Did Louisiana's hate-crime law cover targeting someone for military service?

Plain-English summary

Representative Jim Tucker asked whether the Armed Forces counted as an "organization" under Louisiana's then-existing hate-crime statute. In Opinion 03-0161, the Attorney General said the U.S. Armed Forces could fit the definition as either a lawful group acting together or a unit of federal government.

The AG did not say that every offense against a service member was a hate crime. The statute addressed specified conduct targeting a person because of actual or perceived membership or service in an organization. He also cautioned that criminal statutes receive strict construction and that a court would ultimately decide whether this reading applied.

Currency note

Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed this historical opinion's analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

What the opinion meant at issuance

Service members and investigators

The AG identified a possible statutory route for conduct targeting someone because of Armed Forces membership or service. He expressly left final interpretation to the courts under the rule of lenity.

Prosecutors and legislators

The opinion offered an interpretation of "organization" in LSA-R.S. 14:107.2, not a ruling on any charged incident or a guarantee that a court would adopt the reading.

Common questions

Q: Did the AG treat the military as a possible organization under the statute?
A: Yes. He said it could qualify as a lawful group acting together or as a federal-government entity or unit.

Q: Was military service alone enough to make an offense a hate crime?
A: No. The statutory language quoted in the opinion concerned conduct targeted at someone because of actual or perceived membership or service. The opinion did not analyze a particular offense.

Q: Was the AG's answer final for criminal prosecutions?
A: No. He stressed that criminal laws are strictly construed and that a court would ultimately interpret the definition.

Background and statutory framework

The opinion responded to a legislator's question about LSA-R.S. 14:107.2's definition of "organization." The AG quoted its categories for lawful groups and government entities, then discussed the strict-construction rule for criminal statutes using State v. Carr, 761 So.2d 1271. The header names Carr clearly, although the quotation below reads "Cart" in the extract.

Citations and references

Statute in the opinion: LSA-R.S. 14:107.2. Case cited: State v. Carr, 761 So.2d 1271.

Source

• Landing page: https://www.ag.state.la.us/Opinions
• Original PDF: https://www.ag.state.la.us/Opinion/Download/03-0161

Original opinion text

P.O. BOX 94095
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
BATON ROUGE, LA 70804-9095
RICHARD P. IEYOUB CRIMINAL DIVISION Telephone:
ATTORNEY GENERAL
(225) 342-7552
FAX:
(225) 342-7893

Jim Tucker,
Opinion No. 03-0161
Louisiana State Representative
64-B MILITARY DEPARTMENT
732 Behrman Highway, Suite C-2
LSA-R.S. 14:107.2; State v. Carr, 761 So.2d 1271 Terrytown, LA 70056
The definition of "organization" in LSA-R.S. 14:107.2 may include members of the Armed Forces, but as criminal statutes are strictly interpreted, this conclusion would be subjected to judicial interpretation.
Dear Representative Tucker:

Our office is in receipt of your opinion request letter of April 3, 2002 containing the following question: Does the definition of "organization" in LSA-R.S. 14:107.2 include members of the armed forces?

The statute defines as a "hate crime" certain activities targeted at people because of their "actual or perceived membership or service in, or employment with, an organization." The statute reads in pertinent part:

...D. "Organization", as used in this Section, means all of the following:
(2) Any lawful corporation, trust, company, partnership, association, foundation, or fund.
(2) Any lawful group of persons, whether or not incorporated, banded together for joint action on any subject or subjects.
(3) Any entity or unit of federal, state, or local government.

It is the opinion of this office that the United States Armed Forces could fall within either section (2) or section (3) of the definition of "organization" as given in subsection (D) of LSA-R.S. 14:107.2. The Armed Forces are a lawful group of persons banded together for joint action on any subject or subjects, if military matters can be considered "subjects." Also, the Armed Forces is an entity of federal government, so the military could also fit under section (3) of the definition.

However, please keep in mind that all criminal statutes are interpreted in a strict fashion. The court in State v. Cart said, "It is a wel!-established tenet of statutory construction that criminal statutes are subject to strict construction under the rule of lenity...Thus, cr .... ~na! statutes are given a narrow interpretation and any ambiguity in the substantive provisions of a statute as written is resolved in favor of the accused and against the State." 761 So.2d 1271, 1274 (La. 2000).

Page 2

Therefore, this conclusion that the U.S. Armed Forces fall within either section (2)
or section (3) ultimately would be subjected to judicial interpretation.

If the office can be of further assistance, please do not hesitate to contact us.

Very truly yours,

RICHARD P. IEYOUB
ATTORNEY GENERAL

BURTON
~
ASSISTANT
GENERAL

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