Did Kentucky cap political-party committee gifts to candidates in the June 1996 special elections?

Plain-English summary

In June 1996, Kentucky's Attorney General concluded that the contribution limits in the statutes he examined did not restrict how much a political party executive committee could give to a candidate in three June special elections. The opinion concerned only those elections. It did not announce a general rule for later races.

The issue arose from two amendments to KRS 121.150(25). An April amendment extended rules for permanent committees to party executive committees, but referred to gifts “in any one election” while the older subsection still measured limits across an “election cycle.” A second bill would replace the cycle language on July 15. The AG read the interim wording as referring to the election cycle. Because the June special elections occurred before that cycle ended and before the new election-based rules took effect, he found no statutory amount limit for party executive committee gifts in those elections.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1996. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Historical summary

June 1996 special-election candidates

The AG answered only whether statutory limits restricted receipts from political party executive committees in the June special elections. He said they did not. His closing sentence confined the opinion to those elections.

Political party executive committees

Senate Bill 55 had added executive committees to KRS 121.150(25) in April 1996, but the text referred to an “election” while the incorporated subsection still measured an “election cycle.” The AG construed the interim provision as using the cycle concept until the second amendment took effect.

Election administrators comparing the two 1996 changes

House Bill 695 was due to take effect July 15, 1996. The AG said its revised rule would measure limits separately for each election after that date, resolving the textual mismatch. The June special elections fell before that change.

Common questions

Did the AG find a party executive committee contribution cap for the June 1996 special elections?
No. He concluded that no statutory amount limit applied to contributions from those committees to candidates in those particular elections.

Why did the temporary rule not produce a June-election cap?
The AG read the interim wording as tied to an election cycle rather than to each special election. The law was due to switch to election-based accounting only after the June races.

Did the answer apply to other elections?
The opinion expressly limited its conclusion to the special elections held in June 1996.

Background and statutory framework

The AG compared Senate Bill 55's addition of party executive committees to KRS 121.150(25)(b) with House Bill 695's later removal of election-cycle references in the incorporated subsection. He cited Barker v. Stearns Coal & Lumber Co. for construing statutory wording to effect the legislature's evident purpose and OAG 96-19 for the July 15 effective date.

Citations and references

• KRS 121.015(2)
• KRS 121.150(25)
• KRS 121.150(25)(b)
• House Bill 695
• Barker v. Stearns Coal & Lumber Co., 287 Ky. 340, 152 S.W.2d 953, 959-960 (1941)
• OAG 96-19

Source

• Landing page: https://www.ag.ky.gov/Resources/Opinions/Opinions/OAG96-026.htm

Original opinion text

OAG 96-26

June 17, 1996

Subject: Whether There are Statutory Limits on Political Party Executive Committee Contributions to Candidates in Three Special Elections to be Conducted in June 1996.

Written by: Gerard R. Gerhard

Requested by: The Honorable Gex Williams, State Senator

Syllabus: With the elimination of statutory limitations on contributions by political party executive committees to certain candidates during an “election cycle,” no statutory limitations are present, until other provisions become applicable, to restrict political party executive committee contributions to candidates in special elections to be conducted in June 1996.

OAGs cited: 96-19

Statutes construed: KRS 121.015(2); 121.150(25); 121.150(25)(a); 121.150(25)(b)

Constitutional sections construed: 55

OPINION OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

The following question, in substance, has been presented:

Given amendments of KRS 121.150(25), during the 1996 Regular Session of the Kentucky General Assembly, are there any statutory limitations on the amount that a political party executive committee may contribute to candidates in special elections to be held in June 1996?

Answer in Brief

In our view the answer is no. When three special elections for certain offices are conducted, in June 1996, they will occur during a statutorily defined “election cycle” for which certain limitations are imposed upon political party executive committee campaign contributions. Statutory references to an “election cycle,” however, are eliminated, effective July 15, 1996, pursuant to House Bill 695, passed during the 1996 Regular Session of the General Assembly. It follows that campaign contribution limitations imposed in relation to an “election cycle” will have no bearing upon contributions in connection with special elections conducted prior to the end of what would have been an election cycle. Discussion follows.

KRS 121.150(25)

Prior to its amendment during the 1996 Regular Session of the Kentucky General Assembly, KRS 121.150(25) imposed limitations on aggregate contributions candidates for certain elections could receive from “permanent committees,” commonly known as “political action committees,” in any one election cycle.

KRS 121.150(25) was amended during the 1996 Regular Session of the General Assembly by Senate Bill 55, so that contribution limitations, previously applicable to “permanent committees,” were extended to executive committees of any county, district, state or federal political party. By virtue of an emergency declaration in the measure, Senate Bill 55 became effective when it was approved by the Governor, on April 12, 1996.

Senate Bill 55 (1996 Reg. Sess.)

Senate Bill 55, in part pertinent here, amended KRS 121.150(25), retaining the original language of that provision as subsection (a), and adding a new subsection (b), so that KRS 121.150(25), as of this writing, provides:

(a) A candidate for elective public office, except slates of candidates for governor and Lieutenant Governor, shall not accept contributions from permanent committees which, in the aggregate, exceed thirty-five percent (35%) of the total contributions accepted by the candidate in any one (1) election cycle or five thousand dollars ($5,000) in any one (1) election cycle, whichever is the greater amount. For the purposes of this subsection, “election cycle” means the period between regular elections for the office a candidate seeks. The percentage of the total contributions or dollar amounts of contributions accepted by a candidate in an election cycle that is accepted from permanent committees shall be calculated as of the regular election day that ends the election cycle. Funds in a candidate's campaign account which are carried forward from one (1) election cycle to another shall not be considered in calculating the acceptable percentage or dollar amount of contributions which may be accepted from permanent committees for the election cycle for which the funds are carried forward. A candidate may, without penalty, contribute funds to his campaign account not later than twenty (20) days following the election cycle so as not to exceed the permitted percentage or dollar amount of contributions which may be accepted from permanent committees or the candidate may, not later than twenty (20) days after the end of the election cycle, refund any excess permanent committee contributions on a pro rata basis to the permanent committees whose contributions are accepted after the aggregate limit has been reached.

(b) The provisions of paragraph (a) of this subsection regarding the receipt of aggregate contributions from permanent committees in any one (1) election shall also apply separately to the receipt of aggregate contributions from executive committees of any county, district, state, or federal political party in any one (1) election.

(Emphasis added.)

It will be noticed that subsection (b) (above) indicates that references in subsection (a), to contributions from permanent committees “in any one (1) election,” shall apply to contributions of specified executive committees. Subsection (a), however, does not contain such references. Instead, subsection (a) contains references to “election cycle,” rather than to “election.” It must be presumed that the legislature, not having amended subsection (a) to delete references therein to “election cycle,” was aware that such language would remain until House Bill 695 became effective July 15, 1996. In Barker v. Stearns Coal & Lumber Co., 287 Ky. 340, 152 S.W.2d 953, 959-960 (1941), the Court observed:

Courts are authorized to insert words or phrases into an act of legislation by construction only when it is necessary in order to rescue the enactment from absurdity or to effectuate a purpose made obvious by other portions. [Citations omitted.]

Following such reasoning here, we believe that, for the period from April 12, 1996, through July 14, 1996, the word “cycle” must be inserted by construction following the word “election,” in subsection (b) of KRS 121.150(25).

KRS 121.150(25) was also amended during the 1996 Regular Session of the General Assembly by House Bill 695. That measure carried no declaration of emergency or delayed effective date. Accordingly, in keeping with Section 55 of the Constitution of Kentucky, House Bill 695 will become effective on July 15, 1996. See OAG 96-19.

House Bill 695 (1996 Reg. Sess.)

House Bill 695, in relation to what is now KRS 121.150(25)(a), provides that certain candidates shall not accept, from permanent committees, contributions which, in the aggregate, exceed fifty percent of the total contributions accepted by the candidate in any one election, or $10,000 in any one election, whichever is the greater amount. The measure also deletes references, in what is now KRS 121.150(a), to “election cycle.” The effect of this deletion is that, after House Bill 695 becomes effective, on July 15, 1996, contribution limitations imposed in KRS 121.150 will apply to each election (see KRS 121.015(2)), rather than to an “election cycle.”

After House Bill 695 becomes effective, KRS 121.150(25)(b) (see above) will be read according to its literal terms, since after that time, subsection (a) will contain references to “election,” rather than “election cycle.” Subsection (b) will then be consistent with subsection (a).

Summary

There are no statutory limitations on the amount that a political party executive committee may contribute to candidates in special elections to be held in June 1996.

The views expressed in this opinion are limited only to their relation to special elections to be held in June 1996.

A. B. CHANDLER III

ATTORNEY GENERAL

GERARD GERHARD

ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL