Can a Kentucky sheriff use court security officers to transport newly arrested prisoners to jail?

Plain-English summary

Spencer County does not have its own jail, so newly arrested prisoners have to be taken to the jail in Shelbyville. The Spencer County Judge Executive asked whether the sheriff could use certified court security officers to transport newly arrested prisoners from the sheriff's office or the Taylorsville police department to that jail, even though the transport was not tied to a court proceeding.

The Attorney General concluded the sheriff could, given the facts. Because the county has no jail, KRS 441.510(4) requires the fiscal court to adopt a transportation plan naming the party responsible for moving prisoners. The opinion assumed (based on the county attorney's representation) that the fiscal court had designated the sheriff as the transportation officer. From there, the analysis was straightforward: one of a court security officer's statutory duties is "transporting prisoners" (KRS 70.280(1)(f)), and a sheriff may appoint his own court security officers (KRS 70.030(2)). So a sheriff who is the responsible transportation party may appoint court security officers to help.

The harder question was whether that transport duty is limited to court-related movement. The opinion held it is not. Reading the statute's text as supreme, it noted that other duties in the same statute carry express limits (serving warrants only on people "physically present in the courtroom," guarding prisoners only "during court appearances"), but the "transporting prisoners" duty has no such qualifier. Because the legislature knew how to add limits and did not add one here, the opinion concluded court security officers may transport prisoners regardless of whether the transport relates to an ongoing court proceeding.

Currency note

This opinion was issued in 2020. Subsequent statutory amendments, court decisions, or later AG opinions may have changed the analysis. Treat this page as historical context, not current legal advice. Verify current law before relying on any specific rule, deadline, or remedy mentioned here.

Background and statutory framework

Because Spencer County has no jail, KRS 441.510(4) governs prisoner transport and requires the fiscal court to adopt a transportation plan specifying the responsible party, which may be the jailer or sheriff (KRS 441.510(4)(a), (b)) or any reasonable plan naming a responsible party (KRS 441.510(4)(c)). The opinion assumed the sheriff was designated under KRS 441.510(4)(c). A court security officer's duties include "transporting prisoners" (KRS 70.280(1)(f)), and a sheriff may appoint certified court security officers (KRS 70.030(2)). Applying a textualist reading (Owen v. Univ. of Ky.; Univ. of Louisville v. Rothstein; Revenue Cabinet v. O'Daniel quoting Stone v. Pryor), and the negative-implication point that other subsections (KRS 70.280(1)(d), (e)) contain express courtroom limits absent from (1)(f) (Staples v. Commonwealth), the opinion concluded the transport duty is not limited to court proceedings.

Citations and references

Statutes:

• KRS 70.280 (incl. (1)(d), (e), (f)); KRS 70.030(2)
• KRS 441.510(4) (incl. (c))

Cases:

• Owen v. Univ. of Ky., 486 S.W.3d 266 (Ky. 2016)
• Univ. of Louisville v. Rothstein, 532 S.W.3d 644 (Ky. 2017)
• Revenue Cabinet v. O'Daniel, 153 S.W.3d 815 (Ky. 2005)
• Stone v. Pryor, 45 S.W. 1136 (1898)
• Staples v. Commonwealth, 454 S.W.3d 803 (Ky. 2014)

Source

• Landing page: https://www.ag.ky.gov/Opinions/Pages/default.aspx
• Original PDF: https://www.ag.ky.gov/Resources/Opinions/Opinions/OAG%2020-18.pdf

Original opinion text

The full opinion as issued by the Office of the Kentucky Attorney General:

Commonwealth of Kentucky
Office of the Attorney General
Daniel Cameron, Attorney General
Capitol Building, Suite 118, 700 Capital Avenue, Frankfort, Kentucky 40601
December 30, 2020
OAG 20-18
Subject: Whether, under KRS 70.280, court security officers may transport newly arrested prisoners from the Spencer County Sheriff's office or Taylorsville police department to the jail in Shelbyville.
Requested by: John Riley, Spencer County Judge Executive
Written by: Brett R. Nolan, Charles A. English, Assistant Attorneys General
Syllabus: Under the facts presented, the Spencer County Sheriff may appoint court security officers to assist in transporting newly arrested prisoners from the Sheriff's office or Taylorsville police department to the jail in Shelbyville.

Opinion of the Attorney General

John Riley, Spencer County Judge Executive, asks for this Office's opinion on whether KRS 70.280 allows court security officers to transport newly arrested prisoners from the Sheriff's office or Taylorsville police department to the jail in Shelbyville. For the reasons that follow, the Attorney General concludes that the Spencer County Sheriff, if designated as the transportation officer under KRS 441.510(4)(c), may appoint court security officers to assist in transporting newly arrested prisoners from the Sheriff's office or Taylorsville police department to the jail in Shelbyville.

Background. Spencer County does not have a jail, which means that KRS 441.510(4) governs prisoner transport. Under KRS 441.510(4), the fiscal court must adopt a transportation plan that "establishes the party responsible for transporting prisoners as necessary." Id. The fiscal court can require that the jailer or sheriff serve as the transportation officer, see KRS 441.510(4)(a), (b), or it can "adopt any reasonable transportation plan so long as the party responsible for transporting prisoners is specified," KRS 441.510(4)(c). According to Spencer County Attorney Kenneth S. Jones, the Spencer County Fiscal Court adopted a transportation plan designating the sheriff as the transportation officer. The Office of the Attorney General does not have a copy of the plan, and so it will assume for the purpose of this Opinion that the Fiscal Court has designated the sheriff as the transportation officer under KRS 441.510(4)(c).

Analysis. Kentucky law allows the sheriff to use court security officers for transporting prisoners. One of the statutory duties of a court security officer is "[t]ransporting prisoners," KRS 70.280(1)(f), and the sheriff is authorized under KRS 70.030(2) to "appoint his or her own certified court security officers" to assist in performing his or her duties. So if Spencer County has designated the sheriff as the "party responsible for transporting prisoners," KRS 441.510(4)(c), the sheriff can lawfully appoint court security officers to assist in this duty under KRS 70.030(2) and KRS 70.280(1)(f).

The more difficult issue, however, is whether a court security officer is permitted to transport prisoners for reasons unrelated to a court proceeding—e.g., transporting a newly arrested prisoner from the sheriff's office to a detention facility. We conclude that court security officers are permitted to transport prisoners regardless of whether the transportation relates to an ongoing court proceeding.

We start first with the text because "the text of the statute is supreme." Owen v. Univ. of Ky., 486 S.W.3d 266, 270 (Ky. 2016) (citing Scalia & Garner, Reading Law 56 (2012)). Here, the text of KRS 70.280(1)(f) provides simply that one duty of a court security officer is "[t]ransporting prisoners." The statute does not impose any limit on the circumstances in which a court security officer can perform this duty. Absent such limiting language, we cannot interpret the statute "to impose a constraint . . . unexpressed by the General Assembly." Univ. of Louisville v. Rothstein, 532 S.W.3d 644, 651 (Ky. 2017). Rather, we must "assume that the Legislature meant exactly what it said, and said exactly what it meant." Revenue Cabinet v. O'Daniel, 153 S.W.3d 815, 819 (Ky. 2005) (internal alterations and quotation marks omitted) (quoting Stone v. Pryor, 45 S.W. 1136, 1142 (1898) (Waddle, S. J., dissenting)). And in this case, the General Assembly did not say that court security officers may only transport prisoners for court proceedings.

Adding further support to our interpretation, other provisions of KRS 70.280 include exactly the kind of limitation that is absent from subsection (1)(f). Court security officers, for example, are authorized to "serv[e] warrants and other court papers"—but only on "individuals physically present in the courtroom." KRS 70.280(1)(e). Similarly, court security officers are charged with "[g]uarding prisoners"—but again, only "during court appearances." KRS 70.280(1)(d). These provisions leave no doubt that the General Assembly knows how to draft limits on the circumstances in which a court security officer exercises his or her duties, but chose not to do so when providing the duty of "[t]ransporting prisoners." See Staples v. Commonwealth, 454 S.W.3d 803, 816–17 (Ky. 2014). The only reasonable conclusion is that KRS 70.280(1)(f) does not impose any such limits.

Thus, if designated as the transportation officer under KRS 441.510(4)(c), the Spencer County Sheriff may appoint court security officers to assist in transporting newly arrested prisoners from the Sheriff's office or Taylorsville police department to the jail in Shelbyville.

Daniel Cameron
ATTORNEY GENERAL
Brett R. Nolan
Charles A. English
Assistant Attorneys General