Could coordinated insurance claims practices violate Louisiana antitrust law without a formal plan?

Plain-English summary

A state senator asked whether insurance claims-handling practices like those addressed in a federal consent judgment would violate Louisiana antitrust law if they occurred in the state without a formal plan. The Attorney General answered yes. He identified the judgment's allegations as price fixing in auto repair and appraisal, customer or market allocation, and interference with appraisers' independence.

The opinion cited Louisiana decisions treating R.S. 51:122 and 51:123 as counterparts to federal antitrust provisions. It said federal interpretations could persuade Louisiana courts, while the federal analysis did not control the state-law question. The answer addressed the described practices; the opinion did not decide whether any particular Louisiana party had engaged in them.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2001. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Could similar insurance claims practices raise a Louisiana antitrust claim?
The AG said yes for the practices described in the federal consent judgment, including price fixing and dividing customers or markets.

Did the absence of a formal plan change the AG's answer?
No. The senator expressly asked about similar practices without a formal plan, and the AG answered yes.

Did the AG treat a federal antitrust ruling as controlling Louisiana law?
No. The opinion called federal analysis persuasive but not controlling when interpreting the Louisiana provisions.

Background and statutory framework

The senator supplied a federal consent judgment involving the Association of Casualty and Surety Companies. The AG compared the claims described there with Louisiana antitrust causes of action discussed in Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. United Gas Pipeline Co.

Citations and references

• R.S. 51:122
• R.S. 51:123

Source

• Landing page: https://www.ag.state.la.us/Opinions
• Original PDF: https://www.ag.state.la.us/Opinion/Download/01-0077

Original opinion text

April 10, 2001
OPINION 01-77

OPINION 01-77
Honorable Heulette “Clo” Fontenot
166 - A TRADE REGULATIONS - Antitrust
State Senator, District No. 13
Acts, which violate federal antitrust laws
most often also violate Louisiana antitrust
4686 Groom Road, Suite D-2
laws.
Baker, LA 70714

Dear Senator Fontenot:

You presented this office with a federal consent judgment in the matter of U.S. v. Association of Casualty and Surety Companies, Civil Action No. 3106, and requested an opinion based upon this consent judgment as follows: “If the same style claims handling practices without the existence of a formal plan is occurring in Louisiana, would these practices violate Louisiana’s anti-trust laws?”

The answer is yes for reasons that follow.

The federal consent decree asserts the following antitrust claims against the defendants: conspiracy to violate the antitrust law and (1) price fixing or controlling prices in the auto repair shop industry; (2) price fixing or controlling prices in the appraisal industry; (3) allocating/dividing customers, territories, markets or business; and, (4) destroying the independence of appraisers.

All of the above-mentioned claims exist under Louisiana antitrust law as can be seen from the holdings in both the Louisiana appellate and Supreme Court versions of Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. United Gas Pipeline Co.

“Antitrust law’ is a generic term referring to a wide scope of business regulations and statutes. LP&L v. United Gas Pipeline Co., 478 So.2d 1240, 1253 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1985). (Some of the Louisiana claims which can be brought are listed on pg. 1254 of the decision).

Thus, it finally becomes apparent that due to the broad scope of antitrust law and long chain of actions over several decades, this court is not dealing with one action under one theory, but rather with a number of actions under a variety of theories and statutes. Id. at pg. 1254.

Page 2

Honorable Heulette “Clo” Fontenot
OPINION NO. 01-77
Page 2

Finally, R.S. 51:122 and 123 are virtually identical, in relevant part, to the analogous provisions of federal antitrust statutes, sections 1 and 2 of 15 U.S.C., . . .

Because La. Rev. Stat. Ann. R.S. 51:122 is a counterpart to S. 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, the Untied States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Sherman Act should be a persuasive influence on the interpretation of our own state enactment. However, the federal analysis is not controlling.
LP&L v. United Gas Pipeline Co., 493 So.2d 1149, 1158 (La. 1986) (quoting Parish National Bank v. Lane, 397 So. 2d 1282, 1285 (La. 1981) (citing Madison v. Travelers Ins. Co., 308 So.2d 784 (La. 1975) and Kay v.
Carter, 243 La. 1095, 150 So.2d 27 (1963).

Thus, because these causes of action exist under the federal antitrust law, they also exist under the Louisiana Antitrust law as well.

Trusting this opinion to be of sufficient information, I remain

Very truly yours,

RICHARD P. IEYOUB
ATTORNEY GENERAL

BY:________
Jane Bishop Johnson
Assistant Attorney General

JBJ:spa

Page 3

OPINION 01-77

166 - A TRADE REGULATIONS - Antitrust

Acts, which violate federal antitrust laws most often also violate Louisiana antitrust laws.

Honorable Heulette “Clo” Fontenot
State Senator, District No. 13
4686 Groom Road, Suite D-2
Baker, LA 70714

Date Received:
Date Released: April 10, 2001

JANE BISHOP JOHNSON
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL