Could Cotton Valley restrict personal use of police cars despite having an elected police chief?

Plain-English summary

Cotton Valley asked whether its ordinance limiting town vehicles and property to official business could apply to a police department led by an elected chief. The Attorney General found the restriction valid. It distinguished the chief's authority over official law enforcement use from personal use of municipal vehicles.

The opinion also recognized a specific exception to the personal-use characterization: an officer on call who drove a vehicle between work and home was not using it for a personal purpose. For officers not on call, the AG said travel to and from work in a police vehicle could be restricted as personal use.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2002. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Could the town ban personal use of its police vehicles?
The AG said the town's ordinance was valid insofar as it restricted vehicles to official business. That restriction did not interfere with the elected chief's inherent power over official police use.

Was a police officer's drive home always personal use?
No. The opinion treated travel between home and work by an officer on call as official use. It said comparable travel by an officer not on call could be restricted.

Did the elected chief's authority cover personal use of a police car?
The opinion said the chief's inherent authority covered official law enforcement use. It cited an earlier opinion stating that the mayor and aldermen had to approve the chief's personal use of a city police vehicle.

Background and statutory framework

The town ordinance applied to vehicles and other movable property owned by Cotton Valley and barred their personal use by employees and elected officials. The AG reviewed earlier opinions about the inherent powers of an elected chief and the distinction between official and personal vehicle use. It concluded that this ordinance did not invade those official police powers.

Citations and references

• Lentini v. City of Kenner, 211 So. 2d 312 (La. 1968)

Source

• Landing page: https://www.ag.state.la.us/Opinions
• Original PDF: https://www.ag.state.la.us/Opinion/Download/02-0282

Original opinion text

August 21, 2002
OPINION 02-282

Mayor Keith Chanler
Town of Cotton Valley
P.O. Box 415
Cotton Valley, LA 71018-0415

Dear Mayor Chanler:

This office is in receipt of your request for an opinion of the Attorney General in regard to the Town ordinance providing for the use of motor vehicles and movable property of the Town of Cotton Valley. The ordinance in question provides as follows:

Sec. 1. All motor vehicles and movable property owned and titled in the name of the Town of Cotton Valley are hereby declared subject to this Ordinance.

Sec. 2. All employees and elected officials of the Town of Cotton Valley, Louisiana, shall use such motor vehicles and other movable property belonging to the Town of Cotton Valley solely for the conduct of the official business of the Town of Cotton Valley, provided, however, such motor vehicles may be used outside of the Municipal Limits of the Town of Cotton Valley when an employee or public official is on official business of the Town.

Sec. 3. No employee or elected official of the Town of Cotton Valley shall use a motor vehicle or other movable property owned and titled in the name of the Town of Cotton Valley for personal or private reason within or without the Municipal Limits of the Town of Cotton Valley.

Sec. 4. Any employee or elected official of the Town of Cotton Valley who violated any provision of this Ordinance shall be subject to legal action against him under any applicable State law or Statutes.

Sec. 5. All provisions, clauses, and sentences of this Ordinance are severable and should any provision, clause or sentence be declared void, all other provisions, clauses and sentences of this Ordinance shall remain in full force and effect.

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Mayor Keith Chanler
OPIONION 02-282
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Sec. 6. All Ordinances or portions thereof in conflict with this Ordinance are hereby repealed.

You ask that this office give an opinion “as to the legality of this ordinance on the employees of the Police Dept. with an elected Chief”, pointing out that the ordinance mentions elected officials.

Basically the Ordinance in question restricts the use of police vehicles and property to official business, and we find this office has rendered several opinions that found such a restriction valid and concluded that it would not interfere with the inherent powers of an elected Chief of Police. Atty. Gen. Op. Nos 00-398, 99-190, 97-558, 96-475, 77-391.

In Atty. Gen. Op. 00-398, this office stated, “It is an established principle that the mayor and alderman may not revoke the ‘inherent powers’ of an elected Chief of Police of a Lawrason Act municipality to operate, control and administer police department personnel. This inherent authority, however, applies only to the official law enforcement use of municipal police vehicles.” With reliance upon Lentini v. City of Kenner, 211 So. 2d 312 (La. 1968) this office then stated that personal use of city police vehicles by the chief of police must be approved by the mayor and board of aldermen, and that the mayor and board of alderman may specifically request that the municipal vehicles be used by the chief of police only when he is working or conducting business relative to the municipal police department.

It was further observed in the latter opinion that an ordinance which prohibits the Chief of Police from allowing his off duty officers to have their vehicles at their private residence would be valid “in those instances where the Chief of Police authorized use to and from work for those officers on ‘call’ status.” For those individuals that are not on “call” it was stated this use of the police vehicle going to and from work would be personal use which may be restricted by the governing authority. This office concluded:

Because the ordinance at issue would prohibit only the unauthorized personal use of these vehicles, it is our opinion that the ordinance does not infringe on the Chief of Police’s inherent powers. It should be noted here, however, that there have been numerous opinions from this office authorizing the twenty-four hour use of a police vehicle by a Chief of Police in the exercise of his official duties such as being on ‘call’ in case of emergency.

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Mayor Keith Chanler
OPIONION 02-282
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Consistent with a long line of opinions of this office we find the Ordinance in question is valid wherein it restricts the use of motor vehicles for official business of the Town, but recognize those on call using the vehicle to travel to and from home are not using the vehicle for personal use.

We hope this sufficiently answers your inquiry, but if we can be of further assistance, do not hesitate to contact us.

Very truly yours,

RICHARD P. IEYOUB
ATTORNEY GENERAL

By:_____
BARBARA B. RUTLEDGE
Assistant Attorney General

RPI/bbr

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Mayor Keith Chanler
OPIONION 02-282
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OPINION 02-282

70 - Motor Vehicles - Control
& Regulation
77 - Officers - Local & Municipal

Discusses Town ordinance
providing for the use of motor
vehicles and movable property
owned by the Town.

Mayor Keith Chanler
Town of Cotton Valley
P.O. Box 415
Cotton Valley, LA 71018-0415

Date Received:
Date Released: August 21, 2002

BARBARA B. RUTLEDGE
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL