Could a Kentucky school board pay for crossing guards after a city stopped staffing a school intersection?

Plain-English summary

After Hopkinsville stopped assigning police officers to a school crossing, counsel for the Christian County Board of Education asked whether the board could pay for guards instead. The Kentucky Attorney General reaffirmed in 1992 that common school funds could not be spent on crossing guards because their employment was not an educational purpose under the state constitution. The AG also said the city retained control over its streets and traffic devices, could employ crossing guards for traffic regulation, and could not transfer that street responsibility to the school board merely by ending its own staffing.

The opinion described ordinary AG opinions as advisory and said a court would ultimately decide the legal questions raised.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 1992. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Historical summary

County school boards considering guard expenditures

The AG applied the state constitution’s restriction of common school money to educational purposes. It reiterated an earlier opinion that employing guards to control a crossing did not meet that test, even though safer crossings benefited students. The board also lacked authority to regulate traffic on city streets.

Cities responsible for street traffic

The opinion said cities had jurisdiction over their streets and the authority to employ guards for traffic regulation. It identified no statute allowing Hopkinsville to give up that responsibility for existing city streets. The AG cited a statute allowing a city to install school-zone flasher lights at city expense.

Common questions

Could Christian County’s school board use school funds for crossing guards?

The AG said no under the constitutional educational-purpose limit as it read the law in 1992.

Did the city’s decision to withdraw police officers shift traffic control to the board?

No. The opinion said the city retained jurisdiction over its streets and the school board had no comparable authority to regulate traffic there.

Could Hopkinsville itself employ crossing guards?

The AG said yes, as part of the city’s authority to regulate street traffic.

Was the AG’s interpretation binding on the board or a court?

The opinion said AG opinions other than open-records opinions were advisory, and courts would ultimately decide the questions raised.

Background and statutory framework

The AG relied on Section 184 of the Kentucky Constitution, which restricted common school money to common school education, and identified Section 180 as another limit on repurposing tax revenue. It reaffirmed earlier AG views that crossing-guard employment was not an educational expenditure and applied city street-jurisdiction statutes, including KRS 82.081, KRS 82.082 and KRS 189.336(2). The city’s withdrawal of personnel did not, in the AG’s analysis, grant the school board traffic-control authority.

Citations and references

• Kentucky Constitution, Section 184: common school funds restriction applied by the AG.
• Kentucky Constitution, Section 180: the opinion’s additional restriction on using taxes for another purpose.
• KRS 82.081 and KRS 82.082: city street control cited by the AG.
• KRS 189.336(2): city-funded school-zone flasher lights cited in the opinion.
• Board of Education of Spencer County v. Spencer County, 313 Ky. 8, 230 S.W.2d 81, 83 (1950): cited for the educational-purpose test.

Source

• Landing page: https://kdla.access.preservica.com/uncategorized/IO_cd9cfb7a-400a-4761-abec-1ddf07b298ea/
• Original PDF: https://kdla.access.preservica.com/download/file/IO_cd9cfb7a-400a-4761-abec-1ddf07b298ea

Original opinion text

OAG 92-6

January 22, 1992
Hon. John P. Kirkham, Counsel
Christian County Board of Education
1404 South Virginia Street
Hopkinsville, Kentucky 42241
Dear Mr. Kirkham:
You have requested clarification on the legality of the expenditure of school funds by a school board for the services of school crossing guards on certain streets in Hopkinsville. Effective October 1, 1991, the City Council ordered the Hopkinsville Police Department to discontinue providing officers to assist students in crossing a particular intersection, and indicated that it would become the responsibility of the school system to provide that service. It is your position that, based on OAGs 79-107, 76-239, 75-614, and 69-488, the local board of education may not expend common school funds for that purpose. Your particular questions are: Is it still the opinion of the Attorney General’s Office that OAG 79-107 represents the law of Kentucky and the interpretation of sections 182 and 184 of the Kentucky Constitution, and that the expenditure of funds for school guard crossings is prohibited constitutionally? Is it still the opinion of the Office of the Attorney General that, as stated in OAG 79-107, a city other than the first class has exclusive control of its streets? Is it still the opinion of the [O]ffice of the Attorney General that the city ‘clearly has the authority to employ school crossing guards for purposes of regulation of traffic and traffic control devices’ and that no other entity may regulate traffic and/or traffic control devices? Is it, thus, still the opinion of the Attorney General as stated in OAG 79-107 that the city school board does not have the authority to regulate traffic, the city having the exclusive control over traffic and traffic control devices?

PAG 92-6
Page 2

Last, but not least, in terms of importance by any means, is the Christian County Board of Education precluded from expending funds for school crossing guards and is it bound by the Attorney General’s opinions with respect to such expenditures until either the Constitution be changed, a court interpret the law differently, or a change be made in the line of opinions previously issued by the Attorney General on this subject? In answer to your first question, it remains the opinion of the Attorney General’s Office that OAG 79-107 correctly states the law of Kentucky in interpreting section 184 of the Kentucky Constitution. In part, Section 184 states: ‘any sum which may be produced by taxation or otherwise for purposes of common school education, shall be appropriated to the common schools, and to no other purpose.’ Accordingly, this Office concluded that a city ordinance placing police women school crossing guards, who previously had been employed by the city, under the employment of the city school board, was unconstitutional. Section 184 of the Kentucky Constitution. OAG 79-107. It remains true that:
[t]he test is, what constitutes an educational purpose within the meaning of Section 184 of the Constitution, rather than whether an activity might be beneficial to education. Board of Education of Spencer County v. Spencer County, 313 Ky. 8, 230 S.W.2d 81, 83 (1950). In OAG 79-107, we stated, “[t]he employment of school crossing guards is not an ‘educational purpose’ for which school funds may be expended.” OAG 79-107, at p. 1, citing OAG 76-239 and 69-488. Section 180, rather than Section 182, of the Kentucky Constitution also prohibits the expenditure of a tax collected for one purpose to be applied to another purpose. In answer to your second question, it remains the opinion of the Attorney General’s Office that cities have jurisdiction over city streets. OAG 83-321, citing KRS 82.081, 82.082, and Graves County v. City of Mayfield, 305 Ky. 374, 204 S.W.2d 369 (1947). Just as this office found, in that opinion, that a city of the 5th class had no statutory authority

PAG 92-6
Page 3

allowing the city of Hopkinsville to abdicate its responsibility and jurisdiction over existing city streets for the purpose of expending money for construction and improvements, we find no statutory authority allowing the city to abdicate its responsibility and jurisdiction over existing city streets for the purpose of expending money for safety of citizens. In fact, KRS 189.336(2) expressly authorizes a city, by ordinance, to install, at city expense, school flasher lights in school zones, as necessary. In answer to your third question, it remains the opinion of the Office of the Attorney General that the city has authority to employ school crossing guards to regulate traffic, while the local school board does not. OAG 83-321, KRS 82.081, 82.082, and 189.336(2). Due to the city’s exclusive control over its streets, no other governmental entity has similar control. OAG 83-321, at p. 3. In answer to your fourth question, it is still the opinion of the Attorney General that the city school board does not have the authority to regulate traffic, as the city has exclusive control over traffic and traffic control devices. OAG 83-321, KRS 82.081, 82.082, and 189.336(2). In answer to your fifth question, all opinions of the Attorney General, with the exception of Open Records Opinions which have the force of law, are advisory. Nevertheless, this Office makes every effort to provide an accurate, impartial interpretation to guide the requester in his decisions. Ultimately, the questions that you raise are for a court to decide. Sincerely, CHRIS GORMAN ATTORNEY GENERAL

Anne E. Keating
Assistant Attorney General
AEK/par