Could Kentucky merit-system deputy sheriffs campaign for office or count prior police training toward their required hours?

Plain-English summary

The AG answered two 1993 questions about Kentucky deputy sheriffs covered by a county merit-board system. It read KRS 70.267 to prohibit political fundraising for a party or candidate and a covered deputy's own candidacy for any public office. It said a deputy could do some off-duty campaign work using private resources, but could not campaign while on duty. On training, it found no provision allowing an earlier 400-hour course from prior employment to replace the training required within the statutory period after a merit-board ordinance or a deputy's appointment.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1993. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Historical summary

Covered deputies and political campaigns

The AG distinguished political fundraising and candidacy, which the statute prohibited for covered deputies, from other private political activities. It gave the example of off-duty envelope stuffing for a campaign with private resources if the mailings did not seek contributions or gifts. It also said on-duty campaigning would direct public resources to a private purpose and noted that the statute protected personal opinions, beliefs, and voting.

Deputies with prior training

The opinion rejected grandfathering based on a 400-hour course from prior employment. It read KRS 70.263's time provisions as requiring the specified approved training within one year after the county adopted the merit-board ordinance for existing deputies, or within one year after appointment for deputies joining an already covered county.

Sheriffs and merit boards

The AG said the statute provided no alternative training route for large groups of deputies. It suggested staggering the schedule and possibly seeking legislative relief, without treating either idea as an existing statutory exception.

Common questions

Could a covered deputy sheriff run for county office under the 1993 merit statute?

The AG said KRS 70.267(3) barred a covered deputy from being a candidate for any public office and provided forfeiture of the deputy position for a violation.

Could a deputy help a campaign while off duty?

The opinion allowed activity outside the statute's fundraising prohibition when it used private resources. Its example was stuffing envelopes that did not solicit gifts or contributions. It rejected campaigning while on duty.

Did 400 hours of training from an earlier job satisfy the merit-board requirement?

No. The AG found no authority to count prior training in place of training obtained within the periods specified by KRS 70.263.

Background and statutory framework

The request concerned county deputy sheriff merit boards under KRS 70.260 to 70.273. The opinion parsed KRS 70.267's political-activity restrictions and protection of private beliefs, and KRS 70.263's training and forfeiture provisions. It also invoked § 171 of the Constitution of Kentucky when discussing use of on-duty public resources for campaigning. All conclusions reflect the 1993 provisions quoted in the original text.

Citations and references

• KRS 70.267(1), KRS 70.267(3), and KRS 70.267(4): fundraising, candidacy, and protected personal rights.
• KRS 70.263: approved training and one-year periods discussed by the AG.
• Constitution of Kentucky § 171: public-resource concern for on-duty campaigning.

Source

• Landing page: https://www.ag.ky.gov/Resources/Opinions/Opinions/OAG93-009.htm

Original opinion text

OAG 93-9

February 9, 1993

Hon. Charles R. McCollom, III

Henderson County Attorney

P.O. Box 1316

Henderson, Kentucky 42420

Re: Questions Concerning Deputy Sheriff Merit Boards. AGO Corr. No. 93-(O)-92.

Dear Mr. McCollom:

By letter of January 18, 1993, you pose several questions related to statutes providing for the establishment of "deputy sheriff merit boards" (KRS 70.260 to 70.273).

First, you ask, in substance, for clarification of the meaning of the phrase "prohibited conduct" as that phrase appears in the title (but not the text) of KRS 70.267. We understand your question to relate to what constitutes prohibited conduct of deputy sheriffs.

KRS 70.267 provides, in part:

(1) No deputy sheriff covered by the provisions of KRS 70.260 to 70.263 shall directly or indirectly solicit, receive, or be in any manner concerned in receiving, soliciting, or publicizing any assessment, gift, subscription or contribution to or for any political party or candidate for public office.

(3) No deputy sheriff covered by the provisions of KRS 70.260 to 70.273 shall be a candidate for any public office. Any person who violates this subsection shall forfeit his position as a deputy sheriff.

(4) Nothing contained in this section shall be construed to abridge the rights of any deputy sheriff with respect to his personal opinions, beliefs, or right to vote.

From a plain reading of KRS 70.267(1) it appears that a deputy sheriff is prohibited from participating in fund or gift solicitation matters of a political party or candidate, and by KRS 70.267(3) from being a candidate for any public office.

As the statute does not ban political activities that are not associated with political fund or gift solicitation, a deputy sheriff is not prohibited from activities not encompassed within the plain words of KRS 70.267. We do not believe, however, that a deputy sheriff may engage in campaign activities for or against a given candidate or political party while on duty, as such would involve direction of public resources toward a private purpose, which is violative of § 171 of the Constitution of Kentucky. A deputy, while off duty, and assuming private resources were involved, could for example stuff envelopes in connection with a political campaign if the mailings do not involve solicitation of contributions or gifts for a political party or candidate for public office.

Specific statutory protection is provided to deputy sheriffs regarding their personal opinions, beliefs, and right to vote. KRS 70.267(4) (above).

Your second question asks, again in substance, whether deputies who, in prior employment, received 400 hours of training, may be "grandfathered" so as not to be required to obtain additional training as called for by KRS 70.263. We believe the answer is no.

KRS 70.263 provides:

(1) Each person serving as a deputy sheriff on the effective date of an ordinance that creates a deputy sheriff merit board for the county in which he serves shall, within one (1) year following the effective date of that ordinance, successfully complete at least 400 hours of training approved by the Kentucky Law Enforcement Council.

(2) Each person appointed as a deputy sheriff in a county that has adopted a deputy sheriff merit board before the date of his appointment shall, within one (1) year following the appointment, successfully complete at least four hundred (400) hours of training approved by the Kentucky Law Enforcement Council.

(3) A person failing to meet the requirements of this section shall forfeit his position as deputy sheriff immediately upon the expiration of the applicable one (1) year time limit.

(Emphasis added.)

KRS 70.263 is specific as to when training must be obtained as indicated by the emphasized (underlined) language of the statute (above). There is no statutory authorization for accepting prior training in lieu of training as specifically called for by KRS 70.263. Accordingly, we believe one cannot be "grandfathered" as to training based upon training obtained other than in strict compliance with the specific requirements of KRS 70.263(1) and (2).

Last you ask about alternatives for obtaining training given the time limits for obtaining training imposed in KRS 70.263, and the large number of deputies involved.

KRS 70.263 does not provide alternatives for obtaining training. The department obviously should attempt to arrange a "staggered" schedule of training, and might want to seek legislative relief.

Sincerely,

Chris Gorman

Attorney General

Gerard R. Gerhard

Assistant Attorney General