Could a Kentucky fiscal court charge cities or arrestees a general county jail booking fee?

Short answer The AG said a Kentucky fiscal court could not impose a general administrative booking fee on a municipality or arrestee without statutory authority. It distinguished fees agreed with a city for incarcerating people charged with or convicted of city ordinance violations under KRS 441.035.
State
Kentucky
Opinion
OAG 94-56
Issued
August 10, 1994
Issued by
Chris Gorman, Attorney General of Kentucky
Requested by
Steve Henry, Jefferson County Commissioner

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This page answers the general question as of 1994. Ask about yours and see what current Kentucky law means for your facts, with citations you can check.

Disclaimer: This is an official Kentucky Attorney General opinion. AG opinions are advisory and are not binding court precedent. This page is informational and is not legal advice.
About this page: The plain-English summary, reader guidance, and Q&A below were written by Ezel based on the official AG opinion. The original opinion (linked on this page) is the authoritative source for any reliance.

Plain-English summary

In 1994, Kentucky's Attorney General said a fiscal court could not charge a general administrative fee to a municipality or arrestee merely for booking a person into the county jail. The office found no statute granting that broad fee power. It also noted that the jailer's duty to receive lawfully committed persons under KRS 71.040 was not conditioned on payment of a booking fee.

The AG distinguished KRS 441.035, which allowed a county and city to agree on fees for services when the county jail held prisoners charged with or convicted of violations of city ordinances. That narrower agreed fee arrangement did not authorize a general booking charge for other prisoners.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1994. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Historical summary

Fiscal courts considering a general fee

The AG said county fiscal courts needed express statutory authority for the powers they exercised. It found no authority to impose a general administrative booking fee on municipalities or arrestees and concluded the proposed fee was unlawful under the 1994 statutes it reviewed.

Cities with ordinance prisoners

KRS 441.035, as quoted in the opinion, permitted a city to use the county jail for people charged with or convicted of city ordinance violations by paying fees agreed with the fiscal court for the services rendered. The AG said such services could presumably include booking, but treated this negotiated city-ordinance category as distinct from a general booking fee.

Jailers receiving prisoners

The AG quoted KRS 71.040's duty to receive and keep lawfully committed people until lawful discharge, subject to the emergency medical attention condition described there. The statute did not make booking depend on a fee payment.

Common questions

Could a county charge every arrestee an administrative booking fee?

The AG answered no under the 1994 statutes it analyzed. It found no statutory authority for a general fee imposed on arrestees.

Could a county charge a municipality for every jail booking?

The AG rejected a general booking fee. It distinguished a specific statutory route for agreed fees when a city used the county jail for city ordinance prisoners.

Did the jailer's duty to accept a lawfully committed person depend on a booking payment?

No. The AG said KRS 71.040 did not condition that duty on a fee.

Background and statutory framework

The Jefferson County question asked about a fee imposed on municipalities or arrestees. The AG cited Fiscal Court, Etc. v. City of Louisville for the principle that fiscal court power must be expressly delegated by statute. KRS 441.035 supplied a limited agreed-fee mechanism for city ordinance prisoners; KRS 71.040 supplied the jailer's intake duty. Neither, the office concluded, supported a general fee.

Citations and references

  • KRS 441.035: agreed county jail service fees for city ordinance prisoners.
  • KRS 71.040: jailer's duty to receive lawfully committed persons.
  • Fiscal Court, Etc. v. City of Louisville, Ky., 559 S.W.2d 478, 481, (1977): express statutory delegation of fiscal court power.

Source

Original opinion text

OAG 94-56

August 10, 1994

Subject: County jail administrative booking fee

Written by: Gerard Gerhard

Requested by: Hon. Steve Henry, County Commissioner, Jefferson County District A

Syllabus: A fiscal court cannot lawfully impose a general administrative fee for booking of prisoners in the county jail because there is no statute empowering it to do so.

OAGs cited:

Statutes construed: KRS 71.040, 441.035

OPINION OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

The following question has been presented:

May the Jefferson County Fiscal Court impose upon a municipality or arrestee and administrative fee for booking at the county jail?

It is the opinion of the Attorney General that the Jefferson County Fiscal Court cannot lawfully impose, upon a municipality or arrestee, a general administrative fee for booking at the county jail, because there is no statute empowering a fiscal court to impose such fee.

In Fiscal Court, Etc. v. City of Louisville, Ky., 559 S.W.2d 478, 481, (1977), the court observed:

Tradition establishes that county government in Kentucky is based on the premise that all power exercised by the fiscal court must be expressly delegated to it by statute.

A review of the statutes does not disclose any statute empowering a fiscal court to impose, on a municipality or arrestee, a general administrative fee for booking at the county jail.

KRS 441.035 provides, in part:

The United States may use the jail of any county, and any city may use the jail of the county in which the city is located for the incarceration of prisoners charged with or convicted of violations of the city's ordinances, by paying the county the fees by agreement with the fiscal court for the type of services rendered.

(Emphasis added.)

While the statute quoted above empowers the establishment of a fee for the "type of services rendered" (which presumably would include booking), to be paid by a city for incarceration in a county jail of prisoners charged with or convicted of violations of city ordinances, there is no statute authorizing what we have termed a "general" administrative fee for booking of prisoners charged with or convicted of other types of violations.

We note also that KRS 71.040 provides, in part:

At the time of booking, the jailer shall receive and keep in the jail all persons who are lawfully committed thereto, until they are lawfully discharged, unless the person is in need of emergency medical attention, in which case the arresting officer shall obtain medical attention for the person prior to delivery to the jail.

The duty of the jailer to receive and keep in the jail, until they are lawfully discharged, all persons lawfully committed to the jail, is not made contingent upon a fee for booking. And see, KRS 95.787.

Given the absence of a statute authorizing a fiscal court to impose an administrative fee for booking upon a municipality or arrestee, and the statutory duty imposed upon the jailer as noted, in our view a fiscal court cannot lawfully impose a general administrative fee on a municipality or arrestee for booking in a county jail.

CHRIS GORMAN

ATTORNEY GENERAL

Gerard R. Gerhard

Assistant Attorney General

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