Could a Kentucky legislator vote in a floor session by live audio and video from another location?

Plain-English summary

In 1997, Kentucky's Attorney General said a legislator could not take part in floor proceedings by interactive audio and video while physically absent from a legislative session. Remote viewing and listening were possible, but the AG said an absent member could not debate, vote, or count toward a quorum.

The opinion relied on constitutional provisions locating sessions at the seat of government and referring to members' attendance. It also drew an analogy to a Kentucky decision on telephone voting by municipal legislative bodies, while acknowledging that the courts had not decided the General Assembly question directly.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1997. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Historical summary

Legislators away from the chamber

The question concerned an interactive audio and video connection to floor proceedings. The AG distinguished observing the proceedings from participating officially. It said a member away from the session could watch and listen like anyone else, but could not join debate, cast a vote, or be counted toward the quorum.

Constitutional basis

The AG read Kentucky Constitution §§ 36, 37, and 43 together. Section 36 located legislative sessions at the seat of government; Section 37's language on quorum and compelling absent members' attendance suggested actual presence; and Section 43 referred to attending sessions and traveling to and from them. The opinion viewed a remote connection as inconsistent with those provisions.

Common questions

Did a live video link allow an absent member to vote?

No. The AG said the member could view the floor proceedings but could not vote from elsewhere.

Could a remote member count toward the quorum?

No. The opinion said physical presence was needed to count the member for quorum purposes.

Had a Kentucky court already decided remote voting by state legislators?

The AG said no court had examined that exact General Assembly question. It cited a Kentucky decision concerning telephone voting by municipal legislative bodies as related authority.

Background and statutory framework

Legislative Research Commission director Don Cetrulo asked about participation through an interactive connection. The AG discussed Kentucky Constitution §§ 36, 37, and 43, its earlier OAG 83-8 on quorum, and Fiscal Court of Jefferson County v Courier-Journal and Louisville Times Company on telephone votes by municipal bodies. The opinion's analysis addressed floor proceedings in 1997.

Citations and references

• Kentucky Constitution §§ 36, 37, and 43: session location, quorum, and attendance language discussed by the AG.
• KRS 61.826: statute cited with the municipal telephone-voting discussion.
• Fiscal Court of Jefferson County v Courier-Journal and Louisville Times Company, Ky, 554 SW 2d 72 (1977): related municipal voting decision.
• OAG 83-8: earlier quorum opinion cited by the AG.

Source

• Landing page: https://kdla.access.preservica.com/uncategorized/IO_8cf15e65-3a0e-444c-a8e1-ae3bdc8a430f/
• Original PDF: https://kdla.access.preservica.com/download/file/IO_8cf15e65-3a0e-444c-a8e1-ae3bdc8a430f

Original opinion text

OAG 97-37
December 22, 1997

Subject:

Whether state legislator may participate in session without being physically present

Requested by:

Don Cetrulo, Director, Legislative Research Commission

Written by:

Ross T. Carter

Syllabus:

Legislator may not vote or otherwise participate in official capacity without being physically present

Statutes construed:
OAGs cited:

Ky Const §§ 36, 37, 43

OAG 83-8 (f)

Opinion of the Attorney General
We have been asked whether a legislator may participate in floor proceedings during a session by means of an interactive audio and video connection. The answer is no. Our conclusion derives from two sources. First, although courts have had few occasions to address this issue, what little authority is

OAG 97-37
Page 2

available disfavors electronic participation in lieu of physical presence. In the absence of specific authorizing legislation, members of municipal legislative bodies may not vote by telephone. Fiscal Court of Jefferson County v Courier-Journal and Louisville Times Company, Ky, 554 SW 2d 72 (1977); KRS 61.826. Although this point of law has never been examined in the context of the General Assembly, we see no reason why the courts would adopt a different view for legislation at the state level. Second, three provisions of the state constitution contemplate actual physical presence at the seat of government during a session. Section 36 states:
[T]he General Assembly shall convene in regular session, and its sessions shall be held at the seat of government . . . . Section 37 states: Not less than a majority of the members of each House of the General assembly shall constitute a quorum to do business, but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day, and shall be authorized by law to compel the attendance of absent members in such manner and under such penalties as may be prescribed by law. We have said that § 37, the quorum provision, requires that a member be actually present at the session in order to be counted for quorum purposes. OAG 83-8. The phrase “compel the attendance of absent members” implies that an actual presence is necessary. Section 43 states: The members of the General Assembly shall, in all cases except treason, felony, breach or surety of the peace, be privileged from arrest during their attendance on the ses-

OAG 97-37
Page 3

sions of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the same . . . . A constructive presence by audio or video connection is patently inconsistent with these provisions. Although a member might listen to and view floor proceedings via audio-visual technology, as any other person, an absent member could not under any circumstances be counted as part of a quorum, could not participate in the debate, and could not vote. Albert B. Chandler III Attorney General

Ross T. Carter
Assistant Attorney General