against the police officer that has arrested him—specific threats including the phrasing “I’m going to kill you” and “I’m going to get your ass” – Whereupon he names the officer specifically. These threats are made as a direct result of the actions the police officer had taken in the performance of his duty, does this constitute public intimidation?

It is the opinion of this office that the answer to your first question is found within Title 5 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure, which governs Arrests. LA-C.Cr.P. Art. 218 states:

A peace officer, when making an arrest without a warrant, shall inform the person to be arrested of his intention to arrest him, of his authority, and of the cause of the arrest. A private person, when making an arrest, shall inform the person to be arrested of his intention to arrest him and of the cause of the arrest.

The statute clearly suggests that what is necessary when making an arrest, absent exigent circumstances (such as fleeing, or resisting arrest), is to inform the individual being arrested of the 1.) Intention of the officer to do so, 2.) his authority to make the arrest, and 3.) the cause of the arrest. There is no prerequisite of a uniform or marked car. It is likely that the lack of such a prerequisite is what allows an undercover officer to make arrests and/or use unmarked cars during stops/arrests. Thus, we feel that an officer, absent any provisions to the contrary, may perform interdictions without a marked unit.


Page 2

Investigator Charles Hall
OPINION 05-0165
Page 2

As to your second question, whether or not the threats constituted public intimidation, it is the opinion of this office that the answer is a question of fact to be decided by a trier of fact (judge or jury). The statute states, “LA-R.S. 14 § 122. Public intimidation and retaliation A. Public intimidation is the use of violence, force, or threats upon any of the following persons, with the intent to influence his conduct in relation to his position, employment, or duty: (1) Public officer or public employee.”

The courts have held that “[t]he offense of public intimidation requires specific criminal intent. Public intimidation is not simply the intentional use of force or threats upon an officer, but rather the use of force or threats (made to or) upon the officer with the specific intent to influence the officer's (future) conduct in relation to the officer's duties. (See) State v. Jones, 00-980 (La.App. 5th Cir.10/19/00), 772 So.2d 788; State v. Meyers, 94-231 (La.App. 5th Cir.09/14/94), 643 So.2d 1275.” State v. Mead, 823 So.2d 1045 (La.App. 2 Cir., 8/14/02).
[Parenthesis added.]

“The determination of whether the requisite intent is present in a criminal case is for the jury.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); State v. Davies, 35,783 (La.App.2d Cir.04/05/02), 813 So.2d 1262.” State v. Mead, 823 So.2d 1045 (La.App. 2 Cir., 8/14/02).

In the real life situation which was the basis for your inquiry, the individual obviously made several threats. For any one or more of those threats to constitute the crime of public intimidation, a judge or jury (trier of fact) must find that the threat was made with the specific intent to influence the future conduct of the police officer.

I hope the foregoing Opinion has been responsive to your question.

Very truly yours,

CHARLES C. FOTI JR.
ATTORNEY GENERAL

BY: ______
STEPHEN MARTIN
Assistant Attorney General

SM/rv/jy


Page 3

OPINION NO. 05-0165

6 ARRESTS

LA-C.Cr.P. Art. 218, LA-R.S. 14:122

Under Title V governing arrest only 3 elements are given for a warrantless arrest, the officer must inform the individual of his intention, authority and cause for arresting the person. The presence of a marked car is not necessary.

For a threat to constitute public intimidation, the threat must be made by the offender when he/she has the specific intent to influence the future conduct of the public employee or official being threatened.

Inv. Charles Hall
Concordia Parish Narcotics Task Force
Vidalia Police Department
602 John Dale Drive
Vidalia, LA 71373

Date Received: April 04, 2005
Date Released: July 25, 2005

STEPHEN MARTIN
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL

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