Could Kentucky eliminate jury trials in paternity cases without violating its constitution?

Plain-English summary

Kentucky law allowed either party in a paternity case to demand a jury trial when the Attorney General issued this opinion in 1998. The Cabinet for Families and Children asked whether the legislature could remove that statutory right without violating the Kentucky Constitution. The question arose because the opinion identified federal funds available only to states that did not allow paternity jury trials.

The Attorney General answered yes. Section 7 of the state constitution protected jury trials in proceedings that carried a common-law jury right in 1791. The opinion relied on an 1831 Kentucky decision that rejected a jury right in paternity proceedings. It concluded that the General Assembly could repeal KRS 406.061 without violating the state constitution.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1998. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Common questions

Q: Did Kentucky parents have a right to a jury trial in paternity cases in 1998? A: Yes, under KRS 406.061 as the opinion described it, either party could demand a jury. The Attorney General treated that right as statutory rather than constitutionally protected.

Q: Why did the Kentucky Attorney General say the legislature could end paternity jury trials? A: The opinion read Section 7 as protecting jury trials where the common law recognized them in 1791. It relied on Scantland v Commonwealth, an 1831 Kentucky case holding that a jury was unnecessary in a paternity proceeding.

Q: Did the opinion say that Kentucky had already repealed the jury-trial statute? A: No. It answered whether the General Assembly could repeal KRS 406.061 without violating the state constitution. It did not report that the legislature had done so.

Background and statutory framework

The opinion quoted Section 7's protection of the “ancient mode of trial by jury” and used Steelvest for the rule tying that protection to common-law jury rights recognized in 1791. It then applied Scantland to paternity proceedings. The Attorney General also examined § 54 of the state constitution and found nothing there that changed the answer.

The opinion mentioned a federal funding condition in 42 USC § 666(a), but its legal conclusion addressed Kentucky's power to repeal its jury-trial statute, KRS 406.061. It did not determine the state's actual receipt of funds.

Citations and references

Constitution and statutes: Ky Const § 7; KRS 406.061; 42 USC § 666(a).

Cases: Steelvest, Inc v Scansteel Service Center, Inc., 908 SW 2d 104, 107 (1995); Scantland v Commonwealth, 29 Ky (6 J J Marsh) 585 (1831).

Source

• Landing page: https://kdla.access.preservica.com/uncategorized/IO_71cbd33a-dab8-4412-8a8f-af88b6c5a5e0/
• Original PDF: https://kdla.access.preservica.com/download/file/IO_71cbd33a-dab8-4412-8a8f-af88b6c5a5e0

Original opinion text

OAG 98-1
January 8, 1998
Subject:

Jury trial in paternity action

Requested by:

William K. Moore Jr., General Counsel, Cabinet for
Families and Children

Written by:

Ross T. Carter

Syllabus:

General Assembly may amend statute to remove
provision for jury trials in paternity actions

Statutes construed:
OAGs cited:

Ky Const § 7; KRS 406.061

None

Opinion of the Attorney General
In Kentucky, either party in a paternity action may demand a
jury trial. KRS 406.061. Certain federal funds are available only to
states that do not allow jury trials in paternity actions. 42 USC § 666(a) (5)(I). We have been asked whether the General Assembly may remove the jury trial provision without denying a right guaranteed by the state constitution. Section 7 of the Constitution of Kentucky says, “The ancient mode of trial by jury shall be held sacred, and the right thereof remain inviolate, subject to such modifications as may be authorized by this Constitution.” Our courts have construed this provision to mean that a litigant may demand a jury trial in any proceeding in which a right to a jury trial was recognized under the common law as it existed in 1791.

OAG 98-1
Page 2

Steelvest, Inc v Scansteel Service Center, Inc., Ky, 908 SW 2d 104, 107 (1995). The question therefore is whether in 1791 there was a common law right to a jury trial in paternity actions. That precise question has been answered by the Court of Appeals. In Scantland v Commonwealth, 29 Ky (6 J J Marsh) 585 (1831), the court held unequivocally that “a jury is not necessary or proper in a case of [paternity]. It is now too late to debate the point.” We have examined other sections, including § 54, of the state constitution and find that they contain nothing that would affect the question before us. Because there was no common law right to a jury trial in paternity actions, no such right is preserved in our state constitution. The General Assembly may repeal KRS 406.061 without offending any constitutional provision. Albert B. Chandler III Attorney General

Ross T. Carter
Assistant Attorney General