Did a full-time Kentucky deputy sheriff qualify for police funding even when assigned to court security?

Plain-English summary

After the 1998 General Assembly added sheriffs and deputies to the Kentucky Law Enforcement Foundation Program, eight sheriffs asked which deputies qualified for its funding. The Attorney General concluded that a deputy's primary assignment did not control eligibility. A full-time sworn deputy met the statutory criteria because the oath and resulting arrest authority made the deputy responsible for enforcing state law, even if the deputy chiefly provided court security.

The opinion distinguished sworn deputies from unsworn sheriff's-office personnel and from categories the statute expressly excluded. It also said an executive agency could not add further eligibility requirements by regulation or policy when the legislature had already defined the eligible group.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1998. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Q: Did a deputy assigned to courthouse security qualify for Kentucky police funding in 1998? A: The Attorney General said yes if the deputy was full-time and sworn. The statute expressly included full-time deputies providing court security.

Q: Did a deputy's daily duties have to involve patrol or investigations? A: No. The opinion treated a sworn deputy's legal authority to enforce state law as the relevant factor, regardless of primary job assignment.

Q: Could an agency impose extra KLEFP eligibility rules on deputy sheriffs? A: The opinion said no. It read the 1998 statutory criteria as complete and concluded that regulations or policies could not add conditions the statute did not authorize.

Background and statutory framework

KRS 15.420(2), as amended in 1998, supplied the program's definition of eligible police officers. The opinion read that provision alongside KRS 70.030, which addressed deputy appointments, and KRS 431.005, which described peace-officer arrest powers. A full-time deputy who had taken the oath possessed the law-enforcement authority the funding statute required.

The opinion did not say every sheriff's-office employee qualified. Its conclusion covered sworn full-time deputies, while the quoted statute excluded special deputies and several other officer categories.

Citations and references

Statutes: KRS 15.420(2); KRS 70.030; KRS 431.005.

Case: Cornette v. Com., 899 S.W.2d 502, 506 (Ky. App. 1995).

Source

• Landing page: https://kdla.access.preservica.com/uncategorized/IO_88bcc48e-fd6b-44be-897c-a534ebaa32eb/
• Original PDF: https://kdla.access.preservica.com/download/file/IO_88bcc48e-fd6b-44be-897c-a534ebaa32eb

Original opinion text

OAG 98-13
October 7, 1998
Subject:

Kentucky Law Enforcement Foundation Program

Requested by:

Ted Collins, Franklin County Sheriff
Phillip Sturgill. Boyd County Sheriff
Stan Scott, Calloway County Sheriff
Merle Edlin, LaRue County Sheriff
Bobby Hammons, Scott County Sheriff
Harold E. Tingle, Shelby County Sheriff
Randy K. Clark, Trigg County Sheriff
John Coyle, Woodford County Sheriff

Written by:

Scott White, Assistant Deputy Attorney General

Syllabus:

Sworn deputy sheriffs are eligible for KLEFP
funding regardless of primary duty or job assignment.

Statutes construed:

KRS 15.420, 70.010, 70.030, and 431.005

Opinion of the Attorney General
Introduction
We have been asked what criteria a deputy sheriff (a county official) must meet to be entitled to funding from the Kentucky Law Enforcement Foundation Program (KLEFP). We provide a response pursuant to KRS 15.025 (3) & (4). This question arises as a result of the 1998 General Assembly making sheriffs and their deputies eligible for KLEFP funding.

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Based upon well settled rules of statutory construction and
agency authority under KRS Chapter 13A, it is our opinion that the criteria for deputy sheriff KLEFP funding is that he or she be sworn and full time. No other requirement or criteria can be superimposed on sheriff offices by any Executive Branch agency. Any other non-statutory criteria would violate the clear intent of the General Assembly as expressed in KRS 15.420(2), (as amended 1998). As such, so long as the deputy is sworn and is full-time, then the KLEPF eligibility determination. Analysis KRS 15.420(2) was amended by the 1998 General Assembly to provide, for the first time, that sheriffs and their full-time deputies were eligible to receive KLEFP funding under KRS 15.440 and KRS 15.460. To be eligible, one must be a police officer, as defined in the Act. KRS 15.420(2) sets out that, for KLEFP purposes, a police officer is:
. . . a full-time member of a lawfully organized police department of county or city government, sherifff, or full time deputy sherifff, including those providing court security, appointed pursuant to KRS 70.030, or state or public university police officer who is responsible for the prevention and detection of crime and the enforcement of the general laws of the state, but does not include Kentucky State Police, any sherifff who earns the maximum constitutional salary for his office, any special deputy sheriff appointed pursuant to KRS 70.045, any constable, district detective, deputy district detective, special local peace officer, auxiliary police officer or any other peace officer not specifically authorized in KRS 15.410 to 15.510. (Italicized portion represents the 1998 amendments). Thus, to be eligible for KLEFP funding, a deputy only needs to be full-time, and responsible for the prevention and detection of crime and enforcement of the laws of the state. The question then turns on what the legislature

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meant by the phrase . . . responsible for the prevention and detection
of crime and the enforcement of the general laws of the state. . . . Id. Principals of statutory construction require that a statute must be construed literally unless to do so would lead to an absurd or wholly unreasonable conclusion. ITT Commercial Financial Corp. v. Madisonville Recapping, 793 S.W.2d 849 (Ky. App. 1990). Indeed, where the intended meaning of a statute is clear from the language of the statute as a whole, then the terms used by the legislature must be afforded their common usage meaning. Dept. of Alcoholic Beverage Control v. Liquor Outlet, Inc., 734 S.W.2d 816 (Ky. App. 1987). We believe applying these rules to this statute, that the phrases meaning is clear and susceptible to only one conclusion: the police officer” must be empowered to enforce the laws of the Commonwealth. We believe that this requirement is satisfied if the deputy is a sworn deputy, as distinguished from non-sworn sheriff personnel. Since sworn deputies have arrest power, and, therefore, peace officer status, then they are specifically empowered, as law enforcement officers, to enforce the laws of the Commonwealth. A sworn deputy sheriff is charged with all of the arrest powers prescribed in KRS 431.005, Arrest by peace officers - By private persons. This statute states: (1) A peace officer may make an arrest: (a) In obedience to a warrant; or (b) Without a warrant when a felony is committed in his presence; or (c) Without a warrant when he has probable cause to believe that the person being arrested has committed a felony; or (d) Without a warrant when a misdemeanor, as defined in KRS 431.060, has been committed in his presence; or

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(e) Without a warrant when a violation of KRS 189.290,
189.393, 189.520, 189.580, 511.080, or 525.070 has
been committed in his presence, except that a violation of
KRS 189A.010 or KRS 281A.210 need not be committed in
his presence in order to make an arrest without a warrant
if the officer has probable cause to believe that the person
has violated KRS 189A.010 or KRS 281A.210.
(2) (a) Any peace officer may arrest a person without warrant when the peace officer has probable cause to believe that the person has intentionally or wantonly caused physical injury to a family member or member of an unmarried couple. (3) For purposes of subsection (2) of this section, a "peace officer" is: (a). . . a duly elected sheriff, or a full-time paid deputy sherifff; (emphasis added). Also, KRS 446.010 Definitions for statutes generally, states that a peace officer means sheriffs and  . . . other persons with similar authority to make arrests. Id. at (24). This definition includes sworn deputies. The General Assembly has provided for two types of sheriff office personnel: sworn and unsworn. KRS 70.030. The former, that is sworn deputy sheriffs, must take the KRS 70.010 oath of office (the swearing) before he or she can execute any of the duties of the office of deputy sheriff. KRS 70.030(1). Once sworn, then these deputies have the aforedescribed KRS 431.005(1) and 446.010(24) arrest power. Based on these statutes it is quite plain that a sworn deputy sheriff - as opposed to non-sworn sheriff office personnel - has the authority and responsibility to engage in the “. . . prevention and detection of crime and the enforcement of the general laws of the state.” KRS 15.420(2) (as amended 1998). Thus, sworn full-time deputies, as law enforcement officers, meet the statutory criteria for KLEPF.

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KRS 15.420(2) also sets out the complete and exclusive list of
KLEPF criteria: full time and law enforcement power. It is clear, then,
that administrative regulations or agency policies cannot be used to
modify the terms of the statute so as to place additional criteria on
KLEPF eligibility. See, KRS 13A.120(2); and, Cornette v. Com., 899
S.W.2d 502, 506 (Ky. App. 1995) (. . . regulations must not address
matters properly within the purview of the statute and which the
statute has already addressed.).
Conclusion
For these reasons, all full-time sworn deputy sheriffs, irrespective of primary duties or job assignments, are eligible for funding under KLEFP. Since the statute does not authorize any Executive Branch agency to promulgate administrative regulations to further define this term, any additional requirements on eligibility would be improper and contrary to the express intent of the General Assembly. ALBERT B. CHANDLER, III ATTORNEY GENERAL

Scott White
Assistant Deputy Attorney General