Did Kentucky’s criminal-law justification for teacher force override a school regulation banning corporal punishment?

Plain-English summary

A county attorney asked whether teachers could still use corporal punishment because KRS 503.110 described circumstances in which physical force was justified under criminal law. The Kentucky Attorney General said in February 1992 that the State Board’s school-management statutes and then-current regulation, 704 KAR 7:055, set the conduct standard for public school employees. That regulation prohibited corporal punishment while allowing reasonable and necessary restraint for the specified protective purposes. A criminal-law defense did not displace the Board’s authority to regulate school conduct.

The AG also said the regulation would expire when the 1992 General Assembly adjourned unless its prohibition was enacted as a statute. The opinion therefore cannot establish what school discipline rules applied after that session.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1992. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Historical summary

Teachers and school administrators in February 1992

The regulation barred employees and others engaged by public elementary or secondary schools from inflicting corporal punishment or bodily pain on pupils. It permitted reasonable and necessary physical restraint to prevent injury, obtain a weapon or dangerous object, or protect property from serious harm. The AG treated that rule as a school-employment standard issued under the Board’s management and student-safety authority.

Readers comparing criminal and school rules

KRS 503.110 addressed when force would not be criminal. The AG explained that this justification did not remove the Board’s separate authority under KRS 156.070 and KRS 156.160. The opinion expressly flagged the regulation’s scheduled expiration at the end of the 1992 session.

Common questions

Did the criminal statute permit corporal punishment despite the school regulation?

The AG said no. The criminal provision concerned justification for force; it did not override the then-effective regulation barring school corporal punishment.

Did the regulation prohibit all physical contact with a pupil?

No. The quoted rule allowed reasonable, necessary restraint for the listed protective purposes, including preventing injury and obtaining a dangerous object.

Was the ban permanent under this opinion?

The opinion said the regulation would expire upon adjournment of that legislative session unless the prohibition was codified. It did not decide later law.

Background and statutory framework

The opinion read KRS 156.070 and KRS 156.160 as authorizing the State Board to regulate school management and pupil safety. It contrasted 704 KAR 7:055’s school conduct rule with KRS 503.110’s criminal-law justification. The Board regulation controlled school employees while it remained in effect, subject to the expiration the opinion described.

Citations and references

• KRS 156.070 and KRS 156.160: Board rulemaking and school-management authority.
• 704 KAR 7:055: then-current regulation prohibiting corporal punishment with specified restraint exceptions.
• KRS 503.110: criminal-law justification for some physical force, distinguished by the AG.

Source

• Landing page: https://kdla.access.preservica.com/uncategorized/IO_a1c685d4-180f-420c-babb-70176eb4609f/
• Original PDF: https://kdla.access.preservica.com/download/file/IO_a1c685d4-180f-420c-babb-70176eb4609f

Original opinion text

OAG 92-20
February 10, 1992

Hon. Douglas L. Greenburg
County Attorney
111 Short Street
Harrodsburg, Kentucky 40330
Dear Mr. Greenburg:
You have requested clarification from this Office on whether corporal punishment may still be administered in the common schools. In particular, you ask how the ban on corporal punishment, placed in effect by the Kentucky State Board for Elementary and Secondary Education with the promulgation of 704 KAR 7:055, affects the applicability of KRS 503.110 which authorizes the use of force by teachers under certain conditions. It is the opinion of this Office that KRS 156.070, 156.160, and the accompanying regulation, 704 KAR 7:055 set the standards to be followed by employees of the common schools with regard to the imposition of corporal punishment. The General Assembly has granted authority to the State Board for Elementary and Secondary Education to promulgate administrative regulations “necessary for the efficient management, control, and operation of the schools and programs under its jurisdiction.” KRS 156.070(4). Specifically, the regulations, among other areas, may include “. . . regulations deemed necessary or advisable for the protection of the physical welfare and safety of the public school children.” KRS 156.160(1)(f). Based on the authority of the above referenced statutes, the State Board promulgated 704 KAR 7:055 prohibiting corporal punishment of pupils attending any common school. The regulation provides, in part: (1)Effective July 1, 1991, no person employed or engaged by any public elementary or secondary educational system

OAG 92-20
Page 2

within this state shall inflict or cause to be inflicted corporal punishment or bodily pain upon a pupil attending any school or institution within such educational system; provided, however, that any such person may, within the scope of his employment, use and apply such amounts of physical restraint as may be reasonable and necessary to protect oneself, the pupil, or others from physical injury, to obtain possession of a weapon or other dangerous objects within control of the pupil, or to protect property from serious harm. (2)Every resolution, bylaw, rule, ordinance, or other act of authority permitting or authorizing corporal punishment or bodily pain to be inflicted upon a pupil attending a public elementary or secondary school or educational institution, except as allowable under subsection (1) of this section, shall be void. In contrast, KRS 503.110, a statute found under the penal code in the chapter on general principles of justification, merely defines when use of physical force will not be considered a crime. KRS 503.110 addresses use of force by individuals who have responsibility for the care, discipline or safety of others, including minors, in a school setting: (1)The use of physical force by a defendant upon another person is justifiable when the defendant is a parent, guardian or other person entrusted with the care and supervision of a minor or an incompetent person or when the defendant is a teacher or other person entrusted with the care and supervision of a minor, for a special purpose, and: (a) The defendant believes that the force used is necessary to promote the welfare of a minor or mentally disable[d] person or, if the defendant’s responsibility for the minor or mentally disabled person is for a special purpose, to further that special purpose or maintain reasonable discipline in a school, class or other group; and (b)The force that is used is not designed to cause or known to create a substantial risk of causing death, serious physical injury, disfigurement, extreme pain, or extreme mental distress. The existence of principles of justification in KRS 503.110 under which use of physical force will not be considered a crime does not change the fact that the State Board for Elementary and Secondary

OAG 92-20
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Education retains authority and supervision for management and control of common schools. KRS 156.070. That authority includes prescribing regulations for management of the schools. KRS 156.160. Note that the administrative regulation governing corporal punishment, 704 KAR 7:055 expires upon adjournment of the 1992 session of the General Assembly. Therefore, unless the regulation is codified in the form of a statute, the prohibition will expire. Sincerely, CHRIS GORMAN ATTORNEY GENERAL

Anne E. Keating
Assistant Attorney General
AEK/par