Could Louisville's aldermanic president punish one board member without a vote of the full board?

Plain-English summary

Louisville's aldermanic president had barred one alderman from chairing committees or presenting legislation without support from six other aldermen. The decision had been rescinded, but a requester asked whether the president could impose those restrictions as discipline and whether the mayor could intervene.

The Attorney General concluded that KRS 83.470 gave the power to discipline board members to the full Board of Aldermen, not its president acting alone. It expressly left open whether the president's particular actions constituted discipline; that factual and legal finding belonged to a court. The opinion also concluded that the mayor could not discipline the alderman or intervene in matters of discipline before the board.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1998. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Q: Could Louisville's aldermanic president alone ban a member from chairing committees as punishment? A: The Attorney General said the president had no unilateral disciplinary power. If a restriction was intended as discipline, the power under KRS 83.470 belonged to the full board.

Q: Did the opinion decide that the restrictions on this alderman were discipline? A: No. It identified that as a question for a court and did not make a factual finding about the president's rescinded actions.

Q: Could Louisville's mayor discipline an alderman instead? A: No. The opinion treated discipline of a board member as a legislative matter assigned to the board, outside the mayor's executive authority.

Background and statutory framework

The opinion read KRS 83.470 as assigning member discipline to the whole Board of Aldermen. It then used KRS 83.430's separation of city government into legislative and executive departments, together with KRS 83.530's assignment of executive power to the mayor, to reject mayoral intervention in board discipline.

The Attorney General did not decide the alderman's individual rights or the precise status of the president's rescinded restrictions. Its answer turned on who could exercise disciplinary power if the actions were discipline.

Citations and references

Statutes: KRS 83.470; KRS 83.430; KRS 83.530.

Case: Legislative Research Commission v. Brown, 664 S.W.2d 907 (1984).

Source

• Landing page: https://kdla.access.preservica.com/uncategorized/IO_20c43515-2e94-431c-8d94-5e67413e329e/
• Original PDF: https://kdla.access.preservica.com/download/file/IO_20c43515-2e94-431c-8d94-5e67413e329e

Original opinion text

OAG 98-6
May 1, 1998
Subject:

Authority of President of Board of Aldermen to impose sanctions upon a board member.

Requested by:

Reverend Louis Coleman

Written by:

Diane Schuler Fleming

Syllabus:

The President of the Board of Aldermen does not have statutory authority to unilaterally discipline any member of the board.

Statutes construed:

KRS 83.470

Opinion of the Attorney General
The Reverend Louis Coleman has requested an opinion from this office concerning a unilateral decision of Louisville Board of Aldermen President Steve Magre, which has since been rescinded, to ban 12 th Ward Alderman Paul Bather from chairing committees or presenting legislation to the Board unless the proposals have the support of six other aldermen. Concerned that the actions have the effect of disenfranchising the 12th Ward, the Reverend Coleman presented questions for our consideration which we interpreted as follows: (1) Does the President of the Board of Aldermen, as a form of disciplinary sanction, have the power to prohibit an alderman from serving as chair of a committee?; (2) Can the Aldermanic President limit an alderman’s ability to

OAG 98-6
Page 2

introduce legislation as a disciplinary sanction?; and (3) Does the Mayor have authority to intervene in this matter? The power to discipline or punish a member of the Board of Aldermen for disorderly conduct has been placed exclusively with the full Board pursuant to KRS 83.470. No power has been vested in the President which would enable him to take unilateral disciplinary action against any member. Thus, if President Magre’s actions were intended to discipline Alderman Bather, he clearly lacked the authority to do so. Instead, the matter should have been placed before the full Board and analyzed in accordance with the Board’s Code of Ethics and other principles of law that may be applicable. See, Louisville Code of Ordinances, Ordinance 261, Series 1994, Chapters 30 and 36. It should be noted that this office is not making a finding that the actions of President Magre constituted “discipline” under KRS 83.470. Whether the actions of the President in fact were discipline is a matter better left to the courts that have the procedures and recognized authority to make such findings of fact and conclusions of law. Finally, we turn to the question of whether the Mayor has the authority to intervene in this matter. In KRS 83.430 the General Assembly set forth the following mandate: In each city of the first class there shall be a legislative, an executive, and a judicial department. None of these departments shall exercise any power properly belonging to either of the others, except as permitted by law. Pursuant to KRS 83.530, the executive power is vested in the mayor. Legislative power is granted to the Board of Aldermen. KRS 83.400. Thus we see that a strict separation of powers between the legislative and executive branches of government has been established for cities of the first class. This language mirrors that of Section 28 of the Kentucky Constitution, which the Kentucky courts have consistently

OAG 98-6
Page 3

interpreted as providing for a separation of powers. See, Legislative Research Commission v. Brown, Ky., 664 S.W.2d 907 (1984). The power to discipline a member of the Board of Aldermen has specifically been granted to the legislative branch, that is, to the Board itself. KRS 83.470. Therefore, Mayor Abramson does not have the authority to discipline Alderman Bather or intervene in such matters before the Board. To do so would be an improper usurpation of power. Albert B. Chandler III Attorney General

Diane Schuler Fleming
Assistant Attorney General

199