Could Kentucky judges ban weapons throughout a courthouse shared with county offices?

Plain-English summary

In 1997, Kentucky's Attorney General considered whether circuit and district judges could ban deadly weapons throughout a courthouse and annex that also contained county offices. The answer turned on which government occupied the space. The AG concluded that the courts could ban weapons in space the county provided for court functions under KRS 26A.100, but found no authority for judges to impose that ban in county offices in the same building.

The opinion based court control on the space statute and the judiciary's power to maintain orderly proceedings. It also recognized that peace officers could carry deadly weapons when necessary for their protection while performing official duties. The AG separately noted a county's statutory ability to prohibit licensed concealed weapons in county-controlled building areas.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1997. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Historical summary

Judges and court administrators

The AG treated courtrooms, chambers, court staff offices, jury facilities, and other space provided under KRS 26A.100 as areas the local courts could control. A weapons ban confined to that space fit the courts' authority to protect the administration of justice. The opinion did not extend judicial control merely because county offices shared an entrance or hallway with court space.

County officials and visitors

The AG found no basis for a local court's ban to reach county offices in the shared courthouse. It distinguished the county's own authority under KRS 237.115 to restrict licensed concealed carry in portions of buildings the county owned, leased, or controlled. That was a separate county action, not an extension of a judge's order.

Peace officers

The opinion identified a statutory exception for peace officers carrying deadly weapons when necessary for protection in the discharge of official duties.

Common questions

Could judges ban weapons from a courthouse they did not occupy exclusively?

Yes, within the space provided to the circuit and district courts under KRS 26A.100. The AG did not treat shared occupancy as defeating control of court space.

Did the same court order cover county offices in the building?

No. The AG said it could find no authority for judges to ban deadly weapons in those county offices.

Did a concealed-carry license override a court-space ban?

The AG said Kentucky's licensing statute did not prevent a unit of state government from prohibiting licensed concealed carry in the portion of a building it occupied. The opinion also quoted a separate license restriction for court premises.

Could peace officers still carry while on duty?

The AG recognized KRS 527.020(2)'s allowance when carrying was necessary for a peace officer's protection in the discharge of official duties.

Background and statutory framework

A state representative asked about courts housed alongside county offices. The AG read KRS 26A.100 as giving courts control of the space supplied for judicial work and relied on judicial authority to preserve decorum. It distinguished state courts from counties under the local firearms regulation statute, KRS 65.870, and discussed separate concealed-carry provisions for court and county areas. The opinion left county offices outside the local courts' ban.

Citations and references

• KRS 26A.100: county-provided space for local courts.
• KRS 65.870: local firearms regulation limit, distinguished from authority of state courts.
• KRS 237.115: control of licensed concealed carry in occupied building space.
• KRS 527.020(2): peace-officer allowance identified in the opinion.
• Craft v. Commonwealth, Ky., 343 S.W.2d 150, 151 (1961): judicial power to administer proceedings.

Source

• Landing page: https://www.ag.ky.gov/Resources/Opinions/Opinions/OAG97-009.htm

Original opinion text

OAG 97-9

March 21, 1997

Subject: Authority of Kentucky circuit and district courts to ban deadly weapons in a courthouse and courthouse annex in which those courts are located.

Written by: Kent T. Young, Assistant Attorney General

Requested by: Robert R. Damron, State Representative, 39th Legislative District

Syllabus: Kentucky circuit and district courts may ban deadly weapons in courthouse or courthouse annex space provided those courts by county government in accordance with the express provisions of KRS 26A.100. Notwithstanding such a ban, peace officers may carry deadly weapons when necessary for their protection in the discharge of their official duties.

Statutes Construed: KRS 26A.090(6); 26A.100; 26A.110; 26A.130; 65.870; 67.080(2)(b); 67.130; 237.110(12)(a), (b), (c), (d); 237.115; 527.020

Opinion of the Attorney General

We have been asked to address whether the law authorizes the judges of the Kentucky circuit and district courts in a county to ban all deadly weapons from a courthouse and courthouse annex not occupied exclusively by those courts. We provide this opinion on a question of public law pursuant to KRS 15.025(2). To simplify the opinion, we will refer to the judges of the Kentucky circuit and district courts in a county as the “local courts.”

The Kentucky General Assembly has expressed a clear preference for locating local courts in county courthouses, or if ordered by the Kentucky Supreme Court, in other county buildings. The legislature therefore has placed an obligation on county and urban-county governments to “provide such reasonably available space which would not disrupt the operation of county government as necessary” for the following:

(a) A courtroom or courtrooms for the circuit and district court;

(b) Chambers for the circuit judge and district judge or judges;

(c) Office space for the circuit and district court staffs;

(d) Office and storage space for the circuit clerk's operations;

(e) Jury facilities for the circuit and the district court;

(f) Office space for other officers of the Court of Justice including pretrial release officers, court reporters, court administrators, judges' secretaries, friends of the court and commissioners; and

(g) Such other facilities necessary for the operation of the circuit and the district court as may be agreed upon by the county or urban-county government and the Administrative Office of the Courts.

KRS 26A.100(2).

With respect to courthouse or courthouse annex space provided local courts by county government in accordance with the express provisions of KRS 26A.100, local courts may generally ban deadly weapons. We find authority for such action in the following:

1. Courts have inherent power to act to preserve decorum and ensure the orderly administration of justice in the conduct of judicial proceedings. Smothers v. Lewis, Ky., 672 S.W.2d 62 (1984); Arnette v. Meade, Ky., 462 S.W.2d 940 (1971); Craft v. Commonwealth, Ky., 343 S.W.2d 150, 151 (1961); Young v. Basnight, Ky., 329 S.W.2d 195, 199 (1959); Burton v. Mayes, Ky., 118 S.W.2d 547 (1938); see, also, 20 Am Jur 2d Courts 43, 45 (1995). This includes the authority to regulate the admission of the public to court proceedings. Jackson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 138 S.W.2d 422 (1896).

2. Implicit in KRS 26A.100 is local court control of space provided the local court pursuant to KRS 26A.100. This implicit right of control extends to controlling the carrying of firearms in space local courts have been provided pursuant to KRS 26A.100.

“The State, no less than a private owner of property, has power to preserve the property under its control for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated.” Adderly v. Florida, 385 US 39, 47, 17 L.Ed.2d 149, 156, 87 S.Ct. 242 (1966). Not all local court space in a courthouse or courthouse annex is customarily open to members of the general public. A judge's chambers would be one example.

The right to bear arms set forth at Section 1, Seventh of the Kentucky Constitution is not absolute. See OAG 96-40.

There is little doubt that in some circumstances the government may ban the entry on to public property . . . of all persons except those who have legitimate business on the premises.” United States v. Grace, 461 US 171, 178, 75 L.Ed.2d 736, 744, 103 S.Ct. 1702 (1983). The legitimate business that members of the general public have on local court premises does not require that they carry deadly weapons onto those premises.

3. Kentucky circuit and district courts are a part of state government. KRS 65.870, which prohibits firearms regulation by city, county or urban- county governments, does not apply to Kentucky circuit and district courts.

4. KRS 527.020 sets forth a general prohibition against carrying a concealed deadly weapon in Kentucky.

5. A Kentucky license to carry a concealed deadly weapon does not authorize the licensee to carry a concealed firearm into “[a]ny courthouse, solely occupied by the Court of Justice courtroom, or court proceeding.” KRS 237.110(12)(c).

6. KRS 237.115(1) states in relevant part that “[n]othing contained in KRS 237.110,” the statute which authorizes the issuance of licenses to carry concealed deadly weapons, “shall be construed to limit, restrict, or prohibit in any manner . . . the right of a unit of state . . . government to prohibit the carrying of concealed deadly weapons by licensees in that portion of a building actually owned, leased, or occupied by that unit of government.” A Kentucky circuit court and a Kentucky district court are each units of state government. Since no applicable meaning of the term “unit” is contained in the Kentucky Revised Statutes, the term is given its ordinary meaning. See, e.g., Lynch v. Commonwealth, Ky., 902 S.W.2d 813, 814 (1995).

While local courts may ban concealed deadly weapons from their premises, we note one exception. Peace officers are entitled to carry deadly weapons lawfully “when necessary for their protection in the discharge of their official duties.” KRS 527.020(2). This statutory provision would appear to further the orderly administration of justice.

A local court deadly weapons ban limited in scope to courthouse and annex space which has been provided the local court pursuant to KRS 26A.100 implicates no separation of powers concern. Local court control of such space is implicit in KRS 26A.100. Generally speaking, local court orders which derive from authority that is necessarily implicit in a statute “do not violate 27 and 28 of the Kentucky Constitution.” Commonwealth v. Partin, Ky.App., 702 S.W.2d 51, 53 (1985).

Moreover, pursuant to Sections 27 and 109 of the Kentucky Constitution, the judicial power of the Commonwealth is reposed in the Court of Justice. Pursuant to Section 109, the Court of Justice includes the Kentucky Supreme Court, the Kentucky Court of Appeals, the Kentucky circuit courts, and the Kentucky district courts. “[T]he judicial branch of . . . state government has exclusive authority to manage its own affairs.” Ex parte Auditor of Public Accounts, Ky., 609 S.W.2d 682, 685 (1980). “[T]he grant of judicial power to the courts by the constitution carries with it, as a necessary incident, the right to make that power effective in the administration of justice.” Craft v. Commonwealth, Ky., 343 S.W.2d 150, 151 (1961). As the court explained in Young v. Knight, Ky., 329 S.W.2d 195, 199 (1959), “[i]t is not possible for any judicial tribunal to fulfill its functions without power to preserve decorum and to enforce its orders.” This inherent power includes the authority to regulate admission of the public to court proceedings. Jackson v. Commonwealth, Ky., 38 S.W. 422 (1896); 20 Am Jur 2d Courts 45 (1995). Additionally, the local courts possess inherent power to enforce their orders through contempt proceedings. Arnett v. Meade, Ky., 462 S.W.2d 940 (1971).

Section 116 of the Kentucky Constitution, which recognizes the authority of the Kentucky Supreme Court to prescribe rules of practice and procedure for the Court of Justice, is not implicated by a local court deadly weapons ban. Such a ban, strictly speaking, is not a rule of practice or procedure; i.e., the ban does not purport to prescribe a formal means or method for enforcing a substantive legal right in a cause of action before the court.

We recognize access to county offices and local courts may as a practical matter be obtained through shared building entrances and hallways. We can find no authority, however, for the proposition that local courts may ban deadly weapons in county offices located in the same courthouse or courthouse annex as those local courts. Indeed, we note that ownership, operation, and maintenance of a county courthouse, generally, are county functions. KRS 26A.090(6); 26A.110; 26A.130; 67.080(2)(b); 67.130.

Of course, the legislative body of a county may act pursuant to KRS 237.115 to prohibit those who are licensed to carry concealed deadly weapons from carrying concealed deadly weapons in portions of buildings owned, leased or controlled by the county. See OAG 96-39. Additionally, a license to carry a concealed deadly weapon does not authorize the licensee to carry a concealed deadly weapon into a police station or sheriff's office, a detention facility or jail, or a meeting of the governing body of the county. KRS 237.110(12)(a), (b), and (d). Finally, with respect to the authority of the county to prohibit the open carrying of deadly weapons in a courthouse or courthouse annex, we note the ordinance prohibition embodied in KRS 65.870 extends only to “any part of the field of regulation of the transfer, ownership, possession, carrying or transportation of firearms, ammunition, or components of firearms or combination thereof.” (Emphasis added.)

ALBERT B. CHANDLER III

ATTORNEY GENERAL

KENT T. YOUNG

ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL